THE KOREAN PENINSULA- Mrs. Rachel Minyoung Lee

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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Feb 26, 2026
27th Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
Washington, D.C🇺🇸- December 4-5, 2024
Hi, thank you for having me. I am honored to be here and to be able to share my
insight or observations with you and I'm honored to be joined by my distinguished
fellow panelists. Sid talked a lot about the U.S., the future trajectory of U.S.-DPRK relations
and in the hopes of maybe not overlapping too much with what Sid said, I'll briefly maybe touch
on my own reflections about the prospects of DPRK-U.S. engagement. I think it is important to
recall or understand that the strategic environment that the incoming Trump administration
will inherit is vastly different from the one he experienced when he was in office.
For the reasons that Sid said, he talked at length about the post-Hanoi summit,
the repercussions of the summit's failure that have had on Kim Jong-un's thinking.
I think one thing that I would like to add to what Sid said is how the failure of the
Hanoi summit has prompted North Korea to really think hard about its policy on the United States.
I think the one main takeaway for Kim Jong-un from the Hanoi summit is that the DPRK and the U.S.
are in for a long-term confrontation, which meant for Kim Jong-un that he had to prepare for
longer-term threats, in his words, from the United States.
I think that, again, also in addition to that, I think the collapse of the Hanoi summit also
prompted Kim and his associates to think also about the value of the United States.
I think with the great power competition, we talk a lot about U.S.-Sino strategic competition,
the great power competition has influenced or impacted Kim and his associates' thinking about
the U.S., how they perceive the U.S. leadership on the global stage, the perceived waning leadership
of the United States on the global stage, which I think also fed into North Korea's
foreign policy reorientation. In September 22, in his speech to the North Korean National
Assembly, he basically renounced his policy of more than 30 years of normalizing relations with
the U.S. through denuclearization. In that speech that I referred to, he essentially renounced or
declared that there would be no denuclearization. There was one if clause in there. He said that if
his denuclearization of nuclear policy were to change, the world has to change,
and the political and military environment in Northeast Asia has to change. Based on what he
said about no denuclearization in that same speech and the past statements from the DPRK
about the U.S., that basically amounted to, in my opinion, the removal of U.S. extended deterrence
from the region. Going back to prospects then for U.S.-DPRK engagement in the future, any prospects
for any nuclear negotiations between the two countries in the future, I think for any substantial
progress to be made between the two countries, the Trump administration would have to offer
a shockingly different deal, which then goes back to my point earlier about
North Korea's thinking, the condition for resuming nuclear negotiations and even for
making substantial or even any meaningful progress, which is removal of extended deterrence.
I think in my mind, that would probably, again, based on past North Korean statements also,
is tantamount to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea, if not complete withdrawal,
a substantial reduction of the forces, and a complete stop to the joint drills between the
United States and South Korea. I think maybe perhaps if those two conditions were met,
then those would perhaps be enough for North Korea to at least engage in and make some progress in
nuclear talks. But other than that, I'm having a hard time thinking what else would entice
North Korea back to the table, number one, and actually make it possible for the nuclear talks
to make any substantial headway. I talked about foreign reorientation of North Korea,
so when we talk about North Korea's foreign policy reorientation, I think we do have to talk about
Russia, DPRK-Russia relations, which is the second point of my talking points.
There is a lot of questions still, I think, about whether the DPRK-Russia relationship is
a transactional, commercial, tactical relationship that will not outlast the war in Ukraine,
or whether it's a longer-term strategic relationship. I don't think anybody can say
what the actual outcome will be. In fact, I highly doubt that Kim Jong-un and Putin
themselves know what the outcome of this relationship will be. But as a North Korea
expert, looking at this from Kim Jong-un's point of view, I think that North Korea's intention is
definitely longer-term and strategic. We talk a lot about the immediate benefits of
the war, the DPRK-Russia relationship for North Korea. We talk about the cash, we talk about the
oil supplies from Russia. We talk about the possible transfers of sensitive military technology
from Russia to North Korea. We talk about, since the news about North Korea sending troops to
Russia, we talk about also the real battlefield experience that North Korea may be getting
by sending troops to the war front. But more from a mid-medium to longer-term point of view, I think
Kim Jong-un is looking for other benefits as well that I think would be worth
for us to think about. I think for Kim Jong-un, it's not just a war
between Russia and Ukraine. This has more meaning to him than that. It's more about
joining forces with Russia, fighting side by side with a major power
to build a new global order. These are the words that he himself has used and
that North Korea's foreign ministry has used time and again, at least going back to October 2023.
