Why did China send three ministers—foreign affairs, public security, and defense—to Vietnam at the same time? This rare “3+3” meeting signals something far beyond routine diplomacy. In this video, we break down what Beijing is really trying to achieve—from South China Sea tensions to regional security coordination and growing geopolitical pressure. We also examine speculation around whether Xi Jinping is quietly preparing for contingency scenarios in southern China. As Vietnam pushes back with international law and strategic caution, one question remains: Is this cooperation—or a sign of deeper uncertainty inside China?
Hi, everyone. Hi. All right. Welcome to Lay's Real Talk. Happy weekend. I hope everyone has
had a great start of the weekend. Yeah. So far, so good. Okay. Let's talk about, guess what?
Japan's prime minister just visited the White House with US-Japan relations reaching a new high,
especially in economic, energy, and infrastructure cooperation.
Meanwhile, China has also sent a high-level delegation to one of its key partners,
Vietnam. So tonight, we're going to take a closer look at this very interesting
and actually quite revealing trip that just took place in Southeast Asia. Pictures first. Let's see
this. Let me make them smaller. Okay. Now, immediately after China's annual two sessions,
from March 15th to the 17th, three of China's most powerful ministers traveled together to Vietnam.
They are Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Public Security Minister Wang Xiaohong, and Defense Minister
Dong Jun. Now, just pause there for a second. This is not a routine visit. You have diplomacy,
internal security, and military all represented at the highest level. That alone tells you this
is not business as usual. So let me first tell you what officially happened.
So China's foreign ministry released a brief announcement saying that at the invitation of
Vietnam, which is the standard verbiage that the CCP is very much obsessed with,
a proper means at the request of the CCP. Anyways, it says at the invitation of Vietnam,
Politburo member and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Public Security Minister Wang Xiaohong,
and Defense Minister Dong Jun visited Vietnam from March 15th to the 17th to attend the first
ministerial-level meeting of the China-Vietnam 3 plus 3 Strategic Dialogue Mechanism on Diplomacy,
Defense, and Public Security. The ministry also stated that Wang Yi would co-chair the 17th
China-Vietnam Steering Committee for Bilateral Cooperation with Vietnamese Leaders. And then,
according to Vietnamese media, on the 16th, Vietnam's top leader, its Communist Party General
Secretary To Lan—I hope I'm saying his name correctly—he met with all three ministers.
Then on the 17th in Hanoi, another key meeting took place, the 17th Bilateral Cooperation
Committee, co-chaired by these two guys. So on paper, everything looks smooth. High-level
meetings, new mechanisms, structured cooperation, but always the real story is in the details.
Who were in the delegation? There's an ex-account called China Personnel Watch,
review the full list of accompanying officials. And this is where things get interesting.
And so the delegation included Ambassador to Vietnam He Wei, Vice Foreign Minister Sun
Weidong, who is in charge of Asia affairs, Vice Public Security Minister Xu Datong,
who is in charge of international cooperation. And then you have PLA Major General Zhang Baochun,
who heads the CMC International Military Cooperation Office. And then you have Deng
Zhi, who is Wang Yi's secretary. And you have the Ministry of Public Security's General Office
Director Guo Kan, who is like the minister's chief of staff. And then you have Foreign
Ministry Asia Department Deputy Director Liang Jianjun. And then you have Foreign Ministry
Information Department Deputy Director Guo Jiakun. And then you have Protocol Department
Deputy Director Song Jia. So this is not just the diplomatic team. It's a full-spectrum state
apparatus, all embedded in one visit. So the question becomes, what exactly are they trying
to do there? Now, the 3 plus 3 signal is highly unusual. Notice the wording. It says this is the
first ever 3 plus 3 meeting. Now, normally in international diplomacy, the standard format is
2 plus 2. Foreign minister, defense minister, countries like the U.S. and Japan, U.S. and
India, U.S. and Australia, all use this format. The purpose is to align diplomatic and military
strategy. But 3 plus 3, that's rare. China added a third pillar, public security. So now the
structure becomes diplomacy, military, internal security. And that's not a standard framework.
