This analysis examines China's electric vehicle sector, highlighting its surface-level success in dominating the domestic market and surpassing global rivals like Tesla in sales. However, underlying challenges include stagnating sales, reliance on massive government subsidies, and limited overseas growth due to trade barriers and low base volumes. The industry faces a critical transition from growth-oriented to mature business models, demanding higher profit margins that conflict with its core strength of low prices. Without sustainable competitive advantages like advanced tech or strong branding, companies risk financial collapse amid subsidy reductions. While political interventions may delay the reckoning, long-term viability requires shifting from exploitation-driven cost-cutting to innovation and fair practices.
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Hi, I'm Dong Shong. Welcome to Digging
into China, where we explore China in
depth to review unique perspectives.
China's electric vehicle industry has
long been heralded by the Chinese
Communist Party as a monumental
achievement, often presented as a
cornerstone of hope for the nation's
economic future. So, where does this
industry stand today? In this episode,
we'll explore the state of Chinese
electric vehicles. In my view, China's
new energy vehicle sector is defined by
two key traits. On the surface, it
appears to be advancing rapidly, but
beneath that, it faces a series of
underlying crisis. Let's start with the
positives. The apparent rapid progress.
On the surface, China's electric vehicle
industry has achieved significant
success. Domestic electric vehicles
dominate the Chinese market with foreign
brands reduced to a single major player,
Tesla. Legacy automakers such as BMW,
MercedesBenz, Audi, and Toyota have
struggled to compete with their electric
offerings in China. As Chinese citizens
see a variety of cars on the streets
daily, there is a palpable sense that
the domestic electric vehicles reign
supreme. Fueled by the strength of the
domestic market, BYD is expected to
surpass Tesla in global sales this year,
positioning itself as the world's top
selling electric vehicle brand.
Furthermore, the robust growth of
domestic electric vehicles coupled with
their rising share of China's total auto
sales has left many traditional joint
venture and foreign automakers
struggling. Domestic brands now command
over 60% of the market share in China,
significantly eroding the profits of
foreign and joined venture automakers.
If we focus solely on these figures, it
might seem that Chinese electric
vehicles having conquered the domestic
market are poised to dominate globally
as the Communist Party suggests,
promising a bright future. Could BYD
become China's equivalent of Toyota?
Could China emerge as the next global
automotive powerhouse? In reality, the
answer is no. Why is that? Let's turn to
the undercurrents, the hidden
challenges. Recently, you may have seen
reports that on October 2nd, BYD
released its financial result showing it
sold just 400,000 vehicles in September,
a 5 and a half% yearon-year decline.
This marked the first sales drop in 19
months since the start of 2024. BYD also
lowered its annual sales target from 5.5
million to 4.6. 6 million vehicles. This
slowdown is not unique to BYD. The
entire Chinese auto industry is
experiencing similar trends. According
Goldman Sachs analysis of passenger
vehicle insurance registrations in
China, growth in overall vehicle
registrations has noticeably stalled
with new energy vehicles showing the
same pattern. Why use insurance
registrations instead of sales figures?
The reason is that some dealers in
China's auto industry, particularly in
the electric vehicle sector, are
suspected of inflating sales by
self-purchasing.
Insurance registrations offer a more
accurate picture of actual demand.
With the Chinese market experiencing
stagnant growth and sales, what about
overseas markets? Haven't we heard that
the Chinese electric vehicles are
performing well abroad? Could there be a
scenario where domestic struggles are
offset by international success?
Unfortunately, the overseas picture is
similar. While news reports highlight
Chinese electric vehicles being exported
globally with impressive yearon-year
sales growth, such as BYD's over 200%
growth in Indonesia in the first half of
the year or over 100% growth in other
regions. These figures are misleading.
The growth appears dramatic only because
the baseline sales numbers are low.
Chinese electric vehicles may be seeing
high growth rates in Southeast Asia, but
they haven't disrupted the region's auto
sales landscape, where Japanese brands
continue to dominate.
