How strong is the Russian army?

Army Analysis
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7 Video Views·Jan 2, 2026
On the eve of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a British delegation warned Russian generals not to go ahead. Shashank Joshi, our defence editor, speaks to one of those who issued that warning: John Foreman, Britain’s former defence attaché in Moscow. They discuss what it was like to hear his Russian counterparts lie about their intentions in Ukraine, how Vladimir Putin miscalculated the invasion and the weaknesses of Russia’s armed forces.
Few outsiders understand Russia's military and its mindset better than my guest,
John Foreman, who served as Britain's defence attaché in both Kiev and Moscow. He has seen
the Kremlin's world up close. He spent years serving the Russian army. He was tailed by FSB
spies, and he was in the room as Britain's defence chiefs warned Russian generals not to invade
and watched as that warning was ignored. John Foreman, welcome to Inside Defence.
Thank you, Shashank, for the invitation.
John, it's great to have you here. You spent 40 years in the Royal Navy, doing lots of Navy
things. But latterly in your career, from 2019 to 2022, you were Britain's defence attaché in
Moscow. You were our military's man in Moscow, in the lion's den. And you were in the room,
as we can see here, just to take you back a few years. As Britain's defence minister,
there's Ben Wallace and Sir Tony Radkin, the chief of defence staff,
were meeting their Russian counterparts, there's Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov,
and asked them face-to-face whether they would invade. I think you're there in the back corner,
aren't you, John? You watched as they brazenly lied to your face. What was going through your
head, as we can see you there, and what was the atmosphere in that room like?
Well, we'd had two weeks to arrange it, you know, and it was actually in the run-up to the
invasion. The intelligence had been more and more evidence that Russia was going to invade,
so this was really much a last-ditch attempt to deter them from doing so. The key point was that
we knew that Shoigu and Gerasimov met Putin, so rather than going through layers and layers of
other intermediaries, we'd speak to the Russians directly. What was the mood like?
It started off as quite stuffy, you know, Shoigu was a man, like a vain man,
but the point was to refute their sort of talking points and really get onto the substance of it,
and really say, look, if you don't invade, which would be a bad thing for Europe,
and bad for Ukraine, and bad for Russia, then there are things we can do bilaterally
and multilaterally to stabilise our relationship. So there was a carrot on the table?
Well, I think there was a carrot about the demands they'd issued to us in the end of 2021
on European security, which ones were, you know, negotiable and which ones weren't.
But that should say, it was both our interest not to have, you know, conflict,
both bilaterally and multilaterally. But I don't think they're listening, you know,
my role here at the end, I was doing what was the mood like, also I speak Russian,
listen to how they spoke, and then I had a friend down here who was taking the notes,
now sort of prepared notes, and somebody said they're either Champions League liars,
or, you know, they're lying to our faces, or they're saying it's all great, don't worry about
it, John. I think the proof of the pudding was that Ben Wallace sent more weapons,
defensive weapons to Ukraine. So I think we saw through their lies.
Yes, and you're confident they were lying? It's not that they were in the dark as well from Putin?
No, I think Shurik and Grasamov definitely knew, and I think a couple of others did,
but it's interesting afterwards, I was outside being thanked by the Russian generals for having
brought this big delegation and sorted it out, it was all fantastic, and how we're going to have
peace in our time, and you know, we can have a new relationship. And I looked at their eyes,
I don't think they knew what I knew. And so there was quite a lot of optimism on both sides,
actually, I think some people in the Foreign Office also grabbed at the straws and said,
this is a great sign that Russia's not going to attack, and I think also in some parts,
this machine, because, you know, the way the nature of decision making is taken by Putin,
you know, ultimately it was his decision. They probably agreed in principle,
the planning had been done, but the final go had not yet been given. And I think that was probably
taken around about Valentine's Day that year, 14th, and then a week later they invaded. So
we were before that, this final decision, based on all the facts, so the preparation was carried on.
You know, you had been observing the Russian army on exercises, reading their military journals,
talking to their academics, that's what your job was. What did you think of as their strengths
and weaknesses? And when they eventually failed to adapt to being punched in the mouth,
was it because they had a bad plan, or was it because there was a fundamental rot in their army
to do with culture or proficiency or something? You sort of got it with hindsight. Have you taken
a view on this? Well, I think it's an omni-shambles, to be honest, to the Russians.
Did they underestimate the Ukrainians? Yes. Did they overestimate themselves? Yes. Were
they blinded by, as I wrote in The Economist, the hubris, chauvinism, racism? Yes.
