The tank battles of El Alamein saw two legendary commanders face off against each other; Bernard Montgomery and Erwin Rommel. The outcome of these battles would prove to be decisive in the North African Campaign of the Second World War.
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At the start of 1942, the progress of the Second World War was causing concern for the Allies.
Continental Europe was in the grip of the Axis powers.
On the Eastern Front, German-controlled territory extended to the fringes of Moscow.
On the other side of the world, Japan had just begun its devastating march across the Pacific.
By early 1942, the Allies were a long way from winning the war.
But by the end of the year, the situation had changed.
Christmas 1942 was a time for quiet satisfaction on the Allied side.
The American triumph at Guadalcanal had put an end to Japanese expansion.
At Stalingrad, the Soviet Union stood on the brink of decisive victory.
And the forces of the British Empire had also secured a great triumph in battle.
It was so significant that Churchill called it the end of the beginning of the Second World War.
Throughout 1942, British and German forces clashed in only one ground battle.
North Africa had already seen a British victory in December 1941,
when the siege of Tobruk was lifted.
But six months later, Tobruk was back in Axis hands.
It seemed only a matter of time before the fall of Cairo,
and the end of the Allied presence in North Africa.
But the Egyptian capital was saved.
By the end of 1942, the Axis forces faced crushing defeat in the North African desert.
This turning of the tide was the direct consequence of one epic battle.
A 12-day confrontation that gave a hint of things to come.
The whole complexion of the war was beginning to change.
The North African engagement that began in October 1942 revealed a huge imbalance of resources.
For the first time, Allied commanders had the advantage in manpower and material.
High-quality equipment from the United States became prolific in the African desert.
And American tanks, like the Sherman, proved especially effective.
But the Allies also possessed superior tactics and leadership.
And for the British officer heading the operation, victory was a great personal triumph
over one of the greatest German commanders of the Second World War.
This was the duel in the desert between Bernard Montgomery and Irvin Rommel.
El Alamein is the name for a tiny settlement near the coast of Western Egypt.
In 1942, it was an unremarkable trading post.
But thanks to the fortunes of war,
this small dot on the map gave its name to a famous battle.
An engagement that proved to be the decisive chapter in the North African campaign.
And a turning point in the war.
In September 1940, the British public gave little thought to their country's presence in Egypt.
The Battle of Britain and the threat of German invasion were far more immediate concerns.
But one man was well aware of the British position in North Africa.
Benito Mussolini, Il Duce.
The leader of Italy, Germany's partner in the Axis alliance.
Italy also maintained a military presence on the African continent in Libya and in Abyssinia.
In 1940, Mussolini drafted a plan to connect the two colonies,
beginning with the conquest of Egypt.
It was not the first time that the Italian leader had dreamed up a grand military adventure.
And like many of his other big ideas, the result was a disaster.
Mussolini's troops did not share their leader's hunger for the fight.
After the Italians had advanced 60 miles into Egypt,
the British Western Desert Force struck back.
Although Major General Richard O'Connor had only 30,000 men,
compared with 300,000 Italians,
the British commander launched a counter-attack on December the 7th.
This comprised a reinforced infantry assault through the gaps in the Italian line,
backed up by an encircling armoured advance.
The results were spectacular.
Taken by surprise, the Italian invaders were surrounded,
and in just four days, 38,000 men surrendered.
At last, the British regional commander Archibald Wavell
could send some good news back to London.
But the British weren't finished yet.
Wavell and O'Connor decided to chase the Italians
into the eastern Libyan province of Cyrenaica.
On the 6th of January,
the British Desert Force captured the Italian fortress of Bardia.
16 days later, the port of Tobruk was taken.
But the Allies soon faced an unexpected problem.
They had not allowed for the thousands of surrendering Italian soldiers.
By February the 7th, 130,000 Italian troops had been taken prisoner in North Africa.
And the British were the masters of Cyrenaica.
But that was the end of the advance.
On the 12th of February, Churchill ordered O'Connor to secure his position at El Algeila,
and release as many men as possible for combat in Greece.
It was not the only significant event of the 12th of February.
In the Libyan capital Tripoli, a new Axis group arrived,
a far more effective fighting machine than the Italians.
