BlackRock Just Confirmed the Worst Case Scenario

Housing Market Breakdown
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17 Video Views·Feb 4, 2026
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BlackRock just marked down private credit loans, and it’s not a one-off event. Ken and Danille McElroy break down why this moment exposes the same floating-rate, refinance-dependent risk now sitting across multifamily real estate.
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BlackRock just pulled the curtain back in what is actually happening in the multifamily market.
This may be a live on BlackRock, but realistically, we are talking about something much bigger.
Yeah, so the reason why I want to chat about this topic is this is not about BlackRock.
I just really want to be clear. This is about private credit.
And if you guys don't know what private credit, I'll explain what it is real quick.
So it's basically credit outside of the traditional banking system.
So there's all these debt funds and all these folks that, as you guys all know, landed on multifamily.
All these traditional names now are in trouble.
And where do they get their money?
They get their money from insurance companies and companies like BlackRock.
So they get their money from institutional investors.
So you set up, for example, ABC Debt Fund.
You go to BlackRock, you get $100 million, $250 million, whatever it is.
And then you start laying out on the street.
So that's what this is.
And so Jerry, why don't you first pop up that first graphic.
I think it's important that we show the rise in private credit.
So this is a really important graph.
So basically what this means, now this is not 2008.
I want to point that out, guys.
But this is what's going on behind the scenes.
This is big money, Wall Street money, investing into private credit.
So the way you need to think about this is if a bank, let's say, think of it like airplanes.
Like a bank would invest in, let's say, the big airlines.
Private credit invests in jets, private jets.
That's the way you need to think about this.
So private jets are expensive.
They're flexible.
They don't do what banks do.
So there's a little more leniency.
But BlackRock, on the other hand, they are the largest asset manager in the world.
Okay, that's good, Jerry.
Thank you.
BlackRock's the largest asset manager in the world.
And so why is this important?
I think it's important because they're traditionally not this early.
And so all it really does is it's just exposing things that we kind of all thought were there.
Because these debt funds, what they've been doing is they've been putting these assets on their asset management balance sheet kind of with a hope note.
You know what I mean?
Working with borrowers.
So all these properties are sitting there.
All these multifamily properties are sitting there.
And so for BlackRock to come out and report this, and just to be clear, this is a big deal, right?
I mean, BlackRock is obviously one of the most conservative and largest money managers in the world, if not the biggest.
And for them to come out and write this down, it basically shows that there is a problem inside the engine.
And as before, we all kind of knew it, but we're just waiting for the first domino.
This is a big domino.
Yeah, I mean, essentially, they were really thinking rates were going to go down, right?
And save all of this.
And that's what they were waiting for.
You know, extend and pretend was kind of pretending everything was OK, while at the same time thinking that the rates would go down and it would be OK.
And to your point, they weren't recording these on their balance sheet.
They were recording them as if everything was OK.
Yeah. And to be clear, you know, BlackRock, it'd be like BlackRock would lend or any of these big institutions would lend to somebody and then they would create this debt fund.
So, you know, so really it's BlackRock invested in another company that actually placed money out on the street.
So that's why this is so important.
And so this is basically when when cash flow ends, the math becomes a reality.
And that's that's essentially where we are.
You know, and so so, Jerry, let's let's look at that real quick before you say that.
So it was very a little sketchiness.
So the entire industry in 2001, 2003 was based on values going up, rates not jumping like they did and the deal working.
So it's all based on some kind of future refi.
Right. I mean, that's what that's what was happened prior to this.
So let me just explain it in simple terms.
Let's say there was a 300 unit project that somebody paid two hundred two hundred thousand dollars a unit or 60 million bucks.
So that 60 million bucks, let's say 40 was that 20 was equity.
OK, so a traditional deal.
They move forward.
So year one, what happens?
I'm going back to, let's say, 2022 year one.
Rates start to go up.
Oh, cash flow goes down.
All things being equal property still moving along just fine.
Twenty twenty three rates are still going up and expenses are up.
OK, so that's year two.
All of a sudden their cash flow starts to run out and then they start to cash call LPs and all that kind of stuff.
OK, now go to twenty twenty four.
All these new units, all these new apartment units get added to the US like we had a record year in twenty twenty four and twenty twenty five.
We had five hundred thousand units being added.
OK, so what does that do?
What that does is it lowers occupancy.
It creates more opportunities for the renter.
And so now the renter has more choices.
And so what happens is the apartment operators now have flat rents.
