What is happening with the CHINA Real Estate CRISIS

Global Finance News
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A couple of years ago, China burst the largest real estate bubble on the planet.
It was the country with the most oversized real estate sector in the world. Because,
contrary to what many of you may think, the driving force behind the Chinese economy was
not cheap manufacturing, but rather the construction sector, which accounted for
more than 30% of GDP. Evergrande, the real estate company that triggered the collapse,
was one of the highest grossing companies not only in China, but in the entire world.
And just when the pandemic hit, everything came crashing down.
Construction collapsed, along with housing prices, and new construction fell to levels
not seen in 15 years. The risk was enormous, because the collapse of construction could
also seriously damage the financial sector. What's more, even the government itself launched
an emergency plan to prevent an unprecedented financial crisis. Nevertheless, a couple of
years have passed since then and the Chinese economy continues to grow at a steady pace.
The country has lost one of its biggest economic drivers. But everything continues
as if nothing had happened. How is this possible? Has China been saved from the bursting of the
bubble? Or are there more problems than meets the eye? What is behind all this?
Today on Visual Economic we're going to tell you all about it.
Visual Economic Community, talking about housing in China is no small matter. We're
talking about the true driver of its economy for more than 25 years. Since the country launched
itself into capitalism, the Asian giant has been urbanizing at breakneck speed. And that's despite
the fact that for years millions of people from the countryside were unable to move legally to
the big cities. Even so, today more than 90% of Chinese families own their own home. And many
have two. Or even three. But the real key point is this. In China, bricks and mortar are not just
a roof over your head, they are the main vehicle for saving. Why? Because the Chinese government
imposes strict capital controls. It's a bit like a light version of Argentina's capital controls.
Citizens cannot freely take their money out of the country. Forget about investing in the S&P 500
or international funds. So what do citizens do with their savings? They put them into what they
have closest at hand. Housing. The result? Millions of Chinese are betting their personal finances
on bricks and mortar. And obviously, now you understand why Chinese politicians trembled
at the mere thought of a real estate bubble. Construction wasn't just another sector, it was
the sector. At its peak, it accounted for 35% of GDP, 50% above the norm in developed countries.
In other words, if something went wrong, not only would the economic engine grind to a halt,
the savings of millions of families would also evaporate. But surprise, surprise, for now,
everything points to it being a false alarm. Chinese GDP continues to grow at a healthy pace,
above 5% when most analysts were betting on 4.7%. Not bad. How did they do it? By making a move.
Xi Jinping ordered credit to be diverted from construction to industry, and not just any
industry, to the most cutting-edge sectors. The result? You can see it for yourselves.
Electric cars, batteries, solar panels, drones, biotechnology. China is betting big on the future,
and for now, it seems to be working. Much better than continuing to build empty apartments.
Now, be careful. Not all that glitters is gold. Not all these sectors are equally profitable,
as we've already told you right here on this channel. But hold on a second,
because the story is not that simple. It's true that industry has been a lifeline. But
that doesn't mean that the real estate crash has come without a price. In fact, its effects are
still there, like a heavy backpack. A backpack that weighs down growth, and also the public accounts.
What happens when a giant like Evergrande goes bankrupt because it can't pay its debts?
For many, nothing serious. After all, if it went under because it speculated too much,
then too bad for the speculators, right? At most, a few workers will lose their jobs. And that's it.
Well, no. Not at all. Evergrande's debts weren't to three wealthy monopoly players. No. They were
to suppliers. And to ordinary families. The key? In China, many apartments are sold off-plan.
In other words, people pay in advance, before a single brick has been laid.
Thousands of families handed over their life savings for a flat that, today, does not exist.
In the best case scenario, what they have is a half-finished structure. In the worst case scenario,
an empty lot. And yes, the government did let Evergrande go under. In the long term,
this may make sense. If the state always bails out companies, what incentive do companies have
to manage themselves well? But pay attention, that decision has consequences. And not small
ones. Because in the short term, the damage is brutal. Many families have literally lost
everything.
And no, this isn't just a simple anecdote. It's a very good example to help understand
the next point. The pandemic. The trade war with Trump. Then with Biden. And now,
once again, with Trump. The last few years have not exactly been a walk in the park for China.