Building a new global order based on independence, justice against imperialism.
North Korea has in effect become a major global player. There's not a day that goes by where we
read about the war in Ukraine where North Korea is not mentioned in one way or the other.
Not in a good way, but North Korea has become a bigger actor on the global stage.
I think that for Kim creates bigger diplomatic space, speaking of which,
the other thing that Kim Jong-un may be looking for also through its improved and deepening
relationship with Russia is to gain access to international or multilateral forums such as
BRICS. For the first time in September 2024, we saw North Korea sending its foreign minister
to a BRICS event. I believe it was the BRICS women's forum where the foreign minister talked
about various issues, including the regional situation in Northeast Asia.
I think that is something also that North Korea may be looking forward to is to gain access
through Russia to gain access to multilateral institutions. Again, gaining greater flexibility
for its diplomatic efforts on the global stage and regionally as well.
The economic impact, the longer-term economic impact also of the deepening relationship between
the DPRK and Russia. I don't believe that Kim Jong-un has sent troops to Russia just for cash
and whatever military technology he is seeking to get from Russia. The cash that he may be earning
from the troop dispatch, I think, is very small compared to how much he is gaining or how much
he is earning through cyber theft, which is in the millions and perhaps even in the billions.
Of course, he would appreciate that extra cash, but I think that is not the main reason.
The longer-term impact probably economically is, Sid mentioned this earlier in his presentation,
but the revitalization of North Korea's munitions industry, the defense and munitions
industries, and through that revitalizing, perhaps, Kim Jong-un hoping to revitalize
the civilian economy as well, because there has to be that trickle-down effect.
Those are some of the benefits that I think that Kim Jong-un is looking forward to reaping
by improving the relationship with Russia. China, I would like to conclude by adding
one thing about China. We rarely talk about China these days when we talk about North Korea,
which is kind of strange because we always talk about China when we talk about North Korea,
but these days it is all about deep-heritage Russia. I think one of the reasons why North
Korea is doing this, aligning with Russia, if you look at the treaty that they signed in June,
it is very comprehensive. There are a lot of economic trade elements. I think Kim Jong-un's
major concern is the over-reliance on China economically and financially. I think,
again, by improving relations with Russia and hopefully through Russia, I think North Korea
is trying to diversify its economic and trade relations with other countries that are friends
with Russia. For example, we have seen relatively higher-level Belarusian delegations visiting North
Korea just this year, twice, two delegations alone, where they talked about agricultural
cooperation. Belarus has wheat, they have fertilizer, both things that North Korea needs
very desperately and for which North Korea has relied China on more in the past. I think these
are the opportunities that, again, may be driving Kim Jong-un to improve and deepen and expand its
relations with Russia. What impact this might have on DPRK-China relations and China's leverage
over North Korea is something to think about because this relationship between the DPRK and
Russia has had an impact in the way that North Korea is approaching China. The two countries'
relationship has been strained over the past one year. There is hardly any exchange between
the two countries. It's all about Russia, Russia, Russia and North Korea's state propaganda.
The question to ask, I think, worth asking is, as we continue to look at North Korea and North
Korea-Russia relations, is North Korea's approach to China now more of a tactical,
temporary change or is this more of a strategic change, so maybe shifting away from China
and toward Russia? I don't think that North Korea will give up on China, given the importance
for North Korea that China has for North Korea economically, but I think it is worth thinking
about the possibility. I like to say that when we talk about North Korea-Russia relations,
we have to be a little bit creative and imaginative because three years ago,
we would not have imagined talking about DPRK-Russia relations. We would not have conceived
of this relationship coming this far or even Kim Jong-un sending weapons and troops.
