LIVE: Fed Chair Jerome Powell Speaks at NABE Annual Meeting

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Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell delivers remarks at the 67th Annual National Association for Business Economics (NABE) meeting in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, at 12:30 p.m. ET on Oct. 14.
So just a few words about these wonderful individuals
who have given three years of their time to the NABE board,
or a little longer in the case of Julia.
First, Wilco, who could not be with us today.
He's of Amazon, and his impact on NABE has been tremendous.
He's been a key driver of the Tech Economics Conference,
helping it evolve as we've incorporated causal inference
and AI tools into our collective toolkit.
His vision and technical insight have helped keep NABE
at the forefront of applied data and technology in economics.
And then we have Kathleen Navin
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
who has been deeply engaged across NABE programs
from the annual meeting to the economic measurement seminar,
which was absolutely fantastic this year,
and has been an important contributor
to the Certified Business Economist Program
and the NABE Foundation.
Thoughtful input and steady leadership
has strengthened nearly every initiative that she's touched.
Then next we have Yael Selfin, Chief Economist at KPMG UK.
Yael's been a vital bridge between NABE
and the global economics community.
Throughout her involvement in the Policy Conference
and in the International Symposium,
she has helped NABE connect with leading economists
and policymakers across Europe.
Yael's deep network and international perspective
have been invaluable in broadening NABE's reach,
rather, and fostering meaningful global dialogue
among economists.
And finally, Julia Coronado,
Founder of Macro Policy Perspectives,
who has been a true cornerstone of NABE's leadership
for the past decade.
Julia has served seven years on the board,
including as president and most recently as past president.
Her macroeconomic expertise, her mentorship,
expansive network have all shaped countless NABE programs
and surveys and helped advance the CBE program.
So on behalf of all of NABE, I wanna thank Wilco,
thank you Kathleen, Yael and Julia for your service,
for your leadership and for your lasting contributions
to our community and not last contributions,
but lasting, cause I know you're not quite going anywhere,
just rolling off the board.
So if you could please come up
and we will, I think do a quick picture.
Your plaques have not arrived, unfortunately.
Supply chain issues.
All right, now we'll move on to our awards presentation.
So normally when we have such a well-known
and respected speaker, I would say,
this person needs no introduction
and you'd rather hear them speak
than hear me speak about them.
But at this moment, and in the case of the presentation
of the Adam Smith Award, I think it's more than appropriate
that we take a moment to appreciate
exactly who it is we're recognizing today.
So Jerome Powell first took office
as chair of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System in February of 2018
for a four-year term.
And he was reappointed to the office
and sworn in for a second four-year term in May of 2022.
He serves as chair of the Federal Open Market Committee,
the system's principal monetary policymaking body.
Mr. Powell has also served
as a member of the Board of Governors
since taking office on May 25th, 2012
to fill an unexpired term.
And he was reappointed to the board in June of 2014
for a term ending in January of 2028.
Prior to his appointment to the board,
Mr. Powell was a visiting scholar
at the Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington, D.C.
where he focused on federal and state fiscal issues.
From 1997 to 2005, he was a partner at the Carlyle Group.
He served as an assistant secretary
and as an undersecretary
of the U.S. Department of the Treasury
under President George H.W. Bush
with responsibility for policy on financial institutions,
the treasury debt market and related areas.
And prior to joining the Bush administration,
he worked as a lawyer and investment banker
in New York City.
In addition to service on corporate boards,
Mr. Powell has served on charitable
and educational institutional boards,
including the Bentheim Center for Finance
at Princeton University
and the Nature Conservancy of Washington, D.C. and Maryland.
And of course, among his many other professional engagements
he has been a strong and consistent supporter
of the National Association for Business Economics.
And we are very grateful for that engagement.
So because of that, we are very pleased
to be presenting him today with the Adam Smith Award.
The Adam Smith Award is NAIB's highest honor
and it was named for the 18th century
Scottish philosopher and economist
whose ideas about economics
led to the growth of modern capitalism.
And this award has been given annually by NAIB since 1982.
And it is essentially, as one of my colleagues said to me,
this is our hall of fame.
Past recipients include several Fed presidents
and prestigious economists across the spectrum,
including Janet Yellen and Ben Bernanke,
as well as Arthur Laffer, Susan Athey,
and going a little bit further back,
William Poole from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
and Lawrence Klein, who won the award in 2004.
We are very pleased today
to be awarding this honor to Jerome Powell.
Jerome Powell's exemplary leadership
as chair of the Federal Reserve,
especially in navigating the complexities
of monetary policy during challenging times,
has had a profound and lasting impact
on both the US economy and the global financial system.
Under his stewardship,
the Federal Reserve has effectively managed
unprecedented economic challenges,
including the COVID-19 pandemic,
by taking a thoughtful and data-driven approach
to monetary policy setting.
