Myth of Disenchantment: Magic, Modernity, and the Birth of the Human Sciences

Myths and magic
3 followers
Nov 1, 2025
Josephson-Storm argues, these disciplines' founding figures were not only aware of, but profoundly enmeshed in, the occult milieu; and it was specifically in response to this burgeoning culture of spirits and magic that they produced notions of a disenchanted world.
Tantor Audio, a division of Recorded Books presents
The Myth of Disenchantment, Magic, Modernity, and the Birth of the Human Sciences
by Jason Inada Josephson Storm
Narrated by Chris McDonnell
Publisher's Note
In this audio edition, you will hear references to visual elements present
in the print and e-book formats of the book.
The absence of myth is also a myth.
The Coldest, the Purest, the Only True Myth
Georges Bataille
L'Absence du Mythe
1947
A note on texts and translations
Archives consulted, physically or digitally
Bibliothèque Nationale de France
The Fraser Collection at Trinity College, University of Cambridge
The Rudolf Carnap Papers at the University of Pittsburgh Library
The University of Vienna Archive
and the Max Weber Archive at the Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
Translations from Danish, French, German, Japanese, Latin, Polish, Spanish and Swedish
are my own, unless otherwise noted, and I accept full responsibility for any errors.
Introduction
The war against mystery and magic was, for modernity, the war of liberation,
leading to the declaration of reason's independence.
To win the stakes, to win all of them, and to win them for good,
the world had to be de-spiritualized, de-animated.
Zygmunt Bauman
Intimations of Postmodernity, 1992
Euzapia is within our walls.
Her presence communicates a kind of incoherent life to material objects,
and peoples the void with phantoms.
Georges Montagué, Les Parisiennes d'à présent, 1897
Paris, 1907
Marie Curie sat in the sumptuous chambers of an apartment on the Boulevard Saint-Germain.
As the lights were dimmed, the chemist joined hands with the man sitting next to her,
and together they watched the psychic medium across the table begin to shake and mumble,
speaking in a strange low voice,
overcome by the force of a possessing spirit called John King.
Euzapia Palladino, as the psychic was called,
was believed to be able to make objects move without touching them,
and to produce visions of light or luminescent points, visions of hands or limbs,
sometimes in the form of black shadows, sometimes as phosphorescent.
Indeed, as Curie and others later recounted in that very séance,
luminous points began to appear in the darkness, as if crowning Euzapia's head in a shimmering halo.
Slowly the medium extended her hands and ran them through Marie Curie's hair,
passing on a glowing luminescence.
It seemed that the presence of unseen powers had been confirmed.
By all rights, Marie Curie should not have been there.
She was in many respects a paragon of the period's scientific establishment,
a hard-headed and critical thinker, who had made a number of stunning discoveries.
The first woman to win a Nobel Prize,
she is one of the very few people in history to win it twice, physics and chemistry.
Curie's presence at a spiritualist séance is a problem,
because a great many theorists have argued that one of the things that makes the modern world modern
is the rejection of animism, basically, that we have eliminated ghosts,
demons and spirits from the contemporary worldview.
While historians of spiritualism know different, it is widely believed that modernizers like Curie
had no truck with invisible forces.
Most scholars, therefore, would be surprised to learn that she was conjuring ghosts or
studying paranormal manifestations as part of her physics research.
This book will address not only spiritualism's allure, but also why that account of modernity
as de-spiritualization is itself a myth.
It is tempting to imagine that Curie wanted to believe in the spectral persistence of the
souls of the dead because of her recent widowhood.
After all, her husband, Pierre, had passed away in April 1906,
and her diaries from the period frequently expressed her profound longing to communicate
with him.
But this was not the first séance Marie Curie had attended, and indeed, the Curies had engaged
in psychical research together before his sudden death.
For three years, starting in 1905, some of France's most famous scientists had assembled
in apartments and laboratories in Paris to study this particular Italian spirit medium,
Euzapia Palladino.
In addition to the Curies, others often in attendance were the celebrated physiologist
Jacques-Arsène d'Arsenval, the eminent psychiatrist Gilbert Ballet, the aristocratic
Dr. Cardano de Gramont, and three future Nobel Prize winners, the physicist Jean-Baptiste
Perrin, the physiologist Charles Richet, and the philosopher Henri Bergson.
