Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell said second-quarter economic data has provided policymakers greater confidence that inflation is heading down to the central bank’s 2% goal, possibly paving the way for near-term interest-rate cuts. In an interview with Bloomberg host and Carlyle co-founder and co-chairman David Rubenstein at an Economic Club of Washington event, Powell highlighted the three latest inflation readings, but said he wouldn't forecast any message about future rate reductions. This interview was recorded July 15 in Washington, DC. -------- Like this video? Subscribe to The David Rubenstein Show on YouTube: / @davidrubenstein
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This is my kitchen table and also my filing system.
Over much of the past three decades I've been an investor. The highest
calling of mankind I've often thought was private equity. And then I
started interviewing. While I watch your interview because I know how to
do some. I've learned in doing my interviews how leaders make it to the
top. I asked him how much he wanted. He said 250. I said fine. I didn't
negotiate with him. I did no due diligence. I have something I'd like to
sell and how they stay there. You don't feel inadequate now because being
only the second wealthiest man in the world. Is that right?
The most important figure traditionally in monetary policy in the United
States is the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. The current chairman is
J. Powell, someone I've known for many years. Had a chance to sit down with
him recently to talk about interest rates, inflation and the overall
economy.
There are a few billion people in the world who are waiting to see what
interest rates are going to be doing. Do you have any insights on where
interest rates might be going?
So I'm going to take that as a great opportunity to talk a little bit about
the economy and then talk about where that leaves us with policy. So I would
just start by saying that the U.S. economy has performed really remarkably
well over the last couple of years. 2023 last year was the year in which
the economy grew well above 3%. The labor market remained very strong.
Unemployment remained very low and inflation came down at quite a sharp
pace, particularly in the second half of the year by a very large amount.
And that forecast was almost unheard of. It was unheard of before
2023. So big upside surprise that year. This year, we had expected the
economy to slow a bit gradually, the labor market to continue to gradually
cool off after being overheated a couple of years ago, and inflation to
continue to make progress. And something like that is basically what has
happened. The economy is growing now at about 1.5% in the first half of the
year. Most forecasters have about a 2% growth rate for the full year. The
labor market, again, has moved into better and better balance to the point
where I think you can now say it's essentially no tighter than it was in
2019 before the pandemic. Remember that the labor market of 2019 was a very
strong labor market. So we're back to that place, no longer overheated. On
inflation, in the first quarter, we didn't make any more progress. The
second quarter, actually, we did make some more progress. We've had now three
better readings. And if you average them, that's a pretty good pace. So
turning to policy, your question, what we've said is that we didn't think it
would be appropriate to begin to loosen policy until we had greater
confidence that inflation was moving sustainably down to 2%. We've been
waiting on that. And I would say we didn't gain any additional confidence in
the first quarter. But the three readings in the second quarter,
including the one from last week, do add somewhat to confidence. We've also
said that, you know, we're a dual mandate bank. For a long time, since
inflation arrived, it's been appropriate to focus mainly on
inflation. But now that inflation has come down and the labor market has
indeed cooled off, we're going to be looking at both mandates. They're much
better in much better balance. And that means that if we were to see an
unexpected weakening in the labor market, then that might also be a reason
for reaction by us.
Okay, I think I understand. So to put it in terms I can for sure understand,
the markets are suggesting, the futures markets, that there's a 90% chance
that the Fed will lower its discount rate in September. Do you think the
markets know what they're talking about? So today, I'm not going to be sending
any signals one way or the other on any particular meeting. So just to ruin the
fun right at the beginning. I simply, you know, we're going to make these
decisions meeting by meeting, and we're going to make them on the basis of the
data as they come in, the evolving data, the evolving outlook, and also the
balance of risks now that the two mandates are basically close to being
in balance.
All right, there are some people who say that the Fed would not like to lower
interest rates in a presidential campaign period, because you could be
criticized for helping one party or another. Do you have any comment on
whether that's an accurate view?
I do. So our undertaking at all times is that we'll make our decisions based on
the incoming data, the evolving outlook, balance of risks, and only on that. We
don't take political considerations into account. We don't put up a political
filter on our decisions. That would not – it's hard enough to make these
decisions based on the appropriate factors. If you're going to add a whole
different filter in an area where we're not experts, that's not going to improve
the quality of our decisions, and it's also not the orders we have from
Congress. Our orders from Congress are to use our tools to foster maximum
employment and price stability, and to do so without political considerations.
