While the world is distracted by global conflict, a panic is building in the private credit market. In this video, we go inside the opaque world of Private Credit - examine the "Golden Age" of lending that is rapidly turning into a slow-motion crisis. From the "volatility laundering" tricks used by managers to hide billion-dollar losses to the "Exit Trap" currently catching retail investors in BDCs, we explore how the search for yield led Wall Street directly to your 401(k). We look at why insiders like Boaz Weinstein are calling this a scandal, and what happens to the 48 million Americans whose jobs depend on the fragile financial plumbing when the credit finally contracts. Is this a repeat of 2008, or something much quieter but much harder to escape?
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Last week Goldman Sachs held a client call to discuss the investment implications of the war
in Iran. Kunal Shah, a senior executive and the global head of fixed income currencies and
commodities, responded to a question about the views of Goldman's clients on the conflict by
saying that some of the bank's private markets clients were just glad that there's something
to talk about that isn't software exposures and private credit. He went on to say,
this is at least a distraction from that. Now, we can't allow ourselves to be distracted around
here. So, instead of talking about the war in Iran, we have to talk about private credit,
the 1.8 trillion dollar world of shadow banking that investors have been increasingly worried
about over the last six months or so. If you want to know how worried they are,
you just have to look at the stock market. The share prices of the world's biggest
alternative asset managers have been in a free fall. Since the start of 2026,
Blue Owl and Ares management have seen their stocks plunge by around 40%,
while KKR, Blackstone and Apollo have all shed more than 25% of their market value.
Private credit is essentially direct lending to mid-market companies that are often owned
by private equity sponsors. It's an asset class predicated on the illiquidity premium.
Investors trade the ability to exit a position on a whim for a higher yield and a bespoke contract
tailored to the borrower's specific cash flow needs. Private equity firms, who are the big
borrowers, tend to use a lot of leverage, meaning that they tend not to be the most credit worthy.
This ecosystem grew rapidly after 2008, as traditional banks, strangled by post-crisis
capital requirements, were forced to retreat from riskier lending. For a long time,
this was heralded as a golden age for credit, with firms like Blackstone and KKR offering returns as
high as 13% with almost no reported losses. Some funds even advertised loss rates of less than
1 tenth of 1%, a figure that would make most bank risk officers weep with envy. But as interest
rates have risen and many parts of the economy have started to cool, these golden returns are
starting to look a lot more like lead. In February, Blue Owl was forced to block withdrawals from one
of their funds as investors clamored to get out. The rapid expansion of the private credit market
from a niche corner of finance into a $1.8 trillion behemoth is a direct result of the
regulatory cleanup that came in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. As regulators clamped down
on bank balance sheets, forcing them to hold significantly more capital against risky loans,
traditional banks decided that lending to sub-investment grade middle market companies
was simply too expensive. This created a massive vacuum that the private capital industry was more
than happy to fill. For over a decade, this was a symbiotic relationship driven by a search for
yield. In an era of rock-bottom interest rates, pension funds and insurance companies were
desperate for anything offering a decent return, and they were willing to trade liquidity for the
coupons promised by private lenders. This shift was so dramatic that the buyout barons of the
1980s have largely reinvented themselves as alternative credit providers. Bloomberg points
out that KKR, the firm famous for the aggressive corporate raids chronicled in the book Barbarians
at the Gate, now manages more credit assets than it does equity. To understand why this market is
structured the way it is, you have to look at the fundamental flaw in traditional banking.
Banking is essentially an exercise in maturity transformation. Banks take short-term deposits
from people who want their money available at a moment's notice and lend it out to businesses for
five or ten years. This works perfectly until the moment everyone wants their money back at the same
time, at which point you have a run on the bank. Institutional private credit funds solve this
problem by ensuring that there is a maturity match between their assets and liabilities.
When a pension plan or a sovereign wealth fund invests in private credit, they agree to have
their capital locked away for five years or more. Because the investors can't leave, the fund manager
doesn't have to worry about a sudden panic. They can hold their loans to maturity, work through any
problems with the borrower and ignore the daily mood swings of the public markets. For a long time
this was heralded as a more stable way to run a financial system, but as the industry grew it began
to change and it turns out that even the most stable looking structures can have a serious
cockroach problem. Before we dig into that let me tell you about this week's video sponsor
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for sponsoring this week's video. Financial problems rarely travel alone. On an analyst
call last October, JP Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon noted that in credit markets, bad loans are often
like cockroaches. When you see one cockroach, he said, there are probably more. He went on to say
everyone should be forewarned on this one. The first real sightings of these credit cockroaches
appeared late last year with the sudden collapses of First Brands Group and Tricolor. First Brands
was an auto parts manufacturer that filed for bankruptcy owing roughly $10 billion. Its senior
lenders only discovered the full extent of the company's debt during the bankruptcy filing.