His decisive actions to support economic recovery,
promote financial stability,
and ensure a resilient financial system
have demonstrated an unwavering commitment
to US economic growth and wellbeing.
The strength of his leadership
has also earned him the respect of policymakers,
economists, and business leaders worldwide.
His work, particularly in the areas of monetary policy,
financial regulation, and economic resilience,
absolutely align with the ideals of the Adam Smith Award.
He has consistently applied foundational economic principles
to address real-world challenges,
upholding the Federal Reserve's high standards
of sound economic management
and transparent policymaking in the process.
So with that, I am very pleased to welcome to the stage,
Chair Jerome Powell, thank you.
Here we go, thank you very much.
We got a camera somewhere?
I thought we did, but maybe not.
There we go, we don't have a camera.
There we go.
Thank you, thank you so much.
Thank you, Emily.
And thanks to the National Association
for Business Economics for the Adam Smith Award.
It, for me, is an unexpected honor
just to be mentioned alongside many of your past recipients,
including particularly my predecessors,
Janet Yellen and Ben Bernanke.
So thank you very much for this recognition.
I will say, on a more personal note,
I have greatly enjoyed my regular visits
to your annual meeting and your conferences.
It's really been my favorite venue all these years.
It's a place,
this is a place where we can talk about economic issues
and not worry that someone's eyes might glaze over.
I also appreciate the warm welcome
I've always received here.
And putting Fed staff aside for a minute,
I can't think of a more lovable group of econ nerds anywhere.
So thank you again for this prestigious award.
And for the opportunity to speak to you here today.
So, as we all know, monetary policy is more effective
when the public understands
what the Federal Reserve does and why.
With that in mind, I hope to enhance understanding
of one of the more arcane and technical aspects
of monetary policy,
the Federal Reserve's balance sheet.
A colleague recently compared this topic
to a trip to the dentist,
but I found that comparison somewhat unfair to dentists.
So today I'll discuss the essential role
that our balance sheet played during the pandemic,
along with some lessons learned.
I'll then review our Ample Reserve's implementation framework
and the progress we've made
toward normalizing the size of our balance sheet.
And I'll conclude with some brief remarks
on the economic outlook.
So, one of the primary purposes of a central bank
is to provide the monetary foundation
for the financial system and the broader economy.
This foundation is made of central bank liabilities.
On the Fed's balance sheet,
the liability side of the ledger
totaled $6.5 trillion as of October 8,
and three categories account for roughly 95% of the total.
First, Federal Reserve notes, that is physical currency,
totaled $2.4 trillion.
Second, reserves, funds held by depository institutions
at Federal Reserve banks, totaled $3 trillion.
These deposits allow commercial banks
to make and receive payments
and meet regulatory requirements.
Reserves are the safest and most liquid asset
in the financial system, and only the Fed can create them.
The adequate provision of reserves is essential
to the safety and soundness of our banking system,
the resilience and efficiency of our payment system,
and ultimately the stability of our economy.
Third, is the Treasury General Account, or TGA,
currently at about $800 billion,
which is essentially the checking account
for the federal government.
When the Treasury makes or receives payments,
those flows affect dollar for dollar,
the supply of reserves or other liabilities in the system.
The asset side of our ledger
consists almost entirely of securities,
including $4.2 trillion of U.S. Treasury securities
and $2.1 trillion of government-guaranteed
agency mortgage-backed securities, or MBS.
When we add reserves to the system,
we generally do so by purchasing Treasury securities
in the open market and crediting the reserve accounts
of the banks involved in the transaction with the seller.
This process effectively transforms securities
held by the public into reserves,
but does not change the total amount
of government liabilities held by the public.
So, the Fed's balance sheet
serves as a critical policy tool,
especially when the policy rate is constrained
by the effect of lower bound, or ELB.
When COVID-19 struck in March 2020,
the economy came to a near standstill
and financial markets seized up,
threatening to transform a public health crisis
into a severe, prolonged economic downturn.
In response, we established
a number of emergency liquidity facilities.
Those programs, supported at the time
by Congress and the administration,
provide critical support to markets
and were remarkably effective
in restoring confidence and stability.
At their peak in July 2020,
loans from these facilities totaled just over $200 billion.
Most of these loans were quickly unwound
as conditions stabilized.
At the same time, the market for U.S. Treasury securities,
normally the deepest and most liquid open market
in the world, and the bedrock
of the global financial system,
was under extraordinary pressure
and on the verge of collapse.
We used large-scale purchases of securities
to restore functionality to the Treasury market.
Faced with unprecedented market dysfunction,
the Fed purchased Treasury and agency securities
at an extraordinary pace in March and April of 2020.
These purchases supported the flow
of credit to households and businesses
and fostered more accommodative financial conditions
to support the recovery of the economy
when it ultimately came.
This source of policy accommodation
was particularly important,
as we had already lowered the federal funds rate
close to zero and expected
that it would remain there for some time.