The French were not the only ones interested in Euzapia.
From 1872 until her death in 1918, her powers were tested by teams of researchers in England,
Italy, Poland, Germany, Russia, and the United States.
The paranormal researchers who investigated Euzapia were not marginal eccentrics, but
the cutting edge of the period's academic establishment.
Yet these researchers were exploring areas that were often marked out by their contemporaries
as occult, if not downright magical.
They did so not as a legacy of medieval superstitions, nor generally as a way to overturn
science, but rather as a means to extend its borders.
Not everyone who met with Euzapia was a believer in the powers of the beyond.
Some were convinced she was a charlatan, but others came to grant that something extraordinary
happened in those darkened rooms.
In Paris one could find the full spectrum, from skeptics to spiritualist believers, to
those who preferred to explain the sessions in terms of previously unrecognized forms
of energy.
Bergson, for example, began with serious doubts, but ended up producing a paranormally informed
philosophy, and even becoming president of the British Society for Psychical Research
in 1913.
This is perhaps less surprising for a philosopher famous for formulating Ilan Vidal, and one
whose sister, Moina Mathers, née Mina Bergson, was a co-founder of one of the period's most
famous magical organizations, the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn.
But other figures whose professions were more conventionally scientific were also affected
by their experiences with Euzapia.
In one of the last letters before his death, addressed to Louis-Georges Gouy, April 14,
1906, Pierre Curie remarked,
We have had several more seances with the medium Euzapia Palladino.
We already had sessions with her last summer.
The result is that these phenomena really exist, and it is no longer possible for me
to doubt them.
It is incredible, but it is so, and it is impossible to deny it after the sessions,
which we performed under perfectly controlled conditions.
He added,
In my opinion, there is here a whole domain of completely new facts and physical states
of space about which we have had no conception.
While Marie lacked some of her husband's enthusiasm, she remarked in French in a letter
to a friend on April 16, 1906,
We recently attended a few seances with Euzapia, some of which have seemed very convincing.
It is a matter of the greatest interest.
In a Polish letter to a friend, however, she was less guarded, declaring,
Personally I am quite willing to accept the existence of unusual powers in mediums such
as Euzapia, or Ms. Stanisława Tomczyk.
Even the psychologist William James, although he had not witnessed Euzapia first-hand,
asserted,
That her phenomena probably are genuine seems to me established.
The point here is not to mock William James and the Curies for their gullibility,
much less to advocate on their authority that mediums really did once channel the dead.
Indeed, our main business is not to discuss physics or spirits as such,
but rather to provide a cultural and intellectual history of social scientists and philosophers.
In doing so, I challenge one conventional notion of modernity,
and suggest that we should be less surprised than we usually are
to find scientists of all stripes keeping company with magicians,
that reason does not eliminate superstition but piggybacks upon it,
that mechanism often produces vitalism,
and that often in a single room we can find both séance and science.
The single most familiar story in the history of science is the tale of disenchantment,
of magic's exit from the henceforth law-governed world.
I am here to tell you that as broad cultural history, this narrative is wrong.
Attempts to suppress magic have historically failed more often than they've succeeded.
It is unclear to me that science necessarily deanimates nature,
in fact I will argue à la Bruno Latour that we have never been disenchanted.
And for those readers who have already suspected the persistence of magic in modernity,
I will trace the genealogy of the myth of disenchantment,
and how it came to function as a regulative ideal.
A philosophical archaeology of the disenchantment of the world.
Enlightenment's program was the disenchantment of the world.
In the authority of universal concepts,
the Enlightenment detected a fear of the demons through whose effigies
human beings had tried to influence nature in magic rituals.
From now on, matter was finally to be controlled without the illusion of
imminent powers or hidden properties.
Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno
Dialektik der Aufklärung, 1947
While many of the old master narratives have been unravelling,
it is still widely supposed that the defining feature of modernity
is the departure of the supernatural.
Modernization is often equated with the rise of instrumental reason,
the gradual alienation of humanity from nature,
and the production of a bureaucratic and technological life-world
stripped of mystery and wonder.
Scholars often pin this narrative to Max Weber's phrase
Die Entzauberung der Welt,
the disenchantment, or literally, demagicking of the world.