That's what we're always going to do. If you look at the modern record, that is
what we do, and we don't think about election cycles or anything that's
political. Many people use the phrase hard landing to describe – hard
landing is a euphemism for a recession, I guess. People thought in 2023 we
might have a hard landing. People thought in 2024 we might have a hard
landing. And none of these people were economists, professionally trained
economists, but they seem to be wrong. So do you rely on these economists very
much in the future when you're projecting whether you should listen to
their views on where the economy is going, or how do you react to the fact
that we haven't had a hard landing, and disappointed all those economists?
So I'll just say that, as someone famously said, predictions are very
difficult, especially about the future. On the hard landing question, I have
always felt like that there was a pathway to getting inflation back down
to our 2% goal on a sustainable basis without the kind of pain in the labor
market, the kind of high unemployment that has been typical of tightening
cycles and getting inflation down. And the reason why my colleagues and I
thought that was that the labor market was so overheated that it could cool
down quite a bit without having to – there still is apparently no slack in
the labor market. The labor market does not have slack. Essentially, you're at
equilibrium now. But look where inflation is. Inflation's at 2.5%. So
this was in defiance of a lot of conventional wisdom, but we thought that
was right. And that says that you have to be – one thing you learn is humility
in forecasting. So I wouldn't rule it out, but I would say that the kind of
hard landing scenario is certainly not the most likely or a likely scenario.
I think you have said somewhere that when the Fed does lower interest rates
– not saying that you're saying it's going to do that – but if the Fed does
lower interest rates at some point, you didn't think it was ever going to go
back to kind of the free money practically of years ago when interest
rates were almost zero. Is that a fair statement, that you don't think it's a
good idea to go back to interest rates as low as they once were?
The period between the global financial crisis and the pandemic was
historically unusual from the standpoint that we had ever lower interest rates
through that era, including part of the era when, for example, sovereign debt of
the major European sovereigns was trading at a significantly negative rate.
And still, even with rates that low, inflation was very low below target.
And so the question is what caused that and are the forces that caused that gone
for now? And I think most people attribute the low inflation era to slow-moving
forces like demographics, globalisation, technological evolution, things like that.
And those may or may not have changed. But nonetheless, I look at where we are
now. Our funds rate is 5.3% roughly, give or take. And it feels like it's
restrictive, but not severely restrictive. So it tells me that rates, at least for
now, are – the neutral rate must have risen, probably has risen from where it
was during the inter-crisis period. And I think instinctively – I can't prove
this. We're going to learn about this empirically. But it seems to me that the
neutral rate is probably higher than it was during the inter-crisis period. And so
rates will be higher.
The Fed has set a target for inflation of 2%. Now, can you clarify, does that mean
that the inflation rate has to be at 2% before you're ready to move, if you are
ready to move? Or does it have to be within sight? And what does it mean to be
within sight?
So when we change interest rates, that tightens financial conditions. And that,
in turn, affects economic outcomes, you know, growth, labor markets, and
ultimately inflation. But with lags that can be long and variable, as Milton
Friedman famously said. And the implication of that is that if you wait until
inflation gets all the way down to 2%, you've probably waited too long. Because
the, you know, the tightening that you're doing, or the level of tightness that you
have, is still having effects which will probably drive inflation below 2%. So
we've been very clear that you wouldn't wait for inflation to get all the way
down to 2%. Our test has been for the past quite some time, that we wanted to
be, to have greater confidence that inflation was moving sustainably down
toward our 2% target. And what increases that confidence in that is more good
inflation data. And lately here, we have been getting some of that.
So if you go back in history, when inflation began to arise after COVID, at
some point, people said, including you, that it was transitory. In hindsight,
what do you think people missed about the nature of the inflation? Why was it
more enduring than people initially thought?
So these are, this is a question that people will be writing papers about and
debating longer after all of us are gone. So, and it's early to say, it's
actually kind of, kind of soon to be answering it. But I think it's, so
here's my answer to that question. When inflation arrived, it was really coming
out of the goods sector, and it was connected to really high demand for
goods. And it was, and, and, you know, the supply chains, global supply chains,
which account for most manufactured goods, collapsed because of too much
demand and because of COVID. And, you know, so, but, and to us, that looked
like a temporary fleeting situation. We also lost several million people out of
the labor force. So wages went way up as the economy really boomed, when we
reopened the economy. And we thought, you know, there, we were getting,
vaccines were coming in, and we thought that that would fix itself too, kids
would go back to school. We essentially overestimated how quickly the economy
would return to normal. It finally, these things finally did happen in 2023. But
they didn't happen in 2021 or two. And what we meant by transitory was that it
would go away fairly quickly without the need for our intervention. You don't want
to intervene with interest rates, if something's going to go away quickly,
without us intervening, because, you know, monetary policy, as I mentioned,
works with long and variable lag. So the lore is, you look through things like
contemporary oil shock. So that was the mistake, was that it actually, it
actually didn't reverse itself. The problem with the supply side didn't
reverse themselves until 2023, when they really did, when we got, we got a big
burst of employment, and also the supply chains were fixed.