They have high concessions and they have to offer these big incentives to these renters.
So now let's add all those three up high interest rates, which which already hurt cash flow, high expenses, which also hurts cash flow and low income.
So all of that has been going on in twenty two, twenty three, twenty four, twenty five.
And we've all been waiting for this.
Right.
And so what happens is the traditional debt funds, they they they take a property back.
And in that scenario, guys, where there's a 60 million dollar deal, let's say in year three or four, that thing is maybe worth the loan.
So remember, we put 40 million dollars on that on that deal, for example.
When the loan matures, it's worth 40 million.
So you have a loan worth 40 million and you have the property worth 40 million.
So what happens?
They have to resize the loan.
And so then the lender goes to the sponsor and says, you need to write a 10 or 15 million dollar check in order to keep the property.
So that's what's happening.
The loan's maturing.
And so extend and pretend works.
If but when pretend ends, when the maturity date hits, then all of a sudden you've got this, you know, things are going to get exposed.
So I do get confused, though, because what you have to understand is these aren't defaults necessarily.
Well, they are a little bit so.
So, OK, it's a really good question.
So here's first of all, why?
I guess, you know, the the Main Street doesn't really have to worry too much, too much.
All right.
This this is not a bank failing.
These are, again, remember I said outside the banking system.
So what it is, it's BlackRock, wherever they got all their money.
Right. They're the ones that have the write downs.
And so therefore, the debt funds are also going to have to have the write down.
So this is going to be in lockstep with all of that.
So this is traditionally big, high net worth family office, a credit investor.
Now, don't get me wrong.
This is real money to real people for sure.
But it's not Main Street.
Main Street traditionally doesn't invest at this level.
They're not investing into BlackRock or they're not investing into a family office.
This is traditionally very, very high net worth money.
That's traditionally extremely conservative.
Excuse me.
So so that's what's going on.
And the real issue are the maturities.
And Jerry, if you could pull that up, I think this is a real real.
You guys have heard about them, what they call the debt wall.
Now, what I want to explain what this is.
Now, obviously, we didn't go back, but we could.
But the reality is, is all you got to do is type it in.
What you have here are these are loans that are maturing.
OK, so that one at the top on the upper left side, that's one trillion.
So it's a lot of money, right?
Those are billions on the left.
And so I think what you've got here is you've got a you've got each year.
You got multifamily office, industrial, retail, hotel and health care.
So when when when loans are maturing, they come due.
And just like in that scenario where you have a 60 million dollar purchase,
let's say in 2022, that's now worth 40 that when that when that comes due,
which is, let's say, the dark blue down at the bottom,
you've got a big issue.
What you what you have is you have to.
Those are all going to go back or the sponsor has to come in and write a big check.
And you can see multifamily is the largest share here.
Right. And right above it is office.
And you guys already know what's going on with office offices toast.
Why? Because it worked from home and and a lot of people have adjusted that way.
And office really, really took a hit.
Above that is industrial.
Now, industrial, ironically, is actually doing pretty well.
But hotel motels not doing so well.
So the cool part about loan maturities is if you guys really want to look for where
the real deals are in real estate, all you do is look at, you know,
which loans are maturing in twenty four, twenty five, twenty six.
On what assets and what locations.
And you can track these. Right.
And you can pretty much do a calculation.
You can go back and say, oh, this this sold for 40 million, 30 million, 50 million.
And now it's worth 20 million, 30 million, whatever.
And so, you know, the the smart move,
just like what we're doing is to start talking with the lenders here because.
OK, Jerry, that's good.
So so and I'll just give you guys an example.
And I can't expose too much because we're right in the middle of this.
But we just looked at a six property deal and our offer was 60 percent of the loan.
OK, so what does that mean?
What that it's like about fourteen hundred unit
portfolio of six properties owned by a syndicator sitting on a bank's books
or sitting on a private credit books, I should say.
OK, so they bought it for whatever they bought it for.
Hopefully below what we're offering.
But if they didn't, they have a write down.
But somebody is taking the write down.
So let's let's look at let's look at who's lost money already
on those six properties, all the LP money's gone.
OK, and then when it goes back to the bank and because we're negotiating
with with the actual institution,
they now are going to take a 40 percent write down off of the loan.
So let's say the whole portfolio was 100 million.
Let's say, you know, our offer might be 60, 60 for fourteen hundred units.
As an example.
So so this is all happening kind of behind the scenes.
And so these debt funds, what they do is they go contact these big brokers
as they should, because there's a fiduciary piece of this.
