America Is Drowning in Credit Card Debt

Loan Hub
4 followers
#finance
#financement
TIMESTAMPS -
0:00 Intro
1:13 Background
4:11 What the Headlines are Hiding
7:11 Class-level Financial Distress
10:58 Banks, Markets, and the Trump Card: No Cap?
15:55 What Happens Next
Americans now owe 1.28 trillion dollars on their credit cards.
That number hit a new record in Q4 2025, climbing to a level never seen before.
Behind that headline figure, though, there's a split.
The top half of earners are racking up points on flights and fine dining.
The bottom half, meanwhile, are borrowing to cover groceries and rent
and a growing number of them are falling behind.
Serious delinquencies have hit their highest level since the aftermath of the financial crisis,
with states like Mississippi seeing more than a third of card balances in distress.
And now there's a political wildcard in play too.
The Trump administration has proposed capping credit card interest rates at 10% for one year.
Banks say it would shut millions out of credit overnight.
Consumer advocates say the industry can absorb it.
The truth probably depends on which side of the income split you're standing on.
My name is Guy and you're watching Coin Bureau Finance.
Now, inflation may be slowing down, but CPI readouts will be of little consolation
to anyone who remembers the cost of living like four years ago.
The price of everything from rent to groceries, insurance and child care
has escaped orbit and it's not coming back down.
For the bottom quartile of US earners, wage growth hasn't come close to filling that gap.
The difference between what people earn and what life costs has to go somewhere.
And for tens of millions of Americans, it's going onto a credit card.
The average APR on a new card is now above 22%.
If you pay your balance in full each month, you never see that rate.
But the moment you can't, the unpaid portion rolls over and starts accruing interest.
And that's when that 22% starts to bite.
For subprime borrowers, the ones most likely to be carrying these rolled over balances,
rates above 30% are common.
And at those levels, the minimum payment barely touches the principal.
More than half of it goes straight to interest.
It's like a treadmill where the belt speeds up faster than you can run.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, or CFPB,
found that 13% of credit card holders are in what it calls persistent debt,
meaning they've been paying more in interest and fees than they've paid down in principal.
Paying loans with loans indefinitely.
Nearly three quarters of revolving cardholders now report
carrying balances for essential expenses like fuel, food and medical co-pays.
So the credit card has quietly become the lender of last resort for working class America,
filling a gap that wages, savings and public safety nets used to cover.
The San Francisco Fed estimates that the pandemic era savings buffer
that once kept this dynamic at bay was fully depleted by mid 2024.
Since then, revolving credit balances have grown every single quarter.
And because the Fed has held rates higher and for longer than most borrowers expected,
the cost of carrying this structural deficit keeps compounding.
Each month, the rate environment stays where it is.
The interest burden on existing balances grows even if nobody adds another dollar of new debt.
The result is a consumer economy running on borrowed time in the most literal sense.
Now, household balance sheets look stable in aggregate because affluent borrowers with low
utilisation and strong payment histories are pulling the average towards healthy.
But if you strip that out, the picture underneath is considerably worse.
So America is up to its eyeballs in credit card debt.
But the problem with the record balance statistics is that they are a lagging indicator.
They tell you where the debt is and not where it's heading.
For that, you need to look at transition rates,
how quickly borrowers are sliding from being on top of their credit card payments
to being 30 days late, then from 30 to 60 days late, and then from 60 to 90 plus.
And what do you know, those rates are accelerating.
Nationally, more than 7% of credit card balances are now in serious delinquency,
defined as 90 or more days past due.
That's the highest since 2010.
But even that number understates the problem because it's a countrywide average
dragged towards healthy by prime borrowers who are doing fine.
In the lowest income zip codes, the 90 plus day rate has surged
from roughly 12% in 2022 to over 20.1% today.
But it's the state level picture where things get really hairy.
In Mississippi, almost 37% of card balances are in some stage of delinquency.
Louisiana sits at 32% and Alabama 30%.
These are depression level numbers,
concentrated in the parts of the country with the least economic cushion to absorb them.
And then there's student loans.
Federal student loan repayments resumed in 2024 after years of pandemic era forbearance.
But the Biden administration ran a grace period through the end of that year
where missed payments weren't reported to credit bureaus.
During that onramp, student loan delinquency sat at 0.7%.
Once the protections expired, though, and bureaus started reporting the real picture,
it jumped to 16.19% in late 2025.
And when student loan bill delinquency suddenly shows up on your credit report,
something else has to give.
For a lot of these borrowers, that something is the credit card.
Official credit card statistics may also be understating the full picture.
Buy now, pay later, or BNPL, services have exploded in recent years
with volumes now approaching $70 billion annually.
And because BNPL isn't consistently reported to credit bureaus,
it represents a layer of consumer leverage that doesn't show up in the headline debt figures.
The CFPB found that 41% of BNPL users had made a late payment on their most recent loan.
This is disproportionately concentrated among borrowers already stretched thin,
the same cohort falling behind on their credit cards.
