In this fascinating conversation, Michael Levin explores a radical idea: what if reality as we perceive it is not fundamental, but an interface constructed by the brain?
Drawing from his groundbreaking research in biology and complex systems, Levin explains how living organisms process information, make decisions, and shape their own development. He challenges conventional assumptions about intelligence, consciousness, and the nature of reality itself — suggesting that what we experience may be a simplified user interface to a much deeper layer of existence.
This discussion bridges biology, neuroscience, philosophy, and physics, offering a new framework for understanding mind, matter, and meaning.
GUEST BIO: Michael Levin is a biologist at Tufts University working on novel ways to understand and control complex pattern formation in biological systems.
So this is the good place to talk about the increasingly radical weird ideas
that you've been writing about.
You've mentioned it a few times, the platonic space.
So there's this ingressing minds paper where you described the platonic space.
You mentioned there's an asynchronous conference happening,
which is a fascinating concept because it's asynchronous.
People are just contributing asynchronously.
So what happened was this crazy notion, which I'll describe momentarily,
I have given a couple of talks on it.
I then found a couple of papers in the machine learning community
called the platonic representation hypothesis.
And I said, that's pretty cool.
These guys are climbing up to the same point
where I'm getting at it from biology and philosophy and whatever.
They're getting there from computer science and machine learning.
We'll take a couple hours.
I'll give a talk.
They'll give a talk.
We'll talk about it.
I thought there were going to be three talks at this thing.
Once I started reaching out to people for this,
everybody sort of said, I know somebody who's really into this stuff,
but they never talk about it because there's no audience for this.
So I reached out to them and then they said, yeah, I know this mathematician
or I know this economist, whatever, who has these ideas
and there's no way we can ever talk about them.
So I got this whole list and it became completely obvious
that we can't do this in the normal.
We're now booked up through December.
So every week in our center, somebody gives a talk.
We kind of discuss it.
It all goes on this thing.
I'll give you a link to it.
And then there's a huge running discussion after that.
And then in the end, we're all going to get together
for an actual real-time discussion section and talk about it.
But there's going to be probably 15 or so talks about this
from all kinds of disciplines.
It's blown up in a way that I didn't realize
how much undercurrent of these ideas had already existed
that were ready, like now is the time.
And I think this is, like, I've been thinking about these things
for, I don't know, 30 plus years.
I never talked about them before
because they weren't actionable before.
There wasn't a way to actually make empirical progress with this now.
You know, this is something that Pythagoras and Plato
and probably many people before them talked about.
But now we're to the point where we can actually do experiments
and they're making a difference in our research program.
You can just look it up, Platonic Space Conference.
There's a bunch of different fascinating talks.
Yours first on the patterns of forms and behavior beyond emergence.
Then Radical Platonism and Radical Empiricism from Joe Oditz.
And Patterns and Explanatory Gaps in Psychotherapy.
Does God Play Dice from Alexey Tolchinsky and so on.
So let's talk about it.
What is it?
And it's fascinating that the origins of some of these ideas
are connected to ML people thinking about representation space.
Yeah.
The first thing I want to say is that
while I'm currently calling it the Platonic Space,
I am in no way trying to stick close to
the things that Plato actually thought about.
In fact, to whatever extent we even know what that is,
I think I depart from that in some ways.
And I'm going to have to change the name at some point.
The reason I'm using the name now is because I wanted to be clear
about a particular connection to mathematics,
which a lot of mathematicians would call themselves Platonists,
because what they think they're doing is discovering,
not inventing as a human construction,
but discovering a structured, ordered space of truths.
Let's put it this way.
In biology, as in physics,
there's something very curious that happens,
that if you keep asking why,
then something interesting goes on.
Well, I'll give you two examples.
First of all, imagine cicadas.
So the cicadas come out at 13 years and 17 years.
And so if you're a biologist and you say,
so why is that?
And then you get this explanation for,
well, it's because they're trying to be off-cycle from their predators.
Because if it was 12 years,
then every two year, every three year,
every four year, every six year,
a predator would eat you when you come out.
And you say, okay, okay, cool.
That makes sense.
What's special about 13 and 17?
Oh, they're prime.
And why are they prime?
Well, now you're in the math department.
You're no longer in the biology department.
You're no longer in the physics department.
You're now in the math department
to understand why the distribution of primes is what it is.
Another example, and I'm not a physicist,
but what I see is every time you talk to a physicist
and you say, hey, why do the, you know,
leptons do this or that,
or the fermions are doing whatever?
Eventually the answer is, oh,
because there's this mathematical,
you know, this SU8 group or whatever the heck it is.
And it has certain symmetries in these certain structures.
Yeah, great.
Once again, you're in the math department.
So something interesting happens is that
there are facts that you come across.
Many of them are very surprising.
You don't get to design them.
