Former Israeli Ambassador Michael Oren explains why the new Gaza ceasefire is fundamentally different: not just a pause in fighting, but a roadmap tied to Gaza stabilization, expanding the Abraham Accords, and a broader regional reset. Oren warns about unprecedented foreign monitors on Israeli soil, debates whether Hamas disarmament is realistic, and lays out how American power, Iran deterrence, and pressure on Qatar/Hamas shaped the deal. He also tackles tough questions on hostage-for-prisoner swaps, the political future of Netanyahu, and how Israel can win back young American opinion.
this may be the ceasefire end to end all
ceasefires. President Trump said that
Hamas is going to have to disarm or it's
going to be obliterated. If Netanyahu
had to be pressured to accept it, he
didn't be pressured very very much. But
on the contrary, the Qataris were scared
out of their wits. However, there's no
escaping Netanyahu's responsibility for
October 7th.
>> What should Israel be doing, if
anything, to win back the hearts and
minds of the American people?
And welcome back to the brief insights
from the inside. We are joined today by
Ambassador Michael Orin. Ambassador Orin
is the former Israeli ambassador to the
United States, a former member of
Kesset, and a former deputy minister in
the prime minister's office. He joins us
here today. Ambassador Orin, thank you
so much for joining us.
>> Great to be with you. Tada. Thank you.
>> There have been ceasefires between
Israel and Hamas since October 7th,
authored by both President Joe Biden and
President Donald Trump. Yet, it seems
like this last ceasefire in this 21point
plan is the ceasefire to end all
ceasefires. Can you educate both myself
and our audience? What is it about this
Donald Trump ceasefire that is different
than all other ceasefires we have seen
in the past?
>> What makes this ceasefire different than
any other? I say classic Jewish
question. Um, in many ways it is
actually not different. Um, in October
7th there was also a ceasefire and there
were inal ceasefires before October 7th.
Uh, and those ceasefires were based on a
a certain status quo that Hamas had
opened fire at Israel. Israel had
returned fire on a far more massive
scale. U and finally the international
community led by the United States
intervened and imposed a ceasefire which
kept Hamas in power and um and basically
restored the status quo on the border
such as exist before October 7th uh 2023
when that status quo was uh flagrantly
and terribly nightmarishly violated. Uh
this ceasefire too restores something of
his status quo in the sense that Hamas
exists. Hamus is still there. still has
its guns. Um, Israel, the status quo on
the border hasn't been restored. It's
been a different border now. Israel is
now in occupation of 53% of Gaza.
>> But the reality is we still have Hamas
and Hamas still has its guns and Hamas
still has its tunnels. What is different
about this ceasefire is the subsequent
stages. Most ceasefires were just the
ceasefires. They were not um a means to
the ends. They were they were ends in of
themselves. Uh this ceasefire is a mean
to different ends and the ends is first
of all the stabilization and
reconstruction of Gaza uh followed by um
the expansion of the Abraham Accords
followed by some type of discussion
about uh a pathway to a Palestinian
state followed by a radically
transformed Middle East in which Israel
has peace relations with Lebanon, with
Syria, uh with Saudi Arabia certainly
and through Saudi Arabia, with the
entire Sunni world, uh and potentially
ultimately with Iran itself. Um and I
wouldn't I wouldn't negate that
possibility entirely. Uh so this is
fundamentally different than any other
ceasefire. There's one other significant
different shabos that we have to talk
about and that is not just distinguishes
this ceasefire many of the ceasefire but
distinguishes this moment from any
previous period in Israel's history.
This is the first time in our history
where we have a group of foreign
soldiers uh mostly Americans but also
Canadians, Frenchmen, um Spanish, um
Jordanians, UAE soldiers who are situed
on our soil who are monitoring the
movements of our military and
potentially limiting the movements of
our military um flying reconnaissance
aircraft uh over our military. uh that
has never happened before and that is a
a whole range of new challenges for the
sovereign state of Israel.
>> So let me push back though because to
your own point there was a ceasefire on
October 6th of 2023 which Hamas
obviously and flagrantly violated. Part
of the ceasefire in place today is that
all of the bodies of the hostages
including the body of an American
hostage who's still being held uh by
Hamas and Gaza would be returned but we
still haven't found that to be the case
yet. There are still as as today eight
bodies that are still being held by
Hamas. So, how optimistic are you that
we will get to the disarmment of Hamas,
for example, if we can't even get the
bodies of eight hostages that were taken
on October 7th?
