Xi’s grip on power is being challenged from within the CCP. Who exactly is in the anti-Xi camp—and why are these forces emerging now? This episode breaks down the CCP’s hidden power blocs: the conservatives, the reformists, and Xi’s shrinking inner circle. We examine how the fallout from moves against Zhang Youxia reshaped the balance inside Zhongnanhai, why the PLA’s silence matters, and how internal rules are being used to restrain Xi Jinping without open confrontation.
Well, let's be real. The CCP political situation right now is sitting in a danger window. The
fighting hasn't fully broken into the open, but the cracks are already obvious. The clearest sign,
the CCP leadership has fractured. There are effectively two party centers right now.
So now you ask me, how exactly is the CCP fractured? Well, yes, there is the Xi Jinping
camp and the anti-Xi camp. But the anti-Xi camp is not one unified force. So let me break down
the three major forces inside the CCP right now. In my Saturday's program, I explained why the
party elders and princelings are two formidable, but largely hidden forces at the very top.
But they're not clean-cut factions. There's overlap between the elders and the princelings.
And within each group, there are competing camps with different interests and priorities.
And that's where things become truly dangerous for Xi Jinping.
So first, there is the conservative camp, led by this guy, Zeng Qinghong, a key figure
from the old Jian Zemin faction. He is a princeling. The conservative camp
includes regime's loyalists. And most princelings fall into this camp. They are
hardcore defenders of the system because many of them have accumulated enormous wealth
and enjoyed privilege over decades. And they have zero interest in seeing that system collapse.
They are CCP conservatives, meaning that they are party's heartliners. Their goal is very simple,
preserve their forefathers' legacy and keep the Red Dynasty alive.
This camp forms the backbone of the CCP elite. They also maintain very close ties with the
military because they understand one thing clearly. The PLA is the regime's backbone,
the ballast stone, the weight that keeps the entire ship from capsizing.
Their strength lies in vast networks and deep resources, both inside China and abroad.
Now let's talk about the second camp. It's the reformist camp. Its most notable representatives
are party elders like Wen Jiabao, Li Ruihuan, Wang Yang, technocrats with governance experience,
and then also Liu Yuan, a leading princeling. He is also part of this camp.
Now these people are open to real political reform. And one example, General Liu Yuan
has openly argued that the PLA should become a national defense force, not a party army.
So this camp has attracted some reform-minded princelings, but most Red family descendants
still side with the conservatives. So from the party's perspective, these reformists are labeled
rightists, even though their vision is relatively progressive from the CCP's perspective.
Their advantages? Experience in governance, skill in political maneuvering, and most importantly,
a relatively better public reputation because they are seen as less prone to corruption.
Now, Hu Jintao, the highest-ranking party elder, is widely believed to belong to this camp,
although some argue he's not firmly in either camp, either the conservative nor the reformist.
And instead, he acts as a bridge between reformists and conservatives, playing both
sides when necessary. Now you have the Xi Jinping camp. This includes Xi's loyalists,
people who have followed him for three or four decades, many of them his direct subordinates
from his Fujian and Zhejiang years. And most notably, these two, Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong.
These two have been very loyal to him. Right now, this camp is short on manpower.
Many of Xi Jinping's loyalists have been purged over the past year and a half,
especially in the military, where Zhang Youxia wiped out or nearly wiped out much of Xi's
network. Their biggest advantage is very simple. They still have Xi Jinping himself.
He holds all three top posts, party, government, and military. Now, institutional control still
gives his camp leverage over the other two, even as his personal power base continues to shrink.
Now let's talk about Zhang Youxia. So which camp did he belong to or does he belong to?
He was a princeling or he is a princeling, so he's solidly in the conservative camp.
He's a career military officer, and he saw his mission as protecting the party.
He has no interest in political reforms. And so that is why in 2022, when Xi Jinping asked for
help securing a third term at the 20th Party Congress, Zhang Youxia cooperated and used his
influence within the military to help Xi Jinping. Then Xi Jinping did exactly what the Chinese call
burning the bridge after crossing the river. In other words, once Xi Jinping got what he wanted,
he turned on Zhang Youxia. And he used his military loyalists,
to gradually clip Zhang Youxia's wings. Then came the third plenum in the summer of 2024,
when Xi Jinping reportedly suffered a stroke on the spot. That moment changed everything.
Zhang Youxia teamed up with party elders, especially the reformists, and successfully
took control of the PLA. And that's when the party elders and the reformists returned to the spotlight.
How do we know? There's a picture. This picture was taken from the 2024 October 1st National Day
Banquet. Xi Jinping was publicly flanked by two reformist party elders, Wen Jiabao and Li Ruihuan.
It was very unusual. The seating arrangement was very unusual. People immediately sensed
that the party elders and the reformists were back. Then in June 2025, which was only
seven months ago, the CCP formally announced the creation of a central committee decision
and coordination body. That means Xi Jinping now has a boss. The existence of this body provides
checks and balances in the party. Now, with all of that background laid out,
let's talk about what happened when Xi Jinping moved against Zhang Youxia.
