Churchill v Stalin delves into the rivalry between the British and Russian leaders as they contended for influence over the future of Europe after the war. Throughout this intense struggle, Roosevelt played a behind-the-scenes role by covertly intervening to sway the final decision in a way that Churchill was unaware of. This resulted in a clandestine power struggle that took place among these three prominent leaders.
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#warstories#documentary#military 00:00 - Intro 06:03 - HH Promo 06:38 Churchill, Stalin & FDR Discover the past on History Hit with ad-free exclusive podcasts and documentaries released weekly presented by world renowned historians Dan Snow, Suzannah Lipscomb, Matt Lewis and more. Sign up to History Hit to start watching now https://bit.ly/45CPh5u
On August the 15th, 1944,
American and British troops invaded the south coast of France.
Unlike D-Day in Normandy ten weeks before,
Operation Dragoon, as it was called, has passed by relatively unnoticed.
Yet behind it was a ferocious dispute.
The landings had been angrily opposed by the British Prime Minister,
Winston Churchill.
He told the American President, Franklin Roosevelt, they were
the first major strategic and political error for which we too have to be responsible.
The festering soul which underlay Churchill's outburst was not about his enemy, Hitler,
but his ally, the Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin.
Operation Dragoon was the final act in a mental duel between Stalin and Churchill,
in which each man secretly plotted to impose his own will on the future of post-war Europe.
As their duel progressed, Roosevelt entered the arena,
and also started to plot, behind Churchill's back.
Eventually he'd become the pivotal figure upon whom the duel's outcome would depend.
At stake was the future freedom and independence of hundreds of millions of people.
On the evening of Saturday, June the 21st, 1941,
Winston Churchill held a dinner party at Chequers,
the Prime Minister's country residence, in the Chiltern Hills outside London.
Conversation was dominated by reports that Hitler
was about to tear up his pact with Stalin and invade Russia.
Among the guests was Churchill's private secretary, John Colville.
The PM says he will go all out to help Russia.
I said that for him, the arch-anti-communist, this was bowing down in the House of Rimmen.
He replied that he had only one single purpose, the destruction of Hitler,
and his life was much simplified thereby.
If Hitler invaded hell, he would at least make a favourable reference to the devil.
In the small hours of June the 22nd,
three million Nazi troops smashed their way into Russia.
Immediately, the arch-anti-communist welcomed Stalin as an ally.
But Stalin remained suspicious of Churchill,
and believed that what he really wanted was for Germany and Russia to destroy each other.
Churchill, for his part, feared that Stalin would do another deal with Hitler.
In December 1941, the British foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, went to Moscow
to start negotiations for a formal treaty with Russia,
which would try to dispel these mutual suspicions.
As Eden arrived, the Red Army was counter-attacking,
but German forces remained dangerously close to Moscow.
Even so, Stalin was already thinking long-term.
He intended to exact his price for carrying the brunt of the fight,
particularly territory.
Eden noted Stalin's demands.
January the 3rd, 1942.
As regards the special interests of the Soviet Union,
Stalin desired the restoration of the position in 1941,
prior to the German attack,
in respect to the Baltic states, Finland and Bessarabia.
Stalin also wanted back the eastern part of Poland.
In sum, all the territory he'd grabbed as part of the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939.
Top of his list was the Baltic states,
which had only gained their independence from Russia after World War I.
Eden told Churchill,
I am clear that this question is for Stalin the acid test of our sincerity.
Nothing we in the United States of America can do or say
will affect the situation at end of war.
If the Russians are victorious,
they will be able to establish these frontiers,
and we shall certainly not turn them out.
Initially, Churchill was horrified by any thought of conceding to Stalin's demands.
He replied to Eden,
The 1941 frontiers of Russia were acquired by acts of aggression
and shameful collusion with Hitler.
The transfer of the people of the Baltic states to Soviet Russia against their will
will be contrary to all the principles for which we are fighting this war.
I know President Roosevelt holds this view as strongly as I do.