And this addition changes the nature of the meeting completely. It expands from traditional
state-to-state relations into intelligence coordination, internal stability, cross-border
control, and regime security concerns. So this is much closer to a comprehensive security
coordination mechanism. So all that points to the biggest anomaly, which is Wang Xiaohong,
the minister of public security. His being part of this delegation is highly unusual.
Because public security normally handles domestic surveillance, domestic issues. He is the
boss of Chinese police. It deals with internal stability. And they're not typical front-facing
in foreign diplomacy, not at this level. So the question is, why is he there?
Now, there are a few possibilities. Counterintelligence concerns to deal with leaks,
defections, sensitive discussions, or cross-border security issues like telecom fraud, fugitives,
underground networks. It's possible. So it's possible that his involvement means
this is all about controlled risk and system-level coordination.
But the implication is that it goes beyond, it has gone beyond foreign relations,
and it touches on regime security itself. His presence at this meeting indicates that
the visit or the delegation is in Vietnam to address regime security issues or concerns.
So some people have an answer to this as far as why he was there, but I will address that later.
Now, let's keep talking about the people on the list. So you have a major general,
Zhang Baoqun, from the CMC. I actually have a picture of him. And this is crucial. So his
presence signals the visit is being handled above normal ministry level, because all the ministries
fall under the state council. But since he came from the Central Military Commission,
that means the visit is being handled above the state council. And there may be direct military
coordination, and that is possibly linked to South China Sea or contingency planning.
And then there's a small but telling detail. A photo showed Defense Minister Dong Jun standing
with the PLA Navy colonel behind him. Some people were able to, I don't have the picture,
I was trying to find the picture. Some people zoomed in on the nameplate,
and it showed his name is Zhou Wei. And people started to dig into his background.
So he works at the PLA's Navy Staff Department. And he was recognized in 2021 for military
readiness. But beyond that, almost nothing. So he's not a senior general. He's not a public figure.
I mean, the involvement of this type of personnel is typical of a technical or operational support
role, which suggests real practical military coordination, and possibly discussions tied to
South China Sea at an operational level. And also, it's a highly targeted regional focus,
because if you look at the diplomatic side, you have the guy in charge of Asia Affairs,
and another person in charge of Southeast Asia. So it's obviously regional. It's a region-specific
team focusing on Asian dynamics, South China Sea disputes, and regional alignment.
But also interestingly, there is someone from the Information Department,
and someone from the Protocol Department. So that combination matters. It tells you Beijing
is focused on media narrative, symbolism, information control, and messaging.
But here's a subtle but important point. At this level, you don't strictly need a protocol
officer to travel with you for a ministerial visit. So why include one? Because, well,
this is my interpretation. This visit may not just be about current discussions. It may also
involve preparations for a future leader-level interaction or event involving Xi Jinping.
In other words, this trip could be laying the groundwork for something bigger down the line,
and we'll address that later. Also, what's missing is just as important.
Now, here's a subtle but very important point. The names that I gave you, if you notice,
you don't see major economic planners. There's no commerce ministry leadership representation.
There's no officials from the finance department or large SOE representatives. There were none.
So despite the fact that China-Vietnam trade is huge, this is not primarily an economic visit.
So that tells you the real priorities are security, geopolitics, and strategic alignment.
No business deals. So when you put all of this together, this is not just a visit. This is a
That leads to the bigger question. Why this trio? And why now? Why three plus three?
The answer is actually quite simple. On the surface, Xi Jinping has run out of diplomatic
breakthroughs in the West. He has also lost traditional allies one after another. Venezuela,
Iran, and now Cuba. Russia can be lost soon. So take a look at the broader picture. China's
becoming increasingly isolated. Xi Jinping's diplomacy has left Beijing with very few real
friends. Some people say even African countries are beginning to distance themselves.
