Zhang Youxia's Secret Weapon! Xi ‘Helps’ the CIA? U.S. General: You're All Wrong!

China Insider
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807 Video Views·Feb 6, 2026
The case involving John Musia and Liu Zhenli and the intense power struggle between the anti-Xi faction and the pro-Xi camp has not yet reached its conclusion.
A flood of new information continues to emerge, but what is the truth? Which side is actually gaining the upper hand?
A Chinese official has provided the following information to commentator Li Dayu.
The Chinese Communist Party's deceptive propaganda is not merely about putting a rosy gloss on governance.
Even the real situation inside the system is deliberately obscured with fog.
Those who truly wield power may not appear in the news at all.
The mechanisms that genuinely matter are not necessarily the ministerial or bureaucratic systems everyone is familiar with.
In reality, the concept of cliques or family factions within the CCP system can, at times, be even more effective than the so-called authority of the chairman of the Central Military Commission.
Anything that can be openly shouted about in propaganda is quite possibly fake.
What is real is hidden behind the scenes.
On the surface, Xi Jinping appears to have centralized power, and party media continues to elevate him as a singular supreme figure, an image meant to project so-called stability within the CCP.
But Xi Jinping is far less stable than he appears, and he is by no means a true supreme ruler.
More powerful forces are operating behind the scenes, manipulating events.
Xi may personally aspire to be that unrivaled authority, but precisely because of this, he faces correspondingly immense resistance.
What does this reveal about Zhang's situation?
Let's analyze it together in today's program.
On February 4, Du Zheng, a columnist for Up Media, published an article titled,
According to his analysis, Zhang Yuxia is in fact the figure who holds real power within the Chinese Communist military, and Xi Jinping has long been constrained by him.
Xi fears that by the 21st Party Congress, he may truly be forced to step down, or even face political reckoning.
Under immense psychological pressure and nearing a breaking point, Xi has recently gone to great lengths to try to bring down Zhang Yuxia.
The key body assisting Xi in these maneuvers, Du argues, is the Central National Security Commission, overseen by Cai Qi.
Although Cai Qi is formally a deputy director, he is the one who actually runs the commission.
This is the only top-level body aligned with Xi's faction that has the capacity to coordinate with the military.
Through the National Security Commission, and after He Beidong fell from power, Cai Qi quietly took control of Xi Jinping's so-called Hebei private troops, previously under He Beidong's command.
This closely matches earlier revelations by Professor Tai Xia, which I mentioned in a previous video, stating that Xi's faction, specifically Miaohua and He Beidong, had secretly built a private military force.
It was through Cai Qi that Xi Jinping covertly controlled these private troops, operating independently of the PLA's regular command structure, and then used a surprise, covert operation to detain Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli.
This, in fact, explains why the military has remained completely silent in recent days.
However, Xi Jinping underestimated Zhang Yuxia's influence within the military.
In reality, Zhang has always held substantive power.
His career trajectory bears some resemblance to Xi's.
Both benefited from their status as Red Second Generation.
The key difference is that Zhang has genuine military achievements, whereas Xi does not.
Moreover, Zhang's rise was not a favor granted by Xi, but the result of backing from party elders predating Xi, especially Hu Jintao.
Zhang's entry into the Central Military Commission at the 18th Party Congress, like Xi's own assent, was the result of elders designating the general, and a compromise among elite factions.
At the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Zhang not only remained on the CMC, but was promoted to vice chairman, entirely due to his seniority in elite networks, with little to do with Xi.
At that point, there was still no major conflict between the two.
But everything changed at the 20th Party Congress.
Xi Jinping's mindset shifted.
He no longer wanted to accept elite compromise, factional balance, or the collective leadership model based on negotiation.
Instead, he wanted anyone who was not a hardcore loyalist, or who lacked Xi faction bloodlines, to be removed entirely, so he could build a purely Xi family army.
Some historians previously claimed that Xi had personally invited Zhang Yuxia to stay on for another term at the 20th Congress, but Du Zheng's disclosures show this to be incorrect.
Xi's decision to extend his own rule triggered fierce backlash among top leaders, especially party elders, who accused him of going against the tide of history, and expressed extreme dissatisfaction.