These principles had been enshrined in the Atlantic Charter,
which Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed
during their meeting in Newfoundland in August 1941.
Most importantly, they guaranteed the future freedom
and independence of the nations conquered by Hitler.
But Eden argued that what mattered more than principles
was Stalin's cooperation both now and in the future.
Probably Stalin's demand is intended as an acid test
to see what value we attach to that cooperation,
and what sacrifice of principle we're prepared to make in order to achieve it.
In the coming weeks,
Churchill's attitude began to be colored by disastrous turns in the war.
In the Far East, Singapore had fallen to the Japanese.
The Battle of the Atlantic was grim.
Finally, Churchill did an about turn.
On March the 7th 1942, he wrote to Roosevelt
that the Baltic states could be sacrificed to keep Stalin onside.
The increasing gravity of the war has led me to feel
that the principles of the Atlantic Charter
ought not to be construed so as to deny Russia
the frontier she occupied when Germany attacked her.
The next day, the British ambassador to Washington,
Lord Halifax,
was summoned to the White House to discuss Churchill's cable.
Roosevelt showed himself just as willing as Churchill
to sacrifice the Baltic states,
though he preferred to do it more furtively.
FDR's mind is already moving along the only remaining line.
That is of saying to Stalin
that we all recognize his need for security,
that to put anything on paper now is impossible,
that future of Baltic states
clearly depends upon Russian military progress,
and that neither United States nor Great Britain
would or could turn them out.
Why then should Stalin worry?
As early as March 1942,
Churchill and Roosevelt had shown themselves
willing to give away the future freedom
of three independent nations.
They'd been driven by the fear
that Stalin and Hitler would do another deal,
but though the thought once or twice
crossed the minds of both dictators,
it was never a real possibility.
Their submission to Stalin was unnecessary.
It was also the beginning of a slippery slope.
In May 1942, Stalin's foreign minister,
Vyacheslav Molotov,
dashingly clad in his flying gear,
landed in Scotland,
the first trip to Britain by a top Bolshevik
since the revolution.
Having nipped back into his plane
to change into his suit,
he took the train down to London.
There he was to finalize the treaty
between Britain and Russia,
which would conclude the negotiations
begun in Moscow five months before.
Stalin had given Molotov
an extensive shopping list of territory
that Britain must agree
as part of the post-war Soviet Union.
Then, suddenly, while Molotov was in London,
Germany launched its summer offensive in Russia.
Three Soviet armies were being smashed
at the Battle of Kharkov.
Stalin's priorities instantly changed.
He was desperate for military help
from the British and Americans.
He cabled Molotov to sign the treaty
and stop arguing about territory.
That would look after itself.
24th of May, 1942.
The question of future borders
will be decided by force.
The military relief Stalin wanted
was a cross-channel invasion of France
as a second front against Hitler.
But Churchill believed it was premature
and would be a disaster
against the heavily defended French coast.
In August 1942,
he flew to Moscow to tell Stalin
the invasion had to be delayed.
It was an epic, dangerous journey.
Some 40 hours flying
in a stripped-out American bomber
via Gibraltar, Cairo and Tehran
in four long overnight stretches.
His first steps on Russian soil
came with a Churchillian rallying cry.
We will continue hand in hand
like comrades and brothers
until every vestige of the Nazi regime
has been bitten into the ground.
General Alan Brooke,
the British Chief of Staff,
accompanied Churchill.
He recorded this first-ever
face-to-face meeting
of any of the other warlords with Stalin.
August the 13th, 1942.
The two leaders, Churchill and Stalin,
are poles apart as human beings.
And I cannot see a friendship between them
such as exists between Roosevelt and Winston.
Stalin is a realist
with little flattery about him.
Facts only count with him.
Plans, hypotheses, future possibilities
mean little.
At their first meeting,
Churchill said the invasion of France
must be postponed till 1943.
He then projected a vision
of his alternative plan.