By June 2020, we slowed our purchase pace
to a still substantial $120 billion per month.
And in December of 2020,
as the economic outlook remained highly uncertain,
the FOMC said that we expected to maintain
that pace of purchases
until substantial further progress has been made
toward the committee's maximum employment
and price stability goals.
That guidance provided assurance
that the Fed would not prematurely withdraw support
while the economic recovery remained fragile
amid unprecedented conditions.
And we maintained that pace of asset purchases
through October 2021.
By then, it had become apparent
that elevated inflation was not likely to go away
without a strong monetary response.
At our meeting in November 2021,
we announced a phase-out of our purchases.
And at our next meeting in December,
we doubled the pace of that taper
and said that asset purchases would conclude
by mid-March of 2022.
Over the entire period of purchases,
our securities holdings increased by $4.6 trillion.
So a number of observers have raised questions
early enough about the size and composition
of asset purchases during the pandemic recovery.
Throughout 2020 and 21,
the economy continued to face significant challenges
as successive waves of COVID
caused widespread disruption and loss.
During that tumultuous period,
we continued to purchase
in order to avoid a sharp, unwelcome tightening
of financial conditions
at a time when the economy still appeared
to be highly vulnerable.
Our thinking was, pardon me,
was informed by recent episodes
in which signals about reducing the price of securities
and the balance sheet had triggered
significant tightening in financial conditions.
And we were thinking of the events of December 2018,
as well as the 2013 taper tantrum.
Regarding the composition of our purchases,
some have questioned the inclusion of agency MBS purchases
given the strong housing market
during the pandemic recovery.
Outside of purchases aimed specifically
at market functioning,
MBS purchases are primarily intended,
like our purchases of treasury securities,
to ease broader financial conditions
when the policy rate is constrained
by the effect of lower bound.
The extent to which these MBS purchases
disproportionately affected housing market conditions
during that period is challenging to determine.
Many factors affect the mortgage market
and many factors beyond the mortgage market
affect supply and demand in the broader housing market.
With the clarity of hindsight,
we could have, and perhaps should have,
stopped asset purchases sooner.
Our real-time decisions were intended to serve
as insurance against downside risks.
We knew that we could unwind purchases relatively quickly
once we ended them, which is exactly what we did.
Research and experience tell us
that asset purchases affect the economy through expectations
regarding the future size and duration of our balance sheet,
so that when we announced our taper,
market participants began pricing in its effects,
pulling forward the tightening in financial conditions.
Stopping sooner could have made some difference,
but not likely enough to fundamentally alter
the trajectory of the economy.
Nonetheless, our experience since 2020 does suggest
that we can be more nimble in our use of the balance sheet
and more confident that our communications
will foster appropriate expectations
among market participants,
given their growing experience with these tools.
Some have also argued that we could have better explained
the purposes of asset purchases in real-time.
There's always room for improved communication,
but I believe our statements were reasonably clear
about our objectives, which were to support
and then sustain smooth market functioning
and to help foster accommodative financial conditions.
Over time, the relative importance of those objectives
evolved with economic conditions,
but the objectives were never in conflict.
So at the time, this issue appeared to be
a distinction without much of a difference.
That's not always the case, of course.
For example, the March 2023 banking stress
led to a sizable increase in our balance sheet
through lending operations.
We clearly differentiated these financial stability
operations from our monetary policy stance.
Indeed, we continued to raise the policy rate
through that time.
Turning to my second topic.
Pardon me.
Our ample reserves regime has proven highly effective,
delivering good control of our policy rate
across a wide range of challenging economic conditions
while promoting financial stability
and supporting a resilient payment system.
In this framework, an ample supply of reserves
ensures adequate liquidity in the banking system
and control of our policy rate is achieved
through the setting of our administered rates,
interest on reserve balances,
and the overnight repurchase rate.
Reverse repo rate, rather.
This approach allows us to maintain
rate control independently of the size of our balance sheet.
And that's important given large unpredictable swings
in liquidity demand from the private sector
and significant fluctuations in the autonomous factors
affecting reserve supply, such as the TGA.
This framework has proved resilient
whether the balance sheet is shrinking or growing.
Since June 2022, we've reduced the size
of our balance sheet by $2.2 trillion,
from 35% to just under 22% of GDP
while maintaining effective interest rate control.
Our long-stated plan is to stop balance sheet runoff
when reserves are somewhat above the level
we judge consistent with ample reserves conditions.
We may approach that point in coming months,
and we are closely monitoring a wide range of indicators
to inform this decision.
Some signs have begun to emerge
that liquidity conditions are gradually tightening,
including a general firming of repo rates
are becoming more and more intense,
along with more noticeable but temporary pressures
on selected dates.
The committee's plans lay out a deliberately cautious approach
to avoid the kind of money market strains
experienced in September 2019.