And many Chinese overseas projects are struggling to operate. So what does he do? Well,
he turns to one of the last remaining ideological neighbors, Vietnam. A neighboring country,
a fellow one-state system, a fellow communist state. So in simple terms, Xi Jinping needs to
lean closer to Vietnam so he doesn't appear completely isolated internationally.
That goes without saying. Most people can't figure this one out. But here's where things
get very interesting. Before I tell you what people are saying, I want to point out that
the three officials, where are they? Let me go back to the three officials. There we go.
There we go. They're all shaking hands with the Vietnamese leader. So these three officials,
Dong Jun, they are not the most powerful figures inside the system. Dong Jun does not control the
PLA. He's largely a ceremonial defense minister, not a CMC member, not a Politburo member.
He got the job because of Miao Hua, a disgraced head of PLA's political department,
who was taken down by Zhang Youxia. And then Wang Xiaohong, he's powerful in security,
but he's not a Politburo member either. And Wang Yi is a Politburo member,
but he focuses mostly on external affairs, not internal power. But all three are personally
loyal to Xi Jinping. Now, Dong Jun, in particular, rose through Xi Jinping's circle and has been
aligned with Xi politically after Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhengli's arrest. Remember, his defense
ministry so far is the only military entity publicly endorsing the arrests. And then Wang
Xiaohong, you know, is loyal to Xi Jinping. And then Wang Yi, I mean, they are just considered
Xi Jinping's trusted loyalists. So this is not about sending the strongest power brokers
to negotiate. This is about sending trusted people to handle a sensitive mission.
Again, the question, why these three and why Vietnam at this time?
Now, there have been internal whispers suggesting something far more unusual.
They say this, they say Xi Jinping may be quietly preparing a fallback position in South China,
precisely Guangxi province, which is one of China's most underdeveloped southern regions.
So the idea is this. If something were to happen in Beijing, whether political instability,
or loss of control, mutiny, or even wartime retreat, I mean, if a war breaks out and the
United States strikes back, or if any of those situations were to happen, then Xi Jinping could
retreat south and continue ruling from there. And geographically, Guangxi sits right next to
Vietnam, which means if that scenario never becomes... Sorry, I want to show you a map
so visually you know what I'm talking about. Yeah, here we go. So here is a map of Guangxi
and Vietnam. So you know what I'm talking about. So if that scenario ever becomes relevant,
Vietnam's position suddenly becomes critical, and Xi Jinping needs to secure Vietnam's support.
With Vietnam's backing, Xi Jinping could even establish a new command center in Guangxi,
or even allow it to evolve into a smaller but tightly controlled power base, something
resembling a North Korea-style stronghold, mini kingdom in South China. I don't know. These are
just people's speculation, but that's the idea. Now, whether or not you agree with that scenario,
there are a few details that make people pay attention. First, Xi Jinping has allegedly
visited Guangxi multiple times, more frequently than his predecessors. And more importantly,
Guangxi suddenly... I mean, because Guangxi is really not a well-developed region, but recently
it suddenly became famous for its massive, state-of-the-art organ transplant hospital,
which was built recently, and it's already up and running. So I got curious, you know,
why all of a sudden the CCP is building massive organ transplant centers in Guangxi? And I looked
into recent infrastructure build-out in Guangxi, and they are revealing, they tell something.
So let me tell you what kind of infrastructure the CCP is building in Guangxi. First, you have the
Pinglu Canal, which connects inland Guangxi directly to the Tonkin Gulf, which is the red
circle that you see on this map. And this will create an alternative maritime corridor to the
South China Sea area. And then the CCP is building a China-Vietnam Rail and Expressway,
linking Nanning, which is Guangxi's capital, to Hanoi, and border ports,
enabling fast land-based access into Southeast Asia. It's also building the
Beibu Bay, or Beibu Gulf Port Cluster, or you could say Tonkin Gulf Port Cluster.