He told Stalin
that first the Allies would land
in the northwest of Africa
and drive the Germans out.
Then he drew a map
in the shape of a crocodile.
The hard snout, he explained,
was the heavily defended coast of France.
Churchill said that rather than invade there,
he wanted to attack Hitler
in what he called
the soft underbelly of Europe,
the Adriatic and the Balkans.
Stalin questioned him curtly
but politely.
The next day,
Stalin's mood turned vicious.
He accused the British of cowardice.
You British are too afraid
to fight the Germans.
If you tried it like us Russians,
you would not find it so bad.
Churchill reacted with eloquent fury.
I have come all around Europe
in the midst of my troubles.
Yes, Mr Stalin, I have my troubles
as well as you.
Hoping to meet the hand of comradeship.
And I am bitterly disappointed.
I have not that hand.
Later that night,
Churchill told his staff
he would leave Moscow forthwith.
But Stalin had been impressed
by Churchill's passion.
And on the third night,
a banquet at the Kremlin broke the ice.
From the beginning,
vodka flowed freely
and one's glass kept being filled up.
The tables groaned under every description
of hors d'oeuvre and fish, etc.
Molotov was opposite Stalin
and started proposing toasts
within five minutes of our having sat down.
These toasts went on continuously.
By the end of the dinner,
Stalin was quite lively,
walking around the table
to click glasses with various people
he was proposing the health of.
He is an outstanding man,
there is no doubt about that,
but not an attractive one.
Whenever I look at him,
I can imagine his sending off people
to their doom
without ever turning a hair.
During the dinner,
Churchill made an aside
that Stalin was a peasant
whom he could handle.
His aides were horrified
and later, back in his room,
warned him the Russians were bugging everything.
Churchill said very loudly,
The Russians, I have been told,
are not human beings at all.
They are lower in the scale of nature
than the Ourang Utang.
Now then,
let them take that down
and translate it into Russian.
At times, it had been touch and go.
But by the end of the visit,
goodwill had broken out.
P.M. was somewhat late,
and no wonder.
He went to see Stalin
for a final visit at 7 p.m.
and remained with him until 3 a.m.
He had no time for bed
and after a bath,
came straight to the aerodrome.
The band played the International,
God Save the King,
and the Star Spangled Banner,
during which period,
we all stood to attention and saluted.
As Churchill returned to his war-torn country,
he believed he had at least established
a working relationship with Stalin.
He wrote to Roosevelt,
On the whole,
I am definitely encouraged
by my visit to Moscow.
Now they know the worst
and having made their protest,
are entirely friendly.
But just two months later,
an extraordinary message from Stalin
to his ambassador in London,
showed that Churchill's optimism
was illusory.
Stalin remained deeply suspicious
of what he saw
as Britain's lack of military support
and repeated his long-held fears
of Churchill's secret motives.
We in Moscow,
get the impression
that Churchill is aiming
at the ultimate defeat
of the Soviet Union,
in order then to come
to some agreement with Germany
at the expense of our country.
Stalin even suggested
that Churchill was intending
to use Hitler's deputy,
Rudolf Hess,
who was in British captivity,
as a negotiating lever
with the Nazis.
In the coming months,
military success
pushed political suspicion
for a while to one side.
Rommel was beaten
at the Battle of El Alamein.
The Americans and British
landed successfully
in the northwest of Africa.
The Russians defeated
the Germans at Stalingrad.
Military success
was bringing
the post-war world nearer.
Then, in April 1943,
a shocking discovery
put the shape of that world
into sharp relief.
Germany announced
that the bodies
of thousands of Polish officers
had been found in Katyn Forest,
shot by the Russians
in the spring of 1940.
Moscow angrily rejected
the claims as Nazi propaganda.
But as a private lunch,
Churchill said,
Alas, the German revelations
are probably true.
The Bolsheviks can be very cruel.
Katyn had a devastating series
of knock-on effects.
