‘It’s All Fake’_ The Shocking Exposure of China’s Economy _ Auto Industry _ Global Investment

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00:00 Introduction
00:21 China’s Untrustworthy Numbers Problem
06:14 China’s Great Car Boomerang
09:57 China’s Overseas Lending Portfolio
Happy Saturday, everybody. Welcome to another episode of China Update, where we discuss
leading political, economic, and geostrategic analysis on the world's number two economy.
My name is Tony. This is an extra Saturday episode. We normally try and take the weekends
off, but there has been so much to cover this week. My apologies for interrupting your weekend,
but these need to be covered before we move into what will no doubt be a busy week from Monday.
So let's jump in. And first up, this week, the UK-based Financial Times published a great
deep dive report called The Growing Problem with Chinese Unreliable Numbers. Beijing's GDP figures
have drawn scrutiny for years. The questions have become more acute. We begin today's video by
unpacking some of the salient points from this piece while supplementing with some other sources
and commentaries as well. When Chinese economist Gao Shanwen stepped onto a Washington stage last
December, he bluntly pointed out the elephant in the room. Quote, we do not know the true number
of China's real growth figure. End quote. It was less a provocation than a warning. The story China
tells about its economy simply doesn't match what is happening on the ground. In the years following
the pandemic, doubts have deepened. GDP growth officially hovered close to 5%. Yet Gao suggested
the real pace was closer to 2%. Within weeks, he was no longer chief economist at SDIC Securities.
In economists' WeChat groups, he disappeared. For nearly a year, he made no public appearances
until resurfacing quietly this autumn at a conference in Shanghai. His absence
has come to symbolize a wider and more unsettling trend. The political sensitivity around China's
economic data has intensified just as the country faces its most challenging slowdown in decades,
a slowdown which we have been following on China Update for several years now, driven by a deep
property slump, fading consumption, and an escalating geopolitical environment. China's
breakneck growth once dazzled the world. Yet even in those years of double-digit expansion,
outsiders questioned the credibility of official statistics. Now, with momentum weakening,
those concerns are sharper, and transparency has declined. Rather than clarifying old inconsistencies,
Beijing has cut off data series, limited access for researchers, and narrowed what the public can
see. This comes at a moment when investors, governments, and multinationals are watching
China's economy more closely than ever, and often find themselves paring through fog.
Eswar Prasad, former IMF official and Cornell professor, points to, quote,
opacity and data collection, end quote, and, quote, the absence of transparency on sampling methodology,
end quote. For a country that is one of the world's two largest economies, he says, quote,
it would be nice to know what is really going on, end quote. Unlike other major economies,
China does not release a quarterly breakdown of GDP by consumption, investment, and net exports,
a standard measure the IMF has repeatedly requested. In its latest assessment, the IMF
gave China's national accounts a C rating, placing it level with India and below Vietnam. Yet other
indicators paint a more fragile picture. Official data shows sustained declines in home prices and
surprising signs of deflation. This year, fixed asset investors, China's most watched proxy for
spending on construction, infrastructure, and equipment, has fallen for only the second time
in decades. But strangely, GDP figures continue to report steady contribution from investment,
implying an unexpected offset. Analysts still cannot say from where. Economists now rely heavily
on what is available. Australia's central bank recently reconstructed missing expenditure side
data using fragments such as fixed asset investment. Think tanks at Brookings have done the same.
Yet even these workarounds are becoming harder. Since 2018, China has removed sector-level detail,
halted price series needed to adjust for inflation, and revised historical totals without
explanation. It was not always this way. After joining the WTO in 2001, Beijing worked with
Canada's statistical agency to modernize its system, abandoning the Soviet-style material
product accounting it had used until 1993. Engagement peaked in the early 2010s when
foreign researchers were granted more access and domestic statisticians returned from overseas
training eager to reform. But as General Secretary, Xi Jinping consolidated power.
Particularly after securing a third term in 2022, China began to reverse course. Data sensitivities
that spiked during COVID have not eased. Even retail sales, one of the few monthly indicators
still published, has an unclear relationship to GDP. That uncertainty matters. Foreign direct
investment worth trillions of dollars depends on some baseline sense of reality. China's data
challenges are not simply technical. They speak to the tension between economic transparency
and political control. The National Bureau of Statistics reportedly adjusts figures from
over-reporting local governments, but researchers estimate these corrections, about 5% annually,
are no longer enough. The roots run deeper than the pandemic too. China political commentators
argue that the big shift started in around 2012-13, based on the view that China was surrounded
and continues to be surrounded by enemies. With that mindset, openness looked like vulnerability.
At a now-censored speech at Shenzhen, the Chinese economist we just mentioned, Gao,
returned to the contradictions. Collapsing property investment with no visible GDP impact.
Retail and growth diverging unnaturally. With eyebrows raised, he observed,
perhaps this phenomenon exceeds our ability to understand. His conclusion was understated,
but unmistakable. China's growth data is simply unreliable. In the world's second largest economy,
even the driest figures tell a political story. And for now, the silence around them speaks
loudest of all. Next up, we have two more developments to cover, but just quickly,
if you want to continue to be on top of more analysis on China like this, consider subscribing,
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if you'd like to help keep the channel financially sustainable. Next up, in his The Dune Insights
newsletter this week, global auto markets expert Michael Dune published a thought-provoking piece
called The Great China Joint Venture Boomerang. The piece is timely and worth examining. Now,
as we unpack his argument, some viewers will be tempted to see Dune as a pro-China cheerleader.