Xi's arrogant act of having Hu Jintao escorted out of the Congress Hall undoubtedly had a devastating impact on the subsequent balance of power.
It must be understood that Zhang Yuxia's retention at the 20th Party Congress, continuing as vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, and notably as first-ranked vice-chairman, was the result of strong, determined support from party elders.
Their intention was clear—to preserve leverage over China's political trajectory.
Xi Jinping's original plan was for the two vice-chairmen of the Central Military Commission to be He Weidong and Miao Hua.
Miao Hua has maintained a 30-year personal relationship with Xi Jinping and Peng Liwan, while He Weidong rose largely thanks to Miao Hua's recommendation.
However, Zhang Yuxia had greater seniority and much stronger backing from party elders, so Xi never gained a decisive advantage within the CMC.
After Zhang Yuxia was retained at the 20th Party Congress with the elders' support, he in turn promoted two figures.
Former Minister of National Defense Li Shengfu and Liu Zhenli, his close subordinate from the war against Vietnam, who was brought directly into the Central Military Commission as chief of the Joint Staff Department.
As a result, when Zhang Yuxia fell, Liu Zhenli was arrested at the same time.
The two were inseparable, like lips and teeth.
Against this backdrop, tensions between Zhang and Xi steadily escalated, with many incidents along the way.
One example concerns Xi's post-military reform practices.
From 2019 to 2022, at the beginning of each year, Xi Jinping personally went to military training grounds to issue training orders to the entire PLA.
After Xi finished reading from prepared scripts, all soldiers on site would shout in unison slogans such as,
But as the conflict with Zhang Yuxia intensified, old Zhang put a stop to it.
In 2023, Zhang Yuxia openly criticized these performances as empty theatrics with no practical value and firmly blocked Xi from continuing them.
Xi was genuinely unable to do anything about it and had no choice but to back down.
In addition, after the 20th Party Congress, Xi sought to use Miao Hua and Heiwei Dome to investigate corruption in the Equipment Development Department and the missile stockpiles of the Rocket Force in order to bring down Zhang Yuxia.
During this process, Li Shunfu was indeed arrested, as were Rocket Force Commander Li Yuchao and several others.
But in the end, Zhang Yuxia emerged unscathed.
Why?
It was not because Xi showed him leniency, but because Zhang's influence in the military was simply too strong.
With powerful backers behind him, Zhang ultimately confronted Xi head-on, negotiated from a position of strength, and survived the challenge.
By the two sessions in March 2025, however, Heiwei Dome stirred up trouble once again, using the pretext of cracking down on inflated combat readiness.
To dig further into alleged corruption in Zhang Yuxia's equipment procurement and deficiencies in military training.
This time, Zhang refused to tolerate it and struck first, moving to neutralize his opponent, after which Heiwei Dome disappeared.
By October of last year, nine senior generals aligned with Xi, including Heiwei Dome, had been purged in one sweep.
According to Du Zheng, this was not some form of Xi Jinping's self-revolution, but rather Xi being crushed by Zhang Yuxia and the forces backing him.
Subsequently, at the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee, Xi was stripped of his party authority.
Had Xi not launched a counterattack, his final fate would have been nothing more than waiting to be executed.
This, then, was why Xi devised this covert surprise attack.
Do Du Zheng's revelations have any factual basis?
On February 2nd, Du Zheng quoted an anonymous army-level commander within the CCP military as saying that Zhang Yuxia has long held real power in the armed forces.
From group army commander to theater command chief to head of the Central Military Commission's equipment development department,
each of his posts carried immense authority and could directly determine officers' careers, creating vast networks of mutual exchange.
Anyone he promoted, approved, or signed off on became effectively bound to him,
and those later promoted by these figures were in turn labeled remnants of the Zhang Yuxia faction.
Because such people are extremely numerous within the military and are connected to even more officers, few dare to speak out about the Zhang Yuxia affair.
Even those inclined to respond to Xi Jinping's calls now dare not act.
They fear retaliation from Zhang's network and are unsure how the struggle will ultimately end.
As a result, the situation has effectively reached a stalemate.
