How The Luftwaffe Outshone The Soviet Air Force During Operation Barbarossa | Air Wars | War Stories

exploded along a 1,250 mile front from the Baltic to the Black Sea. 3 million German troops, 600,000 vehicles and 3,350 tanks were about to invade the Soviet Union. Operation Barbarossa involved a three-pronged ground advance by Army Group North on Leningrad, Army Group Centre on Moscow and Army Group South towards the Ukrainian city of Kiev. Each Army Group had its own dedicated air support. Air Fleet One in the north, Air Fleet Two in the centre, Air Fleet Four in the south. The Luftwaffe deployed 60% of its total strength for this operation. 1,945 aircraft, of which 1,400 were serviceable on the day, including bombers, dive bombers, single-engine fighters, twin-engine fighter bombers and reconnaissance aircraft. Small groups of bombers were set to take off in darkness and be ready to attack enemy airfields at dawn, with the main airstrikes going in an hour later. To protect the flanks, at 2am, Heinkel 111s would surreptitiously drop mines in the Baltic and Black Sea. So before the opening barrage, isolated formations of bombers had crossed the frontier at maximum height to escape detection. The Heinkel 111s, Junker 88s and Dornier 17s achieved complete surprise, devastating aircraft on the ground with four-pound fragmentation bombs. When the second wave squadrons appeared, there was little aerial opposition. Their Stukas concentrated on close targets, as other bombers flew further inland, escorted by fighters, to attack cities like Bialystok and Grodno. Twin-engine aircraft were the main bombers used by the Luftwaffe for Operation Barbarossa. The Heinkel 111 had a speed of 258 miles per hour and a bomb load of 3,000 pounds. The Ju 88 had a speed of 286 miles per hour and a bomb load of 5,500 pounds. The Dornier 17 had a speed of 270 miles per hour and a bomb load of 2,000 pounds. All three of these aircraft were therefore considerably slower than the newer Soviet fighters, but fortunately fewer of those were available on the 22nd of June 1941. The Soviet air force, badly affected by purges of senior officers, had performed poorly against Finland during the winter of 1939 to 1940. In June 1941, it still relied heavily on older types of aircraft. Two of the fighters were biplanes, the I-15 and the I-153. The monoplane I-16 Rata was slower than the Messerschmitt 109, though more manoeuvrable. On paper in the West, the Soviets had 5,700 aircraft, not including 1,445 naval aircraft. To the astonishment of the Germans, despite the evidence of carnage on their airfields, in the late morning and afternoon of the 22nd of June, Soviet fighters and bombers began to appear in the sky. Lieutenant Schiess, a Messerschmitt pilot, complained that the I-16 fighter was so agile that it could perform a 180 degrees turn just as he was about to open fire. Several dogfights took place, in one of which an I-16 rammed its Messerschmitt 110 opponent after running out of ammunition. Other reports of similar attacks on German aircraft were received, with the Soviet pilots either parachuting to safety or landing their crippled machines. History Hit is a streaming platform that is just for history fans, with fantastic documentaries covering fascinating figures and moments in history from all over the world, from the Battle of Trafalgar and the Revolutionary Era, right through to the Second World War. If you are looking for your next military history fix, then this is the service for you. We're committed to bringing history fans award-winning documentaries and podcasts that you cannot find anywhere else. Sign up now for a free trial, and War Stories fans get 50% off their first three months. Just be sure to use the code WARSTORIES at checkout. In spite of frightening losses, Soviet twin-engine bombers, holding steady in the face of heavy flak and fighters, continued to attack the German airfields until dusk. Clearly, the Luftwaffe's dawn air operations had not been wholly successful. Apart from the obsolescent biplanes and the I-16 monoplane fighter, the Soviets relied on three new aircraft. One was the MiG-3, which had a speed of 400 miles per hour, but had been designed as a high-altitude fighter, and therefore was less effective with its three machine guns at medium and low range. The second one was the LaGG-3, which had a speed of 350 miles per hour, but unfortunately tended to go into a spin in a tight turn and had a reputation for crashing on taking off. That would only stay in service until 1942. The third new aircraft was the Yak-1, which had a speed of 360 miles per hour and was armed with eight rockets as well as machine guns. It was by far the best