And it's a secondary coastal system for trade energy and logistics. And then you have the
Nanning Logistics and Aviation Hub, which expands air cargo and Asian trade centers,
turning Nanning into a regional command node. And it's also building Bailong Nuclear Power Plant.
It's also building an offshore wind and energy storage facility. It's building Expressway
network expansion, which connects inland border and coastal zones for rapid movement of goods
and personnel. It's also building smart border infrastructure to enhance surveillance customs
and cross-border control at key Vietnam crossings. And it's building advanced medical facilities,
like the ones I mentioned earlier. So taken together, these projects form an integrated
system, logistics, energy, access, and control. So these projects will position Guangxi as a
southern gateway and potential fallback corridor for Beijing.
So again, I want to be clear, this claim cannot be independently verified, but it opens up a
broader and more important line of thinking. Is Beijing quietly preparing for contingencies
involving its southern flank? Now, even if we set aside the more extreme interpretations,
there are very practical reasons why Guangxi plus Vietnam matter strategically to Beijing.
So the first is the South China Sea dynamics. Guangxi and Vietnam sit right next to what
Chinese call the Beibu Gulf, or in English, it's the Gulf of Tonkin. If tensions escalate with the
United States, the Philippines, or Asian countries, China would not want Vietnam to
become another front. Instead, it would want Vietnam to act as a buffer or stabilizer.
And then you have the geographical advantage, because Guangxi is located inland and less
exposed than coastal hubs like Shanghai or Guangdong or Zhejiang, Jiangsu.
In the event of war in the Taiwan Strait, Guangxi is directly connected to Southeast Asia.
So in a crisis scenario, like I said, such as war with the U.S. or with Taiwan, Guangxi could
function as a secondary power center far away from the coast. It could also serve as a logistics
corridor through Vietnam-Asian trade routes. That means cross-border transport,
rail and port coordination, supply chain resilience.
So having explained that, and now if we look at the visit from this perspective,
then it totally makes sense that the three of Xi Jinping's staunch supporters,
including the Minister of Public Security, went to Vietnam. And it perfectly explains
why a protocol officer was part of the delegation. If Beijing is quietly building a backup command
center in Guangxi, then these individuals need to be involved, as it's all about Xi Jinping's
security and movements in the future. Okay, so that's that.
Now let's step back and look at the full picture, because the next part is the most important
question to ask. Here's a million-dollar question. Will Vietnam actually play along?
Is Vietnam a dependable partner for China? Well, my answer is it's far from certain,
and there are several reasons for that. China and Vietnam are not what they seem.
On the surface, both are communist countries, or whatever, socialist countries. But underneath,
they are fundamentally different systems. The Vietnamese Communist Party allows
internal elections, and power at the top is more distributed, not concentrated in one person.
Vietnam's economy is far more open, and there are far fewer large state-owned enterprises,
and their share in the economy has been declining over the past two to three decades.
And this is the opposite of China. And the party functions more like an administrative body,
not a dominant controller, ideological. The CCP has functioned as a dominant economic controller
and an ideological enforcer. So Vietnam still carries the communist label, but the system
underneath is no longer the communist in the Chinese sense. So there are four unresolved
tensions between China and Vietnam, and these are not just disagreements. These are structural
contradictions. They don't disappear. They don't get negotiated away easily.
So let's go through them one by one. The first is economic divergence. Vietnam and China are
no longer on the same economic path. China today is doubling down on state control,
strengthening SOEs, tightening control over data, capital, and the private sector.
Vietnam has moved in the opposite direction, opening aggressively to foreign investment,
integrating into global supply chains, and relying on private export-driven growth.
So in fact, many multinational companies now see Vietnam as a China alternative.
