LIVE: NTSB Holds News Conference on LaGuardia Collision

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The National Transportation Safety Board holds a news conference at 1:30 p.m. ET on March 24 to discuss its investigation into a collision on March 22 involving Air Canada Express Flight 8646, a CRJ-900 operated by Jazz Aviation, and a fire truck at LaGuardia Airport in New York City.
All right, good afternoon. Again, I'm Jennifer Homendy,
and I'm chairwoman of the National Transportation Safety Board, or NTSB.
With me today on my left is John DeLue. He is a new board member with the National
Transportation Safety Board, and he's here on his training launch.
To my right is Doug Brazy. Doug is our investigator in charge, or IIC as we refer
to the investigator in charge. Again, he's a senior aviation accident investigator that
has been with the board for 34 years. So today, as I mentioned yesterday,
today's our full day, full first day on scene, and we have a lot to cover. In fact, we started
the morning with a two-hour meeting just to organize our investigative groups and
walk through what we needed to accomplish today. Fortunately, the entire NTSB team has arrived.
Like I said yesterday, we had significant delays with investigators getting here due to backups of
TSA lines, and in fact, I understand that this press conference had to move because the lines
were actually wrapping around the building. But I do have a lot of investigative information to
share today. First, as I mentioned yesterday, we were able to take possession of the cockpit
voice recorder and the flight data recorder. That was at 9.57 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time.
Our investigator, our local investigator, had immediately began a trip down to our headquarters
in Washington, D.C. to take the CVR and FDR to our labs for downloading and for analysis.
We do have some preliminary information to share from the final three minutes from the cockpit
voice recorder, and again, I just want to say it's preliminary and is subject to change,
and for that, I'm going to turn that piece over to Doug Brazy.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. The airplane was equipped with an Akron Aviation Model
Survivor 2-5 cockpit voice recorder and an Akron Aviation Model FA-2100 flight data recorder.
The cockpit voice recorder contained more than 25 hours of good quality audio across four separate
channels. The flight data recorder contained approximately 80 hours of data and recorded more
than 400 parameters. The NTSB will convene a cockpit voice recorder group scheduled for tomorrow
at the NTSB headquarters in Washington, D.C. to review the accident flight recording and produce
a written transcript. The following is a summary of events captured on the cockpit voice recorder
during the final three minutes of the recording. All times are referenced to the end of the CVR
recording. Three minutes and seven seconds prior to the end of the recording, the approach
controller instructed the airplane to contact LaGuardia Tower. At two minutes and 45 seconds,
the flight crew lowered the landing gear. At two minutes and 22 seconds, the flight crew checked in
with the LaGuardia Tower. At two minutes and 17 seconds, the LaGuardia Tower cleared the airplane
to land on runway four and advised that they were number two for landing. At time one minute and 52
seconds, the flight crew set the flaps to 30 degrees. At one minute and 33 seconds, the flight
crew set the flaps to 45 degrees. At one minute and 26 seconds, an electronic 1,000 callout occurred
from the enhanced ground proximity warning system indicating that the airplane was 1,000 feet
above the ground. At one minute and 12 seconds, the flight crew confirmed that the landing checklist
was complete. At one minute and three seconds, an airport vehicle made a radio transmission to the
tower, but that transmission was stepped on by another radio transmission and the source of who
made that transmission has yet to be identified. At 54 seconds, the flight crew acknowledged that
the airplane was 500 feet above the ground and on a stable approach. At 40 seconds, the LaGuardia
Tower asked which vehicle needed to cross a runway. At 28 seconds, truck one made a radio
transmission to the tower. At 26 seconds, the tower acknowledged that radio transmission.
At 25 seconds, truck one requested to cross runway four at taxiway delta. At 20 seconds,
the tower cleared truck one and company to cross runway four at taxiway delta. At 19 seconds,
an electronic 100 enhanced ground proximity warning system callout occurred. At 17 seconds,
truck one read back the runway crossing clearance. At 14 seconds, an electronic 50 callout. At 12
seconds, an electronic 30 callout. And at that same time, the tower instructed a frontier airlines
flight to hold position. At 11 seconds, an electronic 20 callout occurred. And at 10 seconds,
an electronic 10 callout occurred. At nine seconds, tower one instructed, excuse me,
the tower instructed truck one to stop. At eight seconds, there was a sound consistent with the
airplane's landing gear touching down on the runway. At six seconds, there was a pilot transfer
of controls from one pilot to the other. And at four seconds, the tower again instructed truck
one to stop. At zero seconds, the recording ended. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mr. Brazy had mentioned that six seconds before the end of the recording, the pilot transferred
controls. We do know that the first officer was flying and transferred control to the captain.
With respect to aircraft rescue and firefighting operations, we will be developing a timeline of
events. We do know that they were responding to a United Airlines flight 2384 at the gate,
which had two aborted takeoffs. And the ARF, or the Aircraft Rescue and Firefighters,
had received information that there were fumes or smoke or some sort of smell in the cabin,
so they were en route to address that. Truck one, which Mr. Brazy had mentioned,
had collided with the aircraft. We do know that there were other vehicles behind truck one,
which did not begin to cross the runway. We have seen varying information about how many vehicles,
so we need to verify that information, and we'll provide it at a later time.