Now, if you're thinking, I'm not one of these people, why should I care?
Then let's have a think.
Consumer spending accounts for roughly 70% of US GDP.
When the bottom 40% of earners hit their borrowing ceiling,
the effects are going to show up in cash registers.
And this appears to be what happened at the end of last year.
Retail sales flatlined through December and into January,
even with the holiday season supposedly juicing demand.
And the spending that did happen was heavily skewed.
Visa and MasterCard transaction data shows higher income cardholders
still spending freely on travel and eating out,
while mass market spending has shifted almost entirely to essentials.
People are swapping brands, cutting quantities and dropping discretionary purchases altogether.
The trade down is real and accelerating.
And that is not great news for the US economy.
When enough consumers pull back at once, businesses feel it as slowing revenue.
Slowing revenue leads to thinner margins, which leads to hiring freezes,
which leads to fewer paychecks circulating in the economy,
which leads to more people leaning on credit cards to bridge the gap.
It's a textbook feedback loop, in other words, and it's already showing up in the data.
Retailers from dollar stores to mid-range apparel chains
have flagged cautious consumer behaviour,
with several citing credit-stressed households specifically.
Dollar General, which operates almost 20,000 stores in low-income communities across the US,
told investors on its most recent earnings call
that core customers are making fewer trips and buying smaller quantities.
Target, meanwhile, cut its full year guidance after reporting
weaker-than-expected discretionary sales,
particularly in home goods and apparel.
And there's a subtler drag at work, too.
A recent survey by the American Staffing Association found that
40% of workers say personal debt is influencing their career decisions.
People are staying in jobs they'd otherwise leave,
turning down opportunities that involve relocation costs
and indeed avoiding the risk of a career change altogether.
So, as you can see, class-level financial stress has macroeconomic effects
that run deeper than reduced consumer spending.
It also reduces mobility, risk-taking,
and the kind of economic dynamism that is supposed to drive productivity growth.
An economy where a large share of the workforce is too indebted to move,
retrain or take a chance is an economy that's losing flexibility,
even if the headline employment numbers still look solid.
So, the consumption engine that powers American GDP
is running on fumes for a growing share of the population.
The aggregate numbers don't show a crisis yet because the top half is still spending.
But the bottom half has gone from spending to surviving,
and the gap between the two is widening every quarter.
And speaking of surviving, if you want to face macroeconomic pressures like this
and come out in one piece, then being well-informed is a must.
That's why every week we publish a free newsletter
breaking down all of the most important and interesting stories in global finance,
delivered right to your inbox.
And we've also got some exclusive finance-related deals
just for the viewers of this channel.
So, click the link in the description or scan this QR code to find out more.
The newsletter is free and the deals are exclusively for you.
And now, if you want to see how this stress looks from the other side of the counter,
then bank earnings tell the story in black and white.
The key metric here is the charge-off rate,
the percentage of outstanding balances that the bank has given up on collecting entirely,
usually after six months of missed payments.
It's money they've written off as gone.
Capital One reported a charge-off rate of 4.93% in Q4 2025.
Discover came in at 5.03%.
Before the pandemic, these figures sat around 3 to 3.5%, so both are significantly elevated.
Even JP Morgan's card services division posted 3.14%,
which only looks healthy because their cardholder base skews wealthier.
Now, the outlier here is American Express at 2.1%,
but that's because their business model is built on transaction fees
and annual membership charges rather than revolving interest.
They make money when you spend, not when you can't pay.
For the rest of the industry though, the consumers who can't pay are the business model,
and those consumers are defaulting at the highest rate in over a decade.
And this brings us to that policy wildcard I mentioned earlier.
During his 2024 election campaign,
Donald Trump floated the idea of capping credit card interest rates at 10% for one year.
He reiterated the proposal at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2026,
and it's since been taken up by lawmakers on both sides of the aisle.
The idea has obvious public appeal because who doesn't want less usury?
But the banking industry, surprise, surprise, was disgusted.
On the day of Trump's Davos remarks, JP Morgan's share price fell 4%.
Bank of America's dropped 3.8% and Wells Fargo dumped 5%.
Meanwhile, in the following week, short interest across US financial stocks jumped 15%.
The market's verdict was swift and decisive.
A hard cap at 10% would blow a hole in bank card portfolios.
But aren't these bankers just fat cats grumbling that they might have to put up
with a smaller feast from next year's bonus?
Well, let's see what their argument is.
Banks' cost of funds, what they pay to borrow the money they lend out,
currently sits around 3.6%.
Layer on operating costs, fraud losses and charge-offs running at 5% for subprime heavy lenders,
and you're nearly at 10% in pure costs before the bank earns a single dollar of profit.
So a hard cap at that level means guaranteed losses on every subprime loan they write.
On the other hand, a study from Vanderbilt University argues that banks are crying wolf,
pointing out that subprime credit card portfolios generate a return on assets of 10.8%
compared to the national bank average of 1.11%.
In other words, there's plenty of fat that can be trimmed
before we need to start worrying about how banks will make ends meet.