So structurally, Vietnam's rise is happening partly at China's expense. China wants alignment,
Vietnam benefits from divergence. That means the two are not on the same page economically
and cannot be. Second is political systems. On paper, both are one-party states,
but in essence, they're very different. China under Xi Jinping is highly centralized,
dominated by top-down authority, increasingly driven by ideology and loyalty. Vietnam's
system is based on more collective leadership, more pragmatic than ideological, and they're
more willing to adjust policies based on results. So Vietnam operates under a four-pillar system.
They have four leaders at the top. They have the party chief, they have the president,
the prime minister, and then the head of parliament. Of course, among them, the real
leader is the party chief, but there are some segregation of power among them.
So in simple terms, China is becoming more rigid, but Vietnam is becoming more flexible.
So even though they fly the same red flag with the star, Vietnam has one, China has five,
they are not really operating under the same logic.
And then there's the historical memory, and this is something many people underestimate.
In 1979, China launched a war against Vietnam. At the time, Deng Xiaoping, during his visit to
Washington, even informed U.S. President Jimmy Carter of China's intention to attack Vietnam.
China, at the time, desperately needed to save its economy. Pivoting to the West
was Deng Xiaoping's strategy. He believed that a war in Vietnam would be a good proof of
allegiance to win over the U.S. But from Vietnam's perspective, it was an invasion,
and that memory is still very much alive, and that is not just history. It shapes national
identity, public sentiment, and military thinking. I was told that many Vietnamese people do not
trust the Chinese. So no matter how many meetings take place, this historical scar does not go away.
And fourth, there's the South China Sea dispute. And this is the most immediate and dangerous
tension. China claims sovereignty over the Dongsha, Xisha, Zhongsha, Nansha. In English,
they are the Praetor's Island, the Paracel Island, and then Zhongsha. Zhongsha Island
doesn't have an English name, and there's a Spratly Island. Vietnam directly contests
these claims, especially in the Spratly Islands. But this is not about just territory, this is
about global shipping, oil and natural gas resources, and military positioning.
So here's the core problem. China says the issue is non-negotiable. Vietnam says it must follow
international law. These two positions are fundamentally incompatible, and it gets even
more complicated. Because if China makes concessions to Vietnam, then other countries
will follow. We have the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and that creates a chain reaction.
And even worse for Beijing is if international law is strictly applied, then China's current
oil extraction in the South China Sea could be challenged or invalidated. And that is where
things become truly strategic, because China extracts large amounts of oil and natural gas
from the South China Sea every year. And if they agree to follow international law,
then those extraction rights could collapse. And once again, when that happens, the other Southeast
Asian countries could step in, and China's entire position in the region could start to unravel.
So when you put these four tensions together—economic, political, historical, and
territorial—you're not looking at a normal relationship. You're looking at a relationship
where cooperation is tactical, but distrust is structural. And let's take a look at what
the Vietnamese leader actually said, because his words are the most consequential.
So on the 16th, during the meeting with the Chinese delegation,
Tou Long made it very clear. He said, disputes must be handled based on international law,
specifically the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and they must be resolved
peacefully. Now, read between the lines. This is essentially Vietnam telling China,
we're not playing by your rules. We're playing by international rules. And that may be the
strongest signal of all. I shouldn't say strongest. That's the clearest signal of all.
The gap between Vietnam and Beijing, or the gap between Vietnam and China, is not easily bridgeable.
So this visit may look significant. It's the first ever 3 plus 3 meeting. But in substance,
there was no real breakthrough, especially on defense and geopolitical issues.
Vietnam has effectively pushed back the Chinese. They have raised conditions.
I mean, I don't think the Chinese has a lot of room to negotiate anything. So that's why
the Vietnamese leader has held his ground. So when you step back and look at this
visit in full, the picture becomes very clear. This was not a routine diplomatic trip.
It was a strategic signal. Beijing came with a full system, diplomatic, security, and military,
seeking alignment at a time of growing pressure. But Vietnam responded with caution,
boundaries, and a firm insistence on international rules. That tells you everything.