Truck one, however, did not have a transponder. With respect to air traffic control,
we have seen different information about how many certified professional controllers
were in the facility, and we need to verify that in starting with interviews this afternoon. We'll
begin to interview the local controller at four o'clock this afternoon. We do have logs,
but there's also conflicting information, including dates and times on the logs,
so now we have to go through that and rectify some of those inconsistencies. We do, however, know
that there were two people in the cab, two people in the tower cab at the time of collision,
the local controller and the controller in charge. Again, local controller and controller in charge.
For those who may be watching and aren't familiar with aviation, the local controller
manages active runways and the immediate airspace surrounding the airport.
That local controller had signed on at 1045, and the shift would have ended at 645 a.m.
That doesn't mean that he was in position at 1045, but that he had just signed in at 1045 p.m.
The controller in charge is responsible for safety of operations, all safety of operations.
He had clocked in or signed in at 1030 p.m., and that shift would have ended at 630 p.m.
I mean, sorry, 630 a.m. Again, that was signing in at 1030 p.m. The controller in charge was
also doing the duties of the clearance delivery position. The clearance delivery controller
provides pilots with their departure clearance. It is not clear who was conducting the duties
of the ground controller. We have conflicting information. We have some information saying
it was the controller in charge. We have some information saying it was the local controller.
The ground controller duties are that they manage all aircraft and vehicle movements
on the taxiways, and that generally excludes active runways. So these two positions were
combined into two positions, and what we do know is that that is in the standard operating
procedures for LaGuardia. It's for the midnight shift. It's also common practice across the
national airspace where you would have two controllers in the tower cab during the midnight
shift. The midnight shift, as a reminder, is one that we have many times at the NTSB raised
concerns about with respect to fatigue. Again, I do not know. We have no indication that was
a factor here, but it is a shift that we have been focused on in past investigations.
Now, we also know, as I had mentioned yesterday, that LaGuardia has ASDI-X. ASDI-X is a runway
safety system which allows air traffic controllers to track surface movement of aircraft and
vehicles. Yesterday I mentioned that we requested from FAA the ASDI replay of the event. That is
a replay of the display of information that would have been available in the tower cab.
We also asked the tech center for the analysis of ASDI. Their analysis shows that the ASDI-X
system did not alert. The analysis, and I'm going to quote the analysis here. I will repeat it a
second time. ASDI-X did not generate an alert due to the close proximity of vehicles merging and
unmerging near the runway, resulting in the inability to create a track of high confidence.
Again, the analysis is, quote, ASDI-X did not generate an alert due to the close proximity
of vehicles merging and unmerging near the runway, resulting in the inability to create a
track of high confidence. Now, I saw the replay, and there were two targets, so radar, because
there's no transponder, you have radar. So two targets with radar returns on taxiway Delta.
What it looks like on a replay are two blobs on taxiway Delta. We also don't see any of them
go in front of the plane on the runway. We do also know from the replay that the runway
status lights were functioning according to the replay, but we still have to verify that with
tech ops from the FAA. Now, I do want to address one thing, which is reports of distraction.
I have seen a number of reports from press about distraction, whether there was distraction among
controllers. Look, this is, I would caution pointing fingers at controllers and saying
distraction was involved. This is a heavy workload environment. You had a United Airlines
flight. We still have to determine what happened at shift change, which was around 1030. We have
to determine who else was in the tower and the facility and available at the time. We know that
that controller was still on duty for several minutes afterwards. Normally, they would be
relieved. We have questions about that. Was anybody available to relieve that controller?
We don't know that yet. We also have questions about what else was occurring, what other traffic
they were dealing with at the time. So one thing I will close with before I take questions is we
rarely, if ever, investigate a major accident where it was one failure.
Our aviation system is incredibly safe because there are multiple, multiple layers of defense
built in to prevent an accident. So when something goes wrong, that means many, many things went
wrong. And so here, that's why we're here. We're here to prevent this from reoccurring,
prevent this from happening again. And that's going to take some time. So with that, I will
take questions. I ask that you raise your hand, state your name and your affiliation.
So there's a little bit of a difference. The question is on combining positions because we
saw the combining of positions in the midair collision that occurred near Ronald Reagan
Washington National Airport about a year ago. Our understanding right now, and again, this is
preliminary and subject to change, our understanding is that in the DCA midair,
there were procedures followed, a list like traffic volume, staffing available, training,
workload that was considered in order to combine positions like the helicopter position and the
local control position in DCA. In this situation for the midnight shift, it is standard operating
procedure that they only have two on duty and those two perform the duties of other controllers.
That is our understanding right now. However, we're going to further dig into that as part of
our investigation. Certainly, I can tell you that our air traffic control team has stated this is a
problem, that this is a concern for them for years, that they have had this concern for quite a long
time. I can understand it's a concern, especially if there's a heavy workload.