This was the Afrika Korps,
a German force led by a man who became one of the best known figures of the Second World War,
General Erwin Rommel.
By April 1941, Rommel was already a giant figure in the German military.
A First World War hero, he proved himself early in World War II
as commander of the 7th Panzer Division in France.
In early 1941, this gifted soldier was given charge of the new German Afrika Korps,
and he was quick to enhance his already considerable reputation.
Rommel liked to think that he possessed the cunning instincts of the Fox.
In 1941, the legend of the Desert Fox began to take shape.
On April 1st, 1941, Rommel launched an offensive against the British presence in Cyrenaica,
with such devastating results that El Algeila fell, swiftly followed by the port of Benghazi.
By April 7th, the Afrika Korps had reached Gisala,
as the British retreated towards their stronghold at Tobruk.
As April passed, events seemed to conspire against the British forces.
Their commander, General O'Connor, was taken prisoner on the 6th of April.
It was under the command of Sir Noel Beresford-Peirce that the British forces
formed a defensive line close to the Egyptian border on April 11th.
That same day, Tobruk was besieged,
and the men of the 9th Australian Division found themselves cut off
in the face of heavy German fire, both from the ground and from the air.
Again, the Ju 87 Stuka dive bomber proved itself a devastating weapon of war,
as the Afrika Korps fought to break the Tobruk defences.
Over the following months, Tobruk became a familiar name for the British public.
By sheer tenacity, the Australians held out,
and on May 4th, Rommel suspended his assault on Tobruk.
But the city remained besieged,
despite two British offensives aimed at raising the siege.
Fighting was concentrated in the region of the Halfaya Pass,
a geographical feature nicknamed Hellfire Pass.
There were bitter armoured engagements,
before both sides chose to consolidate their positions at the end of June.
Throughout the summer, the defenders of Tobruk remained besieged,
though the Allies managed to withdraw the exhausted Australians
in a daring naval operation.
From August onwards, a mixture of British, Polish, Indian and South African troops
endured the hardships of life in Tobruk.
With the Australians before them, these were the famous Desert Rats,
men whose determination became a familiar subject in the newspapers,
read by the British public.
It was a gripping and harrowing story.
The situation inside Tobruk was dire.
Daily life became a grim lesson in the realities of siege warfare.
Food and fresh water were scarce.
Many Tobruk veterans recalled a diet of nothing but bully beef for weeks on end.
The heat and dust from the desert tested the spirit of the hardest of men,
as did the sheer boredom.
But outside the siege lines, developments were taking place.
As the stalemate at Tobruk continued,
both sides made vital changes of leadership.
In the summer of 1941,
Erwin Rommel was made commander of a new Panzergruppe Afrika,
later renamed the Panzerarmee Afrika.
The British force became the 8th Army of Lieutenant General Sir Alan Cunningham,
under the overall regional command of General Sir Claude Auchinleck.
Together, the new British leadership decided on a November offensive
to relieve their colleagues still trapped inside Tobruk.
Their ambitious plan intended to use the armoured element of the British 30th Corps
to outflank the German line in the direction of Gabr Saleh.
The more lightly armoured 13th Corps was instructed to engage Rommel,
enabling 30th Corps to sweep up towards Tobruk
and lift the siege after seven long months.
The plan was codenamed Operation Crusader,
and the offensive began in the early morning of November the 18th.
The British commanders were confident of success.
Reinforcements had arrived steadily all summer,
pushing Allied tank superiority to over 500.
Rommel's reaction was uncompromising.
Over four days of heavy fighting at the airfield of Sidi Rezegh,
he succeeded in hammering the British 7th Armoured Brigade
in a bitter and confusing tank battle.
But Allied reinforcements arrived in time
to keep the Afrika Korps confined to the region around Sidi Rezegh.
A fierce engagement followed in the desert.
Here, the German Afrika Korps counterattacked with 260 tanks
in a simultaneous assault against the 5th South African Infantry Brigade
and the 22nd Armoured Brigade.
The Allied troops found themselves hopelessly outgunned,
and the desert soon turned into a scene of absolute carnage
as the South Africans fought almost to the last man.
Despite their courage, the result of the engagement was soon clear,
persuading Rommel to make his boldest move yet,
to drive through the remains of the Allied defences
and to march into Egypt.
