NATION STATE RISK AND THE FUTURE INFLUENCE IN SECURITY FROM CHINA, RUSSIA AND NORTH KOREA

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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Mar 2, 2026
25th Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
London🏴🇬🇧- August 31- September 1, 2023
-Honorable Baroness Pauline Neville Jones
House of Lords, United Kingdom, former Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.
This timing of our panel is notorious for having an audience that goes to sleep.
So we try and wake you up by saying some interesting, if not outrageous, propositions.
Yesterday there was a session where the audience was told there were three sessions on cybersecurity.
I think ours was counted as one.
So before you run away thinking you don't want yet another session on the unseen enemy,
we are going to talk about the real, as distinct from the cyber world.
I mean, state risk comes all too easily, one might say, in both the kinetic form,
as well as the non-kinetic or the covert, the unacknowledged, the attack from non-state forces.
Or any characterization of grey zone activity that you might wish to highlight.
Now we're going to be talking about both.
Just a word about nation-states and living with risk.
I mean, this isn't new.
I mean, nation-states live with risk as soon as they come into being.
And they expect, I think history shows that they can expect, you know,
from national aggressors outside their borders.
And so their war and domination is as old as history.
And continues to this day, sadly, as Ukraine shows.
But long as that history is, and there's another form of it too, in the form of guerrilla warfare,
which came from the Peninsular War in the 18th century,
and their inheritors and their successors these days,
we still have guerrilla war, and of course we have terrorists.
In addition to both regular and irregular fighting,
I think the 21st century has really brought a new form of risk to the nation-states.
The one which is different in kind, different in its tools,
and different actually in many ways in its immediate objectives.
It's not to defeat the enemy in open combat,
so much as to dissolve the state by undermining its solidarity,
by destroying its reputation and the effectiveness of its institutions,
the good functioning of its economy,
and the loyalty and respect to the citizenry that people have for their government.
Now states that steal intellectual property or sow political dissent by covert means
are both state actors but also organized criminals,
some of whom have the patronage of the state in so doing it.
And of course there are terrorists with similar aims.
Michael Chertoff said this morning, and he's right,
that the weaponization of information,
which is one of the things that is I think a new way of undermining your enemy,
is a massive challenge, not a static one either.
It's a growing one, and will take advantage of all the new technologies,
no doubt not least AI.
So I think since the millennium,
Western democracies have moved from a position where we felt that our way of life
and our standards and our values were gaining ground generally,
and hoped that we would open up other closed societies such as Russia and China.
I think all of that hope and expectation has gone into reverse.
The autocracies have certainly advanced their presence and their influence in the world,
but they haven't opened up.
And on the contrary, opening up, as I say, has gone into reverse.
And it has not occurred at all, of course, in North Korea,
which remains an outlaw state, intent on threatening its neighbors,
and those countries it identifies as enemies, which is many of us,
and makes its living from criminal cyber activity.
So no, we talk the language of war and peace
as if in many ways these are separate conditions, but they aren't.
Instead, I think increasingly what you can say about the world we live in
is that we live along a spectrum of insecurity and instability.
And as a general proposition, we're moving very fast, but certainly steadily,
and it would seem moderately inexorably,
along a spectrum towards greater and greater tension,
with a rising risk of increased conflict.
It's a very depressing prospect, but it does seem to me that that's the direction of affairs.
And the issue is, are we going to let this happen?
Are we going to try and challenge that proposition?
So it's the autocracies that we're going to talk about,
and all those forces which either aid and abet them or shelter under them,
again we come back to terrorists.
And I hope our speakers, other than me, are going to assess the aims and motives of our opponents
and how well they think the democracies are responding to the challenge of moving
from optimism to what I have to say, I increasingly describe as a very pessimistic outlook.
Do you think we're doing well?
I would say, hmm, not at all sure about that.
And indeed, I think we're doing too little too late,
and we're risking taking sufficient precautions to keep deterrence alive.
And deterrence depends for success on adequate preparation,
adequate preparation to protect yourself,
and that adequate preparation being understood by the enemy.
And we've already had one clear failure.
Deterrence failed in relation to Ukraine.
Are we learning the lessons?
Risk management involves accepting challenging opportunities.
I do wonder whether we've actually, in the way in which we've helped Ukraine,
actually taken all the opportunities that we should have done.
Indeed, we could be accused still of being, if not asleep, but certainly too risk-averse.
Don't we need a strategy?
Do we really have a strategy?
Do we have a strategy in relation to Russia, really?
We have sanctions, yes.
But do we have a strategy?
And do we have a strategy in relation to China?
Or are we simply walking on a path where the possibilities open to us get narrower and narrower
through lack of imagination and initiative?
During the Cold War,
and you have to be careful about taking analogies from a situation that was different
and quite dangerous, but it was simpler,
nevertheless, we did have a strategy.
We had the Armel Doctrine, the twin track,
where we said to the Soviet Union,
well, this is what you're doing,
and this is what we'd be prepared to do if you did something different.
And we offered an alternative.
And indeed, over time, it swung the balance.
Where's our offer?
Why is it that we don't have a positive offer to put to China,
even if China's not going to accept it?
Don't we need to not only influence China,
but also those who are the audience in this conflict?
There are plenty of countries we can see who decline to take sides.
They are players.
And who is at the moment playing with the players?
China has just been to the BRICS meeting.
That's a play, bringing others into the fold,
sheltering them under a leadership.
So we've made much, I think, of the past of the UN General Assembly vote on Ukraine,
and we tout that.
But has it brought us vigorous support?
I wouldn't say so.
And indeed, I think, on the whole,
the audience is moving not in a different direction,
but certainly not in ours.
So how do we turn these things around?
Are we sensible about the way in which we preserve
and seek to advance the international institutions,
things like the international financial institutions?
Are we sharing power enough with them,
or are we simply protecting our position in them,
such that actually the temptation then is for alternative institutions
to be set up in competition?
We see that happening.
Alternative international governments can come into being
while we fail to act sensibly in relation to those which exist at the moment.
So these are very, very big issues.
Ursula von der Leyen, the other day, when she was in,
I think just before she went to China,
said the European Union was not decoupling.
It wasn't its aim.
It was rebalancing.
But if rebalancing is meant to actually mean anything,
it does involve, as I say, A, having a strategy,
and B, having an offer.
And we need that.
We need dialogue.
We are not going to deal with some of these issues
that we don't talk about very much and we haven't talked about here,
like climate change,
or indeed protecting ourselves generally against it.
Can we win that battle collectively as a globe
in the absence of positive dialogue?
I don't think so.
So we have, it seems to me, a challenge of actually not only
the short-term protection, and indeed avoiding protectionism,
but also how we actually reach out to try to get more positive dialogue
on the scene at the same time.
And that doesn't mean to say we don't take the necessary precautions.
Well, that's enough from me.
I want to engage our excellent panel.
Nathan Sales, I'm going to ask you if you would start us off.
Nathan is the founder and principal of Fillmore Global Strategies,
a consultancy which provides legal and strategic advisory services
on issues at the intersection of law, policy, and diplomacy.
He's also a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council.
And he served earlier on in the State Department
as Acting Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights.
He also has been an Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism
and a Special Presidential Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.
So you've had a finger in a lot of the pies that I've just been talking about.
Nathan, over to you.
