Chinese Banks Collapse One by One! 9,000 Branches Close, 100 Million Credit Cards Vanish This Year

Global Finance News
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On December 16th in Jiangyin City, Jiangsu Province, investors had gathered outside.
Investors had gathered outside the Ping'an Bank's Jiangyin branch.
The protest came in response to risks associated with one of the bank's trust products,
prompting these investors to demand accountability.
In the video, many investors held signs with messages like
Ping'an Bank is a scam to express their dissatisfaction.
The bank quickly arranged for security personnel to cover the signs with curtains at the entrance
and prevent people from taking photos or videos.
Ping'an Trust is a subsidiary of Ping'an Group, a Fortune 500 company based in Shenzhen.
The Ping'an brand has long been a symbol of trust for many people.
Many chose to invest in Ping'an Trust products because of this,
but no one expected that Ping'an could face a trust products crisis.
Just days earlier, data showed that as of December 8th,
377 banks in China had been deregistered due to mergers or closures.
Meanwhile, over 9,000 bank branches had closed,
a more than 200% increase from the same period last year.
Many people shared their thoughts on social media.
One user commented,
What's happening now?
Over 9,000 bank branches have shut down,
and the banking industry is at a critical turning point.
Once considered a golden rice bowl, is a banking industry really no longer desirable?
Another user, Xuande says mentioned,
Looking at the current situation,
the pressure on commercial banks might be worse than many people expected.
The topic is quite sensitive right now,
so I'm not sure I could speak too openly about it.
Previously, several platforms handled accounts that were labeled as pessimistic about real estate.
But even so, from the information I've come across,
the issues now exposed in commercial banks are definitely significant.
So, what's happening in China's banking industry that has raised concerns about its future?
On December 2nd, the People's Bank of China released the 2025
Third Quarter Payment System Operational Review.
The data showed that as of the end of the third quarter,
the total number of credit cards in China was 707 million.
On December 17th, Barron's, a century-old American financial weekly,
reported that the number of credit cards in China dropped from a peak of 807 million in 2022
to 707 million.
100 million credit cards have disappeared from the market in just three years.
The report also quoted an employee from a joint stock bank credit card center,
who said that back in 2019,
Now it has become difficult even to get into buildings or meet people,
making it nearly impossible to issue cards.
This has become the norm in the industry.
In the past, credit card promoters were seen everywhere in shopping malls and office lobbies.
Now they're almost gone.
For example, a marketing station set up by Huaxiao Bank in a Dongguan shopping mall
had only two consultations in one morning and didn't issue a single card.
The report suggests that the sharp decline in credit cards
is mainly due to the loss of consumer confidence.
Data for 2025 shows a complete reversal in the relationship between banks and customers,
with banks now actively pushing credit cards instead of customers seeking them.
The data reveals that 37% of customers born after 1995 are cancelling their cards,
while 42% of those born after 2000 don't have credit cards at all.
While credit card numbers are declining, the delinquency rate is rising.
As of June 2025, the credit card delinquency rate at 12 major banks rose to 2.4%,
among them Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Mingsheng Bank and Industrial Bank
had delinquency rates above 3%, with some banks reaching 3.8%.
Smaller banks are facing worse situations,
with Shengjing Bank's credit card non-performing loan ratio at 8.2% in 2024 and Chongqing Bank at 4.2%.
The report concludes that the reduction of nearly 100 million credit cards
along with 12 consecutive quarters of decline,
a reduction of 600 billion yuan in loan volume over six months,
and a drop of 8% in transaction amounts,
signals that the era of credit card market expansion is over.
China's credit card industry is officially moving from a phase of growth to a period of contraction.
December has already brought a series of bad news for China's banking sector.
According to First Financial, the statistics from the Enterprise Early Warning Platform
show that 377 banks have been deregistered due to mergers or closures as of December 8,
nearly double the 190 from the same period last year.
By type, village and township banks had the highest number of closures, at 218,
accounting for nearly 60%.
Next were rural commercial banks and credit cooperatives, with 79 and 70 closures, respectively.
The areas with the most significant reductions in banks and branches were Inner Mongolia,
with 139 closures.
Sichuan, Shandong and Henan also saw more than 20 bank closures each.
Among them, rural commercial banks had the highest closure rates.
Not only are banks disappearing, but the closure of branches is accelerating.
By December 8, 9,661 bank branches had exited the market,
a more than 200% increase compared to 2024.