>> Well, here I just have to quote
President Trump who said that Hamas is
going to have to disarm or it's going to
be obliterated. It's going to be uh
smashed.
>> Well, they're going to disarm uh and
because they said they were going to
disarm and if they don't disarm, we will
disarm them.
>> How will you do that? I don't have to
explain that to you, but if they don't
disarm, we will disarm them. They know
I'm not playing games.
>> At the same time, the United States has
said repeatedly that it it has no
intention of putting boots on the ground
in Gaza. And I can yet to see a
situation where other countries are
willing to set their boots on the ground
in Gaza if the United States doesn't
want to put that uh excuse me for mixing
the metaphor, doesn't want to put the
skin in the game. Um and that's going to
be very very difficult. Um there's only
one military that's capable of
dismantling Hamas and that is even that
is a very difficult task and that is the
state of Israel. But right now Hamas has
a double shield. Um it has restored its
human shield as the population of
northern Gaza has streamed back to
northern Gaza. But now it has this
additional shield uh of monitors of
international monitors uh who are very
much committed to the ceasefire and may
not interpretate interpret violation of
the ceasefire in the same way that we
interpret a violation of the ceasefire.
Uh we've had now three soldiers killed
since the ceasefire breaking the
ceasefire. Uh according to Washington
the ceasefire is holding uh for the
families of those soldiers who have been
killed the ceasefire is emphatically not
holding and uh so we may have different
interpretations. That's always been a
challenge in Israel's relationship with
the United States that we have a
different interpretation of of what
constitutes aggression, what constitutes
a violation of the ceasefire. Um, but
now I think it's it's more poignant
because we have of the presence of these
foreign troops on our soil.
>> But just just to clarify, you see a
possible scenario in the future where
Israel and by extension the Israel
Defense Forces would have to go back
into Gaza to take out Hamas. That that
is a possible scenario that you foresee.
>> It is a possible scenario. It is not an
easy scenario. It is not a likely
scenario. Um I again I'm going to fall
I'm going to fall back to what President
Trump has said repeatedly in the last
few days that Hamas uh has to disarm
that he's committed to taking those guns
away from Hamas and if Hamas doesn't
accord with that demand then they will
be destroyed. He doesn't go further than
that and say how they're going to be
destroyed. Especially since he they also
say that the United States will not be
involved militarily directly in Gaza. So
it it leads you sort of at the default
conclusion. The default conclusion is
well who's going to do this? The state
of Israel would do this. Um and uh and
that's going to raise serious issues,
internal issues in the state of Israel
because the the the latter stages of the
war in Gaz were already becoming very
politically divisive in this country. So
ambassador, now that the war is over, at
least on paper, what does this do for
the Abraham Accords in particular Saudi
Arabia joining the Abraham Accords with
Israel, which would be historic and
really unprecedented?
>> The condition for that, thisan of that
happening would be a continued American
credible military force in the Middle
East, credible military threat. Uh if
Iran feels that America no longer has a
credible military threat or at least has
the United has the Israel enabled to put
a credible military threat on the table
uh then Iran will begin to uh rebuild uh
it will reassert itself in the region.
It will rearm its proxies in the region
uh with Hisbala, the Houthis, the the
the militias in Syria, in Iraq and
ultimately with Hamas itself. um the
continued application of American power
which was essential by the way was a
central component in achieving the 20
points that were um negotiated by the
way quite brilliantly by Steve Wickoff
and and Jared Kushner.
>> The the the key to all of that was this
president's willingness to project and
use power something that two previous
Democratic presidents were very much not
willing to do and somehow believing that
they had leverage in the Middle East by
not projecting power. this this
president understood that what he was
asked he asked Trump was asked how did
you do the 20 points is because I bombed
Iran he's exactly right he's exactly
right now that combined with some very
good personal relations throughout the
region which previous administrations
did not have either um but much of this
hinges on the next phase of those 20
points which is a disarmament of Hamas
now it is conceivable sh that uh the
Saudis will make peace with us even if
there is a Hamas terrorist ministate in
northern Gaza it's conceivable that if
we continue to keep the pressure up on
Hisba and hisbala can be rearmed, we
could have peace with uh with uh with
Lebanon and if we can maintain the
pressure on Iran and keep Iran out of
Syria. Uh then we could have peace with
Syria as well. Uh that is all possible.
