China's economy is slowing dramatically under Xi Jinping's leadership, but this may not be a failure—it's deliberate. Prosperity is no longer the top goal; absolute Party control is. By crushing private giants like Alibaba and Tencent through golden shares and regulations, Xi has eliminated independent power centers that threatened regime security. Deflation and downturns are tolerated—even welcomed—because they drive people toward secure government jobs, concentrating resources in state hands.
This "birdcage economy" prioritizes political reliability over growth, redirecting funds to state firms, military tech, and war-ready industries. Innovation suffers under tight control, yet Xi bets digital tools can make a modern planned economy work where the Soviet Union failed.
The cost: a shrinking middle class, lost vitality, and a society designed for survival, not thriving. In the name of eternal red rule, China is trading wealth and freedom for fortified control.
Help me grow the channel by donating any amount through the link below—your support makes a difference! https://paypal.me/DonXiang
Hi, I'm Dong Xiong. Welcome to Digging into China, where we take a deep dive into what's
really happening in China and share some unique insights. We need to unravel a huge mystery.
Why is Xi Jinping making the economy worse and worse? Or, to put it more accurately,
why, under his personal command and personal deployment, is China's giant economic ship
heading straight toward an iceberg at a speed we can all see while the helmsman refused to turn
the wheel? To really understand this situation, we first have to drop the mindset of just watching
it like a joke. There is a cheap kind of pleasure going around these days, mocking the incompetence
of the decision makers in Beijing, blaming everything on a guy with an elementary school
level understanding who doesn't know basic economics. That story feels good to hear,
but it hides the real horror. What if all this isn't a mistake, but something planned?
Let's focus on those November numbers that left Wall Street gasping for air. Retail sales of
consumer goods grew by 1.3%, a number so bad it's worse than many countries on the edge of war.
But that's not even the scariest part. The scariest part is Beijing's reaction. Facing
such an obvious deflation spiral, the Central Economic Work Conference prescribes a monetary
loose policy. It's like a patient who's already in shock from losing too much blood and the doctor
says, give him a cup of warm water, just don't make it too hot. This isn't just refusing to
save the market, it's running a stress test on purpose. We have to understand that in Xi Jinping's
governing framework, economic prosperity is no longer the top priority. For the past 40 years,
the Deng Xiaoping rule relied on performance legitimacy. The party lets you live a good life
so you support the party. But that approach had a fatal side effect. It created a huge
middle class and private capital groups with their own independent will. That touches the
deepest fear of a Leninist party, the cost of ruling. Just think about it. When Alibaba has
more accurate consumer data than the central bank, when Didi knows city travel patterns
better than the Ministry of Transport, when the tutoring industry can shape the thinking of
hundreds of millions of families, that regime's sense of security drops to zero. In the logic of
modern digital authoritarianism, data is the new oil. And when that oil is in the hands of private
business owners, for Beijing, it's no different from losing the keys to the nuclear arsenal.
So what we call ruining the economy is really a diffusing operation that only makes sense
in communist logic. Xi Jinping isn't unaware that cracking down on digital platforms will wipe
out the trillions in market value. He isn't unaware that smashing the tutoring sector will cause
tens of millions of jobs to disappear. He knows all that perfectly well. But he has to do it anyway.
Because on his scales, those uncontrollable social mobilization forces have to be completely crushed,
even if the price is setting the economy back 10 years.
There is one little-noticed detail in all this called special management shares,
better known as golden shares. This has been a quiet top-secret project Beijing has pushed
forward in recent years. For leading content platforms like Bytedance, aka TikTok,
Tencent, and Weibo, the government uses state-owned funds to buy just 1% of the shares.
But that 1% comes with veto power and a board seat. What does that mean? It means the CCP doesn't
need to spend hundreds of billions to buy these companies outright. With that key 1%,
they can precisely cut away any political ambitions the companies might have.
That's why we see the big internet firms today acting as tame as quails,
not daring to speak up, even setting up party branches on their own and handing over
their algorithms for review. This is a highly sophisticated, parasitic form of control.
In this logic, economic downturn even takes on a positive political meaning. It sounds
counterintuitive, but a deflationary environment actually helps centralize the rule.
During inflation, hot money flows everywhere. People get restless. Everyone thinks they can
get rich. Society is full of unrest. In deflation, asset prices fall. Cash is king. Who has the cash?
Who has the money printer? The government. When housing prices drop, stocks stay low,
and private firms lay off workers, ordinary people's sense of insecurity shoots up.