Moreover, the tools of our implementation framework,
including the standing repo facility and a discount window,
will help contain funding pressures
and keep the federal funds rate within our target range
through this transition to lower reserve levels.
Normalizing the size of our balance sheet
does not mean going back to the balance sheet
we had before the pandemic.
In the longer run, the size of our balance sheet
is determined by the public's demand for our liabilities
rather than by our pandemic-related asset purchases.
Non-reserve liabilities currently stand
at about $1.1 trillion higher than just prior to the pandemic,
thus requiring that our securities holdings
be equally higher.
Demand for reserves has risen as well,
in part reflecting the growth of the banking system
and the overall economy.
Regarding the composition of our securities portfolio,
relative to the outstanding universe
of Treasury securities,
our portfolio is currently overweight,
longer-term securities,
and underweight, shorter-term securities.
The longer-run composition
will be a topic of committee discussion.
Transition to our desired composition
will occur gradually and predictably,
giving market participants time to adjust
and minimizing the risk of market disruption.
Consistent with our long-standing guidance,
we aim for a portfolio consisting primarily
of Treasury securities over the longer run.
Some have questioned whether the interest we pay on reserves
is costly to taxpayers.
In fact, that is not the case.
The Fed earns interest income from Treasury securities
that back reserves.
Most of the time, our interest earnings
from Treasury holdings
more than cover the interest paid on reserves,
generating significant remittances to the Treasury.
By law, we remit all profits to the Treasury
after covering expenses,
and since 2008, even after accounting
for the recent period of negative net income,
our total remittances to Treasury
have totaled more than $900 billion.
While our net interest income has temporarily been negative
due to the rapid rise in policy rates to control inflation,
this is highly unusual.
Our net income will soon turn positive again,
as it typically has been throughout our history.
Of course, having negative net income
has no bearing at all on our ability
to conduct monetary policy or meet our financial obligations.
If our ability to pay interest on reserves
and other liabilities were eliminated,
the Fed would lose control of the Treasury
and would lose control over rates.
The stance of monetary policy
would no longer be appropriately calibrated
to economic conditions
and would push the economy away from our employment
and price stability goals.
To restore rate control,
large sales of securities over a short period of time
would be needed to shrink our balance sheet
and the quantity of reserves in the system.
The volume and speed of these sales
could strain Treasury market functioning
and compromise financial stability.
Market participants would need to absorb
the sales of Treasury securities and agency MBS,
which would put upward pressure on the entire yield curve,
raising borrowing costs for the Treasury and private sector.
Even after that volatile and disruptive process,
the banking system would be less resilient
and more vulnerable to liquidity shocks.
The bottom line is that our ample reserves regime
has proven remarkably effective
for implementing monetary policy
and supporting economic and financial stability.
So I will close with a brief discussion of the economy
and the outlook for monetary policy.
Although some important government data
have been delayed due to the shutdown,
we routinely review a wide variety
of public and private sector data
that have remained available.
We also maintain a nationwide network of contacts
through the reserve banks who provide valuable insights
which will be summarized in tomorrow's page book.
Based on the data we do have,
it's fair to say that the outlook for employment
and inflation does not appear to have changed much
since our September meeting four weeks ago.
Data available prior to the shutdown, however,
show that growth in economic activity
may be on a somewhat firmer trajectory than expected.
While the unemployment rate remained low through August,
payroll gains have slowed sharply,
likely in part due to a decline in labor force growth
due to lower immigration
and lower labor force participation.
In this less dynamic and somewhat softer labor market,
the downside risks to employment appear to have risen.
While official employment data for September are delayed,
available evidence suggests
that both layoffs and hiring remain low
and that both households' perceptions of job availability
and firms' perceptions of hiring difficulty
continue their downward trajectories.
Meanwhile, 12-month core PCE inflation
was 2.9% in August, up slightly from earlier this year,
as rising core goods inflation
has outpaced continued disinflation in housing services.
Available data and surveys continue to show
that goods price increases primarily reflect tariffs
rather than broader inflationary pressures.
Consistent with these effects,
near-term inflation expectations
have generally increased this year,
while most longer-term expectation measures
remain aligned with our 2% goal.
Rising downside risks to employment
have shifted our assessment of the balance of risks.
As a result, we judged it appropriate to take another step
toward a more neutral policy stance
at our September meeting.
There is no risk-free path for policy
as we navigate the tension
between our employment and inflation goals.
This challenge was evident
in the dispersion of committee participants' projections
at the September meeting.
And I'll stress again
that these projections should be understood
as representing a range of potential outcomes
whose probabilities evolve
as new information informs our meeting-by-meeting
approach to policymaking.
We'll set policy based on the evolution
of the economic outlook and the balance of risks
rather than following a predetermined path.
And with that, thank you again for this wonderful award
and for inviting me here today.