Um and in many ways I don't know if if
the alternative is any better of sending
the IDF back into Gaza City.
>> So we've been talking a lot about Israel
and the Israeli people. Let's talk about
Gaza and the Gazins. There have been
small pockets of resistance, isolated
pockets whereby the grassroots within
Gazin society are sort of rising up
against Hamas to very limited degrees of
success. Something rare and daring is
happening in Gaza. Thousands of
Palestinians are protesting Hamas, the
militant group that rules Gaza, and
that's at war with Israel. They're the
first major anti-Hamas demonstrations in
Gaza in more than a year of war. Do you
view that there can be in the future a
scenario whereby a critical mass of the
Gazin people themselves can get rid of
Hamas or is that sort of fanciful
thinking?
>> I'd like to think it would it would be
possible. I'm rather skeptical because
these these clans are divided amongst
themselves. They're not united against
Hamas and Hamas can uh can pick them
off. Hamas has a prepoundonderance of of
power. It still has a tremendous amount
of weaponry at its disposal. It has a
military infrastructure which these
clans do not have. They have the
tunnels. Um and so and then Hamas can
get backing from its regional its
regional patrons which would be you know
the countries that are aligned with the
Muslim Brotherhood that is Qatar and
Turkey and uh so behind the clans maybe
Israel supporting them maybe the United
States is supporting them. So we're
going to get a proxy war that we've
substituted our our victory uh over the
the Shiite access for a a continued
conflict with the Sunni access uh of the
Muslim Brotherhood. And that's something
we have to be very very cautious about.
It's something we have to be very candid
about in our discussions with our
American allies. Uh very open about what
the dangers of Turkish and Qatari
involvement in Gaza mean. So So let's
talk about Qatar. I'm glad you brought
it up. Amit seal the the noted Israeli
journalist. He sort of spoke about the
Israeli attack on Doha as the most
successful failed assassination attempt
as then this was the catalyst that
brought the parties to the table because
Qatar for the first time realized that
they are not invincible and in fact if
they harbor Hamas terrorists that they
could in fact be subject to Israeli
aggression. I'm wondering because many
of us in the west were sort of taken
aback at just how quickly this deal came
into fruition. I'm wondering how you see
Israel's perhaps failed or successful
assassination attempt in Doha played a
role uh in the eventual ceasefire.
>> Uh not not unusually I very much agree
with the meat. Now there's a convention
of wisdom uh in the United States and I
encountered often in my interviews with
the media the western press and and it
has in certain ways being reinforced by
statements made by the president by uh
by his chief negotiators as well that uh
the white house was very disappointed
and that's an understatement with
Israel's military operation against Doha
and that they used that disappointment
uh as a leverage as a way of pressuring
Netanyahu to accept the 20 points. I
find that scenario very unlikely. U for
not the least reason is that the 20
points are are overwhelmingly
pro-Israeli. They meet all of Israel's
war goals. Um they're very small price
to pay uh for those goals. The release
of terrorists from our jails. Certainly
that was certainly the most painful
price but other than that the price is
very abstract and obtuse because you say
okay someday there's going to be a role
for the PA authority uh in the postwar
governance of Gaza um that the PA has to
reform in some way and some way United
States Israel will have to engage in a
uh a pathway talk toward a Palestinian
state. Now a pathway can be could be a
thing with gravel uh doesn't actually
lead to a Palestinian state. The Saudis
I think use the P word the pathway part
very intentionally. So, it was an
overwhelmingly pro-Israel document. Um,
if if Netanyahu had to be pressured to
accept it, he didn't be pressured very
very much. Pressuring on an open door,
but on the contrary, um, the Qataris
were scared out of their wits. No one
ever dared do something like this. And
what this did was to bring home, um,
rather incontroverbly
that the Gaza conflict could not be
contained within Gaza and it was going
to spill out. And the Trump
administration did something truly
extraordinary. Um because throughout
this war, previous American policym had
always been about pressuring Israel.