The London-based
Polish government in exile,
the government for which
Britain had gone to war,
suspected the Russians
were guilty
and demanded an investigation
by the International Red Cross.
Stalin said the demand
by the London Poles
was a hostile act
against the Soviet Union.
He already disliked them,
as they stood for a free
and independent Poland.
He now used the row over Katyn
as an excuse to break off
relations with them.
Churchill was caught
between his loyalty
to the London Poles
and his wish to preserve
good relations with Stalin.
In Washington,
Roosevelt sensed the tension
Katyn was creating.
He secretly decided
it was time that he,
rather than Churchill,
became the prime mover
in the relationship
with the Soviet leader.
On May the 5th, 1943,
he wrote Stalin a private letter
asking for an informal
one-to-one get-together.
The only question was where.
Iceland I do not like
because for both you and me
it involves rather risky flights
and in addition would make it
quite frankly difficult
not to invite Prime Minister
Churchill at the same time.
Therefore, I suggest
that we could meet
either on your side
or my side of the Bering Straits.
Roosevelt dispatched an emissary,
Joseph Davis,
who'd been his ambassador
to Russia in the late 1930s
to hand deliver the letter to Stalin.
While Davis was in Moscow,
Churchill was in Washington.
He spent a fortnight with Roosevelt.
Not once did the president
breathe a word of his
private approach to Stalin.
On May the 26th,
with Churchill safely gone,
Roosevelt received a positive
reply from Stalin.
As I do not know how events
will develop on the Soviet-German
front in June,
I shall not be able to leave
Moscow during that month.
I therefore suggest holding
the meeting in July or August.
But Roosevelt's secret plan
was about to hit a snag.
He and Churchill had decided
to postpone the invasion
of France to 1944.
They believed British
and American forces
were still not strong enough
to beat the German defences.
Stalin responded angrily
to his allies' delay.
The Soviet government
cannot align itself
with this decision
which was adopted
without its participation.
Churchill was worried
by Stalin's hostile reaction.
And by now,
he had also got wind
of Roosevelt's secret letter.
He tried to flush Roosevelt out.
All this makes me anxious
to know anything
you may care to tell me
about your letter
sent to Stalin by Mr. Davis
and the answer
which has been received from him.
I will, of course,
come anywhere you wish
to a rendezvous.
Churchill still had no inkling
he was to be excluded.
Finally, Roosevelt came clean.
On June the 24th,
his special envoy in London,
Averell Harriman,
went to Downing Street
and told Churchill
what had been going on.
Churchill was shattered.
He rang his foreign secretary,
Anthony Eden.
Went round to see Winston
at midnight at his request.
Found him considerably upset
by a message from FDR
that his projected meeting
will be ardour.
Churchill not only felt
personally betrayed,
he could also sense
the blow to British power.
And he could see that Roosevelt,
in trying to hijack
the relationship with Stalin,
was taking the first steps
to an American-Russian partnership
which would determine
the future world.
The next day,
controlling his emotions
as best he could,
he wrote one of the most
important letters of his life.
Former naval person to president,
personal and secret.
Averell told me last night
of your wish for a meeting
with Uncle Joe in Alaska,
adieu.
You must excuse me
expressing myself
with all the frankness
that our friendship
and the gravity
of the issue warrant.
I do not underrate the use
that enemy propaganda
would make of a meeting
between the heads
of Soviet Russia
and the United States
at this juncture
with the British Commonwealth
and empire excluded.
It would be serious
and vexatious
and many would be bewildered
and alarmed thereby.
Nevertheless,
whatever you decide,
I shall sustain
to the best of my ability here.
Churchill had been
kept in the dark
for six full weeks
by the ally
he thought to be his friend.
Four days later,
Roosevelt replied
with a flat lie.
I did not suggest
to Uncle Joe
that we meet alone,
but he told Davies
that he assumed
A, that we would meet alone
and B, that he agreed
that we should not
bring staffs
to what would be
a preliminary meeting.