It turned out that the business had been using its receivables – money it was supposedly owed
by customers – to borrow from several different lenders at the same time. The private credit
industry was quick to defend itself, pointing out that these specific companies had actually
borrowed from banks rather than private funds. But, for many investors, the vibe shift was
undeniable. After a decade of loose lending and fierce competition for deals, they worried that
basic underwriting standards had weakened. This leads us to the more recent case in the UK
involving a mortgage lender called Market Financial Solutions or MFS. MFS recently
collapsed amid allegations of fraud and the double-pledging of collateral. What makes the MFS
story so useful for investors is that the warning signs were apparently visible years ago to anyone
who bothered to look. One credit fund manager decided not to invest back in 2019 because the
unable to provide simple answers to standard due diligence questions. His real reason for passing,
however, was what he called the watch-to-house ratio. He noticed that the founder of MFS wore
a £200,000 Richard Mille watch while living in a house estimated to be worth only around twice
that amount. If the founder's risk was that leveraged, it suggested that the success being
projected was a performance, one that was likely being funded by the lenders themselves.
Despite these signals, several major institutions, including Barclays and Jefferies, handed over
hundreds of millions of pounds to what is now being described as a refinancing merry-go-round.
The company was allegedly using new loans to pay off old ones, recycling debt to keep their default
rates looking artificially low until the money finally ran out. But the real story isn't just
about a few colourful frauds. It's about the staggering amount of hidden distress across
the entire $1.8 trillion market. A recent study by Goldman Sachs asset management looked at 150
European companies that had hit a credit event since 2017. Only four of those 150 companies
ever went through a public bankruptcy. The other 146 were quiet handovers where the lenders simply
took the keys to the business to avoid the public spotlight. When the industry advertises loss rates
of less than one tenth of one percent, you have to ask yourself how is that possible in a world
where public speculative grade debt is currently defaulting at four and a half percent? The answer
is that private credit is often just better at hiding its bruises. The smart money has clearly
noticed this gap between reality and reporting and they're already heading for the door. But as they
exit, they're being replaced by a new group of investors who might not realize exactly what
they're buying. As the flood of money from pension funds and sovereign wealth funds began to dry up,
the world's biggest alternative asset managers didn't just pack up and go home. Instead,
they turned their attention to a much less sophisticated group – retail investors.
This transition is often marketed as the democratization of finance, finally allowing
the average saver to invest alongside the giants of Wall Street. But insiders like the hedge fund
manager Boaz Weinstein describe it in much less noble terms. On the Money Stuff podcast this week,
Weinstein noted that these private credit products are sold and not bought. Most individual investors
don't call their financial advisors asking for a piece of an opaque middle market software loan.
The products are being pushed on them by their financial advisors who get paid a heavy commission.
The reason for the hard sell is simple. The commissions the financial advisor can earn
are massive, especially when compared to selling something simple like an ETS.
Private credit vehicles often pay financial advisors upfront sales commissions as high as
3.5% and often pay ongoing annual servicing fees too. This creates a glaring conflict of interest.
Your advisor isn't necessarily putting you into private credit because it's the best
thing for your retirement. They may instead be doing it because it's the best thing
for their own bottom line. Weinstein went so far as to call the practice of putting
retail clients into these illiquid products a scandal. To understand how the retail products
differ from the institutional funds we talked about earlier, we have to look at a specific
type of vehicle called a business development company or BDC. You can think of a BDC as a
retail-friendly wrapper around these same types of private loans. These come in two main flavors.
First, there are publicly traded BDCs which trade on an exchange like a regular stock.
You can buy or sell them whenever you want, but they have a habit of trading at a steep discount
to the value of the loans they actually own. For example, FS KKR Capital has recently been
trading at a 48% discount to its claimed book value. As Boas Weinstein pointed out,
when you see a public fund trading at 60 cents on the dollar while a private version of the
same portfolio is being marketed at 100 cents, it's a fairly safe bet that one of these two
prices is a work of fiction. Then there are non-traded BDCs, which are the ones marketed
to individuals through financial advisors. These don't trade on an exchange. Instead,
they're marketed as semi-liquid, typically offering investors the ability to exit on a
quarterly basis. However, this liquidity comes with a significant catch – an industry standard
cap that limits total redemptions to just 5% of the fund's net asset value each quarter.
