Basically, because everyone faced the choice of a .50 caliber machine gun or 20mm (or larger) cannons for anti-aircraft use, and most people chose the cannons - including Germany. There were some .50 caliber machine guns adopted by Axis powers, most notably the Hotchkiss 1930, a magazine-fed 13.2mm gun that was used by both Italy and Japan (among others). However, the use of the .50 caliber M2 by the US was really a logistical holdover form the interwar period. The M2 remained in production because it was adopted by US Coastal Artillery as a water-cooled anti-aircraft gun, and commercial sales by Colt were slim but sufficient to keep the gun in development through the 20s and 30s. It was used as a main armament in early American armor, but obsolete in this role when the war broke out.
However, with the gun in production and no obvious domestic 20mm design, the US chose to simply make an astounding number of M2s and just dump them everywhere, from Jeeps to trucks to halftracks to tanks to self-propelled guns. And that's not considering the 75% of production that went to coaxial and aircraft versions...
Anyway, back to the question. The German choice for antiaircraft use was the 20mm and 37mm Flak systems, and not a ,50 MG on every tank turret. And so, there was really no motive to develop such a gun. The Soviets did choose to go the US route, though, and developed the DShK-38 for the same role as the US M2 - although it was made in only a tiny fraction of the quantity of the M2.
Hey guys, thanks for tuning in to another Ask Ian Q&A on Forgotten Weapons.
I'm Ian Colum, and our question today comes from Nathaniel on Patreon.
Nathaniel asks,
Why didn't Germany or the Axis powers in World War Two have a machine gun similar to the American M2?
Well, there's actually quite a lot to unpack in order to properly answer that question.
So let's start with a little bit of background on the M2 itself.
This is a machine gun that was developed at the very end of World War One by John Browning.
It was essentially just a scaled-up version of his Model 1917 .30-caliber machine gun, originally water-cooled.
And it was intended to be an anti-aircraft and anti-tank multi-purpose super machine gun, basically.
And at this time modern tanks, at the end of World War One, were vulnerable to simple .50-caliber AP bullets.
Today we have to have far more high-tech munitions to defeat tank armour.
Back then tank armour wasn't that much.
A .30-caliber rifle round was probably not going to do anything,
but a .50-caliber round could, especially if you fired a whole bunch of them.
And it wasn't just the United States that saw the potential in this, the Germans did as well.
And at the very end of World War One, one of the things that Germany was developing
was the 13.2mm Tank und Flieger machine gun, which was essentially a Maxim gun,
scaled up, just like Browning did, scaled up to a 13.2mm cartridge.
Just for comparison, .50 calibre is 12.7mm, so this is on the order of .55 calibre.
The TUF machine gun would never see service, only a couple of prototypes were built.
But ... they did take the cartridge and build the Mauser Tankgewehr around it.
And it's that cartridge that would serve as the basis for pretty much all of the other .50 calibre developments,
including the American .50 calibre, as the cartridge was developed and ultimately adopted.
Now with the end of World War One ... there had been a presumptive order for 10,000 of these Browning .50 calibre machine guns.
That was cancelled with the end of the war.
And the only reason that the American .50 cal survived was because in 1921
the Coastal Artillery Service decided that it liked the water-cooled .50 calibre machine gun
as an anti-aircraft weapon and formally adopted it.
That was really the one thing that kept this weapon in the US military inventory system.
Now Colt owned the rights to manufacture the gun, and they would try to market it and sell it during the interwar years,
and it wasn't really very popular. They sold some.
The most important thing was that in the 1930s they developed a universal receiver for the .50 calibre machine gun
that would allow it to be very economically manufactured.
One standard receiver that could be built up as either a water-cooled, emplaced gun,
as an air-cooled, heavy-barrelled, flexible mount, or turret mount, or tank-mounted weapon,
or as a wing-mounted, remote-fired aircraft gun.
And this allowed Colt to actually continue manufacturing the gun in a reasonably efficient manner.
Had they not made that innovation to it,
the gun may have been dropped from Colt's production before we even get to World War Two,
because it just wouldn't have been very cost-effective to be manufacturing it
in the small quantities that it was actually being purchased.
Now, when we get to World War Two,
other branches of the service do see a potential for the .50 calibre machine gun.
In particular, it is an aircraft gun and an anti-aircraft gun.
That's really the main reason that this thing exists.