And as if all that weren't enough, the final blow, the bursting of the bubble in its star sector,
real estate. Remember what we said, housing was not only the economic driver, it was also where
Chinese kept their savings. A financial cushion that, overnight, has vanished. All this has
created a perfect storm. The result? Consumption has plummeted. And no, it's not that wages have
plummeted. The problem is something else. Uncertainty. Faced with such chaos, citizens
are doing the most human thing possible, saving every yuan as if it were their last. The figures
speak for themselves. Retail sales are growing well below GDP. And industrial production,
well, let's not even go there. So yes, China's GDP is growing, but that growth is not translating
into real improvements for the people. At least not yet. And as if that weren't enough, consider
this. According to Goldman Sachs, housing demand in China could fall by 75% from its 2017 peak,
from 20 million homes a year to just 5 million. Housing always goes up. We've been told that
ad nauseum. But with birth rates at rock bottom in China and across half the world,
that's no longer sustainable. And take note because, if all this already seems concerning,
there's an even bigger problem. One that could put the entire Chinese macroeconomy in check.
A ticking time bomb. Pay attention.
If the Chinese economy has an enemy, it isn't Donald Trump, overproduction,
or even the aging population. It's local government debt. According to some estimates,
China's total debt has already exceeded 300% of GDP. And who is to blame? This graph you're
looking at tells us everything. The provinces are up to their necks in debt. Some spend twice
what they earn, just on interest and repayments. Or to put it another way, everything they collect
is not even enough to cover half of what their debt costs. Okay, this is an extreme case. But
take note, almost half of the provinces are already allocating all their revenue just to
pay interest. Yes, all their revenue. And yes, I know what you're all thinking.
But wait, Josh, weren't we talking about housing? What does this have to do with provincial debt?
Well, everything. For historical reasons that are irrelevant here,
local governments in China are almost unable to collect taxes. So where do they get the money?
Easy, from selling or renting land. This source accounts for between 30 and 50% of their tax
revenue. In some areas it's as high as 90%. That's crazy. The logic is simple. The more
valuable the land, the more the government collects. And what makes land more valuable?
Exactly, what is built next to it. That's how local governments discovered the
hack to infinite money. They sold land to a developer who built a skyscraper or a highway.
The surrounding land went up in price. And back to square one. A virtuous circle. Or rather,
a wheel that spun faster and faster. And when there wasn't time to wait,
the government went into debt to build itself. The problem? Well, the same old story.
What happens when the music stops and no one wants to buy anymore?
The housing crisis is also a land crisis. Since 2021, local government revenues have
plummeted by almost half. Less land is being sold, and at much lower prices.
What was once a gold mine is now a bottomless pit. But remember, we're not saying that the
financial apocalypse is coming. The central government has more than enough muscle to
bail out the provinces if necessary. But what is clear is that the hack of infinite money is over.
And now comes the ugly part. Raising taxes. And not just a little bit. Local governments are going
to have to scrape together revenue wherever they can. This is going to be a real blow to other
sectors of the economy, such as industry. Until now, industrial companies have enjoyed
very favourable tax treatment. To give you an idea, even though GDP grew by 5%, tax revenue
fell by 3 points. The reason? The driver of growth has been industry. But an industry that
pays very little tax. This is partly why it's been doing the heavy lifting.
In short, China has avoided a total collapse like the one in Spain in 2008. But don't be fooled,
the construction slump will not come cheap for the Asian giant.
The good news is that the market seems to be picking up. Housing prices are still falling,
yes, but much more slowly than a year ago. But let's not celebrate just yet.
Because if everything was going well in the second half of 2024, in 2025 things have changed.
For example, the decline in second-hand home prices has tripled so far this year. And June
was the worst month for sales, down 12.5%. The thing is, something very curious happens
with real estate bubbles. When prices rise steadily, everyone buys like crazy. And when
they fall and apartments are practically being given away, no one buys anything.
For this very reason, the Chinese government is already preparing new stimulus plans for September.
Many restrictions on demand have been lifted. Now, the number one goal is clear. To stop
prices from falling. Not to inflate the bubble again as before, but to stabilize the market.
