THE KOREAN PENINSULA- Mr Sydney Seiler

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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27th Parliamentary Intelligence- Security Forum
Washington, D.C🇺🇸- December 4-5, 2024
-Mr. Sydney Seiler
Senior Advisor, Korea Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Thanks everybody. Fascinating developments in Korea. I first went to Korea in 1982. It was
about two years after the 1980 martial law and it's a young man, you know, on a college campus
in South Korea wondering why I always had to live amid pepper gas and rocks being thrown.
You know, it is remarkable the democratic developments that have taken place there.
At the same time, we see the vulnerabilities. I actually wanted to focus on the DPRK. Compared to
17 martial laws in South Korea, there's only been one martial law in North Korea. Unfortunately,
it's lasted 79 years. And so, joking aside, you know, as we look at the question that I get asked
most often these days, obviously, is what direction will U.S. DPRK relations potentially
head under President Trump? I had the advantage of having been in Korea in an assignment I chose.
I wanted to go one last time before I retired from civil service. So, I was there in Korea
for that crazy 2016 to 2017 missile-a-month mania. My button's bigger than your button,
full fire, inferior to the likes of which the world has never seen. And I had the opportunity
as a senior analyst out there to brief every CODEL that came through the region. And I would
say at the time, I'm not going to speak to how orthodox President Trump is or how normal of
diplomacy this might be characterized, but he's taking a new approach to North Korea that's
testing some propositions like, boy, if we just talk to the right person at the right level,
we could solve all these things. And, you know, at the end of the day, all North Korea really wants
is a better relationship with the United States. That's why they develop the weapons, the missiles,
and the nuclear weapons after all, right? I think 30 years later, after multiple attempts
at negotiating with North Korea, the verdict comes out with an entirely different
outcome. To understand the potential for where we go from here with North Korea,
I think it's really important to kind of take a brief reflection on where we've come,
particularly since the failed summit in Hanoi in February 2019. This was a failure. This was
a major failure for Kim Jong-un, who came to the summit expecting President Trump to cave
for a very lowball deal where they would put a small part of their program on the table in
exchange for major sanctions relief, while failing to address the other covert parts of
its program. It is denied to us since Assistant Secretary Jim Kelly first went there in October
of 2002. Kim had built up the whole diplomatic process of 2018 to 2019 to his home audience
as international recognition of the nuclear power great country status that the DPRK had achieved
through its development of nuclear weapons. If you remember the missile launches of 2017
crescendoing to an ICBM that appeared capable of ranging the United States, Singapore and Hanoi
were to be victory laps. Finally, the Americans are coming to me on my terms. I will put the
denuclearization word out there. Like, who doesn't support denuclearization of the world?
We all want to live in a world without nuclear weapons. And until that day comes, we're going
to keep on and we're going to build more and more. It had been a negotiating position that I was very
familiar with having been involved in six-party talks, been involved in the Obama administration
even one year as a special envoy. There was nothing new in what we were hearing in either
Singapore or Hanoi. But to Kim, the firmness with which President Trump came to Hanoi,
his understanding of the North Korean nuclear program, his understanding of what would be
important as part of a deal, and his understanding of how we might incrementally move in a step-by-step
process was met by Kim Jong-un's shock that he had been lied to by his analysts, by South Korea
government officials, by his perception that somehow President Trump's domestic difficulties
would have him capitulate quickly. And that has shaped Kim Jong-un's thinking fundamentally since
then. Because we move from an era going back to the agreed framework of the 1990s through the
six-party talks, leap day understanding of the Obama era, and then finally Singapore, Hanoi,
an era where there was at least enough credibility to denuclearization talks that we could sit down
and talk about something, some shared goal, even though we knew it would be hard if not
impossible, to an era now in the post-Hanoi period where Kim Jong-un has proclaimed,
justified by a party platform that was agreed upon at the end of 2019, announced in 2020,
and went into place, we don't need diplomacy, we don't need sanctions relief,
we don't need help from the outside, through a head-on breakthrough offensive,
we will prevail. It'll be difficult, there'll be an arduous struggle, an arduous march,
there'll be bell tightening, but we'll get through it through self-reliance.