This was the dash to the wire,
an attempt to reach and penetrate the barbed wire
that marked the Egyptian frontier.
But it proved to be a serious mistake.
The Allies simply allowed Rommel and his troops to pass through their lines
before attacking his overstretched supply line in the rear.
The Desert Fox had overstretched his forces.
It was only a matter of hours before the 8th Army
turned this rare oversight to their advantage.
In the confusion, Rommel lost touch with his forward headquarters,
giving the men of the 2nd New Zealand Division
the chance to advance on Tobruk.
Almost by accident, the original objective of Operation Crusader
lay within the Allies' grasp.
By the time Rommel realised his error in dashing for the wire,
the 8th Army were fighting their way from Sidi Rezegh
towards their besieged colleagues in Tobruk.
Two weeks after the Allies launched the offensive,
the German commander was down to just 40 tanks,
and he realised that a tactical retreat was the only realistic option.
So in early December 1941,
the German and Italian forces began their withdrawal,
leaving the way clear for the relief of Tobruk on December 10th.
The relief of Tobruk sparked rejoicing in Britain.
The British forces had beaten the Germans in a ground engagement,
and the success of Operation Crusader seemed to be confirmed
by Rommel's withdrawal all the way to Alagaila.
But the 8th Army commander, Cunningham, was not part of the celebrations.
At the height of the battle, on November 26th,
he was removed from his command and sent to hospital,
suffering from exhaustion.
Major General Neil Ritchie was drafted in to replace Cunningham.
He did not have to wait long before the desert fox returned,
with a vengeance.
The remarkable war of movement continued.
In the early months of 1942,
Rommel led his Panzerarmee Afrika in a new offensive
that forced the British all the way back to the defensive line at Gazala,
25 miles to the west of Tobruk.
This seesaw movement of troops and machines
became known as the Benghazi Handicap.
The coastal city of Benghazi had already changed hands four times
by the time Rommel launched his attack
against the 8th Army's Gazala line on May 26th, 1942.
The change of ownership did not end there,
but when the German attack began on the Gazala line,
Benghazi seemed a very distant objective for the Allied troops in Africa.
The Panzerarmee offensive launched in May 1942
gave Rommel the breakthrough he so badly needed.
Within weeks, the Allies found themselves
desperately clinging on to their position in North Africa.
This was the Axis offensive that set the stage
for the Great Battle of El Alamein.
On May 26th, Rommel launched his assault
against the Allied defences at Gazala.
This was an infantry attack against the Allied line,
combined with a panzer outflanking movement to the south.
The onslaught produced some of the heaviest fighting
in the whole of the North African war,
and it was the Desert Fox who emerged victorious.
When Rommel's first panzer attack failed to break through as he'd hoped,
he decided to rearrange his forces into a defensive position,
25 miles south of Gazala.
This became known as the Cauldron,
due to the sheer heat of the desert
and the intensity of the fighting that took place there.
By the first week of June,
Rommel stood poised to break out of the Cauldron.
His panzers and artillery created havoc in the British lines.
The Allied soldiers on the ground fought hard to resist,
but the Eighth Army leadership found itself struggling
to cope with the situation.
General Ritchie appeared unsure of how to respond,
but by June the 14th,
with the panzers advancing towards Tobruk,
he was forced to make a decision,
to order a full retreat to the east.
There was worse to come for the British commander.
Tobruk was again under threat,
and its South African defenders were also uncertain of what to do.
Acting on intelligence received,
Ritchie ordered defences to be concentrated to the southwest of the town.
On June the 20th, Rommel launched his attack from the southeast.
It was a fatal decision.
Tobruk fell in a matter of hours.
Back in Britain, the public despaired,
as the great triumph of December 1941 was reversed.
It became clear that changes in British leadership were needed.
Five days after the fall of Tobruk,
General Ritchie was dismissed,
as the shattered Eighth Army attempted to regroup
300 miles away to the east.
This was the decision of General Claude Auchinleck,
now in personal command of the Eighth Army,
and it was this solution that may have saved the Allies in North Africa.
On Auchinleck's instructions,
the Eighth Army positioned itself along a 40 mile length of desert front,
with the sea to the north,
and the impassable Qatara depression to the south.
At this time, the Egyptian capital city of Cairo was convulsed in panic.