of the aircraft to come into service in 1941, and 50% of the Soviet fighters that were developed thereafter were derived from the Yak-1. The standard twin-engine bomber that was in service in June 1941 was the DB-3. That had a bomb load of 5,500 pounds. During the 22nd of June, the Soviets admitted losing 1,811 aircraft, 1,489 of them on the ground, 1,200 before noon. At a cost of 35 aircraft, the Luftwaffe had apparently inflicted a crushing defeat on the Soviet air force. The Soviets had been totally unprepared. Colonel Van Yushkin, commander of the 23rd Air Division, revealed that many men were on weekend leave. Too many airfields were close to the frontier, their positions perfectly well known to the Germans. Even on the operational bases, units were in the process of re-equipping with new types of aircraft. With typical Russian negligence, Van Yushkin remarked, both old and new types stood all about in uncamouflaged rows. At 1.30 a.m., a warning of the imminent German invasion had been sent from Moscow with an urgent order. Before dawn on the 22nd of June, all aircraft are to be dispersed on their airfields and carefully camouflaged. All units will come to immediate readiness. But it was lost in the maze of a complicated communication network. The stage was set for the German columns to advance into the heart of the Soviet Union, supported by the Luftwaffe, which by the 19th of June claimed 4,019 aircraft destroyed for 150 of their own losses. The war offered little risk for us. At night, the well-known sewing machines were on the move, the small double-deckers, with which the Russians had insured the front on the ground, although they only carried small bombs and dropped them. On the day, we had little concern. Nevertheless, we flew very, very low. The only chance we had with the Ju-52, which was actually not a war plane, it had no armored tanks, it had no flamethrowers for night flights, so you flew like a torch through the area, you could not avoid that the flamethrowers were always there. We perceived the risk of encountering Russian fighters as very low. There were hiccups. For a week, Colonel General Heinz Guderian's Panzer Group was held up by the fortress at Brest-Litovsk, where Stuka dive bombers made little impression on the three-foot-thick walls. On the 28th of June, seven Junker 88s with 3,500-pound bombs attacked, breached the wall, and next day, the garrison surrendered. Pressing forward in the center, German troops bypassed Minsk and were preparing to enclose it in a pincer movement on the 30th of June, when waves of enemy bombers began to attack the tanks. Evidently, the Soviet Air Force was not yet finished. However, over 100 Messerschmitt 109s shot down 114 attackers, and Minsk fell on the 7th of July. Nine days later, Smolensk was taken. Moscow lay only 200 miles away. Army commanders resisted diversion of aircraft from close support of their troops. There was no great enthusiasm for bombing Moscow. But on the 19th of July, Hitler ordered reprisals for Russian air attacks on Bucharest and Helsinki. So, during the night of the 21st-22nd of July, 127 Heinkel 111s and Junker 88s took off from four different bases for a round trip of 700 to 800 miles to the Soviet capital. 20 miles from their target, searchlights began to probe the sky. Then suddenly came a roaring volcano, as countless regiments of heavy and light flak opened up. 796 anti-aircraft guns were deployed around the Soviet capital, and 600 fighters, many newly arrived British Hurricanes and American P-40 aircraft, protected its skies. Although 104 tons of high explosive and 46,000 incendiaries were dropped, lack of concentration resulted in minimal damage. During the following two nights, 115 and 100 bombers attacked, but the numbers then dropped. Before the end of 1941, 76 raids were carried out on Moscow, 59 by 10 or fewer bombers. The bombing offensive against the Soviet capital simply petered out. The Soviets argued that their defensive measures frustrated the Luftwaffe in their attempts to bomb Moscow. To fool the reconnaissance aircraft, they camouflaged vast areas of Moscow. For example, they drew houses on the walls of the Tremlin, and they put rooftops along all the main roads. They also deployed a large number of searchlights, and the Luftwaffe pilots reported that they were dazzled on the very first raid by 300 searchlights. The Soviets had available 600 fighters, which they put up between 150 to 200 each time the Germans came over on a big raid. The Soviets claimed in the first three raids that the Germans launched on Moscow, anti-aircraft guns and fighters accounted for 22 of the attacking bombers. Luftwaffe officers were puzzled about the extent of continued Soviet air force activity. On the 11th of December, Hitler would confidently announce that 17,322 enemy aircraft had been destroyed, captured or ridden off. However, unknown to the Germans, production of aircraft in Soviet factories during the second half of 1941 was four times that of the first half. Significantly, that of new fighter types rose steeply. The LAGG-3 from 322 to 2,141, the Yak-1s from 335 to 1,019, 1,867 bombers were produced at three times the pre-war rate, and the overall figure of aircraft production for 1941 reached 15,735. 