In August,
Stalin finally turned down
Roosevelt's request
for a meeting,
claiming the pressures
of war as his excuse.
For the moment,
Roosevelt was thwarted.
Beyond the deceit
and the power play,
the distressing episode
left Churchill
with a further troubling thought.
Up until now,
both he and Roosevelt
had handled Stalin
with kid gloves,
but Churchill
was becoming split-minded.
On one side,
he believed that he,
as one great man,
could deal with Stalin,
another great man,
by face-to-face diplomacy,
but on the other side,
the Katyn massacre
had reawakened
all his old fears
of the Bolsheviks.
A nightmare was forming,
that Stalin was at the head
of a Russian colossus,
which would devour
much of Europe
before the British
and Americans
could get there.
And create a new
totalitarian empire.
Churchill had long feared
that a cross-channel invasion
against the heavily-defended
French coast
would bring dreadful carnage.
Instead,
he favoured
his alternative strategy
of attacking Germany
via the Adriatic
and the Balkans.
By the autumn of 1943,
the British and Americans
had landed in southern Italy.
Churchill's vision
seemed, to him,
possible.
But Stalin had sent
angry cables,
demanding that the Allies
concentrate only
on the invasion of France.
Roosevelt's special envoy
in Britain,
Averell Harriman,
reported to the President.
Churchill's only explanation
is that Stalin wants us
to become involved
in Western Europe
to avoid our entry
in the Balkans.
Churchill was accusing Stalin
of trying to use
military arguments
to further his political purpose
of controlling Eastern Europe
and the Balkans
after the war.
Later, in his memoirs,
Churchill denied
that at that stage,
when Hitler was still
far from beaten,
he too tried to bend
Allied military strategy
to his political purposes,
in Churchill's case,
to keep Stalin
out of Eastern Europe
and protect British interests
in the Eastern Mediterranean.
But there is evidence
that Churchill was being
less than frank
about his motives
in the crucial
last few months of 1943.
In August 1943,
the British and Americans
met at Quebec
to decide the next stage
in the war.
Churchill knew it would be fatal
to suggest to Roosevelt
that they should try
to beat the Russians
to the Balkans
and Eastern Europe
for political reasons.
To Roosevelt,
that would smack
of the European imperialism
he loathed.
So Churchill argued
for his alternative strategy
on purely military grounds.
But one chant remark
revealed his inner thoughts.
Stalin is an unnatural man.
There will be grave troubles.
At Quebec,
Churchill reluctantly agreed
to the American view
that preparations
for the invasion of France
should take precedence
over his alternative strategy.
But back in London,
Churchill began to renege.
Further evidence
of his political motives
emerged at an extraordinary
war cabinet meeting
in early October.
The foreign secretary,
Anthony Eden,
gave an account
of what happened
to Oliver Harvey,
his private secretary.
The PM spoke for three hours.
He talked great nonsense
and AE was furious.
The PM kept saying
such things as,
we mustn't weaken Germany
too much.
We may need her against Russia.
The cabinet colleagues
were horrified at all this.
Churchill's remarks
showed that Stalin's suspicions
of 12 months before
had not been so outlandish.
Churchill now sanctioned
a British operation
against the island of Rhodes.
Capturing Rhodes
was a vital stepping stone
in his alternative strategy.
He hoped that it would bring
Turkey into the war,
providing an easy gateway
to Eastern Europe.
The American chiefs of staff
thought it a wasteful diversion.
Churchill pleaded his case
to Roosevelt.
I am sure that the omission
to take Rhodes
at this stage
and the ignoring
of the whole position
in the Eastern Mediterranean
would constitute
a cardinal error in strategy.
On military grounds,
Churchill's chief of staff,
General Brooke,
was not against the operation.
But why risk a row
with Roosevelt?
I am slowly becoming convinced
that in his age,
Winston is becoming
less and less balanced.
I can control him no more.
He has worked himself
into a frenzy of excitement
about the Rhodes attack,
has magnified its importance
so that he can no longer
see anything else,
and has set his heart
on capturing this one island,
even at the expense
of endangering his relations
with the president.