You get more out than you put in, in a certain way,
because you make very minimal assumptions
and then certain facts are thrust upon you.
For example, the value of Feigenbaum's constant,
the value of natural logarithm E,
these things you sort of discover, right?
And the salient fact is this.
If those facts were different,
then biology and physics would be different, right?
So they matter, they impact instructively,
functionally, they impact the physical world.
If the distribution of primes was something else,
well, then the cicadas would have been coming out
at different times.
But the reverse isn't true.
What I mean is there is nothing you can do
in the physical world to change E,
as far as I know, to change E
or to change Feigenbaum's constant.
You could have swapped out all the constants
at the Big Bang, right?
You can change all the different things.
You are not going to change those things.
So this, I think, Plato and Pythagoras
understood very clearly that there is a set of truths
which impact the physical world,
but they themselves are not defined by
and determined by what happens in the physical world.
You can't change them by things you do
in the physical world, right?
And so I'll make a couple of claims about that.
One claim is, I think we call physics
those things that are constrained by those patterns.
When you say, hey, why is this the way it is?
Ah, it's because this is how symmetries
or topology or whatever.
Biology are the things that are enabled by those.
They're free lunches.
Biology exploits these kinds of truths
and really it enables biology and evolution
to do amazing things without having to pay for it.
I think there's a lot of free lunches going on here.
And so I show you a xenobot or an anthrobot
and I say, hey, look, here are some amazing things
they're doing that tissue has never done before
in their history.
Say, first of all, where did that come from?
And when did we pay the computational cost for it?
Because we know when we pay the computational cost
to design a frog or a human,
it was for the eons that the genome was bashing
against the environment getting selected, right?
So you pay the computational cost of that.
There's never been any anthrobots.
There's never been any xenobots.
When do we pay the computational cost
for designing kinematic self-replication
and all these things that they're able to do?
So there's two things people say.
One is, well, it's sort of,
you got it at the same time that they were being selected
to be good humans and good frogs.
Now, the problem with that is
it kind of undermines the point of evolution.
The point of evolutionary theory
was to have a very tight specificity
between how you are now
and the history of selection that got you here, right?
The history of environments that got you to this point.
If you say, yeah, okay,
so this is what your environmental history was.
And by the way, you got something completely different.
You got these other skills that you didn't know about.
That's really strange, right?
And so then what people say is, well, it's emergent.
And I say, what's that?
What does that mean?
And they say, besides the fact that you got surprised, right?
Emergence is often just means I didn't see it coming.
You know, something happened.
I didn't know that was going to happen.
So what does it mean that it's emergent?
And people say, well,
and there are many emergent things like this.
For example, the fact that gene regulatory networks
can do associative learning.
Like that's amazing.
And you don't need evolution for that.
Even random genetic regulatory networks
can do associative learning.
I say, why, why, why does that happen?
And they say, well, it's just a fact that holds in the world.
Just the fact that holds.
So, so now you have a, you have, yeah, you have an option.
And you can go one of two ways.
You can either say, okay, look, I like my sparse ontology.
I don't want to think about weird platonic spaces.
I'm a physicalist.
I want the physical world, nothing more.
So what we're going to do is when we come across these crazy
things that are very specific, like, you know,
anthropobots have four specific behaviors
that they switch around.
Why, why four?
Why not 12?
Why not one?
Like four, why four?
When we come across these things,
just like when we come across the value of E
or Feigenbaum's number or whatever,
what we're going to do is we're going to write it down
in our big book of emergence.
And that's it.
We're just going to have to live with it.
This is, this is what happens.
We're just, you know, there's some cool surprises.
You know, when we come across them,
we're going to write them down.
Great.
It's a random grab bag of stuff.
And when we come across them, we'll write them down.
That's, that's one.
The upside is you get to be a physicalist.
Then you get to keep your, your sparse ontology.
The downside is I find it incredibly pessimistic
and mysterian because you're basically then
just willing to make a catalog of these,
of these amazing patterns.
Why not instead?
And this is why I started with this,
with this platonic terminology.
Why not do what the mathematicians already do?
A huge number of them say,
we are going to make the same optimistic assumption
that science makes,
that there's an underlying structure
to that latent space.
It's not like a random grab bag of stuff.
There's a space to it,
where these patterns come from.
And by studying them systematically,
we can get from one to another.
We can map out the space.
We can, we can find out the relationships between them.
We can get an idea of what's in that space.
And we're not going to assume that it's just random.
We're going to assume there's some kind of structure to it.
And you'll see all kinds of people.
I mean, you know,
well-known mathematicians that talk about this stuff,
you know, Penrose and then lots of other people
who will say that, yeah,
there's another space physically.
And it has, it has spatial structure.
It has components to it and so on.
We can traverse that space in various ways.
And then, and then there's the physical space.