150 miles from the Moscow-bound troops, Army Group North made swift progress to the outskirts of Leningrad. On the 22nd of September, a Messerschmitt unit commander, Major Trautloft, advanced to an army forward position and studied the Soviet city from close range. The air was alive with metal, he observed, as swarms of Stukas dived on their targets and protective German fighters engaged Soviet aircraft overhead. The Luftwaffe's Air Fleet One then received orders to concentrate on the Soviet fleet in the adjacent bay of Kronstadt. Its 59 battleships, cruisers, destroyers and submarines and over 200 auxiliary vessels threatened iron ore supplies from Sweden to Germany, supply routes to Finland and along the Baltic coast. Thus, at 8.45 a.m. on the 23rd of September, a strong force of Stukas ran the gauntlet of 600 anti-aircraft guns. The battleship Marat was sunk, October Revolution damaged. The Ju-87s returned in the afternoon and from the 25th to the 28th of September kept up the onslaught, often flying three operations a day. One was shot down and crashed onto the deck of the cruiser Kiel and several Soviet ships were damaged by bombs. But the slow-moving Stukas were mauled by the anti-aircraft gunners and Soviet fighters. The Ju-87 Stuka dive bomber had seen service in the Spanish Civil War, in Poland and in France. It had a crew of two, speed of 230 miles per hour and could carry a bomb load of 1,500 pounds. It tended to dive from 12,000 feet, release its bombs at 4,000 feet and the air brakes which slowed it down as it descended let out a screech which was supposed to demoralize the defenders. Unfortunately it was so slow that gradually the anti-aircraft guns got the measure of it and so did fighters, as was shown in the Battle of Britain and also over Leningrad. And the latter part of the action on the Eastern Front, it was used in the anti-tank role. The Soviets mustered 900 army and naval aircraft to defend Leningrad and their fleet survived. The Luftwaffe lacked the strength to obliterate it or fatally damage Leningrad, especially after the bulk of Air Fleet One was withdrawn to join the advance on Moscow. And between the 10th of October and the 25th of December 1941, Li-2 civil transport aircraft flew 6,000 tons of supplies into Leningrad. The Li-2 aircraft which is used extensively in the Leningrad airlift was the Soviet version of the American Douglas DC-3 which had been built under license from 1937. In wartime version it resembled the American C-47 Dakota, the only difference being that it sometimes had a top turret fitted. Meanwhile, 700 miles further south, the battle for Kiev was reaching a climax. To help take the city, secure the wheat fields of the Ukraine and open the way to the coal and iron ore of the Donetsk Basin, Hitler had diverted Guderian's panzer group from the center. To justify that gamble, Kiev and its hinterland had to be taken quickly. On the 16th of September, two German pincers closed east of the city, which fell three days later. Shortly afterwards, all resistance in the area ceased. Apart from directly supporting German troops at Kiev, the Luftwaffe had been charged with preventing the Soviets from attacking them in the rear. In effect, they were asked to blockade the battlefield. For a month, German aircraft carried out a concentrated assault on Soviet railway facilities to the east and northeast, stations, bridges, cuttings and rolling stock. As a result, the Soviets failed to mount any serious attacks on the besieging troops. Elsewhere in the south, before the end of the year, Kharkov, east of Kiev, had fallen. And despite support from aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet, the Soviet Air Force could not prevent the capture of Odessa or invasion of the Crimean Peninsula. During November, after the return of Guderian's tanks from the south, Army Group Center was at last ready to launch a ground attack on Moscow. But when reconnaissance aircraft reported large-scale troop movements from Gorky and Yaroslavl, east of the Soviet capital, its Luftwaffe units had no bombers with the range to interfere. And on the 5th of