CHINA COMPETITION- Hon. Brian Hart

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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Feb 26, 2026
27th Parliamentary Intelligence- Security Forum
Washington, D.C🇺🇸- December 4-5, 2024
-Hon. Brian Hart
Deputy Director and Fellow of the China Power Project at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Thank you all, and good afternoon.
I'm going to switch gears a little bit
and talk about something that I spend a lot of my time
working on, which is Taiwan, and really
what the Chinese military, the PLA, is doing around Taiwan.
And just to kind of frame all of this,
I think it's important to note that for this panel being
on China competition, I think Taiwan
is one of the issues really at the core of U.S.-China
tensions today.
And the Chinese would agree with that just a few weeks ago
when Xi Jinping met with President Biden.
She listed four red lines that China
has in U.S.-China relations.
And the first one that he listed was Taiwan.
And listing that first was not an accident.
It really has been at the core of these tensions.
And I think that that's likely to persist going forward.
So what I thought I would do is really focus concretely
on a couple of things that we've been observing
in terms of China's activities towards Taiwan recently.
And from that, I want to conclude with three points
about where I think that tells us
things are going going forward.
I think, first of all, I want to focus
on some of the recent activities that the PLA did in October
of this year when they held what they called Joint Sword 2024B
military exercises around Taiwan.
So on October 10, Taiwan's President Lai Ching-da
gave his National Day speech.
This is something that's a long-held tradition
that Taiwan's leaders do every year to mark this date.
And typically, there's not much fanfare around it.
But this year, there was a lot of attention paid
because there was a strong likelihood
that China would launch these large-scale military exercises
as an escalation against the speech.
And that's exactly what they did.
Four days after Lai gave his speech,
the PLA initiated large-scale exercises.
And that day saw record levels of PLA activity around Taiwan,
over 100 aircraft sorties flying around Taiwan,
record numbers of naval activity as well.
And I think taking a step back from that, even ahead of that,
we've seen a dramatic uptick in PLA activity before this began.
So back in May of this year after Lai's inauguration,
China did Joint Sword 2024A,
which signaled to all of us watching the PLA
that this would happen again, and that's exactly what they've done.
And in the summer, too, I think they were signaling ahead of this
that the PLA was going to be really active.
We saw a significant amount of signaling,
specifically, I think, focused on signaling to the United States.
Just a few days before these exercises started,
China launched a DF-31 ICBM into the Pacific Ocean.
That's something they had not done since 1980.
So a clear signal from Beijing
that the PLA is going to be playing a big role now and going forward.
The second lesson I think we drew from that
was that the Coast Guard,
China's Coast Guard is increasingly an important part of what they're doing.
And so we saw a record level of Coast Guard activity
involved with these PLA operations as well.
Taiwan's Ministry of Defense reported, I think,
17 Coast Guard vessels operating around Taiwan,
but our team at CSS was able to use AIS ship tracking data
to show that if you widen that scope just a little bit,
there were actually 33 vessels,
at least 33 vessels operating around Taiwan
and some of the areas around that,
including Senkaku, Diaoyu Islands that are disputed,
as well as some of Taiwan's additional outlying islands.
So I think if you take that together and you see,
you know, over 30 Coast Guard vessels
operating alongside a few dozen other PLA vessels,
and really what that tells us is that
China is preparing for a range of activities beyond just engagement.
Really, the Coast Guard would likely be involved
in something like a quarantine or blockade.
And we see them out, you know,
doing the exact kind of operations to prepare for those kinds of activities.
So I think that that was the second major lesson from that activity.
And I think one of the third things that we saw that was pretty interesting
and somewhat new was the involvement of China
really engaging some of its key partners
at the same time that it was conducting these exercises.
And specifically, we see signs that China is increasingly looking
to engage with what some might call the axis of authoritarians
or the axis of people, which includes, in addition to China,
includes Russia, North Korea, and Iran.
So the same day that these exercises were occurring,
Russia's defense minister was in Beijing
meeting with China's defense minister,
and the next day was meeting with China's,
the vice chairman of China's military commission,
Central Military Commission, Zhang Youchao.