So I find, I find that much more appealing
because it suggests a research program,
which we are now undergoing in our lab.
The research program is everything that we make.
Cells, embryos, robots, biobots,
language models, simple machines, all of it.
They are interfaces.
They are, all physical things are interfaces
to these patterns.
You build an interface.
Some of those patterns are going to come
through that interface,
depending on what you build.
Some patterns versus others are going to come through.
The research program is mapping out that relationship
between the physical pointers that we make
and the patterns that come through it, right?
Understanding what is the structure of that space?
What exists in that space?
And what do I need to make physically
to make certain patterns come through?
Now, when I say patterns,
now we have to ask what kinds of things
live in that space?
Well, the mathematicians will tell you
what we already know.
We have a whole list of objects,
you know, the amplituhedrons and the,
you know, all this crazy stuff
that lives in that space.
Yeah, I think that's one layer of stuff
that lives in that space.
But I think those patterns
are the lower agency kinds of things
that are basically studied by mathematicians.
What also lives in that space
are much more active, more complex,
higher agency patterns
that we recognize as kinds of minds.
That behavioral scientists would look at that pattern
and say, well, I know what that is.
That's the competency for delayed gratification
or problem solving of certain kinds or whatever.
And so what I end up with right now
is a model in which that latent space
contains things that come through physical objects,
so simple patterns, right?
So facts about triangles and Fibonacci,
you know, patterns and fractals
and things like that.
But also, if you make more complex interfaces,
such as biologicals,
but importantly, not just biologicals,
but let's say cells and embryos and tissues,
what you will then pull down
is much more complex patterns
that we say, ah, that's a mind,
that's a human mind,
or that's a snake mind or whatever.
So I think the mind-brain relationship
is exactly the kind of thing
that the math-physics relationship is.
That in some very interesting way,
there are truths of mathematics
that become embodied
and they kind of haunt physical objects, right?
In a very specific functional way.
And in the exact same way,
there are other patterns
that are much more complex,
higher-agency patterns
that basically inform, in form,
living things that we see
as obvious embodied minds.
Okay, given how weird and complicated
this we're describing is,
we'll talk about it more,
but you got an ELI-5,
the basics to a person that's never seen this.
So again, you mentioned things like pointers.
So the physical object themselves,
or the brain,
is a pointer to that platonic space.
What is in that platonic space?
What is the platonic space?
What is the embodiment?
What is the pointer?
Yeah, okay, let's try it this way.
There are certain facts of mathematics.
So the distribution of prime numbers, right?
That if you map them out,
they make these nice spirals.
And there's an image that I often show,
which is a very particular kind of fractal.
And that fractal is the Halley map,
which is, it's pretty awesome
that it actually looks very organic.
It looks very biological.
So if you look at that thing,
that image,
which has a very specific complex structure,
it's a map of a very compact mathematical object.
That formula is like, you know, Z cubed plus seven.
It's something like that.
That's it.
So now you look at that structure and you say,
where does that actually come from?
It's definitely not packed into the Z cubed plus seven.
There's not enough bits in that to give you all of that.
There's no fact of physics that determines this.
There's no evolutionary history.
It's not like we selected this based on some,
you know, from a larger set over time.
Where does this come from?
Or the fact that,
I think about the way the biology exploits these things.
Imagine a world in which the highest fitness
belonged to a certain kind of triangle, right?
So evolution cranks a bunch of generations
and it gets the first angle, right?
And cranks a bunch more generations,
gets a second angle, right?
Now there's something amazing that happens.
It doesn't need to look for the third angle
because you already know.
If you know two, you get this magical free gift from geometry
that says, well, I already know what the third one should be.
You don't have to go look for it.
Or as evolution, if you invent a voltage-gated ion channel,
which is basically a transistor, right?
And you can make a logic gate,
then all the truth tables and the fact that NAND is special
and all these other things,
you don't have to leave all those things.
You get those for free.
You inherit those.
Where do all those things live?
These mathematical truths that you come across,
that you don't have any choice about.
Once you've committed to certain axioms,
there's a whole bunch of other stuff
that is now just, it is what it is.
And so what I'm saying is,
and this is what Pythagoras was saying, I think,
that there is a whole space of these kinds of truths.
Now he was focused on mathematical ones,
but he was embodying them in music and in geometry
and then things like that.
There are the space of patterns
and they make a difference in the physical world,
to machines, to sound, to things like that.
I'm extending it.
And what I'm saying is, yeah,
and so far we've only been looking
at the low agency inhabitants of that world.
There are other patterns
that we would recognize as kinds of minds
and that you don't see them in this space
until there's an interface,
until there's a way for them
to come through the physical world.
That interface, the same way that you have
to make a triangular object
before you can actually see the rule of,
you know, what you're going to gain, right?
