Northrop's YF-17 Cobra; Birth of Controversy

Military Aviation Technology
4 followers
2 Video Views·Mar 14, 2026
Please Like/Share/Subscribe and
Buy my book: https://amzn.to/3preYyO
Sources for this video can be found at the relevant article on:
https://militarymatters.online/
The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement.
but is having a bit of a hard time of it at the moment because of reasons. But leaving aside
the row about what happened over the skies of Kuwait and who shot down who and why,
the fact is that the F-18 is no stranger to controversy. In fact, it was born into it,
one could say. And that history is one that often gets skated over, so I thought I'd dig it up.
This will be a two-part series on the dark past of the F-18, starting with the story
of the development of the Hornet, which in the fairytale days of long ago 1970s,
wasn't even called the F-18, or even created by the artist formerly known as McDonnell Douglas.
It was the Northrop YF-17 Cobra. In the late 1960s, the United States was deeply embroiled
in Vietnam, and the air war there was revealing some uncomfortable truths.
American fighters, designed primarily around the concept of firing missiles at long range,
were being forced into close-in dogfights with nimble Soviet-built MiGs, and they were
not doing terribly well at it. The prevailing doctrine at the time had been essentially this,
the dogfight is over, missiles had changed everything. The McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom
was the physical embodiment of this thinking. Big, fast, extremely capable, and in its original
Navy configuration, it didn't even have a gun. Why would it? The missiles would handle everything.
But then Vietnam happened, and the rules of engagement there required pilots to visually
identify targets before engaging. American missiles in use at the time proved far less
reliable than anyone had advertised, and American pilots kept finding themselves in turning fights
against MiGs that were, on paper, a generation behind their own aircraft. Eventually, the F-4s
got a gun pod bolted under the fuselage, or else retrofitted into the basic design in the F-4E,
which I think you'll agree is a fairly ungainly way of admitting that maybe guns weren't obsolete
after all. This led to a small group of military officers and defence analysts, who rather
grandiosely became known as the Fighter Mafia, getting quite a lot of attention in political
high places. They argued that the entire philosophy of American fighter design had gone
wrong. The most influential of the group was Colonel John Boyd, a former fighter instructor
who is generally credited with developing energy manoeuvrability theory. Boyd argued that air
combat success came down to an aircraft's ability to change its energy state, its speed, altitude,
and direction faster than the opponent. Not bigger, not more expensive, faster and more agile. That was
the key. Boyd was joined by a number of influential and, to be honest, largely self-described experts
who lobbied hard for the US military to change their entire outlook on combat aircraft. Instead
of hulking brutes like the F-4 and the new F-15 and F-14 then in advanced development,
the emphasis should be on a cheap, nimble and low capability airframe that could outdance anything
sent up against it and be able to be built in large numbers. Thus was born the Lightweight
Fighter Program. Naturally, the Air Force was really not very enthusiastic. The brass saw the
program as a threat to F-15 procurement with fear that Congress would use a successful lightweight
fighter to cut orders for the Eagle. So the program was kept firmly in the category of
technology demonstrator. Officially, nobody was buying anything. But the Fighter Mafia really
had their teeth in now and the ears of powerful politicians. In April 1972, two companies were
selected to each build a pair of prototypes. General Dynamics with their Model 401 which
would become the YF-16 and Northrop with their P-600 which would become the YF-17. Northrop
weren't some outsider taking a speculative punt on this contract. They had been building
lightweight fighters for years. The F-5 Freedom Fighter and F-5E Tiger II had sold widely to
allied nations precisely because they were affordable, simple to maintain and, despite
these factors, capable little aircraft. The YF-17 traced its lineage through Northrop's internal
N-300 and P-530 projects. The P-530 Cobra, a larger multi-role aircraft that Northrop had
been trying to interest foreign buyers in since 1971, had accumulated a considerable amount of
development already. When the lightweight fighter requirement came in, Northrop stripped up the
multi-role ambitions, tightened it up into a dedicated air-to-air demonstrator and called it
the P-600. The design itself was, by any measure, very elegant. The airframe was primarily aluminium
in conventional semi-monocoque construction but over the 900 pounds, just over 400 kilograms of
the structure, was made of graphite epoxy composite. Highly advanced for the early 1970s.
The twin tail fins were canted outwards at 45 degrees because wind tunnel testing had shown
that a single centreline fin lost effectiveness at high angles of attack which rather defeated
the purpose of an aircraft built around high alpha manoeuvrability. The most distinctive features were
the large leading edge root extensions that swept forward from the wing roots alongside the cockpit.
At high angles of attack they generated powerful vortices that added roughly 50 percent additional
lift, kept the engine intakes breathing cleanly when the pilot was doing something ambitious with
the nose and allowed the aircraft to manoeuvre at angles exceeding 50 degrees. The sort of
performance that would have been suicidal in earlier fighters. Power came from two General
Electric YJ101-GE100 afterburning turbojets, each producing 14,400 pounds of thrust in afterburner.