German conquest seemed inevitable,
but General Auchinleck knew that if Rommel was going to get to Cairo,
he would have to attack the Allied Eighth Army directly.
The Qatara depression ruled out the possibility of an outflanking maneuver.
In July 1942,
the Panzer Armee repeatedly attacked the British line in attempts to break it.
But despite heavy casualties, the Eighth Army line held,
and Auchinleck ordered a counter-attack,
which was itself repulsed as the desert shook with the full force of war.
Despite a succession of fierce engagements,
by the end of the month, the fighting had died out,
as both exhausted armies consolidated their positions.
The Allies' defenses were organized into individual fortifications,
or boxes, along the length of the front.
The most substantial was located around a small coastal settlement called El Alamein.
The fighting that took place here in July 1942
is now referred to as the First Battle of El Alamein,
but this is not the engagement that is best remembered today.
General Auchinleck saw that by establishing defenses at El Alamein,
Rommel would not be able to use his preferred outflanking maneuver.
But in London, there was grave concern about the situation in North Africa.
The loss of Tobruk was seen as a national humiliation,
and although Cairo had been saved,
Churchill decided that changes of leadership were needed again in North Africa.
On the 4th of August, the British leader arrived in Cairo
to inspect the desert situation for himself.
For General Auchinleck, it was a fateful visit.
Churchill's expedition to the desert convinced him that he should be replaced.
Within days, two new men were appointed to take over the responsibilities of Auchinleck.
At this point, the British commanders of the Battle of El Alamein took to the stage.
Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery
formally took over as commander of the British Eighth Army on the 13th of August, 1942.
Within three months, he was a military legend,
whose name would be forever associated with one Egyptian battlefield.
But Montgomery was not the first choice for the command that made his name.
Montgomery was originally due to take charge of the British First Army
for the imminent Allied landings in Northwest Africa, Operation Torch.
The Eighth Army was allocated to General William Gott.
When Churchill visited Egypt in early August, 1942,
he was impressed by Gott's command of the British 13th Corps,
and concluded that he was ready for an army command.
But fate dictated that William Gott was denied the chance to make himself a legend.
On the 6th of August, 1942,
Gott received his new appointment as commander of the British Eighth Army.
The following day, he took off from Cairo in a Bristol-Bombay transport plane.
His destination was the front at El Alamein.
But William Gott never reached his destination.
Whilst in flight, his aeroplane was ambushed by a squadron of Luftwaffe fighters,
forcing the pilot to crash in the desert.
Gott escaped from the wreckage, but others remained trapped inside.
When the British general attempted to rescue them,
the transport plane blew up, killing the newly appointed army commander.
Hours later, the commander of the Southeast Army was informed of his new command.
Following the tragic death of William Gott,
Bernard Montgomery was appointed commander of the Eighth Army in Africa.
Born in 1887, Bernard Law Montgomery joined the Royal Warwickshire Regiment in 1908,
and was already a platoon commander by the outbreak of World War I.
Having been wounded twice and awarded the DSO,
by 1918 he'd risen to the rank of Divisional Chief of Staff.
He'd also acquired a profound distaste
for the carnage that characterised the fighting on the Western Front.
When hostilities resumed in 1939,
Montgomery was appointed commander of the 3rd Division sent to France,
and he was closely involved with the successful evacuation of British forces at Dunkirk.
He'd now acquired the nickname Monty,
and he cut a distinctive figure with his trademark two-badge beret.
By 1942, Monty had become one of the most recognisable faces in the British Army.
By the end of the war, he was a national hero.
A grand title also awaited Montgomery's superior in Africa, General Sir Harold Alexander.
Born in 1891, Alexander first revealed his talents as an officer
during the grim fighting of World War I.
By the time war broke out again in 1939,
he'd risen to the rank of Major General,
and he was given a divisional command in the British Expeditionary Force sent to France.
It was the beginning of a brilliant war.
At Dunkirk, Harold Alexander was also deeply involved
with the amazing evacuation of the British Army almost from under the noses of the Germans.
A senior command in the jungles of Burma followed,
before Churchill appointed him commander-in-chief of British Middle East forces in August 1942.
The relationship between Alexander and Montgomery
was crucial in the preparation and execution of the El Alamein offensive.