Let's pressure out Israel. Let's cut off
arms supply to Israel. Let's uh let's
hold off on certain the certain weapons
to Israel. Nobody came up with a truly
revolutionary idea of let's pressure
Hamas. Oh my god. Right. What a
brilliant idea. And as far as I can see
that the Trump administration said to
the guitarist, you don't want this to
happen. You start bringing your boys to
the negotiating table and tell them to
give up all those hostages overnight.
Overnight. How do you think that
happened? Because because Trump was
pressuring Israel? No. Because they
squeezed they squeezed Hamas and
squeezed them tight.
>> The Israeli air strikes in Doha Qatar
were captured by security cameras. One
explosion at the back of the targeted
building followed by another in the
front.
Well, I think that's a far likelier
scenario contrary to what the
conventional wisdom is in the American
press. You know, there there's so much
you just said to unpack. I just want to
focus on one that perhaps might be the
elephant in the room or at least the
elephant in American political
discourse. Part of the ceasefire was
Israel agreed to release uh convicted
terrorists. Uh this is not me making
assumptions. They have actually been
convicted for acts of terrorism, acts of
rape, acts of murder. What would you say
to the Israeli public who are concerned
that when you release terrorists for
hostages, you are in fact encouraging
and really incentivizing f future
hostage taking. What would your response
be to those criticisms?
>> Very very ineffectual unpersuasive
response which is that this has been
Israel's practice since the 1980s
>> and it has been the practice through
successive administrations, successive
uh prime ministers. It began under
Shimon Perez uh left and right. uh we
created a president back in 1986 of
giving up uh terrorists, murderers uh
for Israeli captives and changing that
now. Okay, changing it hope we can
change it in the future. Uh there's a
bill now in front of the Knesset to
enact the death penalty, enforce a death
penalty against terrorists who kill
Jews. Uh it probably will pass and that
has its own difficulties. It's very
complex, not so simple. Um but that is
is the price of a Jewish state where a
premium is put on the lives of hostages.
Uh
>> and it's in the Torah, it's in the
Talmud and it is an essential component
of our resilience. Um and we have to
think about not just about this war to
think about the next war.
>> Um Israel goes to war unlike the United
States. The the prime minister of Israel
is not the is not the
commander-in-chief. He can't give an
order just to go to war and we go to
war. going to war in this country is
much more consensual. And you could have
a war, you could throw a war here and no
one's going to show up. Uh and so
persuading Israeli parents and brothers
and sisters that if they or their loved
ones go to battle and they fall captive
that the state of Israel will do
everything that's passed power to redeem
them, then becomes a very important
component of our resilience. That's what
gets people to show up for the next war.
>> And we I'm already thinking about the
next war. Believe me, this may be the
ceasefire to end all ceasefires. I don't
know. But we can't bank on that.
>> Without responding directly, I would
just say I was 12 years old when Gilad
Shalit, the kidnapped Israeli soldier,
was released. And of course, there was
jubilation. Our school had a a program
and a celebration. And of course, of
the,200 convicted terrorists who were
released in exchange for Gilachi, one of
them was Yahwa Senoir. So, it's
certainly something that's been on the
minds of of lots of people. I want to
shift just for a moment from the
geopolitical to the very uh practical.
Um, I know you're a diplomat, but this
question might uh be a little
undiplomatic, which is to say this.
There's probably no one more divisive in
Israeli politics and probably even
American politics than Benjamin
Netanyahu. On on the one hand, his his
supporters will say that because of his
leadership, they took out the Iranian
nuclear sites. Hisbal is no longer a
threat. We're on the verge of creating
peace between Syria and Saudi Arabia. On
the other hand, of course, you'll say
that this is someone who, under his own
watch, October 7th was allowed to
happen. We were in Israel's longest war
in its history with Gaza. So perhaps
undiplomatically, how would you rate the
prime minister's leadership, not just
since his reign, but really the last two
years since October 7th?
>> That's interesting because uh you I'm
not really a diplomat. I was only a very
short period as a diplomat. Okay. So
then we can be politically correct.
>> I look back on contemporary uh events
through the prism of the future. Okay.
Um what what will 50 years from now?