More critically, despite years of talk
about building factories overseas and
expanding globally, progress has stalled
due to local policies in some countries
and the financial constraints. In 2024,
Chinese electric vehicle overseas
investment has lacked behind the levels
seen in 2023 and 2022. Without the
ability to establish local
manufacturing, Chinese automakers face
barriers to market access. Only about
24% of the world's major auto markets
have minimal restrictions on Chinese
imports, while 34% requires local
production, and some outright prohibit
Chinese imports. Without the local
factories, the long-term prospects for
Chinese electric vehicles abroad are
limited, offering little room for
optimism in the near future.
Some might argue, what's the issue with
a growth slowdown? It's not a collapse
wide concern. It sounds like you are
unfairly criticizing China's electric
vehicles industry. Let's examine what
this slowdown truly signifies. First, a
slowdown in Chinese auto sales is highly
unusual compared to other industries,
especially given the substantial
government subsidies for car purchases
this year. The scale of subsidies such
as incentives for new energy vehicles
and trading programs has far exceeded
the previous years. If no additional
increases are made in 2025, the total
subsidy budget will reach 342 billion
yen, nearly 100 billion more than last
year. This amount represents 2.8% of
China's fiscal revenue and 7% of total
auto sales revenue. In essence, the
government is covering on average 7% of
the price of every car purchased. This
doesn't include the manufacturing side
subsidies. In 2024, this share was 5%
and in 2023, it was only 2%. When
factoring in additional support like a
land incentives and tax breaks,
estimates from Goldman Sachs and others
suggest that annual support for new
energy companies range from 5 to 700
billion yen, about 15% of total vehicle
prices, surpassing the fiscal revenue of
a province like Hanan. This leads to a
critical issue. Despite these massive
subsidies, the auto industry has not
seen growth and is even even showing
slight contraction toward year end. What
will happen next year? What if these
subsidies are reduced? A recent forecast
by the Rodium Group predicts that if the
Chinese government halts largecale
subsidies in 2026,
maintaining only a minimal 0.8% 8% of
fiscal expenditure. Auto sales could
drop by nearly 30%. If current levels
are maintained, sales could still
decline by 13%. Only by increasing
subsidies by approximately 10% could
sales remain stable. This suggests that
without significant government support
next year, Chinese electric vehicle
sales could plummet. Some might say a
30% drop isn't catastrophic, but such a
decline could trigger a chain reaction,
potentially destabilizing the entire
Chinese electric vehicle industry. Why
would a 10%, 20% or 30% sales drop have
such severe consequences? To understand,
we must consider two types of businesses
model. Unlike the common assumption that
a 30% sales drop leads a proportional
drop in profits or stock prices, the
situation for Chinese electric vehicle
giants is different.
Companies are divided into two
categories. Mature companies like a
Coca-Cola or Toyota have a stable
profits and established markets. So a
30% sales drop typically results in a
similar decline in profits and stock
prices. However, growth oriented
companies like a chat GPT or many
Chinese automakers face a different
reality. For these companies, a 30% drop
in sales or user base can be
devastating. For instance, a video on
Billy Billy claimed Open AI is a failing
because it lost 13.5 billion dollars in
the first half of the year while
praising Deep Seek for lowering costs
and hurting Open AI's profits. This
reflects a misunderstanding of the
economics in the markets. Investors in
AI companies like CH GBT don't
prioritize current profitability, but
focus on user scale. Chbt's 700 million
weekly active users are its greatest
asset. For CH GBT, losses are less
critical than a 30% drop in active
users, which would be catastrophic. The
underlying logic is market expectations.
Mature companies are expected to deliver
stable cash flows and profits. Growth
oriented companies however are expected
to achieve monopolies or build
competitive advantages through user
scale, cost efficiencies or data
dominance. Investors are betting on
their future potential, not immediate
profit. This explains why a slowdown or
stagnation in Chinese electric vehicle
sales has such a profound impact. It
signals that the future these companies
have promised is unattainable.
