Adversarial Foreign Investments- Hon Cordell Hull

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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23rd Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
Washington, D.C🇺🇸- December 6-7, 2022
-Hon. Cordell Hull
Former Undersecretary of Commerce
Well, thank you, Congressman Pittenger,
and thank you to the Parliamentary Intelligence
Security Forum for the invitation.
I'm well aware that I'm kicking off the panel that
precedes lunch, so I will do my best to be quick.
But it's a pleasure to be here, and I certainly
welcome all of our delegates who have come from abroad.
I hope that, notwithstanding the weather,
that Washington is treating you well.
So what I'd like to do is just set a little bit of the stage
about how we here in the United States
treat foreign adversarial investments.
It's something that there's been a little bit more press
on recently than has been historically.
But there's a little bit of background
here that I'd like to get into, and then I
can talk about the things that we considered
when I was in government and that the Biden administration
has carried forward.
But against the backdrop of a number of national security
programs we have in this country,
thinking nuclear, special forces, submarines, et cetera,
foreign investment screening really is relatively new.
It came into its own really in the late 1970s,
and it was held together by a patchwork of regulations
and executive orders.
But it really began to be regulated back then
through the creation of the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States,
also known as CFIUS.
CFIUS is an interagency body led by the Department of Treasury,
and it brings together the components of the government
that would have a role in regulating foreign investments.
So think the Commerce Department,
the State Department, the Defense Department, energy,
et cetera.
What CFIUS also is designed to do
is assess foreign investment transactions
for national security risk.
And the ultimate power that it has
is it can recommend to the president
to block a specific transaction.
But CFIUS really came into its own in the last 15 or so years.
About 2007, 2008, the Chinese National Oil Company
sought to buy Unocal, an oil company here
in the United States.
And Dubai Ports World sought to buy
a number of ports that had strategic implications
for the United States.
That, of course, got a number of our congressmen interested.
And there was an effort in 2007, 2008 to tighten up the laws.
That was generally fine for about a decade.
And then Congressman Pittenger mentioned his bill
in 2017, 2018.
I had the privilege of working in Congress
while that was going through and working
with the congressman and his staff.
But that bill fundamentally redefined
how CFIUS did its work.
It granted CFIUS a number of new authorities.
And it made a number of transactions,
particularly as they're tied to export controls, mandatory.
CFIUS is still largely voluntary here.
And I know a number of other places
it's becoming more mandatory.
But here, by and large, CFIUS is a voluntary process.
What it does, if you get the seal of approval
from the committee, is it gives you a safe harbor.
And it means the US government can no longer
come back and challenge that transaction later.
I had the privilege of working on implementing
some of Congressman Pittenger's bill
when I was at the Commerce Department.
And it really is something that has been a long-running effort
and is in need of constant tweaking.
The 2018 bill also streamlined the process in a number of ways.
We realized that having a fulsome review of 90-plus days
really wasn't the best way to get at it.
There were a number of transactions,
particularly from countries about which
we had very little national security concern.
Think the Five Eyes and similar-type countries.
So they had short-form declarations,
really a couple of pages.
You describe the general terms of the deal,
and hopefully within 30 days, you either get sign-off
or you're told you have to file a longer-form transaction.
The 2018 bill also brought in
certain real estate transactions.
And this is public, but there were a number of concerns
over the years that some of our adversaries
were buying real estate near sensitive facilities,
military and otherwise.
So the 2018 bill brought that within the purview of CFIUS.
The committee, as I said, it really draws together
the best of the U.S. government to assess these transactions
and as a result, it really has the best of the information
that the U.S. government has.
It has law enforcement information,
it has information from our intelligence community,
it has economic and commercial data
from some of our agencies like the Department of Commerce
and the Department of Treasury.
So the committee really does,
as it assesses these transactions,
has the benefit of the best of the U.S. government's
information on the topic.
Now, when the committee makes a decision,
what it can do is it can decide to clear the deal,
it can decide to clear it with conditions,
which is quite often what happens,
or it can recommend to the president
that the deal be blocked.
All of this, of course, is occurring under the backdrop
of our well-established history of free and open investment.
So about a decade ago, there was a pretty aggressive pivot
by the United States government
with respect to foreign investment screening.
We recognized our adversaries were taking advantage.
So I mentioned the presidential blocking power.
That's been used six times in the last decade,
four of which occurred under the Trump administration.