The idea of an infantry anti-ground target heavy machine gun,
that's a thing, but it's really not the primary purpose.
Now, there were other guns around the world that were developed and were adopted ...
in a very similar structure to the M2.
Although most of the others were actually magazine-fed.
Probably the most common of them is the Hotchkiss Model 1930,
which was a magazine-fed 13.2mm heavy machine gun.
And it was adopted and used by a bunch of countries,
including the Italians and the Japanese, as well as the Poles used it,
and a number of other small countries that weren't huge players in World War Two.
But you did have .50 calibre machine guns on the Axis side,
as well as on the ... Allied side outside of the United States.
The British had a .50 calibre Vickers gun, a couple different versions of it actually.
But none of these were put into all that much service.
There is a debate going on at this time, and before World War Two, and after as well,
as to what's the most effective sort of aircraft or anti-aircraft weapon.
And there are a bunch of different schools of thought.
One of them is that ... the trade-off is that .50 calibre doesn't offer you
enough volume in a projectile for an exploding fuse, for an exploding projectile.
With .50 calibre you're pretty much limited to, at best, incendiary, or maybe just armour piercing.
But those both require you to actually hit the target in order to do anything to it.
Once you expand up to about 20mm, now there's enough space in the projectile
to have a fuse and an explosive charge.
And you can damage an aircraft without having to actually hit it.
You can just get close to it, have the projectile burst, and damage the aircraft.
And so this is a big part of the debate in different countries over
what's the best thing to use as an anti-aircraft weapon.
The US, once we get to World War Two, because we do have the M2 in production,
... we understand how to make it, it is in service with the military, the ammunition is in service.
We don't have a really common, say, 20mm gun at that time the way we do with the Browning M2.
And that contributes to the M2 being chosen as the United States answer to this question.
A lot of it is logistics.
In other countries, in a lot of other countries,
you'll see preference for 20mm guns, or even larger.
Especially as World War Two progresses,
people start looking at 37 or 40mm guns for anti-aircraft use.
The aircraft in World War Two are getting more and more heavily armoured.
Now one of the other countries that did actually develop a belt-fed .50 calibre heavy machine gun
was the Soviet Union.
They ... turned the Degtyarev into a .50 cal gun, the DSHK, adopted in 1938.
And they would use it for much the same role as the M2 was intended to be used.
However, one of the big differences, and one of the other reasons that the M2
I think is so well known today, so recognised, and seems to be ubiquitous, well, is ubiquitous,
is during World War Two the US kind of did like a massive industrial flex
on the rest of the world with the M2.
It's a bit meme-y, but you could think of this as like the classic
Uncle Sam painting with like glowing red eyes of fire.
Because the US manufactured about 2 million Browning .50 calibre machine guns.
About 460,000 of those were Browning M2 heavy barrels.
And that's the classic version that we think of,
that you see bolted to like every vehicle in American inventory in World War Two.
We had eight different companies manufacturing these things.
Like, to put that in perspective, by the beginning of 1944 the Soviet Union
had manufactured about 8,400 DSHKs.
We made 460,000 of just the heavy-barrelled air-cooled iteration of the Browning .50.
It's an insane number of guns, and the US doctrine was
we're basically going to put them on anything that can hold them.
We're going to put them on trucks. We're going to put them on tanks.
We'll put them on some Jeeps. We'll put them on half-tracks.
We'll put four of them together in a big mountain.
Put that on a half-track, or on a trailer.
It's like Oprah just handing out .50 calibre machine guns
to everyone who could conceivably use them.
And that's why you see the M2 everywhere,
and you don't see a lot of these other .50 calibre guns that were in existence.
Now you will see the Soviet Union sort of adopt this after World War Two
when ... the US figured for anti-aircraft use on tanks,
we'll throw a .50 cal on every single one of them.
We've got .30 calibre machine guns in the bow perhaps,
or coaxial with the main gun, and that's for anti-infantry use on the ground.
And then for anti-aircraft use each individual tank has a .50 cal machine gun on the turret.
The Soviets would do that after the war with Dishkas,
throwing them on all of their tanks.
Which is ... if you look at Soviet tanks after the war you'll see that.
Some, I think some during the war. I'm not a huge tank historian.
Now the Germans, since ... to try and loop back here to the original question,
why didn't the Germans have a .50 cal machine gun?
Well, the Germans kind of went with the 20mm thing.
The Tank und Flieger development was dropped
largely because of restrictions from the Treaty of Versailles.