So in hindsight, now knowing everything you now know, would you have done
anything differently? Would you have had less quantitative easing? Would you have
changed interest rates differently? What would you have done differently, now
knowing everything we now know?
You know, it's, it's almost unfair, you know, hindsight's always 20-20, right?
You know, we remember what we were doing in real time. We went from a really nice
economy in December of 2019, to a global partial shutdown of the economy. And we
were contemplating, there was no thought that vaccines were around the corner,
economies closing down, we were looking at severe and perhaps prolonged downside
risks. Literally people thinking and doing work on, are we going to have
another depression? Is it going to be the 1930s? So governments around the
world, and particularly the United States government, really went to work to
provide a lot of support to the economy. We did everything we could, including
many things that were right, you know, that we read lines that we'd never
crossed, we crossed them to support the economy and support the financial system.
And it was all done because we were managing severe downside risks, which
did not materialize, we did not have a depression. And part of that is because
of what we did. Then the economy reopens, and demand is very, very strong. And we
saw, basically, we saw a big burst of inflation everywhere, including in the
United States, it was different in different places. But no, so that's what
happened. And you know, it's not, that's, that's how I would answer that.
Okay, but so what you did, you're happy with what you did, in hindsight, you
would say?
In foresight, I think that the work that we did in 2020, in response to the
pandemic will stand up very well in history, I think people will look at the
things that we did. And essentially, the financial system was grinding to a halt
all around the world, we acted, we were the first central bank, and we were the
most, you know, supportive. And, you know, I think that work will hand will hold
together. When historians are looking back on a long time, I think when you get
to the inflation era, that becomes a different question. And, you know, people
are going to be arguing about that for a long time. The thing I'm thinking about
in the middle of the night is always this balance we have between not wanting
to, if we ease too early, you know, we can undermine the progress on inflation.
And if we wait too late, we can undermine economic activity, we can
undermine the expansion.
The FOMC, for those who don't follow Washington acronyms, it stands for what?
What is the FOMC?
It's the Federal Open Market Committee.
Okay, and who is on that committee?
It's a little bit complicated, our structure is. We have seven governors
here in Washington, all nominated by the president and confirmed to staggered
14-year terms. And we have 12 reserve bank presidents at reserve banks around
the country. All 19, 7 plus 12, are participants on the FOMC. In any given
year, all of the seven governors vote, and five of the 12 reserve bank
presidents vote. But one of the voters is always the New York Fed.
Okay, and so when you have an FOMC meeting, how many do you have a year?
We have eight a year.
Okay, so you have eight a year, and when you get together, you get together for
two days or so?
We do. So it generally starts at noon or in the morning of a Tuesday, and we go
all day. We generally talk about the economy, the financial stability issues,
whatever special topics there may be. And at the end of the day, each person
speaks on those things, and I speak at the end of that day. Then there's a brief
presentation on monetary policy, and then we go to dinner upstairs in the Martin
building, and we come back the next morning, we come in at 9 o'clock, and we
talk about monetary policy until we're satisfied with the outcome of monetary
policy, and that usually takes most of the morning.
Okay, so when you go into an FOMC meeting that the first day, do you pretty
much know where you want to come out at the end of the second day, or you want to
listen to everybody and you haven't made up your mind yet?
You know, the way it works is that, you know, I talk to the other 18 participants
regularly, and I talk to all of them at least once in the 10 days before the
meeting, and I'm thinking about this three or four weeks before the meeting,
you know, what should we want to achieve, what data do we need to see, how do we
want to change our communications, all those things. And so I talk to people,
listen to them, and I try to put together an answer that has broad
support on the committee. And so when we go into the committee on Tuesday morning,
you know, I'm confident, usually, that I know where this is going to go, but, you
know, we get data during the meetings sometimes, events happen, but largely you
go in kind of knowing what the likely outcome is, and that's
the design of it. So a lot of people in Washington government
agencies are very good at leaking things. You're not that good at that.