Cooperation may continue, but trust remains limited. And in a region where every move
is carefully calculated, this visit reveals not strength, but constraint.
So my question to you is, what do you think? Do you believe that Xi Jinping is quietly building
a backup center in South China, in the Guangxi area, as some people have claimed, or not?
So let me know what you think. Type one, if you believe he is. Type two, if you believe he's not.
Type three, if you're not sure. So I'm interested in finding out what you think.
That's all. That's all I have. Oh, where is everyone? People are falling asleep? Spratly
Island? All right, let's see. Oh, Nicole is... Brian Cowell. Thank you, Brian.
Someone said Daniel Nordin. Lei looking very nice tonight. Okay, all right. Lighting.
Yeah, people try to help me with lighting. So maybe this is better?
Lei struggles with these technical issues. Lei, the glossy lipstick is distracting.
Okay. Maybe I should use matte lipstick. Leslie Troy. Okay. All right. Thank you. I appreciate
these feedback. Very important to me. Good. Under this strong light, because people say that
my face was not well lit. So I made the lighting, the one on this side, a little stronger, and then
it does make my lip shine. If it's distracting, not good. All right, let's see. Questions,
comments? There's a from Aqua Steve. Lei, is there any new information about whether Zhang
Yuxia is still alive or not? Or is there any chance that Liu Yuan would take the 82nd Army
into Beijing? Oh, okay. That is a mystery that I get asked. That's the question I get asked a lot.
And I see Chinese analysts debate on this issue a lot. Of course, nobody knows,
but based on the latest information and the latest debates I've seen,
I think there's 80% chance that he's gone. There's only 20% chance that he's alive.
So you may also ask, well, if he's gone, well, what about Liu Zhenli, the other general that
was taken down with him? People believe that the two of them are together. If one lives,
the other lives. If one goes, if one dies, the other also is dead. It's impossible that they
would treat them separately because it's more problematic. So they are together in this drama.
Many people believe that there's 80% chance that he's now with us, only 20% chance that he's still
alive. Because Zhang Yuxia is no ordinary princeling. All the princelings have been
given Xi Jinping pressure to produce evidence that he's alive. And he has so far refused to
do that. Why? If he's alive, all you have to do is just show something, a picture or a clip,
show that he's alive. And then you will shut these people up. They can't say anything. Just say,
well, they committed a crime. I'm investigating them. But so far, he has not produced anything.
So people believe that they're not alive. They're gone. Now, as far as Liu Yuan and the 82nd Group
Army, there are people who believe that the 82nd Army, they haven't moved back. They're still
stationed outside Beijing. I believe that they've never actually left since the military parade.
They are in the position to go into Beijing and start a mutiny if they want to.
That's what I heard. Military-wise, they're able to do that.
And there's intention that they want to do that because the 82nd Group Army lost their warehouse
during this flood in 2023. Remember, in 2023, there was a major flood in Zhuozhou, Hebei,
which is a city used by the military, by the 82nd Group Army, as their storage,
as their warehouse. They have large weaponry and equipment and supplies stored there.
Also, people stationed in Zhuozhou. But the local government did not alert the military
about the flooding because in order to save the, what do you call that,
Xiong'an, the new capital city that Xi Jinping built, because in the situation of flooding,
water should go to Baiyangdian, which is where Xiong'an was built or is built. But in order to
save this ghostly capital city, which no one lives in, they diverted the water so that Zhuozhou was
flooded. But they did not alert the military. So the military lost, I was told, thousands of people
because the water level goes up very quickly overnight. And it was during the night. So they
lost several thousand soldiers. And they said that for that reason, the 82nd, and the only reason
they lost their equipment, supply, and people and soldiers, it was because they tried to save
Xi Jinping's face by saving the empty city of Xiong'an. So these people want to get back at
Xi Jinping. That's why they say the 82nd Group Army cannot wait for the moment that they go into
Beijing to bring justice. So that's why the 82nd Group Army is on a very bad turn with the top
leader. But the reason they're not doing anything is because Liu Yuan still does not want to do
anything on his own. They need to get all the party elders and they need to get a green light
from the party elders. And so far, they can't take down Xi Jinping because Trump hasn't visited China
yet. I mean, if they arrest Xi Jinping, it's a different story. But now with the trip being
delayed, it's hard to say what's going to happen next. Anyway, that's what I heard.