The Ukrainians are lesser people. Yes, they are mal-Russian, they are little Russians,
quote-unquote. We are the great Russian people, they are the small Russian people. We are the
heirs of Zhukov, they are just a bunch of, quote-unquote, country bumpkins who are corrupt
and inefficient and come from their own country. I think there was a role of, quote, new generation
warfare, the indirect espionage, sabotage, destabilisation of operations. You don't need
large infantry formations because by attacking the key nodes of Ukrainian power, by undermining
them through subversion, covert action, they'll crumble. For decades. So Ukraine's a house of
cards in a lot of ways. Basically, we've put a lock on the door, we've already done all this work,
and then the whole country's going to collapse. The leadership will flee, will surround the army
in Donbass, force them to surrender, bring on a puppet leader, sort of Lukashenko-type figure,
eradicate the Ukrainian intellectuals and those people that were getting in the way,
and then move on. And I think that was the plan. But I think, you know, so there was
problems in the concept of the plan, there were problems in the intelligence preparation,
especially the intelligence services kicking, passing information out that Putin wants to hear.
Yeah, not sending bad news up the chain.
Yeah, like, you know, all our troops have got COVID and they're not prepared, they haven't
done any rehearsals, whilst we haven't got enough troops, or the Ukraine is going to fight,
and that wasn't heard, because that's the way it's done. But I thought also in the execution,
the fact they had four parallel thrusts into Ukraine at the same time, no overall commander,
no logistics, no rehearsals, as I said. So when my colleagues were driving around the border
in the winter of 2022, they just sat there, getting drunk, getting COVID and doing nothing.
So suddenly they, like, brung up and said, like, lads, you've got to evade tomorrow.
So there's no plans, nothing, the plans are out, the maps are out of date. So,
I mean, I think it's a catastrophic failure of the Russian state. I think it's a symbol of
how much Russia's been, institutions like the army, armed forces, the Ministry of Defence,
have been eaten away by corruption and incompetence.
Let's imagine there was a ceasefire today, and the Russian army starts
rebuilding. It starts thinking, what kind of army do we want in 2030?
Now, one option is a sort of army it wanted before 2022, that is lean, modernised, small units that
are, you know, focused on more lethal firepower. Another option is a Soviet-style mass army that
is built around just vast numbers of people. Do you think the Russians have a view of this? What
forces is NATO going to be looking at in 2030, 2035?
The problem with the Russian army in 2022 wasn't the sort of lean, professional,
readiness army that the Allies have, NATO, or the Soviet-style large force. So they were sort of,
that's why they had things like the battalion task groups and all that. So I think that's
the direction, in line with that sort of sense of conservatism. The problem the Russians have
had is that they, whilst they've been engaged in the war, they can't think about a war.
But I still think it would be a defensive force. I still think that they will, you know, look to
the past for the future. But I'd also say that I think some of the forecasting in the West is
mistaken, it's because they don't think about intent. You know, what is the Russian army for?
Yeah.
And, you know, I can read, you know, we can all read multiple reports by multiple
NATO generals and said, well, you know, if X tanks are built a year, then that takes Y years
to build the army and they'll be ready to attack by then, because then why would they want to do
that? So I also think that whilst they are rebuilding a conventional army, which they'll
have to do, because we're now in the third army, effectively, a bit of a rabble, the professional
army is gone. And Putin said his directions of travel, that will throw emphasis back onto nuclear
weapons. Russia is already inferiority in economy, militarily, financially to Europe. I think that
gap is going to grow. I think Russia's in decline. I think already, when I was speaking to Tony
Radican pointed out, the numbers in terms of European spending, if we will get to the two and
a half, three, three and a half percent, it's gonna be like a trillion extra dollars in defence over
the next five to 10 years, which is a considerable amount of money. At the same time, you have the
Russian economy creaking along, having to rebuild its army. The NATO army is fundamentally untouched,
notwithstanding what's happened to Ukraine. So again, why would Russia want to attack
NATO when having, A, suffered at the hands of Ukraine so grievously, and B, then have to face
an even more superior enemy? And notwithstanding the whole debate whether Americans agree with us
or not, I think even European NATO can handle the Russian army, let alone with the Americans there.
I think the future Russian army will look very much like the previous versions of the Russian army.
An army which, you know, quite good on paper, but again, is there to keep us from them. I think it's
a symbol of how much Russia's institutions, like the armed forces, the Ministry of Defence,
have been eaten away by corruption and incompetence.
