China’s Treasury Dries Up! Civil Servants Can’t Be Paid, Overseas Chinese Forced to Lose Citizenship

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In recent years, much has been said about China’s economic slowdown and ongoing stagnation, yet a full collapse seems elusive. Meanwhile, recent reports exposing massive corruption among CCP elites and the extraordinary wealth of their children have raised serious concerns. Despite these revelations, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to assert its influence in sensitive regions, as if its financial resources are limitless.
In recent years, much has been said about China's economic slowdown
and ongoing stagnation, yet a full collapse seems elusive.
Meanwhile, recent reports exposing massive corruption among CCP elites
and the extraordinary wealth of their children have raised serious concerns.
Despite these revelations, the Chinese Communist Party continues to assert its
influence in sensitive regions, as if its financial resources are limitless.
So, what is the real state of China's economy right now?
How long can it hold up?
Today, we'll take a closer look at the situation from three key perspectives.
First, let's address the recent rumors about Beijing's plans
to introduce policies targeting overseas investment income taxes.
This has been interpreted as a sign that the CCP's treasury is nearly empty.
Reports suggest that in an attempt to shore up the national coffers
in response to economic pressures,
Chinese authorities have increased efforts to tax global investment savings.
This has forced wealthy individuals to rethink their asset allocation and tax strategies,
with some even contemplating closing their accounts
with Chinese brokers and moving them to US-based platforms.
The Financial Times recently reported that tax authorities in major economic hubs like Shanghai,
Zhejiang and Shandong have urged investors to declare their income taxes through official
websites. Authorities have also personally called or texted certain individuals.
This month, the message was amplified through state-run media.
While earnings from onshore accounts in China are tax-exempt until 2027,
the government is now focusing on tracking offshore account earnings.
As domestic capital markets struggle,
offshore accounts are becoming increasingly attractive to Chinese investors.
Investors who spend more than 183 days in a year in China
are required to pay a 20% tax on any capital gains made from their global investments.
While many countries have similar taxes, with rates ranging from 10 to 30%,
Beijing has long lacked the infrastructure,
personnel and budget needed to properly enforce such taxes.
With land sales collapsing and economic growth stalling,
Beijing is under more pressure than ever to find new sources of revenue.
This year, the urgency is particularly high to address local government debt,
fund the newly introduced National Child Care Subsidy,
and finance initiatives aimed at boosting consumer spending.
After adopting the OECD-supported Common Reporting Standard for global tax evasion,
China launched the mobile app for reporting personal income taxes.
The app now exchanges financial account information,
including balances and contact details, with more than 120 member institutions,
including banks, brokerages and asset management firms.
This makes it easier for Chinese authorities to track individuals
trading foreign stocks through online platforms like Fuji Securities or Tiger Brokers.
For example, in June, Shanghai's tax authorities required local investor Roger Huang
to pay 20% tax on his profits from Hong Kong stock trades over the past three years.
However, this tax investigation has also forced investors to reconsider their asset allocation
and tax strategies, with many looking to move their investments to platforms not covered by the CRS.
Many investors are now considering closing their accounts with Chinese brokers
and shifting to US-based platforms.
Analyst Mr. Xi believes the CCP's plan will backfire.
Even if it brings in some revenue in the short term,
the negative effects will far outweigh the gains.
This is because those with the ability to make overseas investments in China
are typically high-net-worth individuals.
These individuals, who can invest in US stocks and foreign real estate,
have little confidence in the domestic Chinese environment.
They also have the means to move their capital out of China at any time.
Moreover, China lacks experience in cross-border taxation
and has no established legal framework or regulatory processes to enforce these taxes.
This will inevitably lead to legal loopholes,
and eventually even violent incidents during enforcement.
Some individuals living in China are investing in foreign stocks or real estate through various
channels but have not yet emigrated, mainly because their domestic assets are not fully
processed or they still have business operations within China.