Out of the rules of geometry and whatever,
or you have to actually do the computation
on the fractal before you actually see that pattern.
If you want to see some of those minds,
you have to build an interface, right?
At least if you're going to interact
with them in the physical world,
the way we normally do science.
As Darwin said, mathematicians have their own new sense
and like a different sense than the rest of us.
And so that's right.
You know, mathematicians can perhaps interact
with these patterns directly in that space.
But for the rest of us, we have to make interfaces.
And when we make interfaces,
which might be cells or robots or, you know,
embryos or whatever,
what we are pulling down are minds
that are fundamentally not produced by physics.
So I don't believe that.
I don't know if we're going to get
into the whole consciousness thing,
but I don't believe that we create consciousness,
whether we make babies or whether we make robots.
Nobody's creating consciousness.
What you create is an interface,
a physical interface through which specific patterns,
which we call kinds of minds,
are going to ingress, right?
And consciousness is what it looks like
from that direction, looking out into the world.
It's what we call the view from the perspective
of the platonic patterns.
Just to clarify,
what you're saying is a pretty radical idea here.
So if there's a mapping from mathematics to physics,
okay, that's understandable, intuitive,
as you've described.
But what you're suggesting is there's a mapping
from some kind of abstract mind object
to an embodied brain that we think of as a mind.
Yeah.
As us fellow humans.
What is that?
What exactly?
Because you said interface, you've also said pointer.
So the brain, and I think you said somewhere
a thin interface.
A thin client.
Yeah, the brain is a thin client, yeah.
Thin client, okay.
So your brain is a thin client to this other world.
Can you just lay out very clearly how radical the idea is?
Sure.
Because you're kind of dancing around.
I think you also point to Donald Hoffman
and kind of who speaks of an interface to a world.
So we've only interact with the quote unquote
real world through an interface.
What is the connection here?
Yeah, okay.
A couple of things.
First of all, when you said it makes sense for physics,
I want to show that it's not as simple as it sounds.
Because what it means is that even in Newton's
boring sort of classical universe, long before quantum anything,
Newton's world, physicalism was already dead in Newton's world.
I mean, think about what that means.
This is nuts.
Because already he knew perfectly well, I mean, Pythagoras and Plato knew
that even in a totally classical deterministic world,
already you have the ingression of information that determines
what happens and what's possible and what's not possible in that world
from a space that is itself not physical.
In other words, it's something like the natural logarithm E, right?
Nothing in Newton's world is set to the value of E.
There is nothing you could do to set the value of E in that world.
And yet that fact that it was that and not something else
governed all sorts of properties of things that happened.
That classical world was already haunted by patterns from outside that world.
This should be like, this is wild.
This is not saying that, okay, everything was cool,
physicalism was great up until maybe we got quantum interfaces
or we got consciousness or whatever, but originally it was fine.
No, this is saying that that worldview was already
impossible, really.
From a very long time ago, we already knew that there are
non-physical properties that matter in the physical world.
This is a chicken or the egg question.
You're saying Newton's laws are creating the physical world?
That is a very deep follow-on question that we'll come back to in a minute.
All I was saying about Newton is that you don't need quantum anything.
You don't need to think about consciousness.
Long before you get to any of that, as Pythagoras, I think, knew,
already we have the idea that this physical world is being strongly impacted
by truths that do not live in the physical world.
Which truths are we referring to?
Are we talking about Newton's laws?
Like mathematical equations?
Mathematical facts.
So for example, the actual value of E or...
Oh, like very primitive mathematical facts.
Yeah.
I mean, some of them are, you know, I mean, if you ask Don Hoffman,
there's this like amplituhedron thing that is a set of mathematical objects
that determines all the scattering amplitudes of the particles and whatever.
They don't have to be simple.
I mean, the old ones were simple.
Now they're like crazy.
I can't imagine this amplituhedron thing, but maybe they can.
But all of these are mathematical structures that explain and determine
facts about the physical world, right?
If you ask physicists, hey, why, you know, this many of this type of particle?
Because this mathematical thing has these symmetries.
That's why.
So Newton is discovering these things.
He's not inventing.
This is very controversial, right?
And there are, of course, physicists and mathematicians who disagree with
what I'm saying for sure.
But what I'm leaning on is simply this.
I don't know of anything you can do in the physical world.
You're around at the Big Bang.
You get to set all the constants.
Set physics however you want.
Can you change E?
Can you change Feigenbaum's constant?
I don't think you can.
Is that an obvious statement?
I don't even know what it means to change the parameters at the start of the Big Bang.
So physicists do this.
They'll say, okay, you know, if we made the ratio between the, you know, the
gravitation and the electromagnetic force different, would we have matter?
Would we, how many dimensions would we have?
Would there be inflation?
Would there be this or that, right?
You can imagine playing with it.
