RESPONDING TO EMERGING TRENDS IN FINANCIAL CRIME- Hon. Brent McIntosh

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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27th Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
Washington, D.C🇺🇸- December 4-5, 2024
Hon. Brent McIntosh
Former Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs
Thank you. Thank you so much, Congressman, for the kind introduction, distinguished parliamentarians
and guests, and my friend JC. It's great to be back here at PISF. It's an honor to address you
on what I think is one of the most pressing challenges facing our global system today,
which is how to combat the emerging threats of financial crime, a problem that we see
acutely throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Why is this relevant to this session?
The combating financial crime is central to the effective exercise of geopolitical power.
Financial crime provides the flow of funds that is the lifeblood of bad actors around the world.
The misuse of the financial system empowers all of the threats we're discussing yesterday and today.
So, from our perspective, it is because of the evolution in statecraft that we've witnessed
in recent years that combating financial crime is so critical. Consider the tools of economic
statecraft, sanctions, export controls, money laundering controls, AML, trade measures, tariffs,
investment control regimes, such as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States,
CFIUS, which I used to oversee when I was at the Treasury Department.
In many areas of international tension, these tools supplement the military and diplomatic measures
that we have traditionally employed as means of influencing foreign states.
In fact, in some conflicts, especially recently, the tools of economic statecraft
have become the primary means of influencing and pressuring foreign actors.
So, for example, when you talk about U.S. efforts to compel China to modify its trade practices,
these have largely relied on economic measures, including sanctions and tariffs.
Or, as we've seen in the war between Russia and Ukraine, we've seen a dramatic expansion
in the use of tools of economic statecraft, especially sanctions and export controls.
The imposition of sanctions by the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom,
and other like-minded countries has spurred Russia to look for alternative ways to conduct
its trade and financial transactions, including turning to a number of countries in Asia.
So we see that a handful of Chinese entities, in particular, have been accused of helping Russia,
as well as Iran, North Korea, and other sanctioned nations,
bypass the restrictions imposed by the international community.
Since the onset of the conflict in Ukraine, Russia has circumvented international sanctions
to acquire approximately 4 billion U.S. dollars' worth of restricted technology,
including microchips. And this was achieved through a network of more than 6,000 shell
companies, many of them registered in jurisdictions like Hong Kong.
Those shell companies facilitated the transfer of sanctioned technologies, the transfer of
sanctioned goods to Russia by acting as intermediaries and obscuring the true
destination of the sensitive technologies that were the subject of those transactions.
As recently as October 30th of this year, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed new sanctions
against entities based in China, Hong Kong, India, and Thailand for supplying Russia with
advanced technology and equipment for its military industrial base. And even outside the Ukraine war,
we're seeing a convergence of different types of financial crime heavily concentrated throughout
Asia. So we take money laundering, sanctions evasion, export control violations. These are
no longer isolated categories of financial crime or separate threats. Indeed, they are increasingly
occurring in conjunction with one another and are intertwined. So, for example, using money
laundering to facilitate sanctions evasions or to facilitate export control violations.
In this context, the landscape of financial crime is rapidly shifting. It's shaped by a
combination of geopolitical developments, technological advancements, and the increasing
complexity of the global financial system. So financial crime is becoming increasingly
sophisticated, interconnected, and adaptive. The bad actors of today are not only more
technologically savvy, they're also more global in their reach and their coordination.
Their immediate activities and their immediate aims are tactical, which is to say they're using
various techniques to disguise financial flows that allow the laundering money, the evasion
of sanctions, or export control violations. But longer term, these same bad actors are trying to
establish durable alternative mechanisms to allow them to operate outside the reach of sanctions and
AML tools that the U.S. and its allies and partners bring to bear. So we see efforts to create
alternative financial channels, some using digital asset technologies that do not rely on the U.S.
dollar or touch the U.S. financial infrastructure. We also see efforts to create an alternative to
the swift financial messaging system on which current payment rails primarily rely. And another
emerging trend in this space, as we see, which is truly a significant challenge to all of us as
financial institutions, as well as to regulators and lawmakers, is the growing use and deployment
of artificial intelligence, AI, and deep fake technologies by financial criminals globally.
These technologies have reached a point where they can be used to create highly realistic fake
documentation, including forged identities, synthetic financial records, even deceptive
video and audio content that is used to mislead financial institutions and governments. I've
seen this material. It is incredibly convincing. As those technologies become more accessible,
it is unfortunately democratizing bad actors' ability to carry out financial crime and to secure
the funding they need. So in addition to the geopolitical and technological challenges we're
grappling with, there's also the proliferation of cross-border data-to-privacy regulations.
This may seem to be a surprising topic for a meeting about geopolitical challenges.
These regulations can be important for safeguarding financial data,
personal financial data, companies' financial data. On the other hand, they do create barriers
to sharing of critical financial intelligence between countries and even within individual
financial institutions that span borders. The fragmentation of data privacy laws is increasingly
impeding the flow of information that is needed to track illicit activity across borders. The
ability to share information is fundamental to the detection and prevention of financial crimes.
The inability to share information across borders threatens the efficacy of the tools
of economic statecraft that are brought to bear against bad actors around the world.
Without a clear and consistent global framework for sharing data across borders,
financial institutions and government regulators are limited in their ability to conduct effective
network analysis and identify bad actors who are operating across borders. Last but not least,
the rise of fintechs and new financial technologies and non-bank payment intermediaries
has introduced new challenges to the regulatory landscape that we are still grappling with.
These innovations bring many benefits to the financial system, to underserved populations.
They also create new risks. Many countries have yet to develop the robust regulatory frameworks
to address these emerging sectors. And in the absence of consistent, harmonized global standards,
bad actors can exploit regulatory arbitrage, moving funds through jurisdictions with weak
oversight, and using new technologies to facilitate illicit transactions.