This is the first, you know, in all the exercises
that we've been tracking over the years,
this is the first time that we saw major high-level China-Russia joint activity
occurring at the same time as these exercises.
And, you know, it's impossible to say for sure that that was intentional timing,
but I think even if it wasn't,
quite, you know, striking to see Beijing and Moscow
engaging on these issues at the same time
that China's conducting such major operations around Taiwan,
and, of course, not to mention Russia is involved in the war in North Korea.
So I want to just quickly wrap up.
I think we're looking forward to getting to a discussion in Q&A,
but, you know, just drawing from these three kind of lessons that I've learned,
I want to project a little bit more into the future
and think about what this tells us about what we can see from China
and China's military around Taiwan going forward.
The first is I really think that we can just see,
we can expect more PLA activities going forward,
and, in fact, we know this.
China's defense ministry during these exercises
said that they will do this again.
Anytime that they see a perceived provocation from Taiwan,
they will use the PLA to send a message,
and, in fact, we may see that in the coming days.
Taiwan's president right now is returning from about a week-long trip abroad,
during which he transited the United States, Hawaii, and Guam,
and China has reacted to this in the past with a major exercise.
So stay on the news next week,
and you may see the PLA conducting joint tours 2024C,
and, by and large, I think more broadly,
we're going to see the PLA more engaged.
I think as the PLA's capabilities are growing,
Beijing feels more comfortable using the PLA
as a tool for political signaling and deterrence signaling,
especially against the United States.
Second big point that I want to mention is, again,
this issue of quarantining and blockading.
Of course, much of the discourse here in Washington revolves around,
when is D-Day, when is the PLA going to invade?
Of course, we need to take seriously the threat that the PLA,
that Xi Jinping and the CCP could decide
that hope for a peaceful unification is lost
and that they need to take action,
and, of course, invasion is one option they can take.
But it's also clear from the activities
that they've been taking in recent months,
really since August of 2022,
a blockade and a quarantine is certainly on the table
in terms of an option that Beijing can take.
And that's important for U.S. planners.
It's important for Taipei.
It's also important for U.S. allies
in terms of how we prepare for various contingencies,
and it'll impact the kind of decisions
we need to make on training,
on operational readiness, on capability, and on force.
It's the kind of forces you need to respond to something
like a coast guard-like quarantine
are quite different from something
that you need to engage Beijing in a full-scale invasion.
And number three, I think this big question is,
again, about how China may be engaging partners like Russia.
Will Russia be sticking its nose a little bit closer to Taiwan?
So far, I think that's something that Russia
has not necessarily wanted to get involved in
because it has its own issues going on in Ukraine.
But we are seeing steady willingness from Beijing
to engage Russia and some other partners on this.
And I think just this week, for example,
we see a Russian submarine and naval warship
operating near the Japanese island of Yonaguni,
which is not far from Taiwan.
So we're seeing Russians, and the Russians have engaged
in a record number of joint military exercises
with China in just this year alone.
So we're seeing them step up their involvement
with each other.
We're seeing Russia engage in the Western Pacific,
potentially getting close to Taiwan
in ways that are concerning.
And so I think that this is a really important thing
for Washington and Taipei
to kind of continue to watch going forward.
And then I think just to wrap up,
I think why is this all important?
Of course, we know, you hear a record daily
why Taiwan is important.
You think about ships.
You think about the humanitarian need
to protect this island of 22 million people.
Why else does it matter?
I just want to conclude with one recent bit of research
that we put out at CSIS,
which is tracking the amount of trade
that goes to the Taiwan Strait.
Our data, people at CSIS helped us crunch these numbers
and found that over $2.5 trillion of goods
passed through the Taiwan Strait in 2022,
which is about a fifth of all maritime traffic.
So take aside what Taiwan itself,
its importance and its criticality to the global economy.
Taiwan Strait, too, is a critical part of global commerce.
So it doesn't take just an invasion
to upset that delicate balance.
A blockade, a quarantine, or other activities
could upset that balance
and could create a lot of headaches
for not just the governments and capitals around the world,
but also the businesses that depend on that
or the lifeblood of the economy.
With that, I'll wrap up and look forward
to the rest of the panel.
Thank you.