Thankfully for the Allies, the two men got on extremely well.
Montgomery also enjoyed an excellent relationship
with the commander of the Desert Air Force, Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur Cunningham.
The two men agreed that air forces and ground troops
needed to work together if strategic objectives were to be achieved.
As proof of this, Cunningham placed his headquarters next to Montgomery's in the Egyptian desert.
Although it was a practical decision, it was unprecedented at the time,
and it symbolized the fusion of land and air power that Montgomery could call on.
His German counterpart did not enjoy such a close relationship with his much smaller air force,
but his reputation as a military leader led many to believe that he could triumph whatever the odds.
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel has always been one of the best known figures of the Second World War.
A charismatic figure with a strong personal presence, Rommel was born in 1891,
and like so many of his generation, saw active service in the First World War.
A true hero, Rommel was awarded Germany's highest award for bravery in the course of the conflict,
and by the beginning of World War II, he'd risen to the rank of Major General.
In 1940, as commander of the 7th Panzer Division, Rommel led a devastating German advance to the
coast of the English Channel, earning a Knight's Cross in the process.
Shortly afterwards, he became the youngest Field Marshal in the German Army.
The German Field Marshal was convinced of his abilities as a leader,
and by 1942, Rommel compared his skills to those of the Fox.
Almost as soon as he arrived in Africa, he acquired the nickname by which he is still known today,
the Desert Fox. But Rommel was not so positive about his colleague's talents.
The structure of the Axis command in North Africa meant that the Desert Fox had to answer
to the commander-in-chief of all German forces in the Mediterranean region, Albert Kesselring.
Born in 1889, Albert Kesselring first trained as a gunner, but by the end of World War I,
his talents had secured him a place on Imperial Germany's general staff.
In the 1930s, he joined the young Luftwaffe, and by 1939, he was a Luftflotte commander during
the invasion of Poland. Kesselring enjoyed a similar command during the Battle of Britain,
and despite the German defeat, his career progressed with his appointment as German
commander-in-chief south. Later on in the war, Kesselring sealed his reputation as a leader
with his imaginative defense of the Italian peninsula. But in Africa, his contribution
was less impressive. His subordinate, Rommel, grew convinced that Kesselring was not prepared
to commit sufficient air power to the North African campaign, and the Allied advantage in
the air proved to be a decisive factor in the Battle of El Alamein. But on the ground,
the Panzerarmee Afrika was a powerful force, an army of conquest led by a cult-like figure
who was virtually worshipped by the men under his command. When Montgomery arrived in Africa,
he was alarmed to find that many of his men were obsessed with Rommel, and more interested in his
next move. Montgomery moved quickly to curb this fascination, but also made his own contribution
to the Rommel legend. In his headquarters, he mounted a large photograph of his great rival,
to keep himself focused on the task of beating this legendary figure.
This personal rivalry remains one of the most compelling background elements of the Battle of
El Alamein. But this most famous of engagements was not the first time that Monty and the Desert
Fox pitted their skills against each other. When Montgomery took command of the Eighth Army on the
13th of August 1942, he was concerned at the state of morale among some of his men, and he felt that
the army lacked a firm leadership structure. The new commander immediately set about establishing
his own unchallenged authority, and he was soon able to boost morale in the best way possible.
Montgomery suspected that Rommel would make a final effort to break through the Allied line
at El Alamein, but he had to consider how the Desert Fox would do this. Given the nature of
the desert terrain, the British commander suspected that his rival would adopt tactics
similar to those which had succeeded so well before the fall of Tobruk.
Montgomery reckoned that Rommel would launch an armoured assault to the south of El Alamein,
before attempting to encircle the British defences, leaving the way clear for a march on Cairo.