Rural commercial bank branches accounted for 5,400 closures.
State-owned large banks closed 962.
City commercial and joint stock banks showed contraction as well.
The reason for bank closures is to manage and mitigate risks.
According to the 2024 China Financial Stability Report,
there are currently 357 banks in high-risk states in China.
These high-risk banks are primarily small and medium-sized institutions,
including rural cooperative banks and village banks.
In an interview with First Financial, a senior official in southern China's
banking technology department noted that more than 80% of daily banking activities,
such as transfers, payments, deposits, wealth management and loan applications,
can now be done online or via mobile apps.
As a result, visits to physical bank branches have become less frequent.
He also calculated that the annual cost of a typical bank branch,
including rent, utilities, equipment maintenance and staff salaries,
is nearly 10 million yuan.
In contrast, the cost of online banking is only one-tenth of that.
This cost pressure has become another key factor in the closure of bank branches.
Recently, China's banking sector has seen a major shift in deposit services.
Reports indicate that the six major state-owned banks have adjusted their deposit product
structures, removing five-year large certificates of deposit.
The focus has shifted to shorter-term products, particularly those with three years or less.
Meanwhile, banks have raised the minimum deposit thresholds for three-year term deposits,
signaling a trend toward higher thresholds, shorter terms and lower interest rates.
Additionally, on the evening of December 2,
app users discovered that the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, ICBC,
was selling its fourth issue of three-year large personal deposits,
with a minimum deposit requirement of 1 million yuan, offering an interest rate of just 1.6%.
At the same time, ICBC's three-year regular deposits offer the same 1.6%
interest rate, with a minimum deposit of only 50 yuan.
This means the returns on depositing 1 million yuan or 50 yuan are the same.
This stood out in the market.
Some analysts believe that when the interest rate on large certificates
of deposit is deliberately reduced to match regular-term deposits,
it sends a clear signal to the market.
Banks are no longer willing to pay extra premiums for long-term funds.
On December 3, First Financial noted that although the end of the year is typically
a busy period for banks to attract deposits, the pressure on net interest margins has led
The deposit market is now becoming more competitive.
On one hand, five-year large certificates of deposits are quickly disappearing,
as some major state-owned banks reduce long-term high-cost deposits and raise
minimum deposit requirements.
On the other hand, some smaller banks are raising deposit rates to attract more funds.
Chief economist Ming Ming at CITIC Securities also pointed out that the recent removal of
five-year term deposit products from several banks signals a shortening of the duration
of bank liabilities.
With increasing volatility in general deposits and weak growth in core deposits,
it is difficult for banks to extend the duration of their assets.
However, due to the long-term government debt supply and the need to improve returns,
banks still face the dilemma of whether to extend the maturity of their bond portfolios.
However, some analysts believe the core reason for banks' sudden reduction of
long-term deposit products is the continued pressure on net interest margins.
For banks, long-term deposits, such as three- or five-year terms,
require them to continue paying higher interest rates for several years,
which is a significant burden.
The main source of income for banks is net interest margins.
The current macroeconomic environment, with mounting pressure on the real economy
and falling loan market rates, the banks' loan income is shrinking.
As a result, they are collectively cutting high-cost liabilities.
An article published on November 25 by a well-known Cuisine Weibo account,
it was noted that in the past, the difference between loan rates and deposit rates
was the anchor for bank profits.
According to third-quarter reports from listed banks this year,
the trend of declining net interest margins has not been reversed,
with nearly half of the banks still in a downward trend.
According to data from Wind, among the 26 listed banks that disclosed
third-quarter net interest margin data,
only 12 achieved flat or slightly higher margins compared to the previous quarter,
while 14 banks saw further declines.
The real concern for the market is that the net interest margins are nearing the safety red line.
Industry experts generally agree that 1.8% is considered the safety line for banking operations.
The average net interest margin for China's banking industry has fallen below 1.5%,
with large state-owned banks averaging around 1.3%,
and some large banks even as low as 1.2%.
This means that banks' profit margins are being compressed to near-dangerous levels.
Analyst Liu Da pointed out that this pressure mainly comes from the government's ongoing policy
to lower loan rates to stimulate the economy,
while deposit rates are not decreasing as quickly.
This has made it harder for banks to maintain the traditional model of low-interest deposits,
high-interest loans.