By the time German armament restarts in the 1930s,
they've made a choice to go with a larger calibre,
and they don't bother to really develop a .50 calibre.
They've got a .30, which is the MG ... 34 at the beginning of the war,
and then they'll develop some .50s.
Now we don't see ... or they'll develop some 20mm stuff.
Now we don't see 20mms on the top of German tanks.
And so I thought, rather than try and bumble around it myself,
I'd go to someone who has a better base understanding of,
say, tank-air-defence-combined-arms doctrine.
And so I reached out to Nick Moran, the chieftain,
to ask him what was German anti-aircraft strategy or doctrine during World War Two.
So Nick was kind enough to help out with an answer.
So Nick, take it away, what was the German thing?
Well Ian, it turns out that you've come up with quite an intriguing question,
and one to which I have no answer either.
So, as you do, I asked around a bit,
and it turned out that also neither Hilary Doyle,
who is basically the final word on German armour,
nor the director of the German Army's Panzermuseum, Rothraths,
has the specific answer either.
However, from what they've told me, we can make some inferences.
To start with, you are quite correct about skipping over
the large machine gun calibres in Germany,
and this applies not only to anti-aircraft work.
At the time when the US Army was fitting calibre 50 machine guns
into turrets of M1 combat cars, M1 armoured cars, and M2 light tanks
as the primary weapon of its armoured vehicles,
the Germans were putting a 2cm cannon into the turrets of Panzer II,
2316 wheels, and 222 recon cars.
That both nations would use their same calibre
when it came to pointing guns upwards would make some sense.
When talking about German air defense,
it's worth noting that two different organizations were responsible for this.
There was the General Luftwaffe Flak units,
which went up to the level of a flak corps,
and were responsible for air defense in general,
particularly of bridges, logistics centres,
and anything else of operational importance.
However, at the unit level, air defense was primarily
the responsibility of the Harris Flak.
Generally speaking, these were one battalion per division.
These could contain weapons as big as 8.8cm,
but more normally we're talking half-track mounted automatic guns,
3.7cm single barrels or 2cm singles or quads.
Compared to heavy machine guns,
such as mounted on the M16 half-track with a squad 50s,
the cannons could provide a larger area of coverage per vehicle.
Quite simply, you can shoot further with a cannon
than you can with a machine gun.
It's worth noting that American divisions tended to have
an anti-aircraft artillery battalion attached as well,
but they were either multiple 50s or a combination 37 and 50,
the M15 combination gun motor carriage.
Flak crews often would try to position themselves
towards the flanks of the Panzer units
as an enemy aircraft often would approach a flank
and then turn in parallel to the front line
in order to line up with as many targets as possible.
With a large caliber gun thoughts,
you could not only shoot at aircraft on the way in,
but also during the attack run.
With caliber 50, that's much more of a point defense weapon.
If you got within range of an M16,
you were in for a significant emotional event,
but the M16 couldn't reach out as far.
There were quite a few M15s built as well,
but they were not as prevalent
as the German 2cm and 3.7cm cannons.
There are, of course, exceptions to everything.
The one-ton Leichter Personenkraftwagen
was basically a truck with an MG34 twin mount,
particularly for accompanying infantry units
or Sturmgeschütz in Thailand,
but they went away mid-war
as basically being ineffective against modern aircraft.
As for weapons on the tank itself,
it seems to have been a difference of opinion
as to the best solution to being attacked.
The goal of your air defense encounter
is to survive, not to shoot down airplanes.
I've actually got a video on that.
It's entitled When Your Tank Is Attacked by Aircraft.
Both German documentation from the time
and reports from Allied pilots
indicated that when attacked,
Germans would shoot absolutely every weapon they had to hand,
from rifles to machine guns.
However, most German tanks
did not equip a pintle machine gun mount.
Some certainly did,
and it was specifically designated as a Flak MG,
with the mount labeled in the manual
as Fliegergeschützgerät.
To that extent, the machine gun mount
is for the same purpose as the caliber 50
on an American tank, air defense.
However, there very well may have been
a difference of opinion
as to the role of a tank commander
when under attack.
The reality was that aircraft generally
were horrible at killing tanks,
though P-47 or Typhoon advocates
weren't open to admit it,
and it was far safer to get into the tank
and close the hatch
than it was to do anything else.
Indeed, one of the biggest problems
that German veteran crews had
was getting their new green crewmen
to not jump out of the tank
when they saw an Allied Jabo lining up on them.