While Churchill fanatically plotted
his alternative strategy,
his foreign secretary,
Anthony Eden,
was attending a foreign minister's
conference in Moscow.
From there,
Eden cabled Churchill
that Stalin was continuing
to insist his allies
must concentrate only
on the invasion of France,
Operation Overlord,
as it was now called.
Churchill was livid.
His doctor, Charles Morin,
who kept contemporaneous notes
of their conversations,
which he later wrote up
into a diary,
recorded his reaction.
October the 26th, 1943.
When I called at number 10
this morning,
I found the PM glaring
over a telegram from Eden.
His face was glum,
his jaws set,
misgivings filled his mind.
Stalin seems obsessed
by this bloody second front,
he muttered angrily.
I can be obstinate too.
Damn the fellow,
he said under his breath.
Churchill now ordered Eden
to tell Stalin
that the invasion of France
might need postponing
in order to reinforce
his favored campaign in Italy.
In Washington,
there was fury
at Churchill's reckless disregard
for agreed allied strategy.
The American war secretary,
Henry Stimson,
noted in his diary,
This shows how determined
Churchill is
with all his lip service
to stick a knife
into the back of Overlord,
and I feel more bitterly about it
than I ever have before.
In Moscow,
Anthony Eden and his team
were just as angry.
The PM is untamable,
he cannot leave well alone,
and he loathes the Russians.
He would torpedo
AE's conference lightheartedly.
Churchill's plotting
was getting him nowhere.
And for Stalin,
the Moscow conference
had one pleasing outcome.
It was agreed
that all liberated territories
would be administered
by the occupying power.
Stalin told his closest associates,
Now the fate of Europe is settled,
we shall do as we like
with the Allies' consent.
In November 1943,
Churchill left Britain
for a long trip.
First to Malta.
Amid the acclamation,
he was angrier than ever.
His campaign in the eastern
Mediterranean was failing.
German forces beat the British
out of the Greek island of Liros.
Churchill blamed it
on the United States' refusal
to supply enough resources.
November the 18th, 1943.
PM gave long tirade
on evils of Americans
and of our losses
in the Aegean and Dalmatian coast.
At this point,
Churchill's wife Clementine,
hearing of her husband's vile mood,
wrote him a long and soothing letter.
My darling,
I'm afraid that so far
your journey has not been
pleasant or refreshing.
Your cold must have made you
miserable and uncomfortable.
And then I know Liros must
cause you deep unhappiness.
But never forget that
when history looks back,
your vision and your piercing energy,
coupled with your patience
and magnanimity,
will all be part of your greatness.
So don't allow yourself
to be made angry.
I often think of your saying
that the only worse thing
than Allies is not having Allies.
From Malta,
Churchill flew to Cairo.
He was feeling better
and Clementine's letter
helped to restore his spirits.
Roosevelt had also traveled to Cairo
and, once in his presence,
Churchill, as always,
succumbed to his charms.
He told his daughter, Sarah,
I love that man.
But Roosevelt refused
all Churchill's pleas
to discuss his alternative strategy.
He continued to suspect
Churchill's imperialist motives
and told him,
Winston,
you have 400 years
of acquisitive instinct in your blood
and you just don't understand
how a country might not
want to acquire land somewhere
even if they can get it.
A new period is open
in the world's history
and you will have to
adjust yourself to it.
It was said teasingly,
but threw Churchill into despair.
He told Harold Macmillan,
the British minister in North Africa,
Germany is finished,
though it may take some time
to clean up the mess.
The real problem is Russia.
I can't get the Americans to see it.
The final destination was Tehran
and the first face-to-face meeting
of the three allied warlords.
This would be the defining moment
in the Churchill-Stalin duel,
with Roosevelt the pivotal figure.
For the president,
the problem was now Churchill
and his backsliding
on the invasion of France.