Okay. All right. Good question. All right. Oh, here's one. Boiko China. All right. Thank you.
Your analysis is more and more important as Iran fails and Trump's visit nears. I really don't
think Trump should go to China. I heard that. I don't know if it's true. But the Chinese are
saying that American intelligence has gathered information to inform President Trump to not go
to China because they are concerned that Xi Jinping is totally capable of doing something
crazy to Trump. And so the advice is not to go. And I agree with that assessment.
Xi Jinping and his Red Guards, like Cai Qi, all these, and Wang Xiaohong, these people grew up,
their formative years was during the craziest days of cultural revolution. These people are
capable of doing something crazy. I mean, the fact that they arrested Zhang Youxia and possibly
killed him shows you they don't really care about consequences. So I don't think Trump should take
any chance or take any risk. What are you going to gain anything by going to China? The United
States are not going to gain anything. But Xi Jinping is going to get loads. And also you risk
your life, your health, your well-being by going there. And maybe it may not be you, but your
staff. So I don't think they should go at all. But that's what I heard. The Chinese say it came
from U.S. intelligence. So I have no idea if that's credible or not. Oregon Valley Girl asked
a question in Chinese, or she said, why the CCP can't tell that everyone has seen through their
facade? Because they're bad. Because they have no sense of shame.
Okay. Someone said, Lei, you should have also a beauty channel, your hair.
My hair looks great today, but I'm wearing black, so you can't really tell.
Not beauty channel. It's not my forte. I think a culture channel, a politics channel,
and a music channel, three are enough. Oh, by the way, we released the song in the music channel.
Nicole, can you copy the link here? So yeah, you can check it out. So we released the song.
Did you guys watch the video? The man, the Dalai Lama, who was not meant to love?
Yeah. Did you watch that? Okay. All right. Here we go.
Oh, some people say one, three, one, three, one. I have not seen a two yet. So it's either one or
three. Cryptic USMC. I'm an American-raised, Vietnamese-born refugee. I hate both communist
countries. My allegiance is to the U.S., and I'm proud to be American. Well said. Yes, I'm proud
to be American too. Thank you very much. All right. So I've seen threes and ones, but no
twos. Yeah. It's either ones or threes, because when I see that list of infrastructure projects,
and these infrastructure projects are very recent. They're not finished. Some of them are starting in
2025 or 2026 or 2024. So they tell us something. They tell us something, right? I mean,
this many infrastructure projects in Guangxi, it's really not a region that's economically
affluent. So all that attention, all the money spent on Guangxi tells you something.
Jim Burns Jr. Thank you, Lei. Find a book called A Conversation with Superintelligence by Jim
Duane Burns Jr. It's only 55 pages. Easy. It will salvage mankind from Islam, Marxism,
and other tyranny. Free with Kindle Plus. Okay. A Conversation with Superintelligence. Okay.
All right. Excellent. Well, thank you for mentioning it. Thank you. Thank you for your
support. Kaz Flanagan. An older person would not survive long-term Chinese imprisonment.
Artist Ai Weiwei explored this. Artist Ai Weiwei, I don't know what happened to him. He
went back to China and started repeating those patriotic official lines. This made some people
suspect that he was a CCP asset. You know, there are a lot of anti-CCP individuals or personalities
based outside China who are actually supported by the CCP. Yeah. So someone said, okay, tarred on,
I don't know how to read your name, tarred on Georgia flute. Lei, do you think she will
welcome President Trump truthfully, not being fake or deceitful? I don't know if there's any
CCP leader who's ever been truthful. I don't believe it's in their blood or in their gene.