The committee also, through a number of court decisions
and other mechanisms, has due process requirements.
So we can't put something into a box and tell an investor
that it's blocked for national security reasons.
We have to give them some reasons on what it is.
Now, again, I mentioned there's intelligence inputs
that go into this, so it has to be crafted
very, very carefully.
But there is a right under our laws for the company
to know that the agencies are considering
blocking the transaction.
What often happens there is once that happens,
and once the agencies have made clear
that it's going to be very difficult
to get this transaction through,
the parties simply abandon the deal and it goes away.
One thing that the committee has been doing
in the last five or so years,
and this began in earnest under the last administration,
is going after transactions that are non-notified.
That's the term of art you'll hear.
And I mentioned that CFIUS remains largely voluntary.
So of the thousands and thousands of transactions
that go through in the U.S. every year,
very, very few of them implicate CFIUS.
But a number go through and the companies don't come in.
And so the U.S. government has now set up a unit,
and again, using intelligence community assets,
using law enforcement,
and really getting good at looking at company filings,
have begun to reach out to some of those companies
and bring those transactions into the fold.
It's something that I expect to continue.
I expect the companies will get a little more sophisticated
and probably come in as a protective measure,
but it is something that is out there.
So the Biden administration recently issued
an executive order that proposed to offer
a little more transparency on this.
Again, with the aggressive pivot,
and the due process notions that underlie
a lot of what the committee does,
the administration sought to set out factors
that would allow companies to assess better
whether they need to come in and bring a transaction
for the committee's review.
The order was issued in September,
and it listed a number of factors
that the committee will consider
when looking at a transaction.
And those include supply chain resilience,
technological leadership,
industry investment trends in this particular industry,
cybersecurity, and risks to U.S. person's information.
Now, I will hasten to add that those are all issues
that had been widely considered under CFIUS
for a number of years.
But again, national security regulation
in this country is often challenging,
and that there's very little
that government agencies are allowed to say.
So the Biden administration's executive order
was really a step in the effort of transparency
that, as I understand it, has been quite welcome.
But although the U.S. government has pivoted
and become more aggressive, so too have our adversaries.
Adversaries are using different forms
to make acquisitions,
and they're structuring transactions
to try and evade the committee's review.
As I mentioned, there's been a rise
in non-notified transactions that have been brought in.
In the mid to late 2010s,
we saw a number of transactions come through the committee
involving semiconductors.
A number of those actually resulted in presidential blocks.
Most recently, however, and again,
this aligns with the Biden administration executive order,
we've seen a number of transactions
touching on personally identifiable information.
Certainly, some of the cases that have been made
into the public domain include the TikTok CFIUS investigation
as well as the dating app Grindr.
So where do we go from here?
So there's widespread U.S. recognition of the problem.
There's bipartisan concern.
As polarized as this country can be
in our politics and our policies,
this is an area
where there really isn't a whole lot of division.
There needs to be continued vigilance.
A number of our adversaries
are using variable interest entities,
setting up shell companies offshore
to try and evade CFIUS review,
or at least evade or obscure the nature of the transaction.
And we heard in the trade-based money laundering lecture,
obfuscation is the name of the game for a lot of this.
So too, when trying to avoid investment screening.
The government needs to continue to increase resources
to CFIUS and other agencies involved in this
because our adversaries are continuing
to change their tactics, and so too must we.
But we also need to work with our allies and partners
to ensure that we're building investment screening capacity
in those countries.
We here in the United States are blessed
to have a number of strong alliances
and like-minded allies
that are proceeding along this path as well.
There are a number of EU member states
that are working on this.
A number of Five Eyes countries
are also working through this.
It's a trend that I expect to see continue
over the next several years.
But we also need to remain nimble.
As we talked about in the last panel on cryptocurrencies,
legislation takes a long time in this country,
even when on something where we largely agree.
So that means the agencies need to be nimble,
and they need to be aggressive,
and they need to get regulations out
that give clarity to acquirers in the capital markets,
but they also need to ensure
that our national security is being protected.
And we're not filling the old maxim
of that a capitalist will sell you the rope to hang them.
But I have hope for the future.
I think the alliances that I mentioned
are gonna carry forward.
I think we're going to have a number
of integrated defenses in some of the screening here
to ensure that transactions
that would not be approved here in the United States
won't be approved in Europe or elsewhere.
So thank you again for your attention.
I look forward to the discussion
and I hope you enjoy the rest of the conference.