Shortly before the conference began,
Charles Moran found himself
talking to Roosevelt's
closest associate,
Harry Hopkins.
Harry Hopkins thinks that the PM
is trying to get out of his commitments.
Sure, we are preparing for a battle
at Tehran, he threatened.
You will find us lining up
with the Russians.
What I find so shocking
is that to the Americans,
the PM is the villain of the peace.
They are far more skeptical of him
than they are of Stalin.
Superficially, Tehran was full
of pleasantries.
Churchill and Roosevelt
presented Stalin with a sword
to commemorate the victory
at Stalingrad.
Stalin handed it on
to his army sidekick,
General Voroshilov,
who promptly dropped it.
Churchill's birthday, his 69th,
fell during the conference.
He hosted a splendid dinner
and Roosevelt gave him
a valuable cachambeau with a note.
With my affection,
may we be together for many years.
In this gathering of great men,
Churchill's ambivalence
towards Stalin re-emerged.
He believed again
he could do deals with him
and secretly agreed,
without telling the London Poles,
that Russia should have
the part of eastern Poland
it had gained under
the Nazi-Soviet pact.
Poland would be compensated
with land from Germany.
Roosevelt, fearing the potential
reaction of Poles in America,
did not want to be directly
involved in the deal,
but privately went along with it.
Also, Churchill and Roosevelt
confirmed to Stalin
they would not oppose
the Baltic states becoming part
of the post-war Soviet Union.
But when it came to the overriding
issue of military strategy,
on which Churchill believed
the rest of eastern Europe's
future might depend,
he was out on a limb.
Stalin and Roosevelt insisted
there should be no delay
in Operation Overlord.
Roosevelt then left Stalin
the choice of which supporting
operation the British and Americans
should prepare,
the eastern Mediterranean,
as Churchill wanted,
or a follow-up invasion
of southern France.
Stalin declared,
Our directive should stipulate,
in conformity with the desires
of the Russians,
an invasion in the south of France.
The operations in the Mediterranean,
of which Churchill speaks,
are merely diversionary.
It was the killer blow.
That night,
after he finally lost the argument,
Churchill returned to his room
with Charles Moran.
Now his other image of Stalin
took over again.
The future totalitarian oppressor.
He pulled up abruptly,
so that he stood looking down at me,
his eyes popping.
I believe man might destroy man
and wipe out civilization.
Europe would be desolate,
and I may be held responsible.
Until he came here,
the PM could not bring himself
to believe that,
face to face with Stalin,
that democracies would take
different courses.
Now he sees he cannot rely
on the president's support.
What matters more,
he realizes that the Russians
see this too.
Stalin will be able to do
as he pleases.
Will he become a menace
to the free world?
Another Hitler?
The PM is appalled
by his own impotence.
Churchill was defeated.
Events in the coming months
rub salt in his wounds.
As the Red Army raced into Poland,
the British and Americans
were ground down
in a long hard slog in Italy.
D-Day,
the invasion of France,
which Churchill had opposed
for so long,
drew near.
He was a disappointed man.
May the 7th, 1944.
He looked very old
and very tired.
He said he could still
always sleep well,
eat well,
and especially drink well.
But that he no longer
jumped out of bed
the way he used to,
and felt as if he would
be quite content
to spend the whole day in bed.
I have never yet heard him
admit that he was
beginning to fail.
Then,
on June the 4th, 1944,
Rome finally fell
to the British and Americans.
With Nazi resistance
beginning to crumble,
they headed north through Italy.
Churchill suddenly saw
a last gasp opportunity.
D-Day,
June the 6th, 1944.
The invasion of France
was on the way,
with far fewer
immediate casualties
than Churchill had ever
imagined possible.
Two weeks later,
the Russian army
launched its summer offensive.
While the British and Americans
slogged their way through France,
there seemed every prospect
that all of eastern
and central Europe
would fall to Stalin,
as Churchill had long feared.
But now,
at the very last minute,
Churchill saw one final chance
to win his duel with Stalin.