There are however many unitless constants of physics.
These are the kind of like knobs on the universe that you could have, could in theory be different.
And then you'd have different physical properties.
You're saying that's not going to change the axiomatic systems that mathematics has?
What I'm not saying is that every alien everywhere is going to have the exact same
math that we have.
That's not what I'm claiming.
Although maybe, but that's not what I'm claiming.
What I'm saying is you get more out than you put in.
Once you've made a choice and maybe some alien somewhere made a different choice of
how they're going to do their math.
But once you've made your choice, then you get saddled with a whole bunch of new truths
that you discover that you can't do anything about.
They are given to you from somewhere and you can say they're random, or you can say, no,
there's a space of these facts that they're pulled from.
There's a latent space of options that they come from.
So when you get, so when your E is exactly 2.718 and so on, there is nothing you can
do in physics to change it.
And you're saying that space is immutable.
It's, I'm not saying it's immutable.
So, so I think Plato may or may or may not have thought that these forms are eternal
and unchanging.
That's one place we differ.
I actually think that space has some action to it, maybe even some computation to it.
But we're, we're just pointers.
Well, so, so let's, okay.
So, so I'll, so I'll circle us, I'll circle back around to that, to that whole thing.
So, so the, the only thing I was trying to do is blow up the idea that we're cool with
how it works in physics.
No problem there.
Like, I don't, like, I think that's a much bigger deal than, than people normally think
it is.
Already there, you have this weird haunting of, of the physical world by patterns that
are not coming from the physical world.
The reason I emphasize this is because now what I'm going to, when I amplify this into
biology, I don't think it sort of jumps as a new thing.
I think it's just a much more, I think what we call biology is our systems that exploit
the hell out of it.
I think physics is constrained by it, but we call biology, those things that make, make
use of those kinds of things and run with it.
And so I, again, I just think it's a scaling.
I don't think it's a brand new thing that happens.
I think it's a, it's a scaling, right?
So what I'm saying is we already know from physics that there are non-physical patterns
and these are generally patterns of form, which is why I called them low agency, because
they're like fractals that stand still and they're like prime number distributions.
Although there's a mathematician that's talking in our symposium, that's telling me that
actually I'm too chauvinistic even there.
Actually, even those things have more, more oomph than even I gave him credit for, which
I, which I love.
So, so what I'm saying is those kinds of static patterns are things that we typically see
in physics, but they're not the full extent of what lives in that space.
That space is also home to some patterns that are very high agency.
And if we give them a body, if we build a body that they can inhabit, then we get to
see different behavioral competencies that the behavior scientists say, oh, I know what
that looks like.
That's a, this, this kind of behavioral, you know, this kind of mind or that kind of mind.
In a certain sense, I mean, yes, what I'm saying is extremely radical, but it is a very
old idea.
It's an old idea of a dualistic worldview, right?
Where the mind was not in the physical body and that it in some way interacted with the
physical brain.
So I just want to be clear.
I'm not claiming that this is fundamentally a new idea.
This has been around for forever.
However, it's mostly been discredited and it's a very unpopular view nowadays.
There are very few people in the, for example, cognitive science community or, or anywhere
else in science that like this kind of view.
Primarily, and already Descartes was getting, getting crapped for this when he first tried
it out as this interaction problem, right?
So the idea was, okay, well, if you have this non-physical mind and then you have this brain
that presumably obeys conservation of mass energy and things like that, how are you supposed
to, you know, how are you supposed to interact with it?
There are many other problems there.
So what I'm trying to point out is that first of all, physics already had this problem.
You didn't have to wait until you had biology and, and, and cognitive science to, to ask
about it.
And what I think is happening in the way, the way we need to think about this is coming
back to the, to my, my point that I think the mind brain relationship is basically of
the same kind as the math physics relationship.
The same way that non-physical facts of physics haunt physical objects is basically how I
think different kinds of patterns that we call kinds of minds are manifesting through
our, through interfaces like brains.
How do we prove or disprove the existence of that world?
Because it's a pretty radical one.
Yeah.
Because this physical world can poke there.
It feels like all the incredible things like consciousness and cognition and all the goal
oriented behavior and agency all seems to come from this 3d entity.
I mean, so like we can test it, we can poke it, can hit it with a stick.
Yeah.
Sort of noises.
Sort of.
I mean the one, so, so Descartes got some stuff wrong, I think, but one thing that he
did get right, the fact that you actually, you don't know what you can poke and what
you can't poke.
The only thing you actually know are the contents of your mind and everything else
might be.
And in fact, what we know from a Neil Seth and Don Hoffman and various other people,
it's definitely a construct.
You might be on drugs and you might wake up tomorrow and say, my God, I had the craziest
dream of being Lex Reed.
Amazing.
It's a nightmare.
Yeah, who knows?