And then they go out and get a broker's opinion of value
on all the six assets and then they put it out to market
and then they, you know, find the people with the cash.
And so so those are the things we're seeing kind of below the surface.
And so that's why this BlackRock issue is such a big deal.
Yeah. And also these equity or these debt funds were,
you know, sold as being very stable.
And traditionally they always are. Right. Yeah.
They usually are stable. So when people are investing this money,
this is kind of more of the safe bet, non risky, you know,
thing to do versus other things.
And so say somebody invested in BlackRock in these debt funds
and then now the debt is being repriced.
Are they out of money as well?
Or is it BlackRock that's out of money or how does that work?
That's a good question.
I obviously if they wrote down these debt funds,
it's one of the largest losses in their history.
So that's why this is such a big deal because they're so conservative.
And they're usually, by the way, late to the game.
So that's another really, really kind of very interesting thing.
They're doing it now, which I actually like this because.
But if you're specifically just in that debt fund,
obviously it depends on what else is in there. Right.
So the whole purpose of a fund is to have a lot of different assets.
And so them writing down, you know, whatever,
whatever they wrote down definitely affects the fund.
But there could be other investments inside of that fund that are doing well.
So I do want to emphasize this is not a crash like 2008.
In 2008, what you had was you had Main Street actually turning their homes
into the banks. Very different.
First of all, there were traditional banks that took the hit.
And we all know the story behind Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and all that.
And the government had to step in. Now, this is very different.
This is on the private credit side. And these are, this is big money.
So this could be your pension, your insurance, you know,
some of the insurance companies, you know, BlackRock.
If you take a look at what they manage, they manage that kind of stuff.
So these are big asset managers, you know, making very, very typically,
very conservative investments. And BlackRock's, you know,
as much as a lot of people don't like them, you know, they're quite a story.
They've done a really, really good job traditionally of making people money.
And so that's why this is such a big deal.
And we're going to go into what the Fed just did that may have triggered that.
But before that, we're going to get a word from our paid sponsor, Monetary Medals.
This wasn't coincidental that this just happened right after Trump
announced the new Fed chair is going to be Kevin Warsh.
Yeah. And this is a big deal. So, so Kevin Warsh, as you guys may or may not know,
super pedigree, right? He was definitely one of the Fed board governors for a long,
long time. But what's really interesting is that he was right in the heyday in 2008.
And so he had all these, I love this guy because here's why.
Basically his statement was bad loans shouldn't be papered over by policy bailouts.
I could not agree more. So he's more of a free market thinker.
He's like, you can't you got to let these things kind of go the way that they're supposed to go.
And I like, you know, he he was really, really critical during the 2008 crisis.
So so but he he he raised his hand like around all this issue.
And I think this is a really, really smart thing to put it put a spotlight on.
Yeah. Yeah. And, you know, he's definitely more hawkish than who they were talking
about was going to be appointed to that position. I can't remember his name off the top of my head.
But because of that, I think everyone is seeing the writing on the wall that rates are not plummeting
anytime soon and that, you know, we can't pretend any longer because now we have a problem.
Yeah. And if you want to his track record is all about no bailouts.
So so for those of you that agree with that, that's what he that's you know,
he just go back and look at his record. So so that's not a bad thing.
So what happens when there's no bailouts? By the way, this is not Main Street.
This is Wall Street. Nobody's nobody's going to want to bail out to Wall Street.
By the way, I've been through that. And 2008 was not one of those.
Well, I guess it kind of was, but mostly it was a it was a bailout for Main Street and Wall Street.
But, you know, because some of these banks were were teetering, that's for sure.
But this is very, very, very different.
And and it's almost not going to be noticed at at the Main Street level.
However, if you have, let's say, money in the market and and, you know,
your quarterly statement that you probably don't completely understand because it's so complex
and you have money in your 401ks or your retirement or whatever,
you could see a little bit of a hit depending on the allocations, of course.
But but also, I don't know if this is the first one.
This what I think what this did was this confirmed what we all thought.
And and I think that's probably the most interesting thing.
Yeah. Yep. So that's going to be a big deal. And that's kind of what's triggering this.
And, you know, this is kind of the first domino. Right.
Because a lot of these multifamily deals with banks,
as well as other private lenders, are also in the same situation.
And so, you know, BlackRock is a big company. And for them to do this,
it's going to signal to a lot of other companies that are debating on what to do.
And you're probably going to see more of this going into 2026.
Yeah, guys, as you guys might have known, we've talked about this.