The market has reached its limit.
Regardless of their ambitious visions,
the consequences consequences go beyond
a simple 30% drop in profits or stock
price. It necessitates a fundamental
shift in their business models and
narratives.
Chinese automakers must now transition
from growth oriented to mature
companies, shifting their focus from
future potential to current performance.
This means prioritizing profit margins
over sales volume. In stock market
terms, this is reflected in the price to
earnings PE ratio. the ratio of stock
price to net profit. Mature automakers
like a Toyota, Mercedes-Benz, BMW, and a
Volkswagen, which lack expensive future
narratives, typically have PE ratios
between 6 and a 10, meaning their stock
prices are 6 to 10 times their net
profits. In contrast, the prominent
Chinese electric vehicle companies often
have PE ratios above 20 with companies
like a series tied to Huawei exceeding
30. This was justifiable when these
companies were focused on future growth.
However, as market growth slows, they
must transform into companies like a
Toyota or BMW, significantly increasing
their profit margins. Failure to do so
risks sharp stock price declines,
reduced funding and potential financial
collapse due to disrupted capital
chains.
Transformation isn't inherently
negative. It depends on preparation. Are
Chinese automakers ready to shift from
growth oriented to mature companies and
lower their PE ratios? The answer is no.
The reason lies in their core
competitiveness.
What do Chinese electric vehicles excel?
The answer is clear. Affordability. This
can mean lower prices or offering
features like a built-in refrigerators
or large screens at a fraction of
competitors cost. This advantage holds
in markets like Southeast Asia. A
Blumenberg survey found that over 85% of
Southeast Asian buyers and 95% of
European buyers choose Chinese electric
vehicles for their affordability.
Data supports this. Chinese electric
vehicles have gained market share
through low prices. Despite Huawei
launching high-end models like the M8,
the average price of Chinese electric
vehicles has been declining. In 2022,
vehicles priced between 200 and 300,000
yen accounted for 26% of sales. But by
2025, this dropped to 20%. The price
peak has shifted to the more affordable
100 to 150,000 yen range. This trend is
even clearer in overall vehicle pricing.
Chinese EV have relied on low prices to
capture market share. However, this
creates a paradox when transitioning to
a mature business model. Their core
strength high value at low cost depends
on affordability. As markets saturate
and growth slows, companies must pursue
profits by raising prices which
undermines their primary advantage. This
loss of competitiveness further impact
sales. Affecting market expectations and
creating a vicious cycle forcing Chinese
automakers to become mature companies
and prioritize profits challenges their
fundamental strength low prices. To
illustrate the impact of price
increases, consider per vehicle profit
margins based on 2024 financial reports
and the first half of 2025. I have
avoided comparing Chinese electric
vehicles to luxury brands like a BMW or
Mercedes which have high margins or
outliers like a Neo which reportedly
lose 100,000 yen per vehicle. Instead,
let's compare mainstream brands like a
Toyota and a Tesla to Chinese electric
vehicles companies with a relatively
stable profits. Toyota earns a per
vehicle profits of 22,400
yen and Tesla earns 17,000. In contrast,
Xiaomi loses 5,100 yen per vehicle and
Shiao loses 5,800.
Lee Auto and BYD perform better with per
vehicle profits of 7,000 and 8,000 yum
respectively. Yet, these figures lag far
behind a Tesla and a Toyota to become
mature companies. Chinese electric
vehicle makers would need to match these
profit margins, requiring price
increases of 10 to 30,000 per vehicle.
If Chinese electric vehicles cost 10 to
30,000 yen more, would they remain
competitive? Would consumers still buy
them? Would they retain their edge
overseas? How much further will the
sales decline? For any company
transitioning to a mature business model
is inevitable. Even Chad GBD will
eventually reach user saturation. The
key is whether the company is prepared
for that shift. For Chinese automakers,
the answer is evident. They are not
ready.