I look forward to our discussion.
Thank you.
Do you want me to go ahead, Pat, or?
No, go ahead.
Thank you, Chair Powell,
for the excellent remarks in the Adam Smith's address.
And we will have about half an hour for questions.
So. I don't like a long time.
I should have talked longer.
So let me start with,
before I go to some of the questions
coming in from the audience,
and do use the Connect app to generate those.
You have said, and you repeat it again here,
that there are no risk-free paths for the Fed now.
So in light of that, and in particular,
with where the recent inflation data are running,
let me group this with some of the questions
that we're seeing coming in on the app as well.
Obviously, always data dependent.
But thinking about the dual mandate
of maximum employment and price stability,
how concerned are you that if the rate
of pass-through of tariffs is slower,
that that might begin to look like more persistent inflation
as opposed to a one-time,
as if the tariff adjustment came through all at once,
and then it would be quite clearly
a one-time price level shift?
So that's certainly a risk.
As I mentioned, there really isn't a risk-free path now
since it appears that inflation is continuing,
certainly is running above our target,
and appears to be continuing to increase quite gradually,
but increase, it's still on the way up.
So there's a risk there that that would lend
to greater persistence.
But now the labor market has demonstrated
pretty significant downside risks
as payroll jobs have declined,
and both the supply and demand for labor
has declined quite sharply.
So those two states of affairs for our two variables,
our two goal variables,
call for different monetary policy responses.
So as they come more into balance,
I think the idea has been that policy should move
from being tight to some degree to being more neutral
as those two things balance out.
But it is clear, though, that if we move too quickly,
then we may leave the inflation job unfinished
and have to come back later and finish it.
And if we move too slowly,
there may be unnecessary losses,
painful losses in the employment market.
So we're in the difficult situation
of balancing those two things.
I think for the last few months,
we've been able to maintain a restrictive stance
because the labor market was still pretty solid.
I think that the data we got right after the July meeting
showed that, which adjusted back all the way through May,
showed that the labor market
has actually softened pretty considerably
and puts us in a situation where the two risks
are closer to being in balance.
Let's move to the other risk then
and talk about employment a little bit.
We had Anna Paulson here yesterday
and she spoke about the break-even unemployment
or break-even employment growth rate.
And that's a question from the audience as well.
So I believe she said that it's certainly lower than it was
and the standard error around those estimates
probably includes some numbers that might even be negative.
Where do you see the monthly break-even
employment growth rate?
I'm not going to try to give you a pinpoint number,
but as you pointed out,
the standard error around these things
is 50,000 plus or minus, something like that.
And that would certainly,
I think the range of plausible numbers
for the break-even rate
probably does go below zero
accounting for those standard errors.
It's clearly come down a great deal.
And that's what's so challenging about this
is that both supply and demand in the labor market
have come down so sharply, so quickly.
And the fact that the unemployment rate has barely moved
is kind of remarkable in and of itself
and suggests that they're moving at roughly the same pace,
although of course the unemployment rate has ticked up,
which suggests that demand
is moving a little faster than supply.
I wouldn't want to point to a specific number
other than to say that it's come way down
and there are many, many estimates out there.
By the way, there are many ways to calculate it.
So you're going to get different estimates.
We're certainly in a volatile and changing environment.
So one question I have is whether you see any changes
in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy actions.
So when we speak of long and variable lags, as we do,
are those changing?
And in particular,
do you think there might be any difference
in the impacts of policy on inflation versus employment?
Is one changing more than the other?
That's like two or three questions.
So I might have to come back to you.
So on transmission, in theory at least, I see two things.
One is what we say and the actions that we take
on monetary policy
and how quickly that gets into financial markets.
So if you go back to when I was in college,
that part would have taken weeks, months probably.
Now that part happens essentially instantaneously.
But the rest of it, once it's in the financial markets,
how quickly does it affect economic activity,
unemployment, employment, inflation, et cetera?
I think that's more dependent
on the conditions in the economy.
For example, if you take the group of people
who had extremely low rate mortgages, right?
And so if you can cut rates, but they're a long way down
and they're sort of in a place
where it's gonna be expensive to move
and to take out a much higher rate mortgage,
even assuming significant numbers of cuts.
So that has probably blunted the transmission
of lower rates into that part of the economy.
But overall, I think it still works the way
we think it works, which is,
long and variable lags means a lot of uncertainty
about how it's being affected.
I think the lure of the last part of your question,
the lure has been that inflation
and employment come later.
The first decisions are purchasing decisions,
hiring decisions and things.
Well, purchasing decisions
can be affected probably more quickly,
but then those would eventually affect employment
and inflation.
So longer lags are when the research generally shows
longer and longer lags for employment and inflation.
And I guess the variable part of that comment
does give us a bit of cover.
A lot of uncertainty.
