China Has Fallen: Here's What It Means for the World

Global Finance News
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We need to talk about China. The Chinese system has been crappy and getting crappier for a very
long period of time. We're all well aware of that. However, something abruptly changed this summer.
It's as if everything has been taken up a notch. Bank lending contracted at the worst rate in over
20 years. Household loans fell up a half a trillion yuan. Industrial production slowed way down.
Consumer spending fell off and contracted for two months running for the first time since
early 2020. Fixed asset investment in China absolutely plunged this summer. And just as bad,
Chinese stocks are soaring. Those have the look and the feel of an artificial trend that's been
put together to put a positive spin on what is turning out to be a significant deterioration
in circumstances. It's very reminiscent of 2015 right before the crash in Chinese stocks and the
hard downshift in Chinese economy that rippled throughout so much of the world and wrecked so
much of the emerging world. And remember too, where it comes to China and Beijing, we're now 11
months after the big bazooka policies from last September. The Chinese government has been
implementing those ideas and then some. It has borrowed a staggering sum by issuing all of these
government bonds. I told you back then it wouldn't work and it has stunningly failed as all government
stimulus policies do. But this goes beyond the usual failures. It's not just that stimulus has
failed to stimulate in China. There's a big-time stumble going on this summer which will ripple all
throughout the rest of the world as if something massive has shifted more than it had before.
Call it payback panda. The usual, normal, what we've become accustomed to deterioration in the Chinese
economy and its banking sector has abruptly shifted, downshifted to the downside starting
around June and heading into July. That's what all the latest economic data says. That's what the
banking sector statistics all say and it's also what we're getting from China's oil sector and
the results from Sinopec. China's big oil company reported operating income that dropped 10.6 percent
in the first half of 2025 compared to the first half of 2024. Its profits before tax crashed by
43.4 percent and net income fell 36 percent to 23.75 billion yuan and the company also said as a result
of all of these results it's going to lower its full-year capital spending plan by around five
percent. A perfect representation and illustration of the struggles in China's economy that become
further problems down the road. Less investment, less of everything else. As Bloomberg reported
yesterday, Sinopec has been contending with a number of challenges this year. The company's
reported lower production of both gasoline and diesel. As they have to put this in here, the
rapid spread of electric vehicles has undermined demand for the transport fuels. However, at the
same time, the industry has been grappling with over capacity and intense competition with Beijing
expected to tighten controls over inefficient refiners. Oversupply simply means under demand.
Recessionary types of conditions. Deflation that's coming from the energy space is a natural
and direct reflection of that falling demand, not necessarily increasing supply, especially in China
where the overall supply is an external variable. And while the media loves to talk about the
widespread adoption of EVs as the reason for lower oil demand, especially in China, and that's true.
It's been, it has put a dent in it. The real dent comes from the other part. Industry grappling
with over capacity because industry, China wide, has been suffering from the same thing.
Over capacity that wasn't over capacity until very recently. Just look at the retail sales data
for under demand in China, like we'll do a little bit further on here. There wasn't supposed to be
over capacity when the capacity was first installed. There never is. That's, I mean,
that's the nature of any business cycle. And while this is, this is a unique cycle in many ways,
at the fundamental level, it still is a cycle. Forgot how to grow remains the downside to it.
Only now in China, forgot how to grow has shown concrete signs of remembering a lot worse,
especially the last couple of months that we're getting here. Before we go on with our video
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to the rest of our video. What the Chinese have tried to do in the 21st century is use those
unique circumstances to their advantage. Xi Jinping really believed that the recovery following the
lockdowns was legitimate, legitimately robust. And most of all, China would benefit the most
from it, more than anywhere else. So Xi intended to leverage that upswell to finally deal with
the festering real estate bust. The same one which was created almost two decades ago
as a transitory response to the Great Knot Recession, which instead became the silent
depression rather than a recovery. And this is, you'll notice, a persistent theme, false dawns,
recoveries that are promised but never delivered. And as the global recovery in the 2010s wore on,
the Chinese built more properties as a way to sustain the previous model of socialism with
Chinese characteristics. But in 2016 or thereabouts, Xi Jinping decided he'd seen enough,
and he began to curtail the temporary Keynesian stimulus, quote unquote, that had only stimulated
the massive property bubble, not the actual economy, which only grew worse throughout the
decade. The pandemic, therefore, seemed to offer a unique opportunity. The massive recovery,
or what everyone believed was a recovery, gave Xi an out. Leveraging the economic gains,
or purported economic gains, or expected economic gains, to offset the drag from the property bust,
creating new avenues for economic activity, employment, and advance, while also giving,
importantly, banks a way to profit on the real economy so that they could offset those legacy
real estate loan losses. And it was a genius idea, or so it seemed. The problem in China
as everywhere else was all based on an illusion, a lie, not a real recovery. Global prices soared
not because the global economy did as it recovered. Prices soared because there were too many negatives
on the supply side, so surprising less upside in demand was all it took to trigger basic economics,
the price illusion. Now, the reality of the situation became painfully clear in early 2023,
reopening. China had locked down the year before, and when they opened back up, it was supposed to
be this renaissance, that China was going to lead the rest of the world into an actual global
recovery, and instead, China face-planted. That wasn't just a warning to Beijing, it was an
unmistakable signal just how embedded forgot how to grow was going to be, because there was no
recovery, only the price illusion. And ever since that shock, the shock to economists and politicians,
not to the markets, by the way, but ever since that shock, the Chinese have been ramping up more and
more quote-unquote stimulus over everything from housing rescues to historic housing rescues,
fiscal spending on waste, then the massive 2024 bazooka, more subsidies, a bank recapitalization
plan, almost everything you can imagine. And China's economy has only gotten worse. At best,
it has been unresponsible, but the worsening thus far has been slow, almost imperceptible,
especially after we get normalized to it, totally in keeping with the forgot how to grow mode.