Why doesn't the Fed leak more? Why don't you kind of leak a lot
more about what you're going to do? You just don't leak that much. I am, I'm kind
of proud of that, actually. We do take our obligations to confidentiality very,
very seriously, and because we know, you know, how consequential it would be for
someone at the Fed to be leaking, you know, we just, our whole success depends
on having the public's confidence that we're ethical and that we're
working on behalf of all Americans and not on behalf of ourselves, and we're not
leaking and that kind of thing. So we do have a culture. When we're working on
a, for example, a regulatory matter or some, you know, matter involving one of
the banks, it never leaks out of the Fed. So I am proud of that record. Some people
have suggested that the Fed's independence is not as good as people
talk about it being, and that maybe we better have more White House
coordination with the Fed. I'm sure you've heard about this. I think that, any
comments on that? I'd be happy to comment on what independence, on the
point of central bank independence. So I think a long time ago, people learned
that a central bank that's independent of political consideration does a better
job getting inflation under control, and that has now, that has accepted wisdom in
all advanced economies around the world. It's also a principle that has very, very
strong and broad support where it really matters, which is in Congress. You know,
you talk to senior leaders in both chambers, in both political parties, and
they all understand that you want an independent central bank that doesn't run
monetary policy to support or oppose any particular politician or political party.
You ever get a call from the President of the United States saying interest rates
are too high or something like that? So, ever? No, I would say that, you know,
meetings with the President are rare and appropriately so. So you are, you've been,
you were originally appointed to the board of the Fed by President Obama, and
you're appointed chair by President Trump and reappointed by President Biden. And
your term as chair goes through, I think, May of 2026. So any thought about staying
through all the way through May 2026? You're going to do that? Yes. Okay. And if
some president came along and said, well, you did a great job. I'd like to reappoint
you. Would you consider that? I have nothing for you on that today.
And is being chair of the Fed a enjoyable job or not so much? It is actually. I think
I enjoy it. I enjoy it quite a bit. I do. First of all, it's a great honor. It's
incredibly interesting. I love the people we work with. I love the institution. At
this time in my life, it's just been a great thing. I'm in my 13th year there now.
It's just been it's been, you know, really challenging and all that. But what else
would you want? I'm very happy doing the job. Now, the Federal Reserve is over 100
years old. It was created under Woodrow Wilson. If you were around then, what would
you have suggested they do better than they did in creating the system? Or do you
think the system works pretty well after 100 years and you wouldn't change it
very much? So I'm giving myself perfect hindsight here. I would do I would do
what what Congress did in 1933. So the original Fed didn't have an FOMC. And it
was it really didn't function very well during the early parts of the Depression
or during other. So in 1933, the current structure was put in place. And that's
with the FOMC, with it, with the number of governors and the voting arrangements.
And I think that arrangement is fine. It works really well. In the 70s, the dual
mandate was added. But ultimately, we're not we're not looking for any law change.
We think we have the authorities that we need. We think that the law is in just a
fine place. So basically, you think the system works reasonably well as it is
today. And today, what is the biggest economic challenge you think facing the
country? Is it growth? Is it inflation? Hard landing, potentially? Or what what
are you most worried about? What keeps you up at night, if anything, in the
economy?
So I'll say in the short term, that's what keeps me up at night. Literally, you
know, the thing I'm thinking about in the middle of the night is always this
balance we have between not wanting to if we ease too early, you know, we can
undermine the progress on inflation. And if we wait too late, we can undermine
economic activity, we can undermine the expansion. And you know, so we want to
get this right. And getting it right is incredibly important for the people we
serve. So that is really that's that's what I spent a lot of my, you know,
thinking time on what you know, longer term, there are lots of things to worry
about. But that's really what most people they have dinner with friends or
sometimes how can you have dinner with friends without hinting at what you're
thinking about? And do you ever get suggestions from your friends at dinner?
This is what you should do or and how do you respond when they kind of say maybe
you should lower interest rates, you just keep eating or what?
You might define the word friend to mean doesn't ask you about interest rates. So
no, people don't do that. Generally, you know, people I don't know will always
say, hey, cut rates. Somebody said that in the elevator this morning.
Did that influence you or no?
I said, Thank you, sir. You know, no, but I mean, you know, we people say things,
but you know, it's fine. So in some parts of the of the society these days,
people are making decisions based on something called artificial intelligence
A.I. Have you thought if you thought about, you know, calling up chat G.B.T.
and saying, you know, you know, here's the all the data we have. What do you
think about would be a good idea? Have you ever thought about that? Or they're
not going to like to do that. We haven't done that. I mean, we have we have done
little things like we've asked chat, cheap GDP, GPT to generate questions for
the press conference. And I'm happy to report for any journalists who are here
that the questions were not as good as the ones we get from real journalists.
So what about my questions? How do they compare to my question?
Okay, no, they weren't that great.