Okay. What will historians write about
Benjamin Netanyahu? Um, you could have a
figure like Harry Truman who was
fabulously unpopular during his
presidency. He had one of the lowest
ratings of any president ever since they
took ratings and today he's thought of
one of the greatest presidents ever. Uh,
so history judges um leaders very very
differently. You know, you know, Winston
Churchill was voted out of office after
defeating the Axis. Um, so we don't
know. Um, what can I say from a vantage
point of say two years of history or
having known Netan now for for 10 years
or watching his career since the 1980s
over the course of the last 40 years um
is this that on one hand he is one of
the most
unfathly talented individuals you ever
met intellectually
physically he's physically very robust
um he's held every position uh in
Israeli governments he's been an
ambassador in Washington ambassador to
the UN He is um um at 75 still
indehaticable
and uh you know is probably the greatest
orator of this century. U you can go a
long list. He's a he's a he was a
commando at Israel's Delta Force and a
commander in Israel's Delta Force and
very successful. You can just go on and
on. His resume can can humble anybody.
Um on the other hand as as great as his
talents uh are his flaws uh which are of
a a a epic biblical
uh dimension and um I would say this in
direct response to your question is that
95% I believe of the decisions made by
Benin Netanyahu since October 7th would
have been taken by any other Israeli uh
prime minister.
probably more aggressive by than other
than by other Israeli prime ministers
because Benjamin is now in
contradistinction to his reputation in
the west is actually conflict averse and
actually hates war is the opposite of
militant and everybody who works with
him everyone who knows him intimately
knows this as well what I'm telling you
h would have been much more aggressive
Europe had been president the war would
have been pursued much more uh robustly
and probably more violently if you can
imagine that However, there's no
escaping Netanyahu's responsibility for
October 7th. And we must we must have a
state commission of inquiry here. We
must or else the healing process cannot
go on. It cannot.
>> And I know that the the responsibility
divides in a different way. I'll give a
plug. I'm writing a book about this war,
about the entire war, not just about
October 7th. And I went deep into the
events of October 7th, what led up to
that event. I was also in government
during this period. I had a front row
seat uh for what's known as the conpsia
the notion that the belief that was
completely widespread in Israeli
governments but also in Washington that
Hamas was committed to peaceful
coexistence at some level and just had
to be incentivized with money. Um, that
was the conception. Everyone bought into
it, not just Benjamin.
But the the irreducible fact is that
Benjamin was the prime minister of
Israel on October 7th and the buck ended
there.
>> And the buck hasn't ended there yet. But
until it does, this country can't fully
begin to heal.
>> Well, I I I so appreciate your
transparency. Before I let you go, I I
would I would hate myself if I did not
ask you this one question. I am an
American. Contrary to my detractors on
Twitter, I I'm not paid by the Israeli
government. I'm America. I was born
here. I'm a citizen here. It is no
secret that Israel's image in the eyes
of the American people, particularly
young Americans, has suffered
significantly since October 7th. I think
for the first time in recorded American
history, more Americans sympathize with
the Palestinians than the Israelis. What
is or what should Israel be doing, if
anything, to win back the hearts and
minds of the American people, in
particular, young Americans who've been
watching Israel's conduct for the last
two years and have decided this is no
longer a country or an alliance that
they want to support. Well, Israel has
to decide something has never decided
before, and that is that the the field
or the battleground of public diplomacy,
of public opinion is every bit, if not
more important than the battleground
itself, than the physical ground, the
the combat. And it has to invest vastly,
seriously, uh concertedly,
uh in social media campaigns, and I say
someone who, you know, deals with the
mainstream media uh but social media
campaigns uh to reach out. Now it is no
small task. We are up against not just
you know 1.4 billion Muslims who may not
like us but we're also up against
Chinese the Russians uh much of the
western media much much of western
academia. It is a huge huge undertaking,
but that does not excuse for not
mounting that type of of counter
offensive um and trying to make our case
and to bring as many young people here
as possible to see Israel uh firsthand
because there actually no amount of
social media can can can replace the the
physical, emotional, transformative
experience of actually being here.
>> Wow. This has been Ambassador Michael
Orin. You've given us a lot to think
about. But we appreciate you making the
time and for everything you're doing to
advance the American Israel
relationship. And when you publish that
book, please come back on. We would love
to have you.
>> Take care, Ambassador. Byebye.