December, with German troops in the suburbs of Moscow, Soviet troops counterattacked, seeking to outflank and trap the Germans. With the ice and snow of a bitter winter now beginning, the Luftwaffe could do little to help. Effectively, it was grounded. To attack Moscow, the Luftwaffe only had twin-engine bombers like the Heinkel 111 and the Junker 88. They had a limited bomb capacity of three to five thousand pounds, but more importantly, their range was between 1,000 and 1,500 miles. At their airfields of 400 miles west of Moscow, it was impossible for them to fly far beyond Moscow to attack troop concentrations. Moreover, they were 100 miles per hour slower than the Yak-1 fighters. Their ability to attack Moscow decisively was therefore very much reduced. The scene was now set for disaster. On the 9th of January 1942, four Soviet armies burst through the thin cordon of troops protecting the boundary between Army Group North and Army Group Center in the area of Lake Seliger, and similar incursions occurred along the whole front. Thousands of Germans soon found themselves surrounded in a series of large pockets. In one of these, by the second week of February, the entire 10 Army Corps and part of 11, six divisions and 100,000 men were isolated southeast of Lake Ilmen at Demyansk. Only an airlift could save them. The weather was frequently unfit for flying, the temperature minus 40 to 50 degrees centigrade. 220 Junker 52 transports were based at Pleskau. Though only one third of them serviceable. To deliver the necessary 300 tons of supplies each day to Demyansk, a minimum of 150 serviceable aircraft were required, plus more ground staff and equipment to overcome the winter condition. These needs were quickly met, and on the 20th of February, 40 Ju-52s landed on the trodden snow of Demyansk's temporary airstrip. The three-engine Junker 52 transport aircraft carried out a number of functions. On occasions it carried cargo, it transported troops, or it took paratroopers into action. It was used in its cargo capacity for Stalingrad airlift, but at 180 miles per hour, it was vulnerable to the Soviet fighters. By the beginning of March, a second emergency airfield was ready. From Pleskau to Demyansk was 150 miles, 100 over enemy territory. Initially, Ju-52s flew singly at low level, which made them vulnerable to Soviet fighters. They were soon organized into type formations though, flying at 16,000 feet and protected by Messerschmitt 109s. Between the 20th of February and the 18th of May 1942, when a relief column got through, at a cost of 265 aircraft, a daily average of 276 tons of food, weapons and ammunition, and 5 million gallons of petrol were delivered to the trapped men, besides 15,446 replacement troops for the 22,093 wounded taken out. Once the thaw had set in, German forces resumed their dash eastwards across the Ukraine. Hitler decided that Army Group South was doing so well, that he detached the 4th Panzer Army into the Caucasus in search of oil, leaving just the 6th Army to capture Stalingrad on the banks of the river Volga. By the 19th of November, 85% of Stalingrad was in German hands. That day, however, the first signs of winter appeared, and the Soviets counterattacked from both flanks, threatening to encircle the 6th Army. Close support Stukas and cannon-firing Heinkel 111s attempted to halt the enemy, but the deteriorating weather blunted their efforts. Several aircraft were lost to anti-aircraft fire, before conditions made flying impossible. Two days later, General von Paulus, the army commander, told Lieutenant General Fiebig of the Luftwaffe's 8th Air Corps by phone, that despite the unpromising situation, he intended to fight on, not retreat. Paulus expected the Luftwaffe to supply him by air. Fiebig warned about over-optimism. When the target, Moscow, was not reached, and a not planned, chaotic retreat was necessary, we said, the flash war is no more, the phase is over. We got to feel it close to our skin, and knew every day, when we landed somewhere, how thin the German front was, how few units had to secure many kilometers, and we were confronted with cut-off parts of the troops, which we had to supply and bring back. That was, for us, one of the tasks. On the 22nd of November, Fiebig informed the 6th Army, that the Stuka close support airbase at Kalach, on the river Don, had been overrun. Even more critically, the Soviet flank attacks had met at Kalach, trapping its 250,000 men. Fiebig warned Paulus's chief of staff, Major General Schmidt, that an airlift was impracticable. Both the weather and the enemy are completely incalculable factors. That evening, however, Hitler ordered the 6th Army to stay put. The Army