It's a ride.
Right.
But, um, but, but you see, uh, I, I, you know, it's, it's not clear at all that, that
the, that the physical poking is your primary reality.
That's not clear to me at all.
I don't know.
That's a obvious thing that a lot of people can show.
It's true to take a step to the, the, the cart.
I think therefore I am.
That's the only thing, you know, for sure.
And everything else could be an illusion or a dream.
That's already a leap.
I think from a basic caveman science perspective, the repeatable experiment is the one that
most of intelligence comes from here.
The reality is exactly as it is.
To take a step towards the Donald Hoffman worldview takes a lot of guts and imagination
and, uh, stripping away of the ego and all these kinds of processes.
I think you can get there more easily by synthetic bioengineering in the following, in the following
sense.
Do you feel a lack of x-ray perception?
Do you feel blind in the x-ray spectrum or, or in the ultraviolet?
I mean, you don't, you have absolutely no clue that stuff is there.
And, uh, all of your, um, your, your reality as you see it is shaped by your evolutionary
history.
It's shaped by the cognitive structure that you have, right?
There are tons of stuff going on around us right now that we, of which we are completely
oblivious.
There's equally all kinds of other stuff, which we construct.
And this is just, this is just modern cognitive science that says that a lot of what we think
is going on is, is, is a total fabrication constructed by us.
So I think this is not a, I don't think this is a philosophical, I mean, Descartes got
there through, from a philosophical point.
That's not what I'm, that's not the leap I'm asking us to make.
I'm saying that depending on your embodiment, depending on your interface, and this is,
this is, um, increasingly going to be more relevant as we make first augmented humans
that have sensory substitution.
You're going to be walking around, your friend's going to be like, oh man, I have this primary
perception of the solar weather and the stock market because I got those implants.
And what do you see?
Well, I see the, you know, the traffic of the internet through the, you know, trans-Pacific
channel.
We're all going to be living in somewhat different worlds.
That's the first thing.
The second thing is we're going to become better attuned to other beings, whether they
be cells, tissues, you know, what's, what's it like to be a cell living in a 20,000 dimensional
transcriptional space.
Okay.
To novel beings that have never been here before that have all kinds of crazy spaces
that they live in.
And that might be AIs, it might be cyborgs, it might be hybrids, it might be all sorts
of things.
So this idea that we have a consensus reality here, that's independent of some very
specifically chosen aspects of our brain and our interaction, we're going to have to give
that up no matter what to relate to these other beings.
I think the tension is, uh, and absolutely.
And this idea that you're talking about sort of almost, I think you've termed it cognitive
prosthetics, which is different ways of perceiving and interacting with the world.
But I guess the question is, is our human experience, the direct human experience, is
that just a slice of the real world or is it a pointer to a different world?
That's what I'm trying to figure out because the claim you're making is a really fascinating
one, compelling one.
There's a pretty strong one, which is there's another world into which our brain is an
interface to, which means you could theoretically map that world systematically.
Yeah, which is exactly what we're trying to do.
Right, right.
But it's not clear that that world exists.
Yeah, yeah.
Okay.
I mean, so that's the beautiful part about this and this is why I'm talking about this
now where I wasn't, you know, about a year ago, up until a year ago, I was never talking
about this because I think this is now actionable.
So there's this diagram that's called the map of mathematics and they basically try
to show how all the different pieces of math link together and there's a bunch of different
versions of it.
So there's two features to this.
One is that, what is it a map of?
Well, it's a map of various truths.
It's a map of facts that are thrust on you.
You don't have a choice.
Once you've picked some axioms, you just, you know, here's some surprising facts that
are just going to be given to you.
But the other key thing about this is that it has a metric.
It's not just a random heap of facts.
They are all connected to each other in a particular way.
They literally make a space.
And so when I say it's a space of patterns, what I mean is it is not just a random bag
of patterns such that when you have one pattern, you are no closer to finding any other pattern.
I'm saying that there's some kind of a metric to it so that when you find one, others are
closer to it and then you can get there.
So that's the claim.
And obviously this is not, not everybody buys this and so on.
This is one idea.
Now, how do we know that this exists?
Well, I'll say a couple of things.
If that didn't exist, what is that a map of?
If there is no space, if you don't want to call it a space, that's okay.
But you can't get away from the fact that as a matter of research, there are patterns
that relate to each other in a particular way.
What's, you know, the final step of calling it a space is minimal.
The bigger issue is what the hell is it a map of then if it's not a space?
So that's the first thing.
Now, that's how it plays out, I think, in math and physics.
Now in biology, here's how we're going to know if this makes any sense.
What we are doing now is trying to map out that space by saying, look, we know that the
frog genome maps to one thing and that's a frog.