The twin engine configuration was a deliberate choice by Northrop, reflecting their belief in
redundancy. The airframe also made extensive use of area ruling to minimise transonic drag.
Performance was impressive. A top speed of Mach 1.95 was achieved in testing. Rate of climb was
50,000 feet per minute and surface ceiling 60,000 feet, 18,300 meters. I mean for a lightweight
fighter that seems rather respectable. There was however one design decision that would come back
to bite Northrop. For the flight controls they decided to retain conventional mechanical systems
rather than committing to a fly-by-wire system. Now Northrop's caution was not unreasonable.
Fly-by-wire was still very much experimental technology at the time so trusting your
aircraft's handling to software and actuators rather than a physical control linkage was not
a trivia leap of faith in 1972. General Dynamics by contrast were doing exactly the opposite with
their YF-16 and that would have significant repercussions. The YF-17 made its first flight
on the 9th of June 1974 piloted by Northrop's chief test pilot Henry Hank Chouteau. The maiden
flight lasted 61 minutes reached 18,000 feet and 610 miles per hour and Chouteau was clearly
impressed. When our designers said that in the YF-17 they were going to give the aeroplane back
to the pilot they meant it. It's a fighter pilot's fighter he said afterwards. The second prototype
flew on the 21st of August 1974 and what followed was the most extensive comparative flight test
program the United States Air Force had ever conducted at that time. Between them the YF-16
and YF-17 flew hundreds of hours in comparative testing being flown against every current USAF
fighter type and rather more pointedly against Soviet MiG-17s and MiG-21s that the Americans had
acquired. And here is where things didn't quite go Northrop's way. The YF-16 outperformed the YF-17
in several critical areas. It had better acceleration, superior climb rates, greater
endurance and better sustained turn rates at most speeds. The single engine YF-16 also enjoyed a 200
nautical mile advantage in mission radius. Kind of staggering that the F-16 outranges anything
but there you go. And at supersonic speeds precisely where the fly-by-wire advantage was
sharpest the YF-16 pulled decisively ahead. Northrop's mechanical controls simply couldn't
match the precision that fly-by-wire gave General Dynamics aircraft when the pilot was pushing hard
at high speeds. Plus the performance gap was only part of the story. The YF-16 used a Pratt & Whitney
F-100 turbofan, the same engine fitted to the F-15 which was already in production.
Engine commonality meant enormous savings in logistics and spare parts. The YF-17's GE YJ-101,
however well integrated, couldn't offer that. In January 1975 Air Force Secretary John McLucas
announced that the YF-16 had won because of its lower operating costs, greater range and
significantly better manoeuvre performance. But as I'm sure you've guessed, the story doesn't end
there, not by a long shot. While the Air Force had been running its lightweight fighter competition,
the United States Navy was conducting its own search for a new fighter. And the Navy
had a different set of priorities. Chief amongst them was a firm requirement for twin engines.
Operating from aircraft carriers where a failed catapult launch over cold water can instantly be
fatal, the Navy was not interested in a single engine fighter. As a result, the single engine
YF-16, despite General Dynamics best efforts to navalise it, was effectively eliminated before
the Navy competition really started. In May 1975, less than four months after the Air Force had
rejected it, the Navy announced that the YF-17 had been selected as the basis for their new
multi-role fighter. Now you would think that would be cause for celebration at Northrop.
Unfortunately, this is where the next controversy started. The Navy required a prime contractor with
extensive experience in naval aircraft. Carrier aircraft are a very different beast, requiring
special anti-corrosion measures, reinforced airframes, arrestor hooks, folding wings and the
ability to survive the controlled violence of catapult launches and arrested landings.
Northrop didn't really have such experience, so McDonnell Douglas,
builders of the F-4 Phantom and the Navy's well-established partner, was designated as
prime contractor for converting the YF-17 into a true multi-role carrier aircraft, the F-A-18.
Northrop's role was reduced to that of major subcontractor. They had won the competition
in the sense that their design was chosen. But in the ways that actually matters, who runs the
program, who gets the revenue, who gets the credit, McDonnell Douglas won. The F-A-18 entered service
with the US Navy and US Marine Corps in 1983 and rapidly proved itself a supremely versatile
platform. It first saw action over Libya in 1986, was a workhorse of Operation Desert Storm in 1991
and has been involved in practically every American military operation since. For McDonnell
Douglas, the aircraft has been a great success. But for Northrop, well, they weren't really happy
about how things worked out. Despite their role in developing and building the new F-A-18,
they thought that they could offer more, as well as getting a better return for an aircraft that
was, after all, their design originally. So they dialed back the design to the original concept
that had created the whole aircraft in the first place for a capable multi-role land-based
aircraft for export, developing the Northrop F-18L. And that is where things get really messy,
legally speaking, and is the subject of my next video. So be sure to check that out for the rest
of this story.