The Chinese electric vehicle industry
got an early start but failed to build
critical competitive advantages such as
advanced autonomous driving technology,
strong brand identity or compelling
narratives. None of these have been
established.
Chinese automakers did not leverage
their early mover advantage to create
these strength. A few years ago, they
hyped autonomous driving, but incidents
like a Xiaomi car crash in April and a
safety test by a car review platform
exposed their shortcomings. Does anyone
still tout Chinese autonomous driving?
As for brand identity, BYD is not seen
as a premium brand. It's more associated
with taxi fleets. Other automakers have
faced has faced frequent issues like
vehicle fires or consumer mistreatment
fostering an image of disregard for
safety and customers. They haven't
cultivated Toyota's reputation for
affordable reliability or the luxury
prestigious of BMW or Mercedes. What
have they built? Little of substance.
In terms of storytelling, they lag far
behind the figures like Elon Musk. Musk
recogni recognized early that the
electric vehicle market was becoming
saturated and began creating new
competitive advantages such as the robo
taxi business based on FSD, autonomous
driving or robotics leverage industrial
capabilities. While many of these are
still conceptual, they provide the
market with a room to envision Tesla's
future, preventing it from being
reclassified as a mature company.
Chinese EV companies, by contrast, have
focused almost exclusively on price wars
and sales volume, offering features like
a refrigerators and large screen TVs.
What's the root of their challenges? Why
are they trapped in a cycle of cutting
prices and chasing sales? I see two
primary reasons. First, misguided
government policies have driven the
Chinese electric vehicle industry into
reckless competition. The industry's
rise began with Xiinping's directive to
prioritize electric vehicles, prompting
companies nationwide to enter the
market. The government cared little
about the profitability, only about the
sales volume and reinforcing she's
narrative of triumphant success. As a
result, automakers become fixated on
sales, chasing the dreams of surpassing
global powers in three years while
neglecting core competitiveness.
Some companies may have prioritized the
competitiveness, but their slower
progress didn't align with the she's win
fast, win big agenda and was sidelined.
Second, in China, cutting costs,
particularly through labor exploitation,
is far easier than innovation. BYD's low
costs beyond the economics of scale and
a willingness to absorb losses stem from
extreme exploitation of Chinese workers.
Why invest in R&D when labor can be
squeezed so effectively? BYD also
pressures its suppliers using tactics
like a delayed payments to extract more
value. A company that disrespects its
people and builds its competitiveness on
exploitations is destined to falter.
Does this mean Chinese electric vehicle
companies will collapse next year? Not
necessarily. While I've highlighted many
challenges, they depend on sales slowing
or declining. Without substantial
government subsidies, next year the
industry could face collapse. However,
Xi Jinping may employ aggressive
political measures such as larger auto
purchase subsidies to prevent this
outcome.
If subsidizing 7% of car price failed to
boost sales this year, why not increase
it to 10% next year? If 10% isn't
enough, why not 15%. If 996 work
schedules still result in high cost, why
not permit 997 schedules to further
exploit workers? These measures might
temporarily mitigate the crisis, but
they only postpone the inevitable
reckoning for the Chinese electric
vehicle industry. They will keep the
industry in a state of limbo next year,
unable to resolve its core issues or
deliver the promised prosperous future,
let alone benefit the Chinese economy or
its people. The Communist Party should
abandon largecale subsidies and focus on
protecting labor rights as the South
Korea once did. The government should
fulfill its fundamental role and trust
in the ingenuity and effort of Chinese
people. Without government interference
and with fair labor protections, Chinese
companies and citizens would naturally
create a competitive innovative
enterprises.
Government intervention only creates an
illusion of prosperity while stifling
truly innovative firms. The Chinese
people don't need an overbearing
overseer. Not the United States, but the
Xiinping himself.
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