With this in mind, the British commander decided to lure his rival into a trap. He prepared a strong
defensive position at the ridge of Alam Halfa, a deadly minefield protected by the men of the
13th Corps, a force that included two tank divisions. Montgomery knew that the ground
was soft in this region, it was a poor area to carry out an armoured attack, so he decided to
try and outwit Rommel with a plan conceived by two of his most senior officers, his chief of staff,
Francis de Guingamp, and Brian Horrocks, newly appointed commander of the British 13th Corps
in Egypt. The plan was to give the enemy false information about the terrain occupied by the
8th Army. Montgomery ordered that a staff car should be abandoned in the no-man's land between
the two sides. Inside it was a fake map, giving the impression that the terrain was good to the
south of the ridge. It was a juicy piece of bait, and the Germans took it. When Rommel launched his
offensive on August 30th, his movements were, as Montgomery suspected. That day, the German
commander ordered a diversionary infantry attack against 8th Army positions in the north,
with the main combined force of Italian and German armour to the south. In total, 515 tanks
advanced into the soft ground to the south of Alam Halfa Ridge. The British ruse had worked,
and General Horrocks was able to talk of the egg having hatched.
In the soft conditions, slow German progress was inevitable. The British minefield took a
toll, as Horrocks' 13th Corps unleashed the power of 300 tanks, several hundred anti-tank guns,
and some 64 batteries of artillery. The commander of the 21st Panzer Division was killed,
and Rommel soon faced the problem of fuel shortages. The supplies promised to him simply
failed to arrive. The Desert Air Force threw up more problems. Not for the last time,
the Hawker Hurricane made a substantial impact on the North African battlefield.
By September the 3rd, it was clear that Rommel's offensive had failed, and the German commander
was forced to withdraw. Montgomery's trickery had contributed much to the outcome of the Alam Halfa
battle. Less than a month after arriving in Africa, Montgomery had shown that Rommel was not
invincible. Now the commander of the 8th Army turned his attention to a full-scale offensive
of his own. He had good reason to do so. In the weeks that followed the Battle of Alam Halfa,
substantial reinforcements of Allied men and material arrived in Africa, as Montgomery
considered the way ahead. Britain's allies in the United States increased their output
of military resources, as the American economy adapted to full war production.
In early September, a total of 300 American Sherman tanks arrived in Egypt.
New American weapons were also supplied to reinforce the British presence in the air,
in the shape of four squadrons of B-25 Mitchell bombers. Egyptian ports became a hive of activity
as new Allied material arrived in the region. By contrast,
the Panzerarmee Afrika was forced to rely on its existing resources.
Hitler promised Rommel substantial reinforcements of men and material.
He assured his African commander that brand new Tiger tanks would soon arrive in the region,
but the Fuhrer failed to deliver, and as summer turned to autumn,
Montgomery knew it was time to take advantage of these German shortages.
By October the 6th 1942, Montgomery had finalized his plan for a general offensive.
By October the 23rd, the British commander was ready to make his move.
As ever, he exuded confidence. He felt sure that he had the right tactics, the right weapons,
and the right troops to secure victory in a second battle of El Alamein.
For many people, the Battle of El Alamein was a simple fight between the African forces of Britain
and Germany. Monty against the Desert Fox. But although the opposing commanders were a German
and a Briton, the forces that they led were drawn from all over the world.
Montgomery's army had an especially international flavor. This can be seen clearly on the map of
the Eighth Army dispositions prior to the Battle of El Alamein. In the north of the front line,
the British commander deployed his 30th Corps, made up of the 9th Australian Division,
the 51st Highlander Division, the New Zealand Division, the 1st South African Division,
and the 4th Indian Division. To the south, Brian Horrocks' 13th Corps included brigade
groups of Free French and Greeks, in addition to two British infantry divisions and an armored
division in reserve. But Montgomery's main tank force was positioned in the north,
in the shape of 10th Corps, with its three armored divisions equipped with some of the
finest weapons of the day, including the American-built Shermans and Grants. These
forces would have a key role to play in the early hours of the fighting at El Alamein.
In all, Montgomery could call on the manpower of 195,000 men, a total that Rommel could only
wish for. At first glance, the Axis dispositions at El Alamein were substantial. Rommel was able
to call on 12 divisions, whereas Montgomery could muster only 10. But the divisions of
the Panzerarmee Afrika were all short of their full complement of men, leaving Rommel with a
total force of just 105,000, and 55,000 of these were Italians, the majority formed into five
frontline infantry divisions, with the German 164th motorized, completing the line nearest the coast.
Rommel's command also included a small reserve force in the north, and an all-important armored
presence. Two Italian tank divisions, alongside two panzer divisions, the 15th in the north,
and the 21st in the south. These were the units who had advanced all the way from El Agheila to
El Alamein in just six months, earlier in 1942, and the panzers would also play a key role at El
Alamein. But in terms of sheer quantity of armored resources, the British enjoyed superiority of
numbers. Montgomery could call on a thousand tanks, a quarter of them the powerful new Shermans.