So you spoke about the adjustments or the challenges
that you're facing with some government data
not currently being published
beyond the headline unemployment rate,
which we're not going to see right away.
What other labor market indicators
are you monitoring most closely
to gauge that side of the mandate?
I think everyone's looking at the same non-government data.
So there's a set of non-government data around,
or non-federal government data around labor markets.
For example, state level unemployment claim reports.
You can total, you can add those up
and get a pretty decent estimate.
That's a really good one.
There's also ADP has its data in employment.
So in the employment space, there's some plausible data.
I will say generally the private data,
the alternative data that we look at
is better used as a supplement
for the underlying governmental data,
which is the gold standard.
And it won't be as effective as the main course
as it would have been as a supplement.
So we don't expect that we'd be able to replace
the data we're not getting.
So I think in employment space,
there's some pretty good substitutes,
less so in inflation space and in economic activity space.
And also there are different private data providers
use different universes and different levels of rigor
in their data analysis.
So we're looking at lots of things
and we're gonna make our decisions
according to the FOMC schedule.
But I think it will be a lot better once we start getting,
for example, the September employment report
is gonna be a very important report.
And we're not on track to have that.
There would still be time for us to get that.
We will get, of course, the September inflation,
the CPI and PPI reports.
So that's a positive,
but we don't comment on fiscal matters,
but from our standpoint, we'll start to miss that data.
And particularly the October data,
if this goes on for a while, they won't be collecting it
and it could become more challenging.
You use the term gold standard
and you didn't mean it in this context,
but I'm gonna pivot here because there's a question
from the audience that's getting a lot of upvotes.
So one of your predecessors, Alan Greenspan,
used to view the price of gold
as an indicator of inflation risk.
So in that context, how do you view the rally
that we've seen in gold?
And if you wanna throw in Bitcoin,
you can comment on that too.
I'm not gonna comment on any particular asset price,
including that one.
And I think we think of inflation
as driven by fundamental supply and demand factors.
And it's not something we look at actively.
The September projections,
we saw revised GDP growth projections
revised upward for both 2025 and 2026.
Now, sometimes it's just an issue to issue thing,
but how do you reconcile that projection of stronger growth
with what we're seeing in terms
of a likely weakening labor market?
So even subsequent to the September SEP,
we've seen economic growth projections
activity data, which are surprising to the upside.
And I mentioned, as I mentioned in my remarks,
so you do have a bit of a tension there
between the labor market data
that we see very low levels of job creation,
and yet people are spending.
So economic activity is strong and we're gonna have to see
how that plays out.
Right now, of course, we're not getting
any new government data on that,
any new federal government data on that,
but it does create, of course, if the economy,
if economic activity were stronger,
then that would tend to support labor market activities
and hiring.
And so we'll have to see how that works out.
Another topic that has permeated the conference
over the last two days has been AI.
So as the Federal Reserve, like all of us grapple
with the implications of generative AI,
what plans are in place to assess its long-term impact
on productivity, implications for labor markets
and overall economic stability?
And does that present any new risks
to monetary policy or financial stability?
So you're right, we're doing what other people are doing,
which is reading all the things that,
I mean, so many researchers are working on AI now,
it's just amazing.
And so we follow all of that.
We also have people at the Fed
who are doing lots and lots of research on AI.
And in terms of, it's just such early days
to be looking for the kind of things that will happen.
So the question of productivity,
it was Robert Solow who said that technology's showing up
everywhere, but in the productivity data.
So this could be the same kind of thing where it's there,
but it takes a long time kind of to show itself
because you would think of another big technological
advances potentially raising productivity,
but I think it's early to say that we're seeing it.
Also, you're seeing, I think some researchers
have found effects on hiring from AI for entry-level people
and for coders and things like that.
So there's probably some of that out there,
but it's just so early to say what it will be.
We also monitor very carefully
what public companies are saying.
Increasingly old statements from big,
from large, mainly large private companies
on things that they think they can do
across their whole business area with AI
and either sort of freeze hiring where it is
or reduce hiring.
And I think we're pretty aware
of what the potential outcomes are,
but the range of potential outcomes is very broad.
I will say in terms of what the Fed can do,
we deal with supply and demand.
We have interest rate and we also do regulation,
that kind of thing.
But if what's needed is greater education and skills,
I mean, I've always liked the model
that technology can work for everybody
as long as everybody's getting the skills
and aptitudes they need to use that technology.
This is Golden and Katz, their work,
which they actually spoke about at Jackson Hole this year,
but it's a 20-year-old book that they wrote.
So we can't do that.
That's not something the Fed can do.
We also can't address the potential societal disruptions
that could happen, potentially,
if there's really significant job loss.
So there are a lot of,
I mean, we're the least of it.
There are potentially really significant implications
for people in the labor force.
And I think we're all speculating about what those might be,
but it's only the beginning of this story.