It's important to understand that this 5% limit applies to the entire fund,
not to your individual holding. In a quiet quarter, when very few people want out,
an individual could potentially cash out their entire stake. But the moment the collective
withdrawal requests hit that 5% ceiling, the fund manager pulls down the gate and starts rationing
the available cash on a pro-rata basis. This means that if everyone tries to leave at once,
you only get a small fraction of your money back. As Antoine Gara described it on the Unhedged
Podcast last week, investors have to get in line for an amuse-bouche of liquidity – a small taste
of their cash while the rest is stuck behind the gate. The fundamental mistake was believing that
you could offer a little liquidity to retail investors in the first place. As Robert Armstrong
has noted, liquidity is binary – it's either there when you need it or it never existed.
Selling an illiquid asset to a retail audience under the guise of semi-liquidity was always going
to be problematic, because you've set up a situation where the gates only stay open when
no one is trying to walk through them. This leads to what former Fed President Bill Dudley calls
a dangerous adverse feedback loop. Once investors realize that there is a limit on withdrawals,
they have a greater incentive to always ask for the maximum amount possible, just to get a spot
in the queue. To meet these requests, the fund manager is often forced to sell their best,
most liquid assets first to minimize realized losses. This leaves the remaining investors stuck
with the most problematic holdings – effectively the cockroaches that we talked about earlier.
It's a structural design flaw that can turn market jitters into an orderly spiral into the abyss,
which really isn't what anyone wants. The industry is currently facing this stress test
just as they are on the cusp of their biggest victory yet – moving these products into 401k
plans. Last year, an executive order was signed to make it easier for alternative assets,
like private credit, to be offered in retirement accounts. I made a video about it at the time.
The Department of Labor has in fact begun the formal rulemaking process that will next lead
to a public comment period before finally giving a green light to 401k administrators
to start investing in these products. Proponents say that this democratization
gives average savers access to better returns, though given that the existing investors are
currently fighting for an amuse-bouche of liquidity, the timing might be considered
inauspicious. To understand why fundraising for this asset class has suddenly hit a wall,
even as the total market has swelled to a staggering 3 trillion dollars, you have to
realize that private credit essentially operates on a different set of physical laws than the rest
of the financial world. While the public markets are currently pricing these firms as if a disaster
is imminent, the private fund valuations are whispering that everything is perfectly fine.
The industry manages to maintain this illusion of stability through a process that AQR founder
Cliff Asness famously calls volatility laundering. By simply choosing not to mark their assets to
the daily market price, managers can create a sense of safety and stability that doesn't
exist. One fund even boasted a sharp ratio of 11, a number so high that it suggests that the manager
has either revolutionized finance or is simply refusing to look at the scoreboard.
The reality is that these valuations are often pure guesswork. For example, JP Morgan recently
restricted its lending to certain private credit firms after discovering what they claim is a
valuation gap. They looked at the same software companies that private funds had marked at par
or at a hundred cents on the dollar and decided that they were actually worth significantly less.
Boas Weinstein noted that some managers are marking risky positions as much as 25 points higher than
what more conservative banks are reporting. Then there's the sector labeling trick. A recent
investigation by Bloomberg News found that this isn't just a few isolated incidents,
it's a systemic practice. By analyzing thousands of filings, Bloomberg identified at least 250
different loans worth more than 9 billion dollars where software companies were being creatively
relabeled. A struggling tech firm might suddenly be classified as a food products or logistics
business, allowing the fund to hide its true exposure to the tech sector and avoid triggering
alarm bells about concentration risk. Lenders also use liability management exercises to keep
the wheels turning on bad loans. Instead of admitting that a borrower is in trouble, they
might allow them to stop paying cash interest and instead add that unpaid interest to the total loan
balance, a practice known as payment in kind or PIC debt. It's a system of mark to magic where the
only thing being managed is the investor's perception of risk. But as we're seeing with
the orderly spiral in the BDC market, perception eventually has to meet reality. A bigger question
looming over all of this is whether the trouble in private credit could precipitate a broader
financial crisis. Whenever a market grows this quickly and this quietly, the ghost of 2008 is
never far away. Investors are increasingly worried that a major market downturn is finally in the
cards. There is of course the fixation on software exposures which, as Kunal Shah noted, has become
the industry's favorite thing to worry about. But the list of headwinds is growing longer by the day.