So the challenges are daunting. In the face of these daunting challenges, what's to be done?
Given the rapidly evolving nature of financial crimes, our response must be both comprehensive
and adaptive. Let me use my own company, Citigroup, as an example. No private sector
institution is more global than we are. We serve customers in 180 countries. We're physically
present in 94. We cannot, as an institution, afford to ignore the evolving sanctions,
AML and related risks that are accumulating around the world and in particular in Asia.
Our leadership is very focused on these threats. A few weeks ago, I was in Singapore and Kuala
Lumpur meeting with our AML and sanctions teams there to ensure we're staying vigilant in the
face of these threats. We have a highly expert and dedicated team of literally thousands of
professionals around the world who are engaged 24-7 in combating financial crime. And that team
will be the first to tell you that the threat environment is constantly evolving and becoming
more challenging every day. The criminals are continually becoming more sophisticated and more
resourceful. And as such, the work of financial institutions and of governments and of the
parliamentarians in this room seeking to thwart this illicit activity must grow concomitantly,
ever more sophisticated and resourceful. We need to be more stringent when operating in
this new environment. We need to apply new technology tools to enhance detection and
prevention. And we need to advocate for greater information sharing among governments, among
financial institutions across borders. Financial institutions, regulators, lawmakers, we need to
work together to build a framework. And that framework must balance the need for innovation
on the one hand and the need for robust oversight on the other. It must be capable of identifying,
preventing and mitigating emerging financial crime risk before they can do substantial harm.
One of the first steps in responding to these emerging threats is to strengthen a proactive,
risk-based AML and sanctions program. Fundamentally, AML and sanctions programs should be about
preventing bad behavior, not punishing it after the fact. That should be our shared goal.
Our financial institutions need to shift to recognize these new threats, moving from waiting
for deviations to being more predictive in our detection and recognition of these threats.
We need to design and deploy programs that can be tailored to track indicia of potential bad
activity. That includes industry, geography, counterparty, client behavior, before these
things become full-scale problems. And to accomplish that, we all need to invest in
comprehensive financial crimes compliance programs, which will cost a good deal of money,
but it's absolutely necessary to combat this threat. A critical area of our focus here is
cross-border financial activity. Preventing activity with sanctioned countries or entities
may seem straightforward, but the challenge becomes dramatically more complex when the illicit
transactions are facilitated by non-sanctioned countries or non-sanctioned entities that act
as intermediaries. Shell companies, complex corporate structures, third-party facilitators
are often used to disguise the true nature, the true ownership, the true control of the assets,
making it difficult to trace the flow of illicit funds. Financial institutions must therefore
continue to invest in enhanced due diligence procedures to identify the beneficial owners
behind seemingly legitimate companies and to ensure that we are not unwittingly being used
to facilitate illicit financial activity. This is where the traditional controls we have deployed
to prevention and detection remain effective but need to shift to a more proactive risk-based
framework. The growing reliance of the financial system on correspondent banking relationships to
facilitate international trade and payments, with that, our financial institutions need to
take a more active role in monitoring cross-border transactions. The challenge with many of these
transactions is that they often occur two or three steps removed from us and they're often
conducted with jurisdictions with weak regulatory standards, and this is where we need global
lawmakers to step in to create harmonized regulation that allows financial institutions
to track and scrutinize transactions across multiple layers of intermediaries, even when
those intermediaries are located in different jurisdictions with varying levels of regulatory
oversight. The ability to share information and intelligence across borders will be critical in
closing the gaps that bad actors currently exploit. Until we have that, bad actors will continue to
exploit loopholes by creating regulatory disparities, essentially regulatory arbitrage
to the advantage of our adversaries. Furthermore, one of the most important steps we can take is
enhancing information sharing, both domestically and internationally. The financial system is highly
interconnected and we need to share intelligence on suspicious activities and emerging threats in
real time. The United States already has such a program, Patriot Act Section 314B. Other countries
are adopting similar programs, so you have earlier this year the Monetary Authority of Singapore, MAS,
worked together with six major commercial banks in Singapore, including our own, to launch a
digital platform called Collaboration Sharing of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing
Information in Cases, which aggregates the acronym COSMIC, which was designed to root out
financial crime in these banks by sharing information across them. This is continuing
MAS's leadership in combating financial crime. These are excellent examples of how information
sharing can work. We need to build on these efforts to ensure that financial institutions
have the information they need to combat financial crimes. Finally, we've seen evolving expectations
on export controls, mostly in the know your customer KYC space. Over the past few years,
we've seen alerts on sanctions and export evasion coming out of FinCEN and the U.S. Commerce
Department, as well as the G7 giving industry guidance on preventing sanctions and export
control evasion. This rise in coordination among agencies and among governments and the upsurge of
industry-related guidance is a noteworthy and favorable development. So let me sum up quickly.
It's incumbent upon the financial industry to match with an equivalent increase in coordination
within financial institutions' AML, export controls, and sanctions compliance programs,
so that instances of potential evasion are rooted out, identified, reported proactively before they
happen. The landscape of financial crimes is rapidly evolving, and the threats it poses
are more complex and interconnected than ever. To respond effectively, we need to take a proactive,
predictive approach to rooting out financial crime and the bad behavior that it facilitates.
This means leveraging new technologies, enhancing due diligence, and fostering,
in particular, greater global coordination to close the gap that bad actors are exploiting.
We have a shared responsibility to protect the integrity of the system,
and I look forward to working together with all of you to strengthen and secure our defenses
against the forces of financial crime and the bad activities that it enables. Thank you very much.