Turns out that exact same genome, if you just take the slightest step with the exact same
genome, which you just take some cells out of that environment, they can also make xenobots
with very specific, different transcriptomes, very specific behaviors, very specific shapes.
It's not just, oh, well, you know, they do whatever.
And then they have very specific behaviors, just like the frog had very specific properties.
We can start to map out what all those are, right?
Make that, basically try to draw the latent space from which those things are pulled.
And one of two things is going to happen in the future.
And so this is, you know, come back in 20 years and we'll see how this worked out.
One thing that could happen is that we're going to see, oh yeah, just like the map of
mathematics, we made a map of the space.
And we know now that if I want a system that acts like this and this, here's the kind of
body I need to make forward because those are the patterns that exist.
The anthrobots have four different behaviors, not seven and not one.
And so that's what I can pull from.
These are the options I have.
Is it possible that there's varying degrees of grandeur to the space that you're thinking
about mapping?
Meaning it could be just like with the space of mathematics, might it strictly be just
the space of biology versus a space of like minds, which feels like it could encompass
a lot more than just biology?
Yeah, except that I don't see how, I don't see how it would be separate because I'm not
just talking about an anatomical shape and transcriptional profile.
I'm also talking about behavioral competencies.
So when we make something and we find out that, okay, it does habituation sensitization,
it does not do Pavlovian conditioning, and it does do delayed gratification, and it
doesn't have language.
That is a very specific cognitive profile.
That's a region of that space.
There's another region that looks different because I don't make a sharp distinction
between biology and cognition.
If you want to explain behaviors, they are drawn from some distribution as well.
So I think in 20 years or however long it's going to take, one of two things will happen.
Either we and other people who are working on this are going to actually produce a map
of that space and say, here's why you've gotten systems that work like this and like
this and like this, but you've never seen any that work like that.
Or we're going to find out that I'm wrong and that basically it's not worth calling
it a space because it is so random and so jumbled up that we've been able to make zero
progress in linking the embodiments that we make to the patterns that come through.
Yeah.
Just to be clear, I mean, from your blog post on this, from the paper, I mean, we're
talking about a space that includes a lot of stuff.
Yeah, yeah.
What is it?
Meditating?
Steve.
Hello, my name is Steve.
AI systems.
So all the space of computational systems, objects, biological systems, concepts.
It includes everything.
Well, it includes specific patterns that we have given names to.
Right.
Some of those patterns we've named mathematical objects.
Some of those patterns we've named anatomical outcomes.
Some of those patterns we've made psychological types.
So every entry in an encyclopedia, old school Britannica is a pointer to this space.
There is a set of things that I feel very strongly about because the research is telling
us that's what's going on.
And then there's a bunch of other stuff that I see as hypotheses for next steps, the guide
experiment.
So what I'm about to tell you, I don't, you know, these are things I don't actually
know.
These are just guesses that, you know, you need to make some guesses to make progress.
I don't think that there are specific, or I don't know, but it doesn't mean that there
are going to be specifically tonic patterns for this is the Titanic and this is the sister
of the Titanic.
And this is some other kind of boat.
This is not what I'm saying.
What I'm saying is in some way that we absolutely need to work out when we make minimal
interfaces, we get more than we put in.
We get behaviors, we get shapes, we get mathematical truths, and we get all kinds of
patterns that we did not have to create.
We didn't micromanage them.
We didn't know they were coming.
We didn't have to put any effort into making them.
They come from some distribution that seems to exist that we don't have to create.
And exactly whether that space is sparse or dense, I don't know.
So for example, if there is, you know, some kind of, you know, a platonic form for the
Godfather, if it's surrounded by a bunch of crappy versions and then crappier versions
still, I have no idea, right?
I don't know if the space is sparse or not.
You know, I don't know if it's finite or infinite.
These are all things I don't know.
What I do know is that it seems like physics and for sure biology and cognition are the
benefits of ingressions that are free lunches in some sense.
We did not make them.
Calling them emergent does nothing for a research program, okay?
That just means you got surprised.
I think it's much better if you say, if you make the optimistic assumption that they come
from a structured space that we have a prayer in hell of actually exploring.
And in some decades, if I'm wrong and it says, you know what?
We tried.
It looks like it really is random too bad.
Fine.
Is there a difference between, like, can we one day prove the existence of this world?
And is there a difference between it being a really effective model for connecting things?
Explaining things versus like an actual place where the information about these
distributions that we're sampling actually exists that we can hit with a stick.
Yeah, you can try to make that distinction, but I think modern cognitive neuroscience
will tell you that whatever you think this is, at most, it is a very effective model
for predicting the future experiences you're going to have.
So all of this that we think about as physical reality is just a nice, convenient model.
I mean, that's not me.
That's predictive processing and active inference.
Like, that's modern neuroscience telling you this, that this isn't anything that I'm
particularly coming up with.