And we'll deal with countries who will deal with us on our terms. Those terms are, one,
stop coordinating with the U.S., two, take the nuclear issue off the table. It's not for
discussion anymore. It's not a credible discussion for any two countries to meet.
And then finally, explore economic cooperation that ignores sanctions, that is willing to go
forward. These were actually the demands of the Moon Jae-in administration, something good to
file away in the back of your mind. Every day, the North would say, stop talking to the U.S.,
stop thinking the nuclear issue is an inter-Korea issue, and stop allowing sanctions to be a barrier
to inter-Korean reconciliation. Now he throws that out to the world, and finally he's got a taker,
Vladimir Putin. First driven to a cooperative relationship, as Vladimir Putin desperately
needed munitions for the battlefield and missiles, and now expanded into a strategic partnership
that is increasingly, potentially destabilizing. As North Korea developed its WMD program from the
1990s onward, the benefactors it had in the Cold War era that allowed for them to stand up the
military they had and then maintain it with spare parts, fuel, etc., all disappeared. And for the
last 30 years, the conventional force has significantly deteriorated. Part of what we
all are afraid, we all are concerned about what Russia might be providing North Korea in terms of
help to its WMD program, and its missile program, and its space program. But more troubling,
perhaps, is the assistance that to the, first of all, the DPRK munitions industry. So for now,
they can help supply Russia, but they can also backfill depleted inventories within their own
forces, and then upgrade and modernize select capabilities, such as perhaps a nuclear-powered
submarine and air defense capability, handed over a week or two ago. And I would expect more
of that. So what you will have is a more robust, vigorous fighting force that can actually follow
through on some of its threats, very similar to the type of axis of evil revisionism that we're
seeing out of Vladimir Putin. You know, Kim Jong-un has an opportunity to achieve long-standing
strategic goals vis-a-vis South Korea, to intimidate it, to dominate it, maybe even
redefine borders in a way that would weaken the ROK president even further, politically embarrass
him, drive a wedge in the U.S.-South Korea relationship, and eventually achieve that
long-desired goal of getting U.S. forces off the peninsula, and revocation of the security
assurances that the United States now provides to South Korea. U.S. policy has been relatively
consistent. It's criticized as strategic patience. I can tell you in my four and a half years working
the policy side, I'm an intel guy, but I did spend those four and a half years both at the
White House and at State, we never use the term strategic patience. But what we did say is we're
not going to chase North Korea. We're not going to reward it merely for showing up at the table.
We're not going to erode the strength of our military deterrent and our financial
sanctions, even though we know they're not perfect. They do help slow and impede the program to some
degree. We remain open for talks. We keep the pressure on, and then we provide deterrence to
South Korea. Jay spoke about some of the transformations that might come into play.
It should power go back in the hand of the progressives. What would U.S.-ROK cooperation
look like in that case? It will have to be recalibrated. During the Moon administration,
they wanted no military exercises. During the Moon administration, they wanted us to roll back
extended deterrence deployments, such as B-52 bomber missions, carrier strike groups, nuclear
missile submarines. We might go into a period where, once again, that demand signal for us to
show that is no longer there, that our exercises will reduce in terms of scope and scale and
messaging volume. That said, we made it through five years of a progressive government who didn't
want us to do those things, and President Trump at that time, remember, he was highly skeptical
of the value of exercises. He said they were a waste of money, a waste of resources, and that
South Korea should pick up more of the bill. Nevertheless, readiness was maintained, deterrence
was maintained, and we made it through. So there's a lot of questions going forward. The events of
the last 48 hours, again, they're not the first time there's been tumultuous political events
on the peninsula that the U.S.-South Korea relationship has had to endure. It survived.
I remember one senior military official who had worked in other theaters where we went in
and we left before the roots necessary for a strong, sustainable government had taken place.
We remained committed to the Republic of Korea for 70 years, and that's helped them go as far
as they have in democratization. The default assumption is that we'll continue going forward.