High Command in Berlin had serious doubts about this. General Zeitzler attempted to persuade Hitler, that it should break out. He calculated, that 700 tons of supplies would be needed daily. Even if all the horses in the pocket were slaughtered, the minimum requirement would still be 500 tons. Zeitzler did not believe the Luftwaffe could achieve that total. Hermann Göring, commander of the Luftwaffe, flatly disagreed. My Fuhrer, I announced, that the Luftwaffe will supply the 6th Army from the air. Fog, ice and snow had already appeared in Stalingrad. The temperature dropped to minus 20 degrees centigrade. Nevertheless, on the 24th of November, the airbases of Tazinskaya and Modovskaya were instructed to fly 300 tons of fuel, weapons and ammunition into Stalingrad daily. Three days later, the 6th Army requested additional flour, bread and other food supplies, as local stocks were dangerously low. But due to the poor weather and low availability of aircraft, only a third of the Ju-52s at Tazinskaya were serviceable. On the 25th and 26th of November, the opening days of the airlift, only 65 tons of fuel and ammunition got through. On the 27th of November, even less arrived. That day at Tazinskaya, Fiebig confided to his journal, weather atrocious, one snowstorm succeeds another, situation desperate. It was now clear that the Junkers 52 aircraft could not deliver the necessary tonnage alone. Heinkel 111s of Morosovskaya and Melorova were ordered to join the airlift. To safeguard the base airfields, Messerschmitt 109s and Stukas were added to their defences. Messerschmitt Bf 109f had two 7.9 machine guns and a 13mm cannon. It had a speed of 390 miles per hour and a ceiling of 37,000 feet. In 1942, it succeeded the Messerschmitt Bf 109e, which had a speed of 360 miles per hour, four machine guns and a ceiling of only 34,000 feet. But both types remained in operation on the Eastern Front for the rest of the war. On the 30th of November, Heinkel 111s and Junker 52s delivered 100 tons of supplies to Stalingrad for the first time. Still one fifth of the minimum demanded for the besieged army. The only operational airfield in the pocket was Pytomnik. Aircraft were guided into it by radio beacon, then visually by a red landing cross and green very light. After the achievement of 100 tons cargo on the 30th of November, the tonnage dropped again as ice and snow hampered the airlift. The shortage of heating equipment to start engines drastically reduced the number of available aircraft, all of which were maintained by ground crew in the open. Attempts to erect shelters were frustrated through lack of wood and metal. Following information that a relief attempt was to be made by the 4th Panzer Army from the Caucasus and that the 6th Army would need extra supplies to break out towards it, a major effort was made from the 19th to the 21st of December. 450 sorties were flown and a total 700 tons delivered. But fog closed in on the 22nd of December and the succeeding two days. Then further dispiriting setbacks occurred. The relief effort failed and the Soviets broke through the River Don defences to head for Rostov and put Tazinskaya and Morosovskaya under immediate threat. After defences just north of Tazinskaya were overrun, 180 Ju-52s made ready to leave. Goering ordered them to stay, which put the entire airlift at risk. At 5.20am on the 24th of December, the first Soviet shells fell on the aircraft, blowing up two aircraft. With fog reducing visibility to 50 yards and the enemy fast closing in, at 5.30 Fiebig gave the order to take off on his own responsibility. Many of the aircraft were still laden with ammunition and fuel for Stalingrad, which, with additional passengers, made it difficult to begin a headland. Two Ju-52s were destroyed in crashes on the ground and several others damaged in the poor visibility. At 6.15 Fiebig flew out in the last Ju-52 as Soviet tanks crashed through the perimeter fence. 108 Ju-52s and 16 Ju-88s escaped from Tazinskaya to airfields further west. Sixty aircraft were lost, spare parts and ground equipment abandoned. The outcome would have been happier had Goering not blocked evacuation the previous day. 25 miles further east, Morozovskaya had not yet come under attack. As the weather closed in, the station commander sent his Heinkel 111s and Stukas away for safety. On the 24th of December, the weather cleared and the Stukas returned to drive off Soviet troops, which were now nearby. On Christmas Day, they were joined by the Heinkels and a unit of Messerschmitt 109s. Persistent bad weather curtailed flying though, and on the 3rd of January 1943, Morozovskaya was abandoned too. The Ju-52s then operated from Salsk, the