At that point, even an iron rice ball job inside a system that pays just a few thousand yuan
starts looking incredibly attractive. Social resources quickly flow toward the public sector.
Look at the civil service exam further now. Thousands competing for one spot. Isn't that
exactly what the authorities want to see? A society that depends on the system to survive
is far easier to manage than one where people freely ride the market waves.
So the real core of Xi Jinping's economic management isn't to make you rich. It's to
tame you. He wants to transform the wild, western-flavored market economy of the past 30
years into a birdcage economy. In this cage, the birds can fly and lay eggs as long as they
understand the owner's whistle. If a bird gets too big and tries to break out,
just starve it a bit thinner or pluck a few feathers. In Xi Jinping's strategic forecast,
decoupling or even conflict with the West is inevitable. If an extreme situation arises,
a supply chain that depends on market is extremely fragile. Only a resource allocation
system driven entirely by administrative orders can keep the regime alive under sanctions and
blockade. So the current so-called economic weakness is, to a large extent, the friction
cost of forcibly switching resource allocation methods. Credit that used to flow to efficient
private firms is now cut off and redirected to pump blood into inefficient but politically
reliable state-owned enterprises, military industries, and strategic emerging sectors.
It's like drawing blood from a person's arms and legs and pumping it straight into the heart
and brain. The limbs will of course die and go cold, but as long as the heart keeps beating and
the brain keeps thinking, the regime considers itself healthy. This advance of the state and
retreat of the private sector isn't just about ownership, it's about distribution rights too.
Now the CCP is hitting high-income groups from every angle, celebrities paying back taxes,
finance workers going without bonuses, anti-corruption in healthcare. A flattened,
atomized society with no strong middle class is the ideal structure for the top ruler.
So when we ask why the economy keeps getting worse, we are actually using the wrong yardstick.
If you measure by people's wealth, yes, it's a disaster. But if you measure by party control,
Xi Jinping has achieved huge success. He has successfully caged that gray
rhino of massive private capital power that could have changed the system.
But this whole logic has one fatal flaw. It rests on the assumption that the treasury can
be overdrawn forever. This high-intensity control, the huge stability maintenance apparatus,
the blood transfusion to inefficient state firms, all require massive amounts of money.
In the past, that money came from the private economy and real estate feeding the system.
Now, after he personally killed those hosts for the sake of security,
what will the parasite live on? That's the secret Beijing is most anxious about right now.
They think they can replace real estate and internet finance with new quality productive
forces, high-tech, hard-tech, as the new blood-making machine. But there is a huge
paradox here. Real technological innovation needs free thought, markets, and a relaxed
environment for trial and error. That's exactly what the current political atmosphere is strangling.
What they want are scientists without independent thought, innovators who only
follow the party. That has never succeeded in human history.
Next, we'll dig deeper into how this Soviet model 2.0 in actual operation step-by-step
drains social wealth and where this unsustainable model is ultimately headed.
To understand the economic operating system Beijing is building now, we have to introduce
a key concept, the normalization of war economics. This doesn't mean war is coming tomorrow. It means
the rulers manage every pore of the national economy with a wartime mindset. In normal
countries, the standard for optimal resource allocation is profit and efficiency. In wartime
logic, the standard becomes redundancy and controllability. Look at what these so-called
new quality productive forces are actually investing in. New energy batteries, industrial
machine tools, high-end chips, grain breeding. What's common to all these sectors? They are the
bottom-line materials needed to keep the country alive under total blockade. To build this capacity,
Beijing doesn't hesitate to use the whole-nation system, ordering banks to pump money in regardless
of cost. This creates a very strange phenomenon, extreme shrinkage on the consumption side.
People not buying houses or new cars, while crazy expansion on the production side.
The result is severe overcapacity. This overcapacity isn't a failure of market cycle
adjustment, it's the inevitable outcome of administrative orders. When every province
and every state firm gets a political task to go into hard attack, everyone rushes to build
the same thing. That's why China's solar panels can sell below cost. Why lithium carbonide prices
crash like a roller coaster? In a performance review for state firm leaders, completing the
political task weighs far more than company profit. Losses belong to the state. But if you don't do it,
your political standing drops, and your political future is ruined.