In fact, Dune has been a leading voice warning Western auto companies of the strategic threat
posed by China for well over a decade. His words are not celebratory, but rather a sad,
I told you so. Let's look at his argument.
The wake-up call nobody wanted has finally arrived, Dune argues. China is on track to
export up to 8 million vehicles in 2025, and Western automakers are helping make it happen.
Just last month, China shipped 666,000 cars—666, not exactly a good omen—an
eight-fold surge from 2020 when exports totaled for the year only 1 million. This isn't a sudden
miracle of industrial strategy. It's, quote, the delayed consequence of decisions global automakers
made decades ago, end quote, and reversed under pressure in 2020. When foreign carmakers entered
China in the 1990s, the deal was non-negotiable. A 50-50 joint venture, mandatory technology sharing
and no independent access to the market. Every major brand, from GM and Ford to BMW and Toyota,
accepted the terms. By the 2000s, joint ventures controlled 90 percent of China's passenger car
sales. For years, one red line seemed unbreakable. These joint ventures would never export. Western
executives insisted it would be suicidal to hand over half their profits on global sales
or become dependent on Chinese manufacturing. Dune argues that that certainty held until 2020.
Tesla's Shanghai factory ignited China's EV boom just as COVID-19 left traditional joint
venture plants idle. Confronted with collapsing demand and excess capacity, global automakers
abandoned their long-held position. Exporting from China transformed from unthinkable to
unavoidable. Dune argues, quote, this was a catastrophic strategic error that will haunt
the global automotive industry for decades. End quote. The result? Millions of Western-branded
vehicles now manufactured in China and shipped worldwide, with profits split evenly with Chinese
partners. GM exported roughly 312,000 vehicles in 2024. Ford, BMW, Hyundai and VW are following the
same path. Mexico offers a preview of the future. SAIC's MG brand is thriving independently,
while also building Chevrolets for GM, meaning GM now relies on a partner that doesn't rely on GM.
When consumers realize a Western brand often sits on a Chinese-made platform,
brand value erodes and leverage shifts permanently. Most concerningly, Dune argues, China isn't just
winning the EV race. Nearly 80% of its 2024 exports were gasoline vehicles, allowing Chinese
firms to fund EV expansion while Western OEMs struggle for profitability. Reversing course will
take years and billions in new factories. Until then, exports will climb, dependence will deepen,
and Western automakers risk becoming what they once feared most, brands without factories.
Quote, the question is whether any Western automaker will remain truly independent,
or whether they'll eventually become brand managers for vehicles manufactured and controlled
by Chinese companies. Based on current trajectories, the only real thing to watch
is which Western automaker surrenders first. End quote. And finally for today, a new report
from Aid Data is reshaping assumptions about China's global financing playbook.
While debate often centers on Beijing's loans to developing economies, the Research Institute's
latest publication, Chasing China, Learning to Play by Beijing's Global Lending Rules,
reveals a striking shift. More than three quarters of China's overseas lending operations now target
upper-middle-income and high-income countries. According to Brad Parks, Aid Data's executive
director and lead author of the 300-page study published this week, the true scale of China's
lending portfolio is, quote, two to four times larger than previously published estimates suggest.
End quote. Drawing on data from more than 30,000 projects across over 100 countries,
the report identifies at least $2.2 trillion in Chinese loans and grants since 2000,
far more than earlier assessments. Perhaps the most surprising finding is the profile
of China's top borrowers. The United States emerges as the largest single recipient over
the past two decades, with Chinese state-owned banks providing roughly $200 billion in financial
support to U.S. companies and projects. These funds have flowed into pipelines, data centers,
airport terminals, and corporate financing for firms such as Tesla, Amazon, Disney, and Boeing.
By the late 2010s, this deepening financial pressure began raising red flags in Washington.
Aid Data finds that China's lending to wealthy economies is increasingly concentrated in
strategic domains. Critical infrastructure, critical minerals, and the acquisition of
high-tech assets, including semiconductor companies. Beijing's state-backed financiers
have quietly built influence not only in the global south, but also in the technological
and industrial frontiers of advanced economies. Indeed, the fruits of this trend reared its ugly
head in recent weeks with the Dutch Nexperia mess, which we have been following here on China Update.
The Dutch chipmaker was acquired by a Chinese firm, and then the Dutch government had to step
in after intelligence reports indicated the firm's IP and technology was being illegally
stripped from the company. That Dutch government action provoked an aggressive reaction from Beijing,
which threatened chip supplies to all of Europe, forcing the Dutch government to back down.
In making its high-income lending activities public for the first time, Aid Data's report
underscores how China's global financing strategy has evolved far beyond the Belt and Road Initiative's
early focus on emerging markets. This new pattern points to a more ambitious and geopolitically
sensitive effort to secure leverage in the world's richest economies. Leverage which
Beijing has already demonstrated it is more than willing to use. Okay, that is today's
episode of China Update. Thank you so much everybody for watching. Have a good Saturday,
have a restful weekend, and I hope to see you for a new week of updates on Monday.