You know, our company's not immune either.
Like our values have gone down from where they were as well.
The whole industry has. Right.
And we did some refinancing and we did some financing during that period of time.
And and, you know, we are battling the same battle.
The difference is, is that, as you guys know,
we kind of sat back and we didn't we didn't hit the pedal on the gas like a lot of people.
Right. There are some people about 30, 40, 50, 60 deals during that period of time.
And they are for sure toast. And they're trying to figure all this out.
And so, you know, luckily, we've been in business 25 years where we had, you know,
caught 20 years of very successful growth.
And and and our loan to values are really, really, really in good shape.
I mean, we're somewhere in the 50s. So but not everyone was like that.
You know, when you're when you're when when you buy something in the space,
you expect to refi out later. That is the game.
Like you when you whether you're building or whether you're buying,
your goal is to at least, you know, have the property worth more. Right.
And so that was the bet that hasn't worked.
So if people that bought in 22, 23, 24, let's say probably 21, 22, 23, more accurately,
they're in trouble. Those values are down.
Those cap rates are up. Those values are 20, 30, 40 percent low.
In some cases, they might even spiral even more.
So as these as these private credit companies, you know,
that maybe got money from BlackRock or even even somebody else start to show their hands.
What you'll see is you'll see a lot more of the stuff up on the market.
And what will what will happen?
The LPs will finally realize that they may or may not be still alive in the game.
And their money could be dead potentially if the sponsor can hold it like, you know,
through this cycle. And that's the whole game.
Like how long can you kick the can down the road?
Because just because a property is worth less doesn't mean you need to dump it.
And so if you can hold it another year, two years, three years,
then then you're probably going to be OK.
And there's there's a whole nother show there as to why.
But in the short term, if there's a loan maturity, which is the real issue,
which is why we showed you the graph.
Then all of a sudden, that's where the rubber hits the road.
That's where the math hits a spreadsheet like and the cash flow is gone.
And the you know, who's going to fund something?
Who's going to write it? Who's going to size do another 10 or 15 million dollar check?
Like in that example, I said just to keep an asset.
So that's what's going on behind the scenes with with all these sponsors.
They're they're they're working with their various lenders.
And some are really, really working with people and some are not.
And so they have their own pressures. Right.
And so what Daniel was talking about earlier was while we saw the first cracks,
let's call it year one or year two, those debt funds were still raising capital.
And they were they were because why?
Because these they haven't taken back these assets.
So maybe they didn't accurately know what the values were worth.
And of course, if rates would have went down, things could have reversed.
You know, cap rates can always compress down, but they did it.
And so now what's happening is, you know, the cards are being shown.
It's the end of the game.
It's like a Texas hole in game where everybody throws their cards down.
And it is what it is.
You know, whatever is on the flop is what is on the flop.
And where we're sitting at is, you know, these these mid mid mid fives to low six interest rates.
They're not going to come down to where they were.
You got higher expenses and and your occupancies are teetering in a lot of markets
because the the there's so much product that's hit the markets.
It's really a renter's market right now.
They have a lot of choices.
But I also want to talk about how this does hit Main Street, though, because not just BlackRock specifically,
but, you know, a lot of these multifamily deals, you know, people's pensions are invested in a lot of these.
You know, it's not just family offices.
You know, there is pension funds.
There's retirement funds, things like that as well.
It's a heck of a point.
Yeah.
And again, it just depends on the allocations.
Right.
The problem with looking at a statement, you know, that you get quarterly is you don't always know what it is.
It's, you know, it's ABC, you know, International Investment Fund.
You know, like, what does that really mean?
And they usually take slivers and they're investing in all kinds of things.
Right. So, you know, if if they invested in gold and silver in that fund and multifamily, then they're probably OK.
You know what I mean?
But, you know, it just depends.
It just depends on what that's invested in.
But there's no question that this private credit market has taken a huge hit for commercial loans that are coming due.
And the issue, you can't extend and pretend.
You can extend until maturity.
And then you can't extend.
And at that point, they need to size it up.
And also, I'll just point out one thing.
When you borrow from, let's say, these companies and I do want to point out, these are very sophisticated private equity companies.
You know, the private credit companies, they're very sophisticated.
They have very sophisticated agreements.
They have very sophisticated triggers.
You know, they're great asset managers typically.
And a lot of times they come from these public institutions anyway.
But the reality is, is usually the money is priced a little bit higher.
It's a little more flexible.