Looking at some of the other questions
that are getting upvoted,
and you can get as far into the weeds as you want,
but you know, this is where people wanna go.
So let me try this one.
As you think of the appropriate level of reserves
in the system, what indicators are most important?
Is it the price of money, so repo levels,
or the volume of borrowings from the Fed,
like the discount window, and so on?
So we have a nice spider chart,
and five main indicators,
one of which is sort of repo levels.
And I think, overall, what they're showing
is that we're still at ample reserves,
sorry, abundant reserves.
We're still at abundant reserves,
meaning above our goal of ample reserves,
a little bit above ample reserves.
But we're beginning to see,
you're starting to see a little bit of tightening
in money market conditions,
particularly repo rates have moved up.
And those are the things we're gonna be watching.
So we think we're still at abundant,
and the pace of runoff is now very, very slow,
so we're gonna be watching all those factors
very carefully, and we're not so far away now,
but there's a ways to go.
I think we're not gonna get away
without addressing this one,
and so I'll try to, again, group some of these together.
First, there's definitely appreciation from the audience,
your ability to try to remain above the political fray.
And I think also, as in your remarks,
you said gradually and predictably,
and that sounds really nice,
right about now.
But with that ongoing scrutiny
of the policy decisions of the Fed,
what measures is the Federal Reserve taking,
and are you taking, to ensure and demonstrate
the continued independence in setting monetary policy?
So the main thing we can continue to do
is to do our work the way we've always done it,
which is think really carefully
about evolving economic conditions
and the evolving outlook and the balance of risks,
and try to make good decisions
to best serve the American public,
and then explain those decisions
and talk about them in a way that makes sense
and is grounded in the data and our overall approach.
I think we're gonna keep doing that,
and as long as we're doing that,
people will be able to tell.
If we start doing something else,
I think people will be able to tell that too,
but that's just not something we're ever gonna do.
We're always gonna keep doing our work.
We don't engage in back and forth with people.
That gets to be political sort of right away,
so we just do our work and do it as best we can.
Overall, I would say the Fed comes through the last,
if you think about it,
go back to the beginning of the global financial crisis.
We've had two world historical crises,
back-to-back essentially,
and the U.S. economy, it's been quite a ride
for the U.S. economy and for American citizens,
but we've come through it as well
or better than any other country in the world,
and we had to innovate and did innovate.
There was really no choice.
We can look back now, and as I did today,
and second-guess ourselves, which is only appropriate.
We've been doing it for 10 years.
Since I got to the Fed 12 years ago,
we were already doing a lot of that,
so that's an ongoing process,
but I think if you take a step back,
the Fed isn't a government agency
that does a good job for the public that it serves,
and that is our only goal,
and I think we do it pretty well.
Don't look for perfection.
These are close calls that have to be made in real time,
but I guess that's what I would say.
That's fantastic, and in that context then,
internally to the FOMC,
how important is it that you have consensus on it?
I mean, we're economists.
We understand the value of spirited debate,
but is that important in terms of communicating the results
and the decisions of the committee?
I mean, consensus is great,
but the most important thing of all is to get it right,
and you come to places, not very commonly,
but sometimes you come to places
where people are gonna have different views,
and this is one of them.
You have a situation here
where literally inflation's above target and gently rising.
The labor market is subject to pretty clear downside risks.
What do you do?
How do you think about that?
That's not a problem that you face very often
in central banking or in the economy,
and people are going to have different weights
and different risk aversion
and different risk appetites on those things.
It would be kind of surprising
if you had no debate over those things,
so we have a healthy debate going on.
I think it's very healthy.
I think the meetings that we've been having
are as good as any we've had
in terms of people sincerely giving
their absolute best argument for their positions,
but they're different positions.
When I was an investor,
I always felt like the most dangerous thing
is if everybody agreed on something
because you need someone to come in
and try to explain why this is a terrible idea,
hopefully somebody really smart,
and that would give you the ability
to really test your thinking,
so I think that's a healthy discussion
that we're having right now,
and I'm not at all surprised
that we have people across the board.
I do think we also, as an institution,
do try to come together around a central answer,
and that's, of course, part of what I try to do
is find an answer that will attract
as much support as possible.
Absolutely.
I know you probably won't want to comment
in great detail on global conditions,
but there are a few questions around that
and what that implies for U.S. monetary policy
and also just looking at the interest rate differentials
between the U.S. and other advanced economies
and how long that could persist
and is there a risk there?
Sorry, what?
The interest rate differentials
between the U.S. and other advanced economies.
Yeah, I mean, we set interest rates
according to the place where our economy is domestically,
taking into account the international aspects
of our economy.
So again, it's not surprising.
I mean, you could name many, many factors,
but for example, tariffs are clearly more disinflationary
for countries that are subjected to them
and they're more, I won't say heavily inflationary,
but there's some inflationary pass-through to consumers
from countries that are putting tariffs on.