He-111s from Novocherkassk, 60 miles further west. No deliveries at all were made to Stalingrad over the Christmas period. On the 31st, 1st and the 4th of January, the daily total exceeded 200 tons, which proved a false storm. Fog prevented flying on other days. The longer flight time from the new western bases gave the Soviets more opportunity to sight anti-aircraft guns along the lines of the Potomac Beacon. Incoming aircraft were forced to make wide detours and use up fuel which would otherwise have gone to the 6th Army. Soviet fighters became more active as well, obliging the Ju-52s to fly in formation, protected by Me-109s. This meant that unloading teams at Potomac were often idle for lengthy periods until faced with 40 aircraft at once. Navigating was not an easy task. We had to move 50 kilometers to the south or north of the line to secure the course. We thought it was unsafe to assess our position. We cut the radio wave at 30 degrees and flew on to the other side. Young pilots, who were supposed to be in this situation at night, flew safely along this radio wave and thus made it to the Russian flagpoles, which the Russians of course stopped after they noticed that there was this navigation device. As early as the 11th of December, Fiebig had asked for another airstrip at Gumrak to be cleared and leveled. Almost a month later, this had not been done, mainly because improving the flak defenses at Potomac had taken priority. The hopes of the defenders were raised on the 9th of January when seven Focke-Wulf Condors flew into Potomac with 36 tons of fuel, ammunition and provisions. On the way back, they carried 156 wounded. 18 Condors had been withdrawn from the Battle of the Atlantic and based at Stellano, 300 miles from Potomac. But several of them had suffered equipment malfunction on the ground in the freezing temperatures and five were lost in action on the 10th of January. On the 16th of January 1943, Potomac fell. Six Stupas and six Me-109s managing to get airborne as Soviet troops closed in. The Messerschmitt volunteer pilots had defended Potomac since December 1942, driving off Soviet MiG-3 and LAGG-3 fighters and IL-2 ground attack aircraft, often with only two or three of the Me-109s serviceable. Ordered to Gumrak, five Messerschmitts crashed on the unfinished runway. The Potomac airfield had originally been designated for fighters, but in the crisis had been extended so it could take heavy aircraft and during the course of the battle had been heavily defended with the anti-aircraft guns. This meant that the Soviet fighters could not easily range above it. When it fell, the Luftwaffe only had the small inadequate Gumrak strip, which did not have anti-aircraft fire and therefore the Soviet fighters ranged very easily above it. Very few Luftwaffe aircraft landed there and many actually refused to do so because of the conditions. Salsk also came under attack on the 16th of January and the Ju-52s moved to a temporary airstrip near Sverevo, at the limit of their operational range. Within 24 hours Soviet bombers found them, destroying 12 and badly damaging 40 on the ground. During the night of the 18th-19th January, a Condor did land at Gumrak and a Heinkel 111 piloted by Major Thiel the following day. But most airlift pilots refused to land, either throwing out their supply canisters or simply turning back. Major Thiel wrote, The airfield is easy to pinpoint from 4,500 to 5,000 feet owing to its rolled runway, its wreckage and the numerous bomb craters and shell holes. The landing cross was covered with snow. Directly my machine came to a standstill, the airfield was shot up by 10 enemy fighters. Because of uncleared wreckage, the runway length was reduced to 80 yards. Soviet aircraft constantly prowled overhead, ready to engage incoming aircraft as soon as the seven lamps of the flare path were illuminated. The Luftwaffe did not give up though. During the night of the 21st-22nd of January, 21 He-111s and 4 Ju-52s did land supplies at Gumrak, the last aircraft to do so. Next day, the airfield fell. After the fuel situation, I wanted to take 17 wounded with me. We were on the way out. At first, I planned to get out at low altitude, but then I saw a cloud bank and tried to reach this cloud bank, which I was able to reach, but I was attacked by a Russian fighter. There was a cat-and-mouse game. While I was in the cloud, he was above me. In the cloud, I was below. He then broke off the attack. Maybe he didn't have any fuel left, I don't know. It was our great luck. But to get through this air fight, which it was, I had to fly long curves, take strong accelerations in the fight. As the unharmed wounded, and there were also the