By contrast, the Panzerarmee Afrika possessed less than 500 machines, and less than half of these
were of German design. 278 of Rommel's tanks were Italian built, only 211 Type III and Type IV
panzers were available to the German commander, and when fighting commenced,
it soon became clear that the Allies had the weapons to deal with the Axis tanks.
Of all the weapons deployed at El Alamein, this British single-seat fighter aircraft
may be the most famous of all. Powered by a 1,460 horsepower Rolls-Royce engine,
the Hawker Hurricane 2D was designed specifically as an anti-tank weapon. It was a modified version
of the 300 mile an hour Hurricane that proved itself at the Battle of Britain, and the changes
were made in the plane's armament. Other versions of the Hurricane were fitted with 12 machine guns
or four 20 millimeter cannon. The 2D used at Alamein was armed with two 40 millimeter cannon,
and this was more than enough to open up a tank in the autumn of 1942.
Sometimes known as the Tank Buster, the Hurricane 2D also earned the nickname
Tin Opener, and Rommel's ground forces soon found out why. In the course of the Battle of El Alamein,
the pilots and gunners of the British No. 6 Squadron terrorized the skies. No German or
Italian tank could have hoped to survive a direct hit from the Hurricane's formidable guns.
The British Desert Air Force could also rely on a number of fine American aircraft during the
desert fighting. The Curtiss P-40 fighter bomber was known as the Kitty Hawk when used in British
service, and the pilots of the Desert Air Force shared with their American counterparts a lasting
respect for the P-40. Equipped with six machine guns and with a bomb capacity of one 500 pound
device and two of a hundred pounds, the Kitty Hawk earned a reputation as a workhorse rather
than a shock weapon, but many a German tank crew found its power more than enough to put them out
of action. The British commanders at El Alamein were also well supplied with American weapons
on the ground. The M2A1 howitzer was not just one of the most effective weapons of the Second World
War. Residual production continues to this day, and the M2A1 can be seen in the arsenals of many
contemporary armies. As a means of providing supporting fire for both infantry and armored
advances, there have been few rivals to the M2A1, especially in terms of reliability, and the Eighth
Army were keen to exploit the firepower of this big American gun right from the start at El Alamein.
But of all the American hardware available to the British in the North African desert,
the most effective weapon on the ground may have been the M4A1 tank, known to the British
as the Sherman. Another weapon famed for its reliability, the British armored divisions were
ecstatic when substantial numbers of these awesome vehicles arrived in the desert ready for use in
their October 1942 offensive. First built in 1941, the Sherman provided all the basic requirements
of an armored fighting machine. The protection was a minimum of 15 millimeters and a maximum
of 75 millimeters, while its main gun delivered a thumping 75 millimeter caliber shell.
The American constructors knew that this was an ideal combination. In the course of the war,
over 48,000 Shermans were built, more than any other tank anywhere in the world. But its
operational debut came at El Alamein, and the forces of the Panzerarmee Afrika had no answer
to it. Among the problems faced by Rommel in North Africa was the relative inferiority of
the material available to his Italian units. At El Alamein, as elsewhere, Italian troops relied on
weapons like the Semovente self-propelled gun. Armed with a 75 millimeter howitzer and mounted
on a tank chassis, the Semovente could not compete in the North African theater. Lacking in speed,
protection, and firepower, Rommel knew that weapons like the Semovente stood little chance
against superior Allied fire. But he knew that there were a number of fine weapons of German
design available to him. Amongst the most famous was the 88 millimeter flak gun. Originally designed
as an anti-aircraft gun, the flak gun quickly proved its effectiveness against tanks during
the early campaigns of the Second World War. It was admired and feared for the impact of its 20 pound
shells, its six mile range, and a rate of fire of some 20 rounds a minute. Long after the Second
World War came to an end, the 88 millimeter flak gun continued in service in many armies across the
world. The gunners of the Panzerarmee Afrika could also rely on another well-known artillery piece
when battle was joined at El Alamein. This was the 7.62 centimeter gun, a weapon designed not in Germany
but in the Soviet Union. When Hitler opened up the war on the Eastern Front, the initial German
advance into Russian territory was devastatingly quick. On many occasions, Stalin's forces were
compelled to retreat and leave their heavier weapons behind. Many 7.62 field guns fell into
the hands of the invaders. The Germans were so impressed that they copied the design themselves.