Deeper still is the militarization of circulation channels. You may have noticed the supply and
marketing cooperative system being hyped again in recent years. This isn't nostalgia for selling
soy sauce or vinegar. Rebuilding the modern supply and marketing system is actually creating a
material distribution network completely independent of market mechanism, fully controlled
by administrative power. At the same time, national teams are heavily investing in private
logistic giants. Look at the changes in board structures at JD Logistics, SF Express, and
their strategic cooperation in non-commercial areas, all pointing to one goal. In an emergency,
these become the state's logistic cores. This explains Xi Jinping's split attitude toward
the digital economy. He absolutely hates games, short videos, and live stream shopping that keep
people hooked on pleasure, what he calls spiritual opium that wastes young people's energy. But he
is obsessed with big data, cloud computing, and artificial intelligence. In his view, technology
shouldn't serve consumer enjoyment. It should serve social control and industrial production.
He wants a noise-free, precisely running digital planned economy. When this logic is applied to
actual company governance, it means party branches spreading everywhere. In the past,
foreign or private firms did party building just for show, maybe a trip to a rare tourism site.
Now it's different. Party branches really participate in major company decisions,
especially on big investments and key personnel appointments. The party organization has a
de facto pre-approval power. This actually completes a bloodless hidden nationalization.
Ownership is still nominally yours, but management and decision rights have been
swapped out. For foreign capital, this is what really sends chill down their spine. They don't
fear market competition or policy swings. They fear that the underlying operating system of this
market has changed. Before, everyone came to do business. Now you realize your partner is actually
an official wearing a mask. This leads to an inevitable result. Foreign capital withdrawal
is no longer tactical. It's strategic. They are not just pulling money out. They are cutting
supply chain dependence. The so-called de-risking is essentially peeling China out of the core of
global value chains. And Beijing seems to have anticipated this, even actively speeding it up.
That's the real intent of the dual circulation strategy. Since decoupling is inevitable,
better to close the door a bit ourselves and keep the industrial chain inside.
But there is a huge logical hole here. The premise of domestic circulation is a strong domestic
demand. Yet everything we've analyzed shows this state-advanced private retreat approach
is precisely eliminating the middle class and ordinary people's spending power. You pour
resources into bridges, roads, loss-making chip factories, and war preparation military industries.
That money does turn into GDP numbers, but it doesn't become wages in people's pockets.
On the contrary, to sustain these inefficient investments, the government has to raise taxes
and non-tax revenue, keep high social security contribution rates, and harvest private wealth
through inflation or hidden taxes. This forms a perfect death loop. The more investment for
security, the weaker effective demand. The weaker demand, the worse the economy. The worse the
economy, the more insecure the authorities feel, leading to more control and more ineffective
investment. In this process, there is one group deliberately overlooked, local governments.
Caught between the tax-sharing reform and the collapse of land finance, local governments
have actually become sacrifices to central power. To keep running, they've started acting like
bandits, crossing provinces and jurisdictions to arrest private entrepreneurs and fill treasuries
with fines and confiscations. This isn't just a simple law enforcement issue. It's public power
turning cancerous from fiscal hunger. But in CCP's eyes, this is another stress test.
As long as localities don't rebel, this grassroots chaos even helps the center play the role of the
wise judge who makes the final ruling. So this new Soviet model shows a suffocating position
in operation. It's like a giant centrifuge, constantly flinging social wealth from the
dispersed private sector towards the authoritarian center. It doesn't care how many eggs get smashed
in the process. It only cares whether the axis stays steady. What we now call consumption
downgrading isn't just the people having no money. It's also a defensive psychological reaction in
society. When people realize hard work no longer brings upward mobility. When entrepreneurs
realize growing big just means becoming a fattened pig waiting for slaughter,
the whole society's drive gets castrated. This dead-hearted state hurts the economy far more
than a few percentage points drop in GDP. Yet, this is one of the intended outcomes
of the system design. An atomized society lacking economic independence, too busy surviving to think
about political power, that's the society that best minimizes ruling costs. Beijing is trying
to prove a proposition that has never succeeded in human history. Even without economic or
intellectual freedom, relying on high-intensity technological control and resource mobilization,
a superpower can still survive long term. The next question is, can this machine really
keep turning forever like its designer's hope, like a perpetual motion machine? Once the fuel,
the private wealth accumulated over the past 40 years is used up, what will overcome the
friction of physics? That's the final moment of judgment. Over the past 40 years, the energy for
China's machine came from two sources, the external market dividends from joining the WTO
and the private creativity unleashed by decentralization and profit sharing.