Indeed, if there is one thing we've been taught to take for granted,
it is that the contemporary industrial-capitalist societies
of Western Europe and North America have lost their magic,
and that it is this absence that makes them modern.
As the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor summarized in 2011,
everyone can agree that one of the big differences
between us and our ancestors of 500 years ago
is that they lived in an enchanted world and we do not.
Disenchantment is also a component of the standard account of secularization.
According to thinkers like Taylor,
part of the way that religion lost its grip on the modern subject
was through science eliminating the supernatural.
In recent years, support for the classical secularization thesis
has withered in the face of religious revivals,
but even the most vociferous critics of the death of God
usually grant the decline of magic,
at least in Western Europe, if nowhere else.
Indeed, part of relativizing secularism
is often to present secularism as Protestant,
which in turn is positioned as anti-magical.
If the post-secular resurgence of religion is tied to the limits of reason,
magic and technology are still widely believed to be opposed,
and only a few would claim that magic is making a comeback.
First and foremost, I want to challenge this model
to rewrite this particular account of modernity
and its rupture from the pre-modern past.
I am not alone in the study of modernity's enchantments,
but the task takes on a special urgency
because versions of the disenchantment thesis
have recently found fresh purchase,
anchoring new movements in philosophy and political theory.
Although they do not speak with one voice,
a host of thinkers—
Karen Barad, Jane Bennett, William Connolly,
Eduardo Kuhn, Manuel Vazquez, and others—
have charged modern philosophy with de-spiritualizing nature
and rendering matter dead and inanimate.
In response, they aim to recover alternate animating ontologies,
sometimes referred to as agential realism
or enchanted materialism.
While I am sympathetic to these movements,
I think that their diagnosis of the current dilemma
too quickly grants, even as it inverts,
the myth of Euro-American modernity
and its putative relationship to rationality and nature.
Simply put, these new philosophers,
like the post-structuralists they seek to replace,
are rebelling against a hegemon
that never achieved full mastery.
The enchanted ontologies and spiritualized orientations
to nature they describe as missing
have been available all along.
In what follows, it is both the mythic construction
and contradictions of the supposedly hegemonic ontology
that I want to explore.
I am particularly interested in the formation
of the old-fashioned but entrenched narrative
that describes the history of the modern scientific paradigm
in terms of the rise of mathematical physics
and the construction of an influential model
of a clockwork universe
that no longer needed spirits or a deity
to drive the motor of the cosmos.
Leaving aside how few historical physicists
actually subscribed to this austere model,
what is fascinating to me
is the way in which the image of a mechanical world
took on its own life,
especially among social theorists,
and thus how it escaped the purview
of the natural sciences
to achieve an ambivalent status
in the cultural formation
of the contemporary world picture.
From my perspective,
this particular world picture is a myth
insofar as it has taken on its own narrative force
and bears little relationship
to the status of physics at any given moment.
Yet some version of this world picture
was often presented exactly not as a myth,
but as an ahistorical and universal real
against which other myths were shattered.
To be clear,
I am not attacking the ontology of contemporary physics,
but am instead interested
in how a particular historical image of physics
came to imprint the human sciences
and by doing so spilled over
into the master description of modernity as such,
even as the physicists themselves
were often pushing against that model from the inside.
In what follows, I ask,
in the face of things like curious scientific seances,
spiritualist revivals,
and the modern resurgence of magical orders
like the Golden Dawn,
how did we get the idea
that modernity meant disenchantment in the first place?
I will answer this question
by exploring the haunting presence of magic
in the very instances
when disenchantment was itself being theorized.
While we know that wonder still dwells in the counterculture,
and it is probably a truism
that scientists often hold to strange ideas
outside of their specific domain of expertise,
I want to investigate the least likely people,
the very theorists of modernity as disenchantment,
and show how they worked out their various insights
inside an occult context,
in a social world overflowing with spirits and magic,
and how the weirdness of that world
generated so much normativity.
This will put us in a position
to disaggregate disenchantment
into inconsistent and semi-overlapping claims
regarding the loss of wonder,
the deanimation of the world,
the progressive rationalization of superstition,
and of course, the end of magic,
which I show nevertheless share a common root.
It is important indeed
to track the persistence of the occult
across the disciplines,
and not just in the natural sciences.