But the next warning sign came last year, that global inflection we keep talking about.
In China, the Chinese banking sector started to accelerate its own decline. Bank lending was
negatively impacted by the failure of the economy after reopening, since reopening was supposed to
provide in and out for banks to generate more than enough accounting profits to offset those
mounting property loan losses. They could effectively clean up their balance sheets
by scraping some of the booming recovery to pay for it. Take away the boom, China's banks are not
just left with those prior losses, they now have to deal with overly leveraged real economy firms
who are suddenly getting to be almost as risky as property developers have been. No wonder loan
growth just fell off. The total outstanding stock of loans was growing at around 11% in 2022,
which is already a much slower rate than before the 2020s. It temporarily jumped up to around
a very nearly 12% in early 2023s reopening, but then quickly faded during the troubled summer.
And by March of 2024, that global inflection, the rate was under 10% for the first time ever,
but it was below 9% just three months later, and at 7.7% year over year in November,
two months after the bazooka. As of the latest figures released for July, outstanding loan
growth is 6.9%, below 7% for the first time ever, and continuing to slow at a staggering
second order rate, a drastically slower rate of growth. And this simply means that Chinese banks
are increasingly only lending to their best and safest borrowers at the expense of everyone and
everything else. That also means household and corporate loans. Now Chinese government,
they've been targeting specifically mortgages and households as a way to try to kickstart
the moribund property sector, and it has not worked either. The PBOC, for example,
has lowered its policy rates, which do have a more direct impact on mortgages in China,
especially those that are tied to the five-year loan primary. And there have been targeted
programs to ease the way for first-time homebuyers, even the relaxation of restrictions where it comes
to second homebuyers and investment properties. But China's bank credit stats show nothing has
worked. In July, the latest data that we just got, new household loans crashed by half a trillion
yuan, more than double the drop of July 2024, which had gone a long way to convincing Beijing
the government needed to amplify and accelerate its housing stimulus, which the bazooka, it did.
And as you can clearly see, no effect. Stimulus doesn't stimulate, especially lower interest
rates. As always, lower policy rates and ramping up fiscal expansion, they're always instead a
response to the weakness, not a solution for it. And going beyond lending to households, though,
Chinese banks are just cutting back everywhere. New RMB loans described by Total Social Financing,
those also crashed unusually in July. Now, July is not a top month for lending anyway, coming after
June when banks and borrowers have to meet quotas, or at the very least secret minimums. Yet this
July was something new, something else. New RMB loans dropped by over 400 billion, the worst in
any July or any month for that matter, in over 20 years of figures. These estimates show that not
only is the banking situation getting worse, it is indeed accelerating. And moreover, it does appear
to be finally have an accelerating downside impact on China's economy. Now, the one thing that China
did do was in response to this increasingly downside to the Chinese banking sector, the
increasing Japanification of Chinese banks, they issued the bazooka, they announced the bazooka,
said they were going to borrow a ton of bonds, and borrow a ton of bonds, they did. So Beijing has at
least lived up to that end of it. They've been issuing bonds like crazy. In fact, according to
Total Social Financing, government bond issuance has been gigantic since last August, when the big
stuff got ramped up. New government bond financings just in the first seven months of this
year have been 8.9 trillion yuan. That compares to 4 trillion January to July 2024. Now according to
mainstream economics, the Keynesian version, that massive government impulse should be more than
enough to offset and overcome the downside from banks and the real economy's long-standing
problems. To Keynesians, it's all just aggregate demand. But the world does not work like Keynesians
assume it does. China is the perfect test case for every last one of their theories. And not only do
they fail every single time, they do so in spectacularly obvious fashion. Now the downside
in bank lending and the slow decline in the real economy, which goes along with it, they've been
building and building the past year or so. Now here in the summer of 2025, it seems to have finally
broken out to an even greater downside. Part of it is just a strain from all that, but also China
is suffering from economic payback too. Having ramped up to a certain degree, producing as many
goods as possible to beat tariffs, there's now the negative pull of the aftermath. I mean, if you
front load demand, there is going to be payback to it. But that's just one more negative factor to add
to all of these others. And the stats really tell the tale. Now industrial production for the month
of July has only moderated here in the summer, with the July growth rate coming back down to around
5.7% year over year from 6.8% in June, having been as high as 7.7% back in March. So payback in industry
has been coming on more incrementally. Retail sales on the other hand, there's been a clear trend
change with those. I mean, you could argue the bazooka had some at least short run effect on
consumer spending, maybe a small acceleration in retail sales last year and perhaps to the start
of this year. But it really changed in March, just like everywhere else around the world. For the
monthly data from the Chinese government, retail sales slowed to just two tenths of a percent month
over month in March, then 0.16% month over month in April. Now retail sales shot back up by almost
six tenths of a percent in May, but that was entirely due to more government stimulus, this
time subsidies for items like appliances or consumer electronics. And all that did as usual
was pull forward demand, leaving the consumer economy in China to suffer its own government
induced short run payback, which is of course exactly what we see shocking only economists
and communists who in the Keynesian variety aren't all that far apart. Retail sales dropped, outright
decline. They outright declined by 0.26% in June, a big shift, and then another decline, 0.14%
in July. These are the worst months for retail sales in China since the end of 2022,
the zero COVID lockdowns, if you can believe that. Given everything here, it's not that hard to
believe. It does look like, and the evidence does point to more and more, that China's economy has
hit that air pocket here in the early summer of 2025. Maybe the most convincing and compelling
evidence for it comes from fixed asset investment. FAI used to be the basis for China's miracle,
which wasn't actually a miracle, it was just basic economics of the Eurodollar's heyday.