Furthermore, the recent removal of long-term deposit products by banks is widely interpreted
as a sign that banks have made cautious and pessimistic judgments about future interest rates
and the economic situation in China.
Liu Da believes that banks are unwilling to lock in five-year deposits because they're concerned
that once interest rates continue to decline,
long-term deposits with relatively high rates will soon become a losing deal.
Therefore, banks prefer to shorten the duration of funds to about one year
to maintain flexibility in their liabilities,
avoiding being locked in by long-term fixed costs.
Liu Da also mentioned that in addition to adjusting deposit structures,
many banks in China have recently started selling properties,
accelerating the disposal of defaulted and mortgaged properties.
Even with significant price cuts, they aim to quickly recover cash flow.
He believes that the banks selling properties directly signal significant pressure,
with the sole goal of regaining cash flow, even if it means taking a loss.
In loan management, banks are also adopting a more lenient approach.
As long as borrowers can continue to repay, even if the pace slows,
the loan will not be immediately classified as bad debt,
thus reducing the pressure on the bank's balance sheet.
Liu Da concluded that the series of actions by banks,
from canceling long-term deposits and narrowing net interest margins,
to accelerated asset sales, all this points to one direction.
The future of deposit returns will be lower,
and available options will continue to shrink.
He further noted that the key issue facing the macroeconomy
is no longer just the level of interest rates, but a lack of demand and confidence.
With unstable income expectations, significant social security pressures,
and a continued weakening of the real estate sector,
monetary policies like interest rate cuts have reached their limits
in stimulating consumption and investment.
Chinese economic commentator Zhang Xing analyzed that the recent frequent
adjustments to policies in China's banking sector,
including selling properties, are essentially self-protective actions.
Compared to the scattered real estate auctions by banks in the past,
a more noticeable change recently is that many commercial banks and local rural commercial banks,
including some large state-owned banks,
have started listing properties for sale on asset trading platforms like Alibaba and JD.com.
According to official Chinese media, banks such as Agricultural Bank of China,
China Construction Bank, Bank of China, Bank of Communications,
Industrial Bank, Ping'an Bank, and several local banks are participating in this.
In Sichuan's rural credit system alone, more than 24,000 properties are up for sale,
with similar numbers in Guangdong, Liaoning, and Guizhou.
These properties, mostly acquired by banks through debt settlements,
are now owned by the banks and have relatively clear legal statuses,
making them quicker to liquidate.
They mainly include residential, commercial, and industrial properties.
However, even so, this batch of properties only accounts for about 40-50%
of the bank's total non-performing assets.
The more serious issue lies in the growing number of defaulted borrowers.
Data shows that in 2025, around 1.9 million people in China were in default for three
consecutive months, a sharp increase from the previous year.
Over 2 million properties have been reclaimed by banks,
and nearly 2 million properties are in the judicial foreclosure process.
In this context, banks can only delay the process by negotiating repayment plans with borrowers,
deferring principal payments, accepting only interest payments,
or even accepting symbolic payments to avoid immediate bad debt classification.
Currently, about 2 million households are in negotiated repayment status,
and estimates suggest that nearly 6 million households may face loan repayment crises,
accounting for one-eighth of all mortgage-holding families.
Meanwhile, many families are trapped in the borrow-money-sell-property dilemma.
With falling property prices, some homeowners are forced to sell at low
prices to avoid judicial foreclosure. However, the sale prices are lower than
their mortgage balances, forcing them to borrow more money to resolve the situation.
The root cause of all this remains the ongoing economic downturn. Industry contraction,
business closures, layoffs, and wage cuts are all affecting the once-secure middle class.
High debt, high property prices, and income instability are creating a vicious cycle,
with falling incomes, shrinking assets, increasing defaults, and growing non-performing assets.
As banks try to limit losses and save themselves, the market can feel the cold economic reality,
which is affecting everyone. Overall, it's becoming increasingly clear that the problems
facing China's economy are now manifesting in the banking system. This is not an isolated issue,
nor a short-term fluctuation. It has been gradually unfolding since the second half
of this year and is spreading across the entire industry, likely to continue into next year.
With weakening loan demand, rising non-performing assets, and squeezed profit margins,
banks have had to frequently adjust their strategies, mostly responding passively to risk.
From this perspective, the recent abnormal actions by Chinese banks are not by choice,
but preparations for an even more challenging phase. As a result, the risk of collapse for
China's economy is no longer just a theoretical possibility, but a very real concern.