But the industry counters that roughly four out of five card accounts
would become unprofitable under a 10% ceiling,
and that the response would be mass closures of subprime accounts
and slashed credit limits across the board.
And the White House appears to have heeded the pushback.
In late January, Kevin Hassett, director of the National Economic Council,
floated a softer alternative, the so-called Trump card.
This would be a voluntary program where participating banks offer a 10% APR product
exclusively to borrowers with pristine credit scores of 780 or above.
Now, consumer advocates were quick to point out that a 10% card
for the people who already qualify for the best rates
does nothing for the borrowers actually drowning in 30% interest.
It's a rebrand of a product that already exists,
dressed up as relief courtesy of the president himself.
Meanwhile, the broader industry response to margin pressure appears to be consolidation.
Capital One's $35.3 billion acquisition of Discover,
the largest bank merger in over a decade,
is being driven partly by the logic that scale is the only defence
in a world where per-account margins are shrinking.
That means bigger books, lower unit costs and more bargaining power with networks.
So, the same credit stress pushing consumers to the wall
is pushing banks towards concentration.
I wonder how that will work out for the consumer.
So, this 10% cap debate is now a hot potato for banks, borrowers and markets alike.
The range of possible outcomes is wide enough that nobody's making confident bets
because each path leads somewhere very different.
Let's consider what could happen if this hard cap actually passes.
Say Congress legislates a 10% ceiling on credit card APRs for 12 months.
Banks respond the way they've promised to,
by slashing credit limits and closing subprime accounts overnight.
An estimated 47 million Americans lose access to mainstream credit.
Spending obviously plunges as a huge slice of the population
find their card no longer works.
Now, of course, these people don't stop needing access to credit.
But shunned by the traditional banking system, where can they go?
Well, they could migrate to payday lenders,
pawn shops and unregulated fintech products,
charging rates that make 30% look like charity.
And there is precedent for something like this.
Chile imposed rate caps on consumer lending in 2013
and lending to high risk borrowers fell 19% within a year.
The people the policy was supposed to help were apparently the first to lose access.
Many of them turned to informal lenders and unregulated credit providers,
offering worse terms than the banks ever had.
In this case, at least, the caps didn't eliminate expensive borrowing.
They just moved it somewhere with even less oversight and even fewer consumer protections.
And there's no reason to assume the same thing wouldn't happen in the US.
Now, in the second scenario, the Trump card proposal gains traction instead.
Banks voluntarily offer a 10% product, but only to borrowers with credit scores above 780.
It's a niche offering for the already credit worthy,
marketed as a presidential win for the American consumer.
Meanwhile, the borrowers trapped in persistent debt at 30% see no change whatsoever.
The bifurcation deepens.
Cheap credit for people who don't need it, expensive credit for people who can't escape it.
But the third scenario is probably the most likely.
The cap stalls in Congress, as these proposals usually do when the banking lobby gets to work.
But the threat alone could influence banks' behaviour.
The Fed's most recent senior loan officer survey already shows banks
tightening their lending standards for credit cards,
reducing limits and raising approval thresholds.
This could gradually squeeze out subprime borrowers
through declining offers, lower limits and rising fees.
This is what economists call the waterbed effect.
If you push down interest rates, the pressure pops up somewhere else.
That could mean more in annual and late fees and balance transfer charges.
The consumer ends up paying the same amount just through a different line item.
Likewise, the waterbed effect will also likely destroy
America's credit card rewards ecosystem entirely.
That's because the points, miles and cashback that prime borrowers love
are heavily subsidised by the interest paid by subprime borrowers.
If a 10% cap obliterates those interest margins, that subsidy is toast.
The Vanderbilt policy accelerator estimates that to preserve profitability under a cap,
banks would need to slash rewards budgets by approximately $27 billion annually.
That means the end of 3% cashback on dining,
the end of sign-up bonuses and no more complementary airport lounge access either.
The industry would likely revert to a vanilla credit market similar to Europe's,
where cards are purely transactional tools rather than wealth maximisation engines.
But maybe the most important takeaway is that in any of these scenarios,
the underlying problem remains.
Wages for the bottom third of American owners haven't kept pace with the cost of living,
and credit has been plugging that gap for years.
The cap debate, whichever way it lands, is an argument about the terms of the borrowing,
not about whether the borrowing should be necessary in the first place.
And that's the part nobody in Washington will entertain.
You can tinker around with rates, restructure products and consolidate banks as much as you
want, but as long as a trip to the supermarket costs more than the hourly wage of the person
stacking the shelves, the bottom half of Americans will be fighting to stay upright
on the credit card treadmill, paying loans with loans to stave off another default.
Not exactly living the American dream, is it?
And if you want to learn more about how capital is fighting to keep that treadmill running
by turning every aspect of life into a paid subscription,
then you're in luck because we have a video report about how that's going right over here.
That's all from me for now, though, so as always,
thank you for watching and I'll see you next time.
This is Guy, over and out.