In Bruno Latour's own sociology, for instance,
it is a sociological truism
that those who study foreign cultures
are themselves less religious,
and few would imagine anthropologists
to be easy believers in the magical.
Indeed, as contemporary anthropologist
Tanya Luhrmann has noted,
for much of its history,
a central task in sociology
has been to explain
how the elimination of magic was ever possible,
and how it was that Western society
moved into its rational mode.
But I will show that the human sciences,
Geisteswissenschaften,
emerged as academic disciplines
in the 19th century,
alongside flourishing
theosophical and spiritualist movements,
and shared the latter's fascination
with magical knowledge
and the spirits of the dead.
There is much evidence
that the spiritualists read social theory,
and conversely,
that the social theorists
were often up on their spiritualism.
Moreover, it was often
the self-professed magicians,
not the sociologists,
who were the first to decry
de-spiritualization
and the general loss of magic,
even as they called for revivals.
Other scholars have argued
that religious studies, for one,
has its origins in the European empires.
This is a trenchant point
that may nonetheless need refining,
since the canonically early figures
in the discipline,
Max Müller, Max Weber, Marcel Mousse,
never went to India
or met an Aboriginal Australian first-hand.
They were, however,
profoundly enmeshed in the occult milieu,
and much of what they thought
they knew about the non-West
was mediated by European esotericism.
Indeed, the very objects of their concern,
their methods,
and even their self-definition
still bear the marks
of this important early encounter
with the occult.
The larger project works out
this occult side of the human sciences,
not just the texts and thinkers
who did not make it into the canon,
but also those canonical figures
whose esoteric preoccupations
have been systematically ignored
or suppressed.
Instead of displacing Eurocentrism
by means of explicit comparison,
what follows is a work of erasure.
The private lives of many theorists
of disenchantment
seemingly run contrary
to their own models.
By exposing this,
I aim to disrupt the old master narratives
to make way for new ones.
By analogue to a similar move
in gender studies,
in part I am trying to queer
or render strange
the hegemonic tradition.
Furthermore,
while the social sciences
are often supposed to be
one of the vectors for secularization
and the displacement of magic,
I will show that sociology
and its cousins
were more likely to birth
new revivals of paganism,
shamanism,
and even magic.
It was not just the human sciences,
but also their accounts of modernity
as disenchanted and secularized
that were ironically articulated
in the very period
during which Britain,
France, and Germany
were in the midst of occult revivals.
Indeed, I will argue
that it was specifically
in relation to this burgeoning culture
of spirits and magic
that European intellectuals
gave birth to the myth
of a mythless society.
To clarify this seeming paradox,
I need to explain
what I mean by myth.
The term myth
is often used either polemically
to indicate an erroneous belief
or romantically
to suggest an archaic
or even sacred mode
of narrative discourse.
Although I admit to willfully evoking
the polemical usage by myth,
I mainly mean to gesture toward
those repeated narrative symbols,
e.g. the death of God,
Achilles' heel,
the naked truth
that are adopted as
prefabricated tropes or metaphors
and whose transposition
carries unconscious meaning
from one domain to another.
The prefabricated trope
I am most interested in is
the myth of modernity itself,
by which I mean
not the stories from a particular epoch,
but the very fable
that there was such an age as modernity
and that it had certain features.
By way of explanation,
Hans Robert Jauss
has reminded us
that modernity
was not a historical event
for which we might determine a date,
1492, 1648, 1789, 1868.
Modernity is first and foremost
the sign of a rupture.
As a term and concept,
it is a device for positing
significant historical breaks.
To speak of the modern
means nothing so much
as to talk of the current,
of the putatively new,
to describe a kind of novelty.
That the term has been used
for hundreds of years
might seem through sheer repetition
to forfeit its claims to originality.
We might now know
that modernity is as much a spatial
as temporal category,
and that to call a culture modern
is to ally it with newness
and to consign its opposite
to colonization
or the scrap heap of history.
It is as much a project
as a periodization,
but the project of modernization
and the period of modernity
are typically entwined,
because modernization works
by projecting an aspirational
and utopian myth of modernity
toward which it aspires.
In this respect,
utopian modernity
is always located elsewhere,
e.g., often colonized subjects
thought of the metropole
as embodying modernity,
or German philosophers
looked to France
as the epitome of the modern,
while French thinkers
looked to England for the same.
