מגיש חדשות NTD שוחח בנושא המלחמה באיראן עם הקולונל בדימוס בצבא ארה"ב, דארן גאוב. גאוב הוא אסטרטג גיאופוליטי, ששירת בעבר כמפקד גדוד וכטייס בלאק-הוק בצבא האמריקני.
לגבי המנהיג החדש של המשטר האיראני, מוג'תבא ח’מינאי אומר גאוב: "אני משער שתוחלת החיים שלו תהיה מוגבלת מאוד, והוא יודע את זה. זה פוגע ביכולת של איראן להמשיך במבצעים שלה, והאנשים האלה מבלים יותר זמן בבריחה מהמוסד הישראלי מאשר בניסיון לנהל בפועל את המדינה".
עם זאת גאוב מתנגד לפגיעה בתעשיית הנפט האיראנית ואומר "הנפט שעליו מתבסס החלק הארי של הכלכלה שלהם, אבל גם חשמל שמוזן לכל המערכות האלה ומפעיל אותן, ודברים אחרים במדינה, שיש להם אולי ערך צבאי עבורם במידה מסוימת, אבל במידה מסוימת גם איננו רוצים להרוס אותם, כי אם נתחיל להרוס אותם, נפגע בעם האיראני יותר משנפגע בממשל שמנסה להחזיק בשלטון".
"אחרי שהשמדנו את רוב מנגנון הביטחון, לפחות בכל הנוגע לשיגורי הגנה אווירית וליכולת השיגורים ודברים מסוג זה, והדברים האלה הופכים לפחות יעילים, אז, אפשר לטפל במנגנוני הביטחון כמו כוח קודס ומשמרות המהפכה האסלאמית, שהמשטר משתמש בהם נגד העם שלו... אנו צריכים להבטיח הפלה מוחלטת של המשטר האייתוללות, ללא קשר מי עומד בראשו ומי יושב בהנהגה, המשטר הזה כולו צריך להסתלק", מסכם גאוב. תמונה: Majid Saeedi / Getty Images
Here for updates and analysis on the war in Iran is retired Lieutenant Colonel Darren Gaub,
a geopolitical strategist, former battalion commander, and Blackhawk pilot in the U.S. Army.
Colonel, thanks for being here. President Trump says the war is pretty much complete
and that they've wiped out every single force in Iran. What more needs to be done?
Good morning. Well, first of all, I would say we actually need to complete the war
as far as meeting all those objectives. It's pretty clear we're not there 100%,
but it's also very clear that we are most of the way there based on the volume of launches
of both drones and missiles from Iran itself, the status of their Navy, and, of course,
the continuous pursuit of their leadership. You know, comedy 2.0 has, I would suspect,
a very limited lifespan, and he knows that, and that impacts Iran's ability to continue
operations as well as those folks spend more time running from Assad and the Israelis than they do
actually trying to run a nation. So that's critical too there. But I think in the next
couple of weeks, you're going to see a severe curtailment of activity as far as Iran's ability
to launch while we continue the pace of operations to hit really what become targets of opportunity
nationwide across Iran to make sure they can't threaten their neighbors. And all those things
that we've highlighted here from the movement of oil supplies to the security of not only Israel,
but, of course, other Gulf Cooperation Council nations throughout the region,
and, frankly, ongoing conflicts Iran has with nations like Afghanistan and Pakistan as well
that are much smaller but still that are still there and do take some of their attention as also.
What could lead to a strike in these facilities?
The refusal of Iran to abjectly surrender, ultimately, I think. But this is one of those
areas I'm watching closely also because I'm concerned about either Israel or us striking
things inside Iran that would actually be needed in order to make sure the people of Iran can
thrive again and rebuild an economy in a post-Ayatollah kind of world. And that includes
oil, of course, which is the hugest part of their economy, but electricity that feeds into
all of those systems and makes it all operate, and other things in their nation that, frankly,
there may be military value to them at a certain point. But at any point, also,
you don't want to destroy them because if you start doing that, you're actually
harming the people of Iran more necessarily than you are the administration that is trying to
hold power. So I think it comes down to how long does Iran, and specifically the dictators and
pulled out and not recognize the fact that, frankly, their time in command and leadership
of Iran is limited at this point. And I don't think they're ever going to recognize that and
give up. But if they don't, we could expand to something that has a bigger impact like that.
Can you explain a little bit more about that, the greatest risk?
Well, part of the objective here is clearly to help Iran become what it can be again,
pre-1979, a mostly free and prosperous nation, very well educated in all of those things that
you would expect of what a free and prosperous nation can be. So as we've peeled back and
removed much of the security apparatus, at least from air defense and launcher capabilities and
things like that, those things become less effective. Then you can get to the security
apparatus like the Quds Force and the IRGC that would be used against its own people.
So that's one risk is what do they do? And do they clamp down harder and become even more violent?
Second part of this would be, what's the next part of the next phase, meaning what
kind of government goes into Iran? Will they do the best thing for Iran? And can we ensure
full removal of the regime that the Khamenei and Ayatollah world represents, regardless of
who's standing there or who's sitting in the seat? That entire regime has to go.