Others already settled overseas but have not renounced their Chinese citizenship
due to business or asset concerns.
For those who have already settled overseas, forcing them to surrender their investment profits
is essentially asking them to give up their overseas investments and even their lifestyle.
This is nearly impossible.
After all, why live overseas under such circumstances?
Moreover, if their investments fail, they will not receive tax refunds from the CCP.
As a result, the CCP will be unable to collect taxes from this group.
If this policy is implemented, it will only push them to liquidate their domestic assets
and consider renouncing their Chinese citizenship.
For those who have not yet settled overseas,
their concerns about China's political and business environment are already high.
This policy will only make them more cautious.
They may temporarily halt overseas investments or pay a small portion of taxes symbolically,
but in the long run, this will only strengthen their resolve to emigrate
and accelerate the liquidation of their domestic assets.
The largest asset for the Chinese people, whether living overseas or in China, is real estate.
As a result, the CCP's push to tax overseas investment income
is likely to push them to sell their properties,
further adding to the pressure on an already struggling real estate market.
This policy is bound to be a costly mistake.
The second major issue is that China's macro leverage ratio has surpassed 300%,
signaling that its debt-driven economy is unsustainable.
The macro leverage ratio is a key economic indicator
that measures the debt level of non-financial sectors relative to a country's GDP.
The 300% figure, reported by China's National Institute for Finance and Development,
is already higher than the United States,
placing China at a high level in international comparisons.
In fact, there are three different versions of China's macro leverage ratio,
calculated by the central bank's annual financial stability report,
the Bank for International Settlements, and NIFD.
These versions vary slightly.
However, NIFD is considered the official financial think tank,
designated by the CCP's central lending group for comprehensively deepening reform in 2015.
This gives a certain level of authority, so we will base our discussion on its data,
while also referencing the other two versions for context.
According to NIFD, China's macro leverage ratio began climbing rapidly after 2008.
From the end of 1993 to the end of 2008,
the ratio increased from 107.8% to 141.2%,
with an average annual rise of 2.1 percentage points.
The 2008 financial crisis and the CCP's 4 trillion yuan stimulus package
had a major impact on China's economy.
From 2008 to 2024, the ratio surged from 141.2% to 290%,
an annual average increase of 9.3 percentage points.
One key point is that, unlike other countries,
China's rise in macro leverage has been entirely driven by policy decisions.
For example, between the second half of 2017 and the end of 2019,
China's deleveraging policy kept the macro leverage ratio stable.
As the pandemic spread in 2020, like other countries,
China also increased debt to stimulate the economy.
However, by 2021, after the pandemic began to transition,
countries started adjusting their pandemic and economic policies.
As a result, macro leverage ratios began to decrease,
with expectations to return to pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2024.
Unlike Germany, Japan, and the US,
whose macro leverage ratios spiked and then declined,
China's ratio has consistently risen.
Why is this?
First, China's authorities maintained the extreme Dynamic Zero COVID policy,
which caused major disruptions,
including the lockdown in Shanghai and a destabilized economy.
Second, although the Dynamic Zero COVID policy was abandoned at the end of 2022,
no substantial measures were implemented to stimulate consumption or revive the economy.
The government continues to follow the same old pattern of large infrastructure,
large investments, large debt,
knowing it is unsustainable but unable to break free.
According to NIFD's report on the second quarter of 2025,
China's macro leverage ratio first exceeded 250% in the first quarter of 2020,
reaching over 275% within 12 quarters,
Due to nominal GDP growth soaring faster than debt accumulation,
the ratio quickly surpassed 300% in just 9 more quarters.
This rapid rise in leverage is a result of slowing nominal GDP growth.
Nominal GDP is calculated at current market prices,
while real GDP adjusts for inflation.
Typically, nominal GDP grows faster than real GDP due to inflation.
However, China has been experiencing deflation,
causing nominal GDP growth to slow.