Is Xi Jinping helping the CIA?
The Zhang Yuxia incident has reportedly shaken even the highest levels in Washington, prompting responses from both Donald Trump and Marco Rubio.
On January 31st, aboard Air Force One en route to Florida, President Trump told reporters,
Asked whether he was concerned about China's stability or Taiwan, Trump reiterated,
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, speaking at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on January 28th, also commented on Zhang Yuxia's purge.
He said he was not surprised, viewing the downfall of Zhang and Liu Zhenli as part of a familiar pattern seen in recent years—purges of senior military leaders.
Rubio emphasized that this was an internal matter for China.
While Beijing does not share or discuss such issues with the U.S., Washington is undoubtedly watching closely.
What can be inferred from Trump's and Rubio's remarks?
One plausible reading is that U.S. intelligence suggests Xi Jinping still holds the upper hand overall.
Could the Zhang Yuxia case even be a windfall for the CIA?
Recently, conservative U.S. outlet Breitbart News reported that the CIA has made major gains in recruiting CCP government officials and overseas intelligence assets, yielding valuable intelligence.
The CIA also released a new video on January 15, 2026, an intriguingly timed move, just days before Zhang Yuxia came under investigation.
The video quickly went viral, surpassing 33.25 million views in just 13 days, outperforming last year's releases.
The timing raises questions.
Did it relate to intelligence the CIA already had?
As Xi Jinping's sweeping purges have rattled the PL, creating fear of collateral damage, the CIA's apparent gains seem to rise in parallel.
The harsher the purges, the more leaks and defections, including from high-level officials.
One might ask, isn't Xi Jinping inadvertently providing miraculous assistance to the CIA?
Meanwhile, on February 4, former U.S. National Security Advisor Michael Flynn shared an analysis on X by General Charles Flynn, his brother and former commander of U.S. Army Pacific.
Charles Flynn argued that most commentary from Academia, Foreign Affairs, The New York Times, and think tanks misrids Xi's latest military purges as a sign of tighter control.
In his view, that interpretation is wrong.
The core issue, Charles Flynn wrote, is not what Beijing is doing to itself, but what we, the United States, and our allies are doing to China, the Chinese Communist Party.
He added that for the first time in decades, the strategic environment no longer favors Beijing.
Sustained, multi-domain competition is quietly eroding China's confidence in its own development path.
Xi's purges, he argued, are not evidence of unchallengeable strength, but symptoms of strategic insecurity.
Authoritarian systems resort to purges when they distrust their own institutions, fear miscalculation, and feel the external environment tightening, doubts deliberately cultivated by a U.S.-led strategy.
It can be said that Charles Flynn's analysis is both distinctive and incisive.
He argues that U.S. deterrence toward China rests on a series of concrete measures.
Strengthening self-reliance and resilience with partners such as Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia in the Indo-Pacific while pressing NATO allies to shoulder greater responsibility.
Rebuilding domestic industrial capacity, supply chains, and economic resilience, especially by developing critical minerals and rare earths to break Beijing's leverage.
Rebalancing trade deficits through targeted tariffs to protect American workers and industries.
Demonstrating credible hard power through strategic operations such as Midnight Hammer and Absolute Resolve.
Proving the ability to strike precisely and decisively while easing regulations on the U.S. energy sector to unleash innovation and achieve energy independence.
Competing aggressively in artificial intelligence while making major investments in science, health care, and defense technology to unlock opportunity and revive America's innovative capacity.
Flynn notes that after years of closely observing American soldiers in combat, he has seen in them an innate capacity for adaptation and innovation.
Quick thinking, rapid adjustment, and a constant readiness to build solutions.
He believes this fully unleashed American spirit of innovation is what China, Xi Jinping, and all authoritarian leaders fear most.
When this spirit is released across every sector by every American, he argues, adversaries will see only America's taillights, utterly unable to keep up.
Therefore, the real story is not that Xi Jinping's control is growing, but that the strategy of the United States and its allies is working, creating an environment in which aggression becomes harder and less attractive.
What do you think of this perspective?
Leave your thoughts in the comments.
Thank you, and see you next time.
