NATION STATE RISK AND THE FUTURE INFLUENCE IN SECURITY FROM CHINA, RUSSIA AND NORTH KOREA

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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Mar 2, 2026
25th Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
London🏴🇬🇧- August 31- September 1, 2023
-Hon. Nathan Sales
Former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights (acting); Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council.
Thank you very much for that introduction. I'd like to thank Congressman Pittenger for his
leadership in organizing, not just this event, but so many over the years to bring us together
for these insightful conversations. I'd like to thank the Baroness for moderating our panel.
And of course, Lucas, thank you for being the brains behind the operation.
The trains don't run on time if Lucas isn't involved, so thank you for that.
We're here at a critical moment in the Ukraine war. And actually, I think terminology is
important, so let me be more precise. We're here at a critical moment in Russia's aggressive war
of extermination against Ukraine. Public opinion in the West is in flux. We're starting to hear
more and more skepticism in Western capitals about the need to support Ukraine. And we're
also seeing a gap, a growing gap, between the rhetorical support that Western statesmen and
stateswomen offer to Ukraine as well as the concrete support that's actually delivered
to Ukraine. On sanctions, for instance, in the United States, the White House has consistently
declined to use the most powerful economic tools in our arsenal, settling instead for half measures.
On the provision of weapons, a clear pattern has emerged in the United States. The White House
initially refuses to provide vital weapon systems, only to eventually give in when shamed into doing
so. We've seen this pattern with Stinger missiles, then it was HIMARS artillery systems, then it was
tanks, then it was F-16s, which, by the way, still will not be delivered until perhaps, if we're
lucky, next year's summer fighting season. Now it's ATAKMS, the Army Tactical Missile System,
a long-range artillery capability that Ukraine desperately needs. So it's no surprise that
Ukraine's offensive isn't moving as quickly as hoped. To be sure, they're making progress,
and just overnight we heard a report in The Wall Street Journal about a possible break through the
main Russian defensive line in the southeast of the country, but the pace has not been what we'd
hoped for. Part of the reason for this is because we've denied them the tools they need to win.
We've given them enough to maintain the status quo, but not enough to win. And now we see the
spectacle of unnamed administration officials anonymously leaking and criticizing Kyiv in the
news media. Let's be clear, if you refuse to give Ukraine the tools it needs to do the job,
you have no right to criticize the manner in which they're doing the job.
So today, in the five to ten minutes that I have with you, I'd like to address two myths that you
often hear in Washington and in other Western capitals as well, I suspect, to justify a more
detached, disinterested approach with respect to Russia's war of aggression. The first is the risk
of escalation, and the second is that this is a distraction from our top strategic priority of
countering a revanchist China. You hear the former concern about escalation risk from the Biden
administration and from some of its democratic allies in Congress. You hear the latter from some
members in the Republican Party. I think they're both wrong. Earlier today we heard from Matthew
Arnold, since we're in the land of Shakespeare, let me reciprocate by saying a plague on both
your houses. So let's move on to that first myth. The idea here is that more robust security
assistance to Ukraine is somehow going to provoke Vladimir Putin to escalate. If we cross Putin's red
lines, so the theory goes, it'll be World War III and perhaps a nuclear exchange. So, for instance,
in practical terms, that means that we can't provide weapons that would enable attacks on
occupied Crimea, we can't provide weapon systems that would enable attacks on Russian territory.
18 months in, the risk of escalation seems to me fairly negligible. Ukraine has been striking
Russia proper and occupied Ukraine for many months. Just in the past several days we've
seen drone strikes, a repeated campaign of drone strikes on Moscow, as well as an attack on a
Russian military air base in Peskov, destroyed four military aircraft. Ukraine also has been
using Western-supplied long-range weapons. Thank God for the United Kingdom and its storm
shadow missiles, which have been provided in the absence of comparable munitions from the United
States. Yet here we are, somehow nuclear Armageddon has been averted. I think we can draw a broader
lesson from these developments. Putin doesn't escalate in response to strength. Putin escalates
in response to weakness. And in this he's following his mentor Vladimir Lenin. You push
with bayonets. If you find mush, you push. If you find steel, you withdraw. So let's consider a
couple of examples of how this dynamic has played out. How did Putin respond to Finland and soon
Sweden joining NATO? Remember, the entire rationale for the war was the risk that Ukraine might join
NATO and this would somehow present a threat to Russia. Yet Putin meekly turned the other cheek
in the face of NATO expansion. A second example, how did Putin respond to the weak communique
coming out of the NATO summit in Vilnius? He escalated. He pulled out of the Black Sea grain
deal, putting at risk millions of people in vulnerable parts of the world to starvation.