In North Africa, its 14 pound shells made a powerful impact against Allied armored units.
But despite the power of the anti-tank weapons available to both sides,
the war in North Africa is still remembered as a conflict dominated by the offensive capabilities
of armored units. And for the fighting at El Alamein, Rommel was able to call on two
well-established tank designs. The Type 3 Panzer was originally designed in 1937,
and by the time of El Alamein, the Type 3 was a battle-hardened model. Armed with a 50 millimeter
main gun and a maximum 50 millimeters of armor, the Type 3 had accompanied German forces wherever
they went in the early years of the war. But this was not the mainstay of the typical German
Panzer division in late 1942. That honor fell to the Type 4. No fewer than 9,000 of them were built,
and its five-man crews were especially keen on the power of its main 75 millimeter weapon.
Its protection was also substantial, but problems with the Type 4 began to reveal themselves
when it was tested against the legendary Russian T-34 during the fighting on the Eastern Front.
The Type 4 and the Type 3 were also inferior to the best of the new American machines
in both firepower and performance. Field Marshal Rommel was well aware of this,
so the German commander was delighted when Hitler promised him delivery of 40 new Type 6 Panzers
in the late summer of 1942. But these superior Tiger tanks never arrived in Egypt. That deficiency
was something the Allied commanders were determined to exploit. By October the 6th,
Montgomery had decided that the main thrust of his attack would be in the northern sector.
This was the responsibility of the 30th Corps, commanded by General Oliver Leese.
The idea was to weaken the Axis defenses with a devastating display of artillery and air power.
With this achieved, Montgomery proposed to follow up with an attack by four infantry divisions in
the north. It was a formidable task. In the late summer of 1942, the Panzer Armee constructed a
fiendish defensive position on the El Alamein front line. In all, there were 445,000 mines to
negotiate, as well as tripwire devices and other booby traps, aptly nicknamed the Devil's Gardens.
But the line would have to be breached if 30th Corps were to succeed in their mission.
At the same time, in the south, the units of 13th Corps would also move forward.
But this was intended as a diversionary tactic, to tie down the enemy positions in this sector,
including the crucial German armor. Back in the north, Montgomery's own armored corps would then
enter the corridor cleared for them by the infantry, break through the German line,
and advance into the open desert. At this point, victory would be assured.
Despite the difficulties posed by the German defenses, the plan was feasible,
and it was given the codename Operation Lightfoot. Montgomery was well aware of his advantage in men
and materials, but he also knew that Rommel was expecting an attack at some point, and his rival
knew that the attack would have to be directly into his line. The only question was where.
So Montgomery decided to play another trick on his enemy, to make the German command think that
the main assault would come in the south. To do this, he ordered the construction of a dummy army
in the southern sector. In the build-up to battle, a fleet of fake vehicles made of inflated rubber
were positioned in the desert. They were joined by fake artillery pieces, fake pipelines, and fake
personnel, as all the time the real Allied force was organized under heavy camouflage in the north.
Finally, Montgomery ordered the broadcast of bogus radio messages from an imaginary armored division
in the southern sector. It was a brilliant enterprise, and the Allied commanders knew
that their October the 23rd attack would come as a surprise to their opponents.
In the early evening of October the 23rd, 1942, the British Eighth Army waited in the
North African desert. Montgomery was always keen to give an impression of confidence,
and as H-hour approached, there was every reason for him to do so. In the battle about to begin,
Montgomery knew that the odds were with him. He had the advantage in men and materials,
he'd achieved tactical surprise, and Rommel was nowhere near the battlefield.
But Rommel would return from his sick leave in Europe and rejoin his men in North Africa,
to play his part in the fighting and make his contribution to the historic events that lay ahead.
Two armies now faced each other, hundreds of thousands of men prepared for battle. But there
would also be a great personal element involved, as Bernard Montgomery and Erwin Rommel faced each
other on the desert battlefield of El Alamein.