Between a slowing US economy, surging oil prices, the escalating war in the Middle East and the
stubborn persistence of inflation, the Goldilocks era for private credit may be over. There's even
growing chatter about stagflation, the worst possible outcome for the levered mid-market
borrowers that make up the backbone of this industry. These businesses are uniquely vulnerable.
They're almost entirely funded with floating-rate debt, meaning that their interest bills have
skyrocketed just as the broader economy has started to cool. When you combine high leverage
with shrinking margins and a global energy shock, those pristine loan portfolios start to look very
fragile. The good news, if you can call it that, is that most experts believe a literal repeat of
global financial crisis is very unlikely. Back in 2008, the entire system was built on
a foundation of banks using short-term deposits to fund long-term toxic subprime loans. Today,
banks are better prepared, with significantly more loss-absorbing equity on their balance
sheets than they had 20 years ago. However, less exposure is not the same as no exposure. Banks
still provide significant back-leverage to private credit firms, essentially lending them the money
that they use to make their own loans. If the underlying borrowers stop paying, that stress
eventually travels back up the chain to the banks. The real concern for many regulators today
isn't the banks, it's the multi-trillion dollar insurance industry. Life insurance, particularly
those controlled by private equity firms, have become some of the biggest buyers of private
credit. Insurance companies are heavily regulated. They are required to hold a specific amount of
capital against their investments to ensure that they can pay out claims. Regulators generally
view a direct stake in a risky private credit fund as an equity-like risk, which carries a
capital charge of around 30%. To bypass these rules, the industry has developed a magic trick
called a rated note feeder. In this structure, a special-purpose vehicle sits between the insurer
and the credit fund. The vehicle issues bonds, or notes, which are then graded by a specialist
rating agency. This bit of repackaging allows the insurer to treat a stake in a risky credit fund
as if it was a top-rated corporate bond. By doing this, they can slash their capital
requirements from 30% to as low as 10%. The Financial Times recently described these
as black-box products. Insurers are being flooded with pitches for these feeders,
often from newer, smaller managers who don't yet have an established track record. In many cases,
the rating agencies are grading what is essentially a blank sheet, rating the manager's
reputation rather than the actual loans, because those loans haven't even been made yet.
One insurance executive noted that buying these notes is akin to giving a loan to a manager
while having no idea what's going on inside the actual portfolio. Insurers are essentially
trading visibility and safety for yield, using financial engineering to hide the risk from
regulators. This is what Bill Dudley means when he warns about a slow-motion crisis.
Because these losses are hidden from view and the liabilities are long-term,
the danger isn't sudden explosion. It's that by the time the situation becomes apparent,
it'll be far too late to fix the balance sheet. It's easy to get lost in the financial alchemy
of rated-note feeders and the volatility laundering of private funds, but we shouldn't
lose sight of what is actually at stake here. As former Fed Vice Chair Roger Ferguson recently
noted in the FT, private credit has become the essential plumbing for Main Street.
These funds are the primary lenders to middle market businesses that employ 48 million Americans
and represent roughly a third of US private sector GDP. The real risk to the broad economy
is that the people who replace the banks might suddenly stop lending. If retail investors
continue to hammer on the exit gates, fund managers will be forced to stop making new loans
just to preserve cash for redemptions. For an economy already feeling the strain of war-driven
energy costs and embedded gas inflation, a sudden contraction in credit could be the catalyst that
turns a slowdown into a slump. However, it is worth asking, as Toby Nangle did in the FT this week,
who cares if private credit goes kaput? Nangle's point is that while the individual cockroaches
are unpleasant, the system itself might be more resilient than we think. Unlike 2008 where a
credit collapse threatened to take down every checking account in the country, the losses in
private credit are largely contained within the portfolios of sophisticated institutions and
wealthy individuals who signed up for the ride. If a fund loses 40% of its value, it's a tragedy
for the investor, but as long as it doesn't trigger a run on the banks, it isn't necessarily
a systemic catastrophe. The irony of the democratization of finance is that the average
saver has been invited to the table just as the exits are being locked. Kunal Shah was right.
The war in Iran is a significant distraction, but for the millions of people whose retirement
is being moved into these products, the real danger is the crisis they aren't talking about,
the one that doesn't end with a bang but with the slow grinding realization that the golden age of
credit is over and the doors have been locked from the outside. If you found this video interesting,
you should watch my video on private equity's quiet crisis next. Don't forget to check out
Masterclass using the link in the video description. See you in the next video.