He attacked grain storage facilities. He bombed a historic church in Odessa.
The bottom line here, Vladimir Putin is a war criminal, but he's not suicidal. He's not going
to risk a wider war with NATO when he's barely staying afloat against Ukraine. Let me move on
now to the second myth that US or Western support generally to Ukraine is a distraction from the
threat of China, and in particular the need to deter the Chinese Communist Party from invading
Taiwan. The first thing we can say about this myth is that Taiwan disagrees. Taiwan does not
think that Ukraine is a distraction from Taiwan's own security. The ambassador to the United States
has said, and I'm quoting now, Ukraine's success in defending against aggression is so important
also for Taiwan in deterring Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party. The same goes for our
regional allies throughout the Indo-Pacific. Japan's prime minister has said, again I'm
quoting, the security of the Indo-Pacific region cannot be separated from European security.
The bigger picture here, Russia is China's no-limits ally. A loss for China's ally is a
loss for China. Or look at it this way, what happens if Russia wins in its conflict against
Ukraine? What would be the effect on Russia of a victory? I think a Russian victory would only
whet Vladimir Putin's appetite for more. He has said quite openly that his intention is to
reconstitute the Soviet Empire, meaning that perhaps Poland would be next, perhaps the Baltics
would be next, perhaps it's Romania's turn. That is a recipe for more involvement by the United
States and Europe, not less. That is a recipe for World War III. In short, if we truly want to focus
on China and the threat that it poses to Taiwan, we need to deter future Russian aggression. We
failed catastrophically to deter Russia in 2021. We can't make that mistake again. The way to ensure
that Russia is deterred from further aggression is to ensure that Russia faces a crushing defeat
now. What would be the effect on China of a Russian victory in Ukraine? A Russian victory
would predictably embolden Xi Jinping to move on Taiwan. Xi would certainly conclude that if Russia
can outlast Western resolve, then China can too. At the same time, we have to reckon with the fact
that the costs to the United States and the costs to our Western allies of supporting Ukraine
have been minimal, zero blood, modest treasure. So far, the United States has provided about $44
billion of military support to Ukraine. That's equivalent to a relatively small share of our
defence budget, about 3.5% of our defence budget over that period of time. By the way, there are
11 European countries who have provided more military assistance to Ukraine as a share of
their GDP, including, I think, our hosts here in the United Kingdom. When you break those numbers
down, the cost-benefit ratio becomes even clearer. A lot of our assistance has consisted of drawdowns
from existing weapons stocks. Of the $44 billion, about $26 billion is dedicated to replenishing US
stocks of weapons. That's about 60%. In return, the West has imposed crippling costs on a top-tier
adversary. Let's look at a couple of numbers. 300,000 Russian casualties, including 120,000
killed in action. 11,000 Russian vehicles lost, including 2,000 tanks, 4,000 armoured combat
vehicles, 1,000 artillery systems and more. That's a good investment. It's also an investment in NATO
security because those are soldiers, those are tanks, those are artillery systems that NATO is
never going to have to face. Indeed, you can actually make the case that support to Ukraine
increases our readiness for a possible conflict over Taiwan. First, sequencing. By supporting
Ukraine now, the West can address the Russian threat first, while preparing for the future
threat posed by China, and ultimately, and crucially, deterring it. Second, there's the matter of our
defence industrial base. Over the past quarter century, and as the Ukraine war has revealed,
our defence industrial base has atrophied, and it has been revealed to be brittle and fragile.
The good news is we now have time to rebuild our supply lines while there's still time,
again, with the goal of ultimately deterring a CCP invasion of Taiwan. In conclusion, I'll just
say it is certainly the case that the United States has vital interests in the Indo-Pacific
region, but we also have vital interests in Europe. That's what it means to be a superpower,
and superpowers can do two things at once. So thank you again to the Baroness for moderating
this panel. Thank you all for being here, and I look forward to the rest of the conversation.