China was transformed by becoming the factory to the world, which meant creating not just the
factories from scratch, also the houses for the cheap workers where they were going to live,
the roads they used to drive to work and drive factory produce to foreign markets,
the ports to ship everything out, and a whole lot more in between. All of that, fixed asset
investment. And FAI was steady to slightly higher at the start of this year, in large part from the
government deploying some of the proceeds of all that bond borrowing. But as you can see,
that quickly dissipated. Over the last couple months though, June and July, we've got the same
degree of something bigger happening, a contraction. FAI has fallen off sharply.
The accumulated year-to-date rate went from 3.7% in May, which wasn't great, to 2.8% in June,
so already a big drop for an accumulated rate to make in just a single month, but then it fell to
just 1.6% here in July. Private FAI went from slightly positive, being still dragged down by
property sector, to minus 1.5% accumulated last month. Even state-owned FAI has dropped off
sharply. And making some of my own back-of-the-envelope calculations, looking at FAI
in single months rather than on an accumulated basis, private FAI must have been falling at
something like a minus 7% year-over-year rate in July, one of the worst months since the first
couple of months of 2020. It's not overcapacity, it is under demand. It is the lack of recovery.
It is the lie that follows the price illusion. China was going along and forgot how to grow,
already not good, and now all the signs show it is suddenly remembering how to do a lot worse.
And that is reflected in all of these deflationary signals we get all over China's economy,
in producer prices, in GDP deflators, even in wage indications. The Chinese have been trying to hold
everything together just long enough for a miracle, another miracle to happen, for the global economy
to legitimately pick up enough to keep China's macro and banking decline more manageable and
within acceptable tolerances. And since that didn't happen, the entire world went from forgot how to
grow to forgot more how to grow last year, the government has tried to step in to stabilize
everything in China with a massive fiscal push which clearly hasn't worked. But now with all of
these negatives piling up, this summer China went from not working to holy crap in all these various
ways. FAI and key investments were dropping sharply, consumer spending already weak, now paying
back to distortions, industry slowing, bank lending just contracting. The only thing which does appear
to be working is China's stock market. But in the same way Chinese stocks seem to be working and
optimistic back in 2014 and 2015, right before the crash and the permanent shift in China and the
global economy. Money in China, savings in China have nowhere else to go. They can't go into the
property sector or real estate, they sure can't go any place in the real economy, so everyone is
looking for some shelter and with state support that appears to be working at the very least in
the stock market, everyone is piling into Chinese stocks. So Beijing's efforts to prop up equities
which go back to January of 2024 have for the time being appeared successful. Everyone is naturally
piled into the share since there are no other options and since government support has
appeared to work, it gives everyone a rationalization. Stocks are the least worst option in a country
which does look like it may have run out of options. Now China has been a mess for well over
a decade and everyone knows it including Xi Jinping. That mess has gotten clearly worse the past
couple years ever since reopening failed in early 2023. Again Beijing is well aware that's why it's
ramped up all this stimulus on all these different fronts. What we're seeing in the summer of 2025
however, goes way beyond the usual failed fiscal or even just the normal deterioration.
Something on the downside has gone into overdrive especially June and July. Trade wars, trade
sentiments, both of those combined with banks that are reaching a possible credit crisis cliff,
something has changed. So we need to pay attention to China and the fact that stocks are soaring
is ironically the last signal to that same effect. Our forgot how to grow world really does appear to
have remembered how to do worse especially where it comes to China and China as you'll note that's
a big one. After months and months of warning about the possibility of tariff inflation Fed
Chair Jay Powell says well we don't have any evidence for that I'm now starting to worry about
the labor market situation in the U.S. too. Jackson Hole went over the details plus what
people missed about it in the video link below. As always thank you very much for joining me,
huge thank you URUtah University members and subscribers and until next time take care.