So there's a very different monetary policy response
potentially just in that.
So I think we need to set,
as every other central bank does,
they're setting rates in their,
whatever their remit is geographically
and they're gonna be different answers.
It's not unusual.
So we have a large number of young economists
in the audience today.
Could you talk a little bit about,
as we look back and it's a momentous award,
it's a nice time to reflect.
If you looked back on your early career
and your early goals,
how do you think that young Jerome Powell
would view where Jerome Powell is sitting today
as the chair of the Federal Reserve?
Surprised.
No, I would say,
so what I would tell young economists is
you've chosen a great profession,
a tremendous profession.
You know, you're basically,
you're getting the tools to analyze public policy
and what works and what doesn't work.
And what should be expected to work and wouldn't and why.
And also what's the state of the economy.
And guess what?
It's not just hard, it's basically impossible.
But it's a very, very difficult thing,
but it yields itself up over time.
And, you know, it's just an incredibly important subject
that carries the capability to do really good things
for the general public.
Who may not feel great gratitude toward economists,
but sometimes, but no, it's really important.
And you've made a great choice
and I would say, wish you the best of luck.
Thank you.
Agree.
Okay, we'll do a little bit of a lightning round here.
We have about five minutes left.
So I'll ask a bunch of questions
that you may not want to get into great detail on anyway.
That's my question.
Yeah.
Some of these are pretty straightforward,
but so we talked quite a bit about labor markets,
but we have not specifically asked the question about
the effect of immigration policies on labor supply.
How restrictive do you think that current policy is?
And is that something that we'll just-
Current immigration policy.
Yeah.
Let me start by saying that we don't have a view
on immigration.
It's not our job to have a view.
So we take that as completely, you know,
it is what it is.
We take it as it arrives.
More, I'd say stronger policy than most people had expected.
You know, we've seen, you know,
very sharp decline in growth of the labor force
and people entering the country.
And yeah, I think you're only beginning to see
the strength of that policy too.
There, you know, there's more expulsions,
those are rising and that kind of thing.
So yeah, that's a big economic factor.
So that will mean, you know, fewer people to work.
You have anecdotal evidence of industries
that are just having a hard time finding people.
You don't see it in wages or anything like that
at this point.
You don't see, at least in the aggregate, you don't.
But yeah, it's gonna be a really important economic fact
because, you know, that's new people
who come into the workforce.
They create their supply, but they also create demand.
They create their own demand.
And, you know, again, from our standpoint,
we're just, you know, our job is to achieve
maximum employment or maximum sustainable employment.
And that will depend both on the supply of workers
and the demand for workers.
Back to the balance sheet, some questions.
Again, I'll kind of try to group these together
around mortgage-backed securities
and housing affordability.
Again, not directly part of the dual mandate,
but would the Fed ever look at any specific actions
with regard to MDS to address mortgage rates
or affordability for housing?
The answer is, look, we look at overall inflation
and not, we don't look at, we don't target housing prices.
And also by, I don't know how you would,
we would certainly not engage
in mortgage-backed security purchases
as a way of addressing mortgage rates or housing directly.
That's not what we do.
We do have, as I mentioned, a very large amount
of mortgage-backed securities and they're running off,
but they run off pretty slowly.
So.
Fair.
Question on the beverage curve.
Ah.
Thank you.
Maybe that's not a lightning round question,
but let's try it.
So do you think that the shift in the beverage curve
is a structural shift or just a blip?
I think it's, you know, you're at a place where,
you know, further declines in job openings
might very well start to show up in unemployment.
You know, you've had this amazing time
where it came straight down.
And, but, you know, I just think you're gonna reach a point
at which unemployment starts to go up.
And we haven't really, we may be hitting that now,
but it's been remarkable how that line,
it just comes down, down, down, down, down, down, down.
Which has been, you know,
really a great part of the recovery.
All right.
Well, we have just a couple minutes left.
I think we'll end with maybe another
sort of philosophical question.
Michael Barr spoke to the policy conference in 2024,
I believe it was,
and he gave some advice to economists.
What would your advice be to the economists in the room
in terms of how we can best serve the challenges
that are facing us collectively in this moment?
I would, I mean, I would,
I'm inclined to say, keep your heads up.
You know, it's a time
when people are challenging expertise.
And, you know, I think it's a distinguished profession.
It's a very high order profession.
You should be proud of your work and keep at it.
You know, I mean, ultimately we're learning
about how the economy works and how society works.
We're, I mean, our understanding is so basic
and so uncertain really still after all these years.
But, you know, you got to think we're making some progress
and doing some good and imposing, you know,
sort of an analytical framework
around the kind of decisions people make about the economy.
So I just want to give you a vote of support
and say, keep at it.
And likewise, NAEP supports you.
Are we done?
I think we're done.
Thank you so much.
Thank you.
Thank you very much.
Thanks.