Well, the question is, how upset does it make me that ASDX didn't work because we've repeatedly
recommended that ASDX work? Well, in order for ASDX to work well, you have to know where ground
vehicles and aircraft are. So in this case, that vehicle did not have a transponder.
And it would have been helpful when you have a radar target, it does not provide you with
the information that you need like it would for an aircraft as a controller. Yes.
Is there any indication from the CVR that the pilots saw the fire truck on the runway? I don't
have information at this time on that. However, we are doing further analysis on our cockpit voice
recorder. We have a group that we have formed that will analyze the CVR. And part of when
they analyze is they will talk in the group about what they're hearing, what they've heard,
any sort of background noises, and we'll provide a transcript, and then we'll release that publicly
so we'll know more then.
It's literally a different shift that you've expressed concerns about in the past,
so is it sort of that later shift when you're looking at what's happening in the air?
And the reason I ask is it's a well-designed way to find out if somebody had reported a
different set of thoughts in public or private. Does that agree? Does that raise questions about
Well, so the question is about the shift. And are we just concerned about that shift in the past?
Or would there be other shifts? And does it make sense to have two controllers in the cab with
such a busy airport and this be sort of standard operating procedures and common practice across
the national airspace? I think I restated it accurately and have now forgotten what you
asked me. But on the standard operating procedures, look, LaGuardia is 900 flights,
I believe, per day. That's pretty substantial. It's not the same as other airports across the
national airspace. That's certainly something we will look at as part of this investigation.
How would that make sense? Why would that make sense at LaGuardia? That is part of our analysis
in this investigation. And what was the other one? Oh, on the mid-shift. We have identified
the mid-shift generally as concern in other investigations largely due to fatigue because
it spans that time frame at your circadian low during the day when you're most fatigued. Yes?
The question was, could there potentially be confusion among the two controllers of who's
having what discussion and could it be that they were both having the same communications or
different communications or conflicting communications since they're doing more than
one job? I can't answer that right now because that's something we have to investigate as part
of this accident scenario. Those are the exact types of questions that we'll ask when we
interview the controllers, both the two that were in the cab at the time and the other controllers
that may have been on duty either and include previously or after that. One thing I want to do
is come back to something that Pete asked about, which is controllers and the information they
should have in ASDX and our past recommendations. Controllers should have all the information,
the tools to do their job, all the information they need. We've recommended ASDX, but you have
to have information on the ground movements, whether that's aircraft or vehicles moving
on the airport, in taxiways, on runways, they should have all the information. This is 2026.
The Secretary talks about upgrading our air traffic control system. We have an old air traffic
control system. This is why he talks about that. We need to upgrade, but we also need to improve
safety across the air. It's not just air traffic control. It's safety all around. Yes. Okay.
With respect to transponders, the question is, is it common for ground vehicles to have
transponders? I don't have the latest figures on that. I would suggest speaking with the Federal
Aviation Administration on that, or you can contact Eric, and we'll get back to you on
numbers. Should they? That's something we'll determine as part of our investigation. I will
tell you that not having a recommendation, yeah, they should. Even though we don't have a
recommendation, air traffic controllers should know what's in, you know, before them, whether
it's on airport surface or in the airspace. They should have that information to ensure safety. Now,
that's not an NTSB recommendation, so I want to be clear, but it could be. We don't know.
And your other question on stepped on, the communication with stepped on, it means there
may have been a mic key or some sort of interference or interruption of the transmission,
because somebody else on the other, why would that be significant? He was asking the question on
what does stepped on mean with respect to communications. That would be significant
because that would mean that somebody may not hear the other part of that communication.
Yes, sir? Go ahead. And you're probably asking about the flight data recorder. We don't have
information, the download from the flight data recorder yet. That group, I believe, is getting
together today to start going through the data. We do have good data, but they're going to start
looking at it today and we'll provide further information down the line. You and then you.
I'm sorry, I didn't hear you. Can I confirm the names of the pilots who passed away? No,
I would refer you to the New York City chief medical examiner. We don't confirm
any fatalities, injuries or names. And your other question, with respect to the truck, did the truck
turn or break? I've probably seen the same CCTV video that you have. We have to do some further
investigation on that, including interviews of both firefighters that were on board. And right
here. The question is, do we know if the two firefighters in the firefighting vehicle heard
the directive to stop? We don't know that yet. We need to do interviews of those two firefighters.
The first question on other technology that would have been available to alert to the controllers.
I don't have that to provide at this time. Our investigators have to begin their analysis. Again,
this is our first full day on scene and we're not even through the day, but we will have more
information on what types of technology might have been available to them. The second question
is on whether ADS-B in and out would have helped prevent this. I would just caution,
and I've heard the discussion on ADS-B in and out with respect to this particular
collision. It happened very quickly. And we need to match up times. We need to look at visibility
with respect to the airplane coming in and look at the movement and visibility of those in the
truck. So we can't say at this time whether that would have made a difference or not.
One question. And let me clarify. The question is on transponder on that truck.
We have no indication there were transponders on any of the trucks.
But there are transponders on other trucks at other airports across the nation. In this case,
they did not have transponders. Thank you.
