Ratcliffe s questioning at House Homeland Committee s ISIS Post Caliphate hearing

I think the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ratcliffe, is recognized. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all the panelists for being here today. I was struck by the remarkable consistency between your comments about ISIS and the ISIS caliphate being badly damaged, but not defeated. And General Kino, I'll start with you, because you've twice made the comment about, when it comes to defeating ISIS, you've talked about the need to drive ISIS out of the footholds that they have in Syria. And I assume those footholds are being fueled by the desperation of the Syrian people with Assad in power, power that he's been able to maintain by using Iran, and Hezbollah, and the IRGC, and Russia. So I guess my question is, when we talk about the Salafi jihadi movement and radical Islamist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda, do you agree that, at least with respect to Syria, the greatest factor into whether or not it continues to exist or expand and contract is whether or not Assad is in charge in Syria? Well, first of all, ISIS and al-Qaeda, which is a thriving organization in Syria, they're only there because there is a civil war there. And they were drawn to an area. And they were able to establish safe zones and take advantage of the circumstances that are there. So they're absolutely feeding on that. Certainly Assad, a brutal dictator to be sure, the so-called Arab Spring arose. And people wanted to turn him out. And they were on their way to actually doing that when the Iranians and the Russians successfully intervened and stalemated the situation. And then the Russian military intervention and the Iranian plus-up really changed the entire momentum. Assad is not going anywhere now. I mean, we've got to be honest about it. They have successfully propped up this dictator. What's going on in Geneva is a fantasy. I mean, the Russians and Iranians may change Assad out because they want another Alawite dictator. But their military intervention has succeeded in indefinitely keeping Assad or somebody like him in power. We have long since squandered the opportunities to do something about that. And so do you think it is an overstatement, then, to say that the jihadi movement there, through groups like ISIS or al-Qaeda or whatever else may come, will continue as long as Assad reigns over Syria or someone just like Assad? Yes, the opposition to Assad is not going to go away either because they are very committed. They want a secular, most of them a democratic state, some of it an Islamic state. So as long as that continues, that'll give radical Islamists opportunity. And that organization, we didn't talk about it here, but the al-Qaeda organization, the son of al-Nusra that operates in Idlib province is a very dangerous organization, which clearly has objectives to operate outside the region in Europe and against the United States. So yes, this is a breeding ground for radical Islam. So I guess that leads to what is an unpopular topic for a lot of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle when we talk about regime change. But it seems to me that our best option for addressing the threat of ISIS and al-Qaeda, and frankly, the threat of, as you call it, a hegemonic threat from Iran and its ability to propagate Hezbollah and groups like that, is a Syria without Assad. And you intimated a little bit about how we would accomplish that. And I know the Free Syrian Army and arming those, and I've heard the arguments about, well, you're just arming terrorists. You made reference, though, to an Arab NATO earlier. And I'm wondering, I heard John Bolton recently talk about a regional Arab force in the area. And so my question, I guess, first question is, are you talking about the same thing there? Yeah, well, first of all, let me say that I don't believe this administration has a coherent strategy to deal with this problem. And I know for a fact the previous administration certainly did not, and actually, I think, enabled the problem to get worse. And it is a complex problem, as Ambassador Krakus so accurately pointed out. And you can be on either side of this issue and be making what seems to be a very plausible argument, to be frank about it, because it is such a disturbing situation. But in my view, Syria is a strategic anchor for the Iranian hegemonic movement and their ability to encroach on Israel and move out of Syria. And it's also a melting pot for radical Islamists. So I think we should take an interest in what is happening there and try to push back on it. And yes, what I would do is try to control the eastern part of Syria of the Euphrates River Valley. And I would bring some of the regional Arab nations in to help do some of that. That gets us back at the bargaining table. In other words, it gives us some political leverage. We're not going to go to Damascus with military force. We're not going to go into Syria with tens of thousands of US forces. There's no political will to do anything quite like that. But there are ways that we can get into and have some negotiating leverage if we have some skin in the game, as opposed to just walking away from it. So you talk about political will. And my time has expired, but this is an important question. I want your perspective. I'd really like it from all of you, and hopefully some other panelists can follow up on it. But when you look at it from the other side of the ledger and political will, when we talk about this issue, do you think that Russia has enough invested that they would ever go to war over Syria? Russia doesn't want to go to war over Syria. And Russia certainly doesn't want to go to war with the United States over Syria. And we don't need to be intimidated by Russia in Syria. And we long since permitted them to take advantage of us. Secretary Kerry told the Russians, because they were rolling into Syria, do not, under any circumstance, bomb the Syrian moderates who we were providing aid to by the Central Intelligence Agency. They had anti-tank missiles, and they were a formidable force as a result of that capability. First people the Russians bombed were the Syrian moderates with the anti-tank weapons. And what do we do about that? Nothing. We should have told them right then and there, you do that again, we're going to take down your airfield, and we're going to go after your proxy force on the ground, the Syrian regime. And my judgment, that would not have led to World War III. It would not have led to war with the Russians. They have a limited capability, have never been outside their region in 35 years. They had 30 to 40 airplanes. We dominate that area in terms of military power. They would have backed up. But we had no will. We lacked will. I appreciate your insights, and I appreciate the Chairman's indulgence.