They might have been truthful to some extent before they became top CCP leader. But once
they assume that role, they cannot be truthful anymore. So the answer is no. Their job has
prevented them from being truthful. Frank Na. Lei, as you're probably aware, China occupies
several properties in the US. Recently, there was drone incursions in the Louisiana base by drones.
Any thoughts? Nice earrings. Yeah. Speaking of CCP's infiltration in the US, I mean, now that
the whole country just woke up and realized we see CCP's footprints everywhere in the country.
The concern is there. They own several private properties, but you don't know what they do in
those properties. So it is concerning. This is exactly why the CCP believe that open society
or democratic countries are weaker because we're open. They feel that they have an advantage over
us because they can come to our society, carry out their operations here without us being aware,
while we cannot go to their countries. So that's why they think that they're superior to us.
So the question is, how do we counter that? Someone asked me, why don't they do something
instead of just waiting, which does not favor them? Why are Chinese so easily persuaded to
do nothing? Don't they realize this is their best chance? It's difficult because no one,
and this is precise. You're right. I agree with you, but they have a handicap because Xi Jinping
is taking advantage of their desire or their fear of being blamed for the one for taking down the
regime. Because Xi Jinping has threatened everyone saying that if you take me down,
then you're really effectively taking down this regime, and then you'll be liable.
So these people have not been clear-headed enough to understand that this regime also has to go.
Most people have remained at the level of just believing that Xi Jinping is the problem,
but he's only part of the problem. The problem is the regime.
So most people want to, I shouldn't say most, many people want to preserve the regime,
but remove Xi Jinping. But that's a mission impossible because Xi Jinping is using that
to protect himself. He says, if I go, the regime goes, and so people stop. Only when people
realize this regime is no good, then they will have the courage to end it. So that's why I don't
think we should put too much focus on Xi Jinping because if he goes and then you have another Wang
Jinping, Chen Jinping to be the next CCP leader, it's probably going to be the same. As long as
they want to preserve the regime, it's going to be the same. All right, let's see. Let me scroll
down. I answered that question. That question, I saw that's being repeated. Okay, here's a question.
Where is it? Okay, something went by. Okay, Frank, I already answered that question.
Okay, here's a super. Harry Mann. Hello, Lei. I found your channel four days ago. I appreciate
your insight. Well, welcome, Harry. I'm glad that you're able to join us. Welcome. Excellent. We
have new people joining us. That's great. All right, did I reach the bottom? Not really. Okay,
here's a question. China. Let's see. Any question? No, I think that's all. I reached the
bottom. I did reach the bottom. All right. So most people think one or three. Here's a question
from Seek the Truth. Vietnam holds all the cards here, and they and the CCP both know it. Vietnam
doesn't trust the CCP. Too much bad history. Vietnam has shifted towards the US. Is this
CCP's desperation? Yes, it is. You nailed it. That's exactly the dynamic between the two.
I agree with your assessment. Okay, Lei. Vietnam would never accept any encroachment. A thousand
years of conflict and domination is remembered throughout the people's history. Yeah. People
told me that the only country that invaded Vietnam is China. There's no other country.
So it's a thousand years of conflict and pain. It's very much on people's mind.
So, okay. Sean. IXT. Thank you for that about Vietnam. Refreshing to hear as I trust your
views. Well, thank you, Sean. All right. That seems to be all. How about we end it here tonight?
Well, I still want to promote my Dalai Lama video a little bit. And I want to promote my song a
little bit. So check out the video and the song because it came straight from my heart. So that's
all for tonight. Thank you very much. And I'll see you next week. Enjoy the rest of your weekend.
Bye.