most seriously wounded, survived this, it will always be a mystery to me. On the 2nd of February, a final message came out of the German 11th Army Corps. Have done our duty and fought to the last. That evening, two waves of HE-111s flew over the city with canisters, but there was no sign of life from the German positions. The tide had now turned. In the opening months of 1943, Soviet troops continued to press forward, and by the spring, two prominent salients had become the focus of attention. At Arel, the German one jutted eastwards. At Kursk, the Soviet salient thrust west into the German lines. Operation Citadel, the German plan to wipe out the Kursk salient, was scheduled to commence at 3.30 a.m. on the 5th of July. Air Fleet 4's immediate job was to provide close support. 1,000 fighters, bombers, ground attack and anti-tank aircraft would cover the north-eastward advance of the 4th Panzer Army around Bayelgorod in the south. However, the Soviets might try a retaliatory assault at Arel, which would outflank the Germans. The Luftwaffe was tasked to prevent this, so in all, 1,700 aircraft were amassed, many of them withdrawn from the air defense of Germany. The initial phase of Citadel went well, with Stukas flying up to six missions daily to blast away for the tanks in a classic blitzkrieg tactic. The operation was doomed to fail though, after the feared attack on the Arel salient occurred on the 11th of July. Defense there, rather than attack at Kursk, now took precedence. By the 19th of July, the two German armies at Arel were threatened with encirclement, like the 6th Army nine months earlier. The Luftwaffe responded in strength, throwing Stuka dive bombers, conventional bombers, fighters and anti-tank aircraft into the fray. The Soviets were driven back, and the German formations able to withdraw. Field Marshal Model thanked the Luftwaffe for saving his command, but the salient appeared. The air operations of the 19th to the 21st of July had prevented a second Stalingrad at Arel, but this was the final major aggressive effort on the Eastern Front. Henceforth, the Luftwaffe would be committed to close support for the armies as they fell back before the Soviet advance on the German homeland. After Kursk, the Luftwaffe's anti-tank role became increasingly important. In addition to the ground attack Henschel 129s, Stukas were equipped with two 37-millimeter cannon under their wings, and Ju-88s carried a 75-millimeter cannon. Even the Focke-Wulf 190s, Ju-87s and Heinkel 177s were committed to anti-tank action. As the Luftwaffe strength ebbed, that of the Soviet air force on the Eastern Front, greatly enhanced by the supply of 19,000 British and American aircraft over four years, continued to rise. 8,500 in December 1943 became 15,500 in January 1945. During Second World War, the Allies supplied a considerable number of aircraft to the Soviet Union. Some RAF squadrons operated from the Archangel area in support of the Arctic convoys, and when the crews went back to Britain, the aircraft were left to the Soviets. Many aircraft were taken by merchant ships to Archangel via the Arctic convoy routes. Many others were flown via Persia into southern Russia, and a fourth way of getting the aircraft to the Soviet Union was via Alaska and Siberia. Many of these were picked up by Soviet pilots at Fairbanks and flown to the USSR from there. In total, the Americans sent 14,800 aircraft and the British 3,000. However, some sources suggest that this is too low, and the overall figure should be something like 19,000. During the drive into eastern Ukraine in August 1943, Soviet forces were supported by 1,400 aircraft as Luftwaffe losses forced Henschel 123 biplanes into action. Four months later, 2,360 Soviet aircraft backed the recovery of western Ukraine. 6,000 aircraft were available in Belarus during the summer of 1944, and in April 1945, 2,400 took part in the assault on Konigsberg on the Baltic. For the final attack on Berlin, 7,500 were deployed. The Luftwaffe cannot be blamed for German failure on eastern front. Operation Barbarossa had the inbuilt seeds of its own destruction. It was too ambitious, even before Hitler fatally undermined it by diverting troops away from the advance on Moscow into the Ukraine. Moreover, like would-be conquerors from the west throughout history, the Germans grossly underestimated the rigors of winter and the determination and military strength of the population. Specifically, they miscalculated the capability of the Soviet Air Force, assuming that immediately after the mounting of Operation Barbarossa, it had been wiped out. Air power ultimately proved a powerful weapon in the Soviet arsenal on the eastern front.