Now, both energy sources are being cut off at the same time. The external containment
circle has formed, and internally, as we've analyzed, creativity is being replaced by control.
When the fuel runs out, what will this huge machine use to overcome friction? That's Xi Jinping's
biggest gamble. He is betting that the whole nation system can achieve technological breakthroughs
without free market soil. Just through administrative orders and resource piling,
he thinks the Soviet Union failed because control wasn't precise enough, because they didn't have
big data or omnipresent surveillance. He believes that with digital technology,
planned economy 2.0 can work. This is an extremely dangerous confidence. It ignores
the most basic truth of economics. Innovation cannot be planned. You might use the whole
nation system to build an atomic bomb, because that's an engineering problem with a clear path.
But you can't use it to create an iPhone or a thriving internet ecosystem. Those are market
problems that need countless individual trials and errors. China today is throwing all resources
at determined engineering goals while strangling all uncertain market possibilities. This leads to
a brutally harsh social reality. The state's military and stability maintenance capabilities
grow stronger, but society inevitably grows weaker. We are witnessing an intensification
of internal colonization. What is internal colonization? It's the central power machine
treating its own people like a colony to plunder through high housing prices, low welfare,
negative real interest rates, inflation tax, continuously extracting wealth from households
to feed inefficient state infrastructure projects, and expensive overseas strategies.
Under this model, ordinary people's quality of life not only fails to rise with national
strength, it actually falls because the state extraction ability grows stronger. People notice
that yes, we have aircraft carriers and space stations, but pensions are in deficit, medical
insurance is shrinking, even roadside parking fees go up. This is the zero-sum game between
great power rise and ordinary people's dignity. Many young people are still lost in the
hallucination of grand narratives, getting pumped up by leading by far-ahead propaganda.
But I have to point out coldly, those shiny national heavy weapons of high-end manufacturing
have basically nothing to do with most of you. Unless you are one of the very few chosen red
engineers or system elites, in this blueprint for high-quality development, the vast majority
of ordinary people are positioned only as biological batteries to keep the system running.
When a battery is drained, or when industrial upgrading no longer needs so many low-end
workers, that surplus population becomes a burden. Xi Jinping is transforming a China that
depended on the West on private firms and had diverse thinking into a self-sufficient,
party-state, integrated, ideologically unified Red Fortress. For this goal, what does a little
GDP drop matter? What does a little foreign capital flight matter? As long as the red rivers
and mountains last forever, these are just insurance premiums that must be paid.
He has successfully destroyed the credit foundation China built over decades,
strangled the most vibrant cells of society, caused China to miss the best window for
transforming into modern civilization, and tied over a billion people onto a war chariot
heading into an unknown abyss. But if you look from the angle of imperial techniques,
power games, and maintaining authoritarian rule, you have to admit, Xi Jinping is a perfect
operator. He precisely identified every force that could threaten the regime—Internet giants,
rights lawyers, NGOs, even factions inside the party—and dismantled them one by one
with thunderous methods. He turned over 90 million party members into obedient tools,
turned hundreds of millions of cameras into tentacles of rule, turned the entire economy
into a logistic base serving regime security. This is the absurd reality we face. A leader
who has completely failed on the livelihood front, yet achieved unprecedented success
on the control front. This tear is the deepest pain in China today.
What will the future bring? Don't expect any collapse theory, and don't fantasize about
internal coup. A regime with nuclear weapons, digital authoritarian technology,
and no moral bottom line has far greater survival ability than we imagine.
China's economy most likely won't experience a dramatic instant collapse. Instead,
it will enter a long, silent process of rotting away. It's like a strong person getting a chronic,
wasting disease. He won't die right away, but he'll slowly wither. In that process,
he'll become more sensitive, suspicious, even aggressive. We'll see a North Korea-style
the political corps wearing a technological skin, a monster where there is no place for
a middle class. Everyone will live in this giant panopticon prison, carefully calculating
their survival points. So even for the simplest wish to live as a person with dignity, we must
see clearly the essence of this logic. Don't be fooled by talk of playing a big chess game,
and don't harbor illusions about power correcting itself. In history's garbage time,
seeing the truth clearly, guarding your own understanding, protecting our wealth and
families, that may be the only thing we ordinary people can do, and the most powerful form of
resistance. Thank you so much for watching. If you find this video helpful, please like it,
drop a comment below, and hit the subscribe button right here. It really helps YouTube
suggest my video to others. I'll be back with more content soon. Until then, be well.