After the fall of Rome,
many of the British
and American troops in Italy
were supposed to be switching
to the invasion of southern France,
Operation Dragoon,
which had been agreed at Tehran
and was scheduled for mid-August.
But British commanders in Italy
now suggested a breakout
via Trieste and Ljubljana
into the Balkans
and central Europe,
the very thing Churchill
had always wanted
his alternative strategy
to achieve.
The overall Allied commander,
General Eisenhower,
would have no truck with it.
Witheringly,
he cabled Roosevelt.
Wandering off overland
via Trieste and Ljubljana,
repeat Ljubljana,
is to indulge in conjecture
to an unwarranted degree
at the present time.
Cables flew across the Atlantic
as Churchill and Roosevelt
fought out the battle of strategies.
Finally,
Roosevelt confessed
his overriding concern.
I am mindful of our agreement
with Stalin
as to an operation
against the south of France.
I cannot accept,
without consultation with Stalin,
any course of action
which abandons this operation.
Churchill was enraged.
Yet again,
Stalin was dictating events.
The planned invasion
of southern France
seemed to him pointless.
On June the 30th,
he drafted the strongest words
he had ever written
to the president.
I cannot exaggerate
the seriousness of this issue.
The whole campaign in Italy
is being ruined.
If my departure from the scene
would ease matters,
by tendering my resignation
to the king,
I would gladly make
this contribution.
But I fear
that the demand of the public
to know the reasons
would do great injury
to the fighting troops
in the Mediterranean.
But no one contemplated
that everything that was hopeful
in the Mediterranean
should be flung on one side,
like the rind of an orange,
in order that some minor benefits
might come to help
the theatre of your command.
So strong was the language
that Churchill,
having drafted it,
sat on the cable.
That night,
he met his military chiefs.
General Brooke
now realized the argument
would get the British nowhere.
June the 29th, 1944.
Just back from a meeting
with Winston.
I thought at first
we might have trouble with him.
He looked like he wanted
to fight the president.
However, in the end,
we got him to agree
to our outlook,
which is,
all right,
if you insist on being damned fools,
sooner than falling out with you,
which would be fatal,
we shall be damned fools with you.
And we shall see that we perform
the role of damned fools,
damned well.
A new telegram was drafted.
Churchill reluctantly conceded.
But told Roosevelt
the decision was...
The first major strategic
and political error
for which we too
have to be responsible.
It was the first time
Churchill had admitted
to Roosevelt his ulterior,
political motive.
And as for consulting Stalin,
what would be the point?
As Churchill put it,
with pained understatement...
On a long-term political view,
Stalin might prefer
that the British and the Americans
do their share in France
in the very hard fighting
that is to come.
And that East,
Middle and Southern Europe
should fall naturally
into his control.
On August the 15th, 1944,
Allied forces invaded Southern France
in Operation Dragoon.
Militarily,
the invasion was a success,
reinforcing the push through France.
As to whether Churchill's
alternative strategy
could have been more successful,
opinion is divided.
But one man agreed with him,
Mark Clark,
the top American general in Italy.
After the war, Clark wrote...
The weakening of the campaign in Italy
in order to invade Southern France,
instead of pushing on
into the Balkans,
was one of the outstanding mistakes
of the war.
Stalin knew exactly
what he wanted,
and the thing he most wanted
was to keep us out of the Balkans.
A campaign that might have changed
the whole history of relations
between the Western world
and the Soviet Union
was permitted to fade away.
Whether or not
Clark and Churchill were right,
there was nothing physically
the British and Americans
could now do
to stop the Russian army
occupying the nations of Eastern Europe
and the Balkans.
But would Stalin allow those nations
their freedom?
Roosevelt had vetoed
the use of military strategy
to block Stalin.
It would now be up to him
to persuade the Soviet leader
to play the democratic game.
Theirs would be the final duel
of the warlords,
and decide what sort of Europe emerged
from the ashes.