All I'm saying is the distinction you're trying to make, which is like an old school,
like, realist, you know, kind of view that is it metaphorical or is it real?
All we have in science are metaphors, I think.
And the only question is how good are your metaphors?
And I think as agents living in a world, all we have are models of what we are and what
the outside world is.
That's it.
And the question is, how good is it a model?
And my claim about this is in some small number of decades, this will either give rise to
a very enabling mapping of the space for AI, for bioengineering, for, you know, biology,
whatever, or we're going to find out that it really sucks because it really is a random
grab bag of stuff.
And we tried the optimistic research program.
It failed.
And we're just gonna have to live with surprise.
I mean, I doubt that's going to happen, but it's a possible outcome.
But do you think it's, there is some place where the information is stored about these
distributions that are being sampled through the thin interfaces?
Like actual place?
Place is weird because it isn't the same as our physical spacetime.
Okay.
I don't think it's that.
So calling it a place is a little, a little weird.
Physics, general relativity describes a spacetime.
Could other physics theories be able to describe this other space where information is stored
that we can apply maybe different, but in the same spirit laws about information?
I definitely think they're going to be systematic laws.
I don't think they're going to look anything like physics.
You can call it physics if you want, but I think it's going to be so different that that
probably just, you know, cracks the word.
And whether information is going to survive that, I'm not sure, but I, but I definitely
think that it's going to be, there are going to be laws, but I think they're going to look
a lot more like, um, aspects of, of, uh, of psychology and cognitive science than they're
going to look like physics.
That's my guess.
So what does it look like to prove that world exists?
What it looks like is a successful research program that explains how you pull particular
patterns when you need them and why some patterns come and others don't, and show
that they come from an ordered space.
Across a large number of organisms?
Well, it's not just organisms.
I mean, I think, I think it's going to end up, and I mean, you can talk to the machine
learning people about how they got to this point again, because this is, this is not
just me.
There's a bunch of, there are a bunch of different disciplines that are converging
on this now simultaneously.
You're going to, you're going to find again, just like in mathematics, where from, from,
from different directions, everybody sort of is looking at different things and, oh
my God, this is one underlying structure that seems to like inform all of this.
So in, in physics, in mathematics, in, uh, computer science, machine learning, possibly
in economics, uh, certainly in biology, possibly in, you know, cognitive science, we're going
to find these structures.
It was already obvious in Pythagoras' time that, that there are these patterns.
The only remaining question is, are they part of an ordered structured, or, you know,
space?
And are we up to the task of mapping out the relationship between what we build and the
patterns that come through it?
So from the machine learning perspective, is it then the case that the, even something
as simple as LLMs are sneaking up onto this world, that the representations that they
form are sneaking up to it?
When I've given, I've given this talk to, to, to some audiences, and especially in the
organicist, um, community, people like the first part where it's like, okay, now there's
an idea for what the magic quote unquote is that's, uh, that's special about the living
things and so on.
Now, now, if we could just stop there, we would have dumb machines that just do what
the algorithm says.
And we have these magical living interfaces that can be the recipient for these
ingressions.
Cool, right?
We can cut up the world in this way.
Uh, unfortunately, or, or fortunately, um, I think that's not the case.
And I think that even, even simple, uh, minimal computational models are to some extent
beneficiaries of these free lunches.
I think that, um, the theories we have, and this, this goes back to the, to the thin client
interface kind of idea, the theories we have of both of physics and computation.
So theory of algorithms, you know, Turing machines, all that, all that good stuff.
Those are all good theories of the front end interface.
And they're not complete theories of the whole thing.
They capture the front end, which is why they get surprised, which is why these things are
surprising when they happen.
I think that when we see embryos of different species, we are pulling from well-trodden
familiar regions of that space.
And we know what to expect, frog, you know, snake, whatever.
When we make cyborgs and hybrids and biobots, we are pulling from new regions of that space
that look a little weird and they're unexpected, but you know, we can still kind of get our,
get our mind around them.
When we start making AIs, the proper AIs, we are now fishing in a region of that space
that we may, that may never have had bodies before.
It may have never been embodied before.
And what we get from that is going to be extremely surprising.
And the final thing just to mention on that is that because of this, because of the inputs
from this platonic space, some of the really interesting things that artificial constructs
can do are not because of the algorithm.
They're in spite of the algorithm.
They are filling up the spaces in between.
There's what the algorithm is forcing you to do.
And then there's the other cool stuff it's doing, which is nowhere in the algorithm.
And if that's true, and we think it's true even of very minimal systems, then this whole
business of language models and AIs in general, watching the language part may be a total
red herring because the language is what we force them to do.
The question is, what else are they doing that we are not good at noticing?
And this is something that we are, I think, as a kind of existential step for humanity
is to become better at this because we are not good at recognizing these things now.