But if so,
then why fit any tanks at all with the pintle?
Well, there is still merit
to sending a bunch of tracer
at an attacking aircraft.
This is certainly the American philosophy
for tank pintle-mounted air defense.
However, we now encounter
a German ammunition conservation philosophy
of Lohnende Siele,
which basically comes down to
only shoot at targets
that are worth the expenditure.
If your object is to distract
an incoming enemy pilot,
the amount of lead
which you would be putting up
from four MG34s
wouldn't have a commensurately
greater effect
for the level of ammunition expenditure
compared to that from shooting
but a single MG34.
You're probably not going to shoot
the aircraft down either way,
but even just one machine gun
ought to give the pilot
something to think about
as he's trying to line up,
especially if there's a second stream
of tracer coming in
from ways away
from a Paris Flak 3.7 cm.
Americans, of course,
have traditionally had a
more DACA approach
to dealing with problems.
Ammunition conservation
doesn't really seem to have been
a particular doctrinal philosophy.
There are two additional touch points
to look at.
One is how anti-aircraft configuration
of American tank destroyer battalions
changed with the change
in perceived air threats.
The tank destroyer battalion
came about after footage
of all those panzers and Stukas
rough stomping Britain and France
came about.
Every platoon of destroyers
was to be accompanied
by a section of anti-aircraft vehicles,
specifically declared
as requiring 37mm automatic cannons.
These ended up becoming
the M15 CGMC.
However, the vehicles were dropped
from the TD table of organization
in late 1942,
presumably after experience
showed that the German air threat
could be tamed
by the US Army Air Forces
and the RAF.
So you didn't really need
to have as many specific vehicles
and crews dedicated
to the anti-air role.
But if an aircraft
did come directly at you,
the caliber 50
wouldn't take up much space
and would at least make you feel
a bit better about life.
On the other hand,
the Germans did start taking weapons
from the Luftwaffe
who weren't shooting down
many of the Allied Diablos.
Note the use of the MG 151,
1.5cm and 2cm guns
in the ground mount role,
eventually being mounted on half-tracks
as a 251-21 drilling.
A stupidly popular weapon,
the German ground troops
would have taken
as many as they could get.
Yet the 1.5cm was replaced
by the 2cm when possible.
They wanted larger.
There was a third gun
to consider in this as well,
the MG 131,
a 13mm weapon
and thus as close
to a caliber 50 as possible.
Though primarily
an electrically primed aircraft gun,
it could be converted
to a ground mount
and percussion fired.
It could thus be mounted on a tank
much like an American caliber 50,
yet it never was.
So why then would the Herb
be willing to accept
a Luftwaffe gun
with a new ammunition type
and resulting logistical complications
in the form of the MG 151
and not the MG 131?
One has to keep going back
to questions of lethality and range
combined with Lohnende Ziele.
If the 131,
which in fairness
also had an unnecessary rate
of fire for the role,
wasn't much more likely
to do more than distract
incoming pilots
than the 7.92mm MG 34,
then it was not necessary
to mount it on the tank
for point defense.
On the other hand,
if you want something
which provides a lot of coverage
and has a good chance
of actually shooting down a target,
especially an armored one
like an IL-2,
you're better off
with a heavier gun
on a dedicated platform
with a trained,
dedicated anti-aircraft crew.
Again, this is my personal inference
from what I can glean.
I have not seen this answered
in official documentation
and apparently neither
has anybody else,
but it's the best I can give you.
Sorry.
Feel free to expand
on my line of thinking
with any other inputs
that you may have.
Take care,
and thanks for thinking of me.
Well, awesome.
Thank you, Nick.
I really appreciate the input.
It's fun to get perspectives
from people who are
subject matter experts
in areas that I'm really not.
So if you're interested
in armored vehicles,
their development
from very early ones
to quite modern ones,
definitely check out Nick's channel.
I will link to it
in the description text below.
And hopefully this did
a fairly comprehensive job,
I hope, of answering the question
of why didn't the Germans
have a version of the M2?
So if you would like to have
one of your questions
answered in video format like this,
head on over to Patreon or Utreon.
You can sign up to help
support Forgotten Weapons,
and I have threads running
on both of those platforms
each month to get submissions
for Q&A questions
just like this one.
Thanks for watching.
Thanks for the excellent question,
and I'll see you guys next time.