And they don't have the balance sheet or the bandwidth to, you know, to weather the storm.
And so when BlackRock takes a write down, then wherever they invested that money is certainly taking it in the chin as well.
And then, of course, but it all starts at Main Street.
So to your point, what does all that mean?
The renter will never really even see it.
Like if you're renting somewhere at $1,500 or $1,000, let's say, you're not even going to notice.
You don't even really care if the management company and the owner, you know, the only thing you care about is the place is clean and, you know, and that they continue to do the routine maintenance and stuff like that.
Like the ownership that's trading, this is essentially like what goes on at the end of a Monopoly game, right?
Like there's going to be people that are going to be buying foreclosed properties and properties that are in default.
Now, there's different levels of default.
So I want to point that out.
So most people think a default is boarded up windows, you know, and something looks horrible from the outside.
And that's not necessarily the case.
A default might be a perfectly well-maintained, beautiful place.
But the equity is gone and the thing is worth less than the loan or maybe what the loan's worth.
And so all you're doing is trading paper.
It's like taking two cars and trading titles back in the day, you know, when they used to do that.
That's all this is.
It's just, you know, they're just trading paper.
The renter won't know.
Mainstreet won't really know.
However, if you have money, to Neal's point, sitting in, you know, into the BlackRock, let's say, equity credit fund, then it's possible, right?
But again, it also depends on what else it's invested in.
But the point isn't that.
But I'm going to push back on you with that because I actually think the renters do know.
Because I have friends living in properties that are distressed right now where nothing's getting fixed.
I have a friend that water's coming in through her ceiling and the management company is trying to get a hold of the owner for the money to repair it and not getting that money.
So I think there's a lot of renters that are living in distressed properties that will know that do know something's going on.
And then when it goes back to the bank or repurchased and it has a better owner that is not underwater, it will be different.
It's absolutely possible.
Right.
Of course.
Right.
There are definitely going to be scenarios where there's no money being spent.
Because let's be clear.
In year one, when the rates go up, the cash flow goes down.
Year two, expenses and rates go up.
Cash flow is really down, maybe even negative.
And now you're funding it.
Right.
And then in year three, when the occupancy started to go down and rents started staying flat, you could potentially run out of money.
At that point, when a property runs out of money, there's a few things that happen.
First of all, the lender typically is all over this.
They may or may not have the resources.
And then they move forward with the process of basically taking back over the properties.
And to your point, they resize the loan.
Somebody takes a hit on that.
Like on the deal that we're offering on 60% of the loan, somebody took a hit on 40% of that loan.
An institution or a private credit for sure took a hit on that loan.
And, of course, all the LP money or wherever that was.
It could actually even be private credit money on the equity piece, what they call a capital stack.
The capital stack is the equity and then the debt.
And the debt can be multilayered.
But that's typically what they call the capital stack.
So we're way down inside of the capital stack.
When you're at 60% of the loan, all the stuff above it is gone.
And to your point, if the property has high deferred maintenance, which is entirely possible,
then, of course, it becomes a little worse.
And to your point, I did hear about some of this in a bunch of portfolios in Houston.
Where they stopped paying their property taxes and the pools are green and there's all kinds of stuff.
So, again, hopefully this will be temporary.
That's why I keep telling you guys this is a great time to buy.
This is why we're looking.
You got to be careful.
We don't want to catch a falling knife for sure.
We also don't need to time the bottom perfectly.
But we know that it's coming.
And I still think, as I said before, 2026 will be, in my opinion, the bottom of the multifamily market.
And the reason is we'll absorb those units and there's not a lot of new construction hitting in late 26, 27, or 28.
Which is why we started building.
Which is we're trying to time the market.
So what you do is you buy when it's low, obviously.
When is it low?
It's low when operationally things are horrible.
So high expenses, high vacancy, and your debt's out of whack.
So there's no cash flow.
And so what you want to do is you want to go in and buy these properties at massively below replacement costs.
But it's technical.
I mean, you got to really know what you're buying.
You don't want to buy some of these deals because they're going to be sitting on these lenders' balance sheets for a while.
Yep, and you just have to know that multifamily is looking at the same exact math that BlackRock was just looking at.
So it will be interesting how all this unfolds this year.
Yeah, this is not a small owner issue, guys.
That's kind of what we've been bumbling around.
This is a confirmation that things are going on in the multifamily space.
Great time to look.
Great time to buy.
However, you can really get in trouble if you buy incorrectly.
So be careful as you navigate this stuff.
As always, I appreciate your time.