So how does it plan to achieve this? First, by completing all those projects abandoned after
the collapse of giants such as Evergrande. And second, by selling the millions of empty
apartments that are scattered throughout the country. And yes, there has already been some
progress. A year ago, at this rate, it would have taken 20 months to clear the inventory. Today,
it will only take 12 and a half months. Nevertheless, this is causing a rather
peculiar phenomenon. One that could create an even bigger problem in the future. Stay tuned.
What you are seeing are plots of land purchased in Beijing for new real estate projects. And there
is one important detail. Today, the large developers are almost all state-owned. In 2017,
they managed barely 20% of projects. Today, they control 60%. Why? Because many private
developers have gone bankrupt. And because ordinary Chinese people trust government
companies much more. After all, if it's state-owned, it's not going to go bankrupt. And
if it doesn't go bankrupt, it's more likely to finish building your apartment. The problem
is that Chinese public companies are not exactly a model of efficiency. No matter what Xi Jinping
says. In fact, the provinces that have privatized the most are the ones that have grown the most.
And this is no coincidence. There are many studies to back it up. Remember,
we're not talking about state-owned companies of old communist China. Today,
they have more autonomy, budgetary limits, and in theory, they compete in the market.
But let's be honest. Even if they have become more dynamic, it's still a rigged game. They are
much more likely to become zombie companies. In other words, they survive only on government
money. What's more, they tend to make less profitable and, paradoxically, more speculative
investments. The result? Grandiose macro projects that no one wants to live in.
Of course, everything we're talking about is happening mainly in large cities,
the famous tier one cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. In the rest of the country,
something similar is probably happening, but honestly we don't have that much data. And this
is crucial when we talk about the Chinese real estate market. We have to make a clear distinction
between what is happening in these tier one cities and the rest. For example, these large cities have
weathered the crisis much better. In fact, in many of them, prices have already started to rise
slowly. However, this is mainly in the luxury segment. The real epicenter of the problem lies
in tier three cities, which is where most of China's housing is concentrated. These local
governments were the most dependent on bricks and mortar to fill their coffers. So, of course,
they were also the ones that overbuilt the most. And now they're the ones suffering the most.
To give you an idea, tier three cities account for 72% of urban housing stock,
but only 66% of the urban population. Do you see the problem? And now add another
ingredient to this explosive cocktail, depopulation. Yes, these cities are
constantly losing inhabitants. In 2021 alone, they lost 2% of their population.
Where did those people go? To tier two cities. Too much supply, too little demand. You don't
need a master's degree in economics to understand why these areas are being hit hardest by the real
crisis. Now, you may be wondering, why are tier two cities the big winners, and not tier one
cities like Beijing or Shanghai? Quick answer. Because even with the crisis, tier one cities
are still prohibitively expensive. Cities such as Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Beijing are more expensive
for Chinese salaries than cities as prohibitive as London or San Francisco. And this is in the
middle of 2025, four years after the real estate bubble burst. For now, tier one cities are driving
the economy. And that is giving real estate giants such as VANK and Country Garden some
breathing room. These two giants are comparable to Evergrande, both in terms of size and in terms
of their debts and accumulated losses in recent years. However, everything indicates that the
government is no longer so close to the idea of intervening if necessary.
VANK, for example, is a symbol. It was the first joint venture in Shenzhen,
and now it has to be bailed out by Shenzhen Metro, a state-owned company. This is a huge
help, especially after seeing its shares plummet from 35 to just five Hong Kong dollars. For its
part, Country Garden, another of the country's biggest giants, has managed to avoid the worst,
but only just. It suspended trading on the stock market due to non-payment,
and although there isn't much information available, the company claims it has sufficient
financial support to restructure itself from top to bottom and prevent another Evergrande
from happening. But watch out. The real problem now is no longer whether another giant will fall,
but the structural damage that this setback could leave on the Chinese economy in the long term.
We'll see how the authorities deal with the fall in consumer confidence and, above all,
with local government dead. But now it's your turn. Will we see another Evergrande in the
coming months? Will the Chinese lose their fear of spending this year? What will the provinces do
with their finances now that the goose that has laid the golden eggs has died? You can leave your
answers in the comments. Don't forget that here on Visual Economic we release new videos every week,
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