I mentioned earlier that one faction had been watching the infighting from the sidelines.
That changed the moment Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were taken down.
That faction reacted the most fiercely. Yes, the conservative camp, Zeng Qinghong's camp.
Why? Because Zhang Youxia is one of them. Now for years, this camp relied on Zhang Youxia
and the military's backing to protect their privileges. Zhang Youxia is a heavyweight
among the princelings, a princeling who controls the guns. So he was the regime's
stabilizer that kept the entire system from capsizing. Now by arresting Zhang Youxia,
Xi Jinping didn't just remove a general, he removed that stabilizer. And more importantly,
he crossed an unspoken red line. No bloodshed among the red families. This was a rule set
during Deng Xiaoping's era, upheld by the party elders who ruled alongside him.
In addition, there's a third reason that the princelings or the conservatives turned sharply
against Xi Jinping. Taiwan. They opposed Xi Jinping's push toward war. On this issue,
they aligned with Zhang Youxia. They believe a war cannot be won and that it would risk
collapsing the regime itself. They also have personal stakes. Much of their family wealth
is parked overseas. The moment Xi Jinping launches a military operation, Western sanctions
would certainly freeze those assets. So for them, this isn't just politics, it's existential.
Now once Xi Jinping crossed that red line and arrested the general who served as their last
line of defense, the princelings felt directly threatened. They stopped watching from the
sidelines and moved to the front lines. And that's why many insiders now say Xi Jinping's
most dangerous enemies inside the party right now are not the military or the reformists.
It's the conservatives, the CCP's core elite, the princelings, and even the hardcore Maoists
who sit with them. So these people see themselves as Xi Jinping's peers.
They don't see themselves as Xi Jinping's subordinates. They're equally privileged,
just as arrogant, and they will not accept Xi Jinping turning his knife on them.
And also, they grew up in the same era as Xi. They're the Cultural Revolution generation.
They were the Red Guards. They've experienced clashes and revolutions and power struggles,
street fights. Like Xi Jinping, they can be ruthless and reckless when their own survival
is at stake. Now, this camp has been working behind the scenes to block the Politburo from
retroactively approving Xi's move against the two generals. They're also the reason
Zhao Leji's National People's Congress withstood pressure from Xi and refused to strip the two
generals of their delegate status. Their influence is also why senior military commanders have stayed
silent over Zhang Ruoxia's arrest. They're invisible, but their influence is felt.
And of course, the reformists are more than happy to welcome a powerful new addition
to the anti-Xi front. Their combined force is formidable. They may operate in the shadows,
but their collective weight inside the party is strong enough to prevent the PLA from tipping
fully toward Xi. And that is why Xi Jinping has been flooding the PLA daily with increasingly
aggressive editorials, trying to coerce the military into pledging loyalty.
His frustration is visible, and that's why the latest editorial went so far
as to openly warn that the party is facing a split.
So people can see that the balance is not tipping toward Xi Jinping right now,
because Xi clearly doesn't have the military on his side. If anything, his opponents currently
hold more influence over the PLA. Now, let's talk about the military right now. I mean,
traditionally, the military, the PLA is with the conservatives. But in the past year and a half,
because Zhang Ruoxia has the support of this, what do you call that, the decision and coordination
body, which is controlled by the reformists. So the military has been working with both the
conservatives and the reformists in the past year and a half. The military is exploiting one key
fact, that Xi Jinping's move against Zhang Ruoxia violated both party rules and internal PLA
procedures. That gives the general or the generals a legal and procedural shield to delay, to hedge,
and to refuse public loyalty statements. It gives them room to resist without openly rebelling,
but they have a problem. They can't stall forever. Once Xi Jinping manages to finish
patching up the paperwork, once he retroactively legalizes the move against Zhang Ruoxia,
any continued resistance will be redefined as disobedience.
Having said that, we need to talk about Xi Jinping's strength. So what is his real strength
to counter all of this? Well, first of all, his status as the party leader. He has bound himself
to the regime and sent a clear message. I'm the party. If you take me down, you're taking down
the regime. So for any CCP insider who still wants to save the party, that creates hesitation. So far
that logic has worked, but how long can fear hold the system together? Nobody knows. And Xi Jinping
has another advantage. He is ruthless and he is fast, and he doesn't hesitate while his opponents
still argue, articulate, or calculate and hold back. So what Xi Jinping relies on most right now
is fear. He manufactures fear on purpose, using fear as the glue that holds his power together.
So for now, the military is responding to the anti-Xi side. The PLA's collective silence
isn't random. And so that's the stalemate we're looking at right now. It's a quiet phase,
a dangerous window period. The fight hasn't fully exploded, but the balance is very, very fragile.