It might seem that only
the dystopian modernity
is thought of as here and now.
We should also remember
that to call an era modern,
even when criticized
from a postmodern vantage,
is to characterize the epoch
in terms of its discontinuity
with the past.
There are different ways
to stage that newness.
Modernity is regularly equated
with everything from specific
artistic and philosophical movements,
to particular historical ruptures,
to distinctive sociological processes,
such as urbanization,
industrialization,
globalization,
or various forms of rationalization.
I will not unravel
all the possible associations
and nuances of the term.
From among these,
I aim to undermine the myth
that what sets the modern world
apart from the rest
is that it has experienced
disenchantment and a loss of myth.
I am not claiming that
industrialization never happened,
nor am I denying that rationalization
occurred in any cultural sphere.
Rather, I am interested in the process
by which Christendom
increasingly exchanged its claim
to be the unique bearer
of divine revelation
for the assertion
that it uniquely apprehended
an unmediated cosmos
and did so with the sparkling clarity
of universal rationality.
Sometimes this account of modernity
has been celebratory,
rejoicing in the ascent
of European science
and the end of superstition,
but equally often it has been a lament,
bemoaning a loss of wonder and magic.
Another key impetus for my project
is to provide a response
to Horkheimer and Adorno's
monumental Dialectic of Enlightenment
and an intervention
into critical theory more broadly.
Insofar as critical theory
represents a single
interpretive community,
it might appear that
we are mainly united
by a common literary canon
and our willingness
to repeat a particular story
that this canon enshrines.
Variants of this tale
are to be found not only
in Dialectic of Enlightenment,
but also to some degree
in many works of the Frankfurt School
and its periphery,
including Theodor Adorno,
Negativer Dialektik,
Erich Fromm,
Escape from Freedom,
Max Horkheimer,
Eclipse of Reason,
Leo Louventhal,
Das Diminutier,
Georg Lukács,
Die Zerstörung der Vernunft,
and Herbert Marcuse,
One-Dimensional Man.
One can even find it
with a different effective tone
in many of the writings
of Jürgen Habermas.
Critical theory broadly addresses
the following problem.
What went wrong with modernity
such that it produced
the horrors of totalitarianism
and mass destruction,
and not the utopia
of a classless society?
As expressed in
the Dialectic of Enlightenment,
the question becomes one of
why humanity,
instead of entering
a truly human state,
is sinking into
a new kind of barbarism.
The Frankfurt School's answers
to the broader question
are essentially similar
within a certain range
of variations
and important elaborations.
To juxtapose a few,
From, 1941.
Freedom,
though it has brought
modern man independence
and rationality,
has made him isolated
and thereby anxious
and powerless,
and hence he is tempted
to submit to new totalitarian leaders
in order to escape
from the burden of his freedom.
Horkheimer, 1947.
It seems that
even as technical knowledge
expands the horizon
of man's thought and activity,
his autonomy
appeared to be reduced.
Advance in technical facilities
for enlightenment
is accompanied by
a process of dehumanization.
Marcuse, 1964.
Instead of providing
freedom from toil and domination,
technological rationality
becomes the great vehicle
of better domination,
creating a truly totalitarian universe
in which society and nature,
mind and body,
are kept in a state
of permanent mobilization
for the defense of this universe.
The primal form
of critical theory's master narrative
is that autonomous reason,
or freedom,
or science,
or enlightenment,
once yoked to the domination of nature,
turns into its opposite,
namely,
the domination of humanity.
In other words,
the intellectual energies
that were supposed to liberate us
are now used to keep us in chains.
To my taste,
the version of this formulation
that is most perspicacious
is the pithy phrase
in the dialectic of enlightenment.
Enlightenment reverts to mythology.
It is easy to see
the Weberian cast of this narrative
and how it is linked
to the deanimation of nature.
Again,
juxtapositions make this clear.
Luventhal, 1921.
The primitive metaphysical world picture
vanishes and makes room
for the enlightened clearing,
Aufklärung,
of a heaven now stripped of stars.
The world becomes disenchanted.
Die Welt wird entsaubert.
The vividness of the demon's grimace
turns into the abstractness of
Sample complete.
Ready to continue?