For example, in the second quarter of 2025,
nominal GDP grew by only 3.9%, the lowest since 2023,
while real GDP was reported at 5.2%.
The main issue is that while debt continues to increase,
nominal GDP growth is slowing,
causing China's macro leverage ratio to surge.
If nominal GDP growth were higher than debt growth,
the leverage ratio would decrease.
This is the fundamental strategy for reducing leverage.
This analysis reveals a deeper problem.
China's larger issue is not just the rise in macro leverage,
but the fact that its economic growth engine is running out of steam.
The returns on investments are declining, GDP growth is slowing,
and it's becoming harder to use debt to stimulate economic growth.
At the same time, total debt is accelerating,
and the economy has entered a phase where debt is used to service other debt,
indicating that China's debt-driven economy has reached its limits.
Now let's break down the components of the macro leverage ratio,
which includes the debt levels of non-financial corporations,
the government, and households relative to GDP.
According to NIFD's report,
China's household sector leverage ratio stood at 61.1% in the second quarter of 2025,
a 0.4 percentage point decrease from the first quarter.
This reflects weak consumer spending in China.
In fact, Chinese consumers have already exhausted their spending power.
According to BIS data,
it took the US 40 years between 1949 to 1989
and Japan 24 years between 1964 to 1988
to increase their household leverage ratios from 20% to 60%.
In contrast, China achieved this in just 11 years,
from 2009 to 2020, the fastest among these economies.
With a housing market bubble and an unstable economy,
Chinese people are opting to save rather than spend.
There's little room left for further increase in household leverage.
The surge in China's macro leverage ratio is mainly driven by the government
and state-owned enterprises,
while private enterprises have been steadily deleveraging.
The NIFD report on the government sector leverage
does not include hidden local government debt.
Likewise, it doesn't distinguish between state-owned enterprises and private firms
in its calculation of non-financial corporate debt.
If hidden local government debt and SOE debt and state-owned enterprise debt were included,
the true government sector leverage would be much higher.
By the end of 2018, China's macro leverage ratio stood at 243%,
far above the emerging market average of under 190%.
If hidden local government debt were accounted for,
the government sector's debt ratio would exceed 90%,
and the combined leverage ratio for the public sector,
including state-owned enterprises and government debt,
would reach 140%, a rare phenomenon globally.
Since the 2020 pandemic, government debt has surged,
and state-owned enterprises have resumed heavy borrowing,
pushing both sectors' leverage ratios even higher.
However, in contrast, China's tax revenue has dropped back to 2019 levels.
According to official data, tax revenue for the first half of 2025
was 9.3 trillion yuan, a 1.2% decrease from the previous year.
This is on par with the first half of 2019,
when tax revenue totaled 9.2 trillion yuan, a 0.9% increase year-on-year.
The key point is that, while China's GDP increased by 96%
from the first half of 2019 to the first half of 2025,
tax revenue has remained unchanged.
This does not indicate a decline in China's tax collection capacity.
On the contrary, with the implementation of the Golden Tax Project 4,
the government's ability to collect taxes has significantly improved.
The real problem is that the tax base has shrunken,
exacerbated by overt capacity and ineffective investments.
As one user on the Chinese platform Zhihu put it,
the real exchange of social products and services has returned to 2019 levels,
meaning that GDP growth in recent years has essentially been illusory.
With China's macro leverage ratio at 300%,
a 1% increase in the long-term benchmark interest rate
would mean an additional interest payment equivalent to 3% of China's GDP.
This highlights the decreasing efficiency of economic growth.
The government and state-owned enterprises are increasing leverage.
On the other hand, tax revenues are dropping,
raising the risk of debt defaults.
China's debt-driven economy is now struggling to sustain itself.
The third significant issue is that many organizations in China are struggling to pay wages.
A troubling trend is emerging across China.
More companies are starting to delay salary payments.
One individual reported receiving only half of their salary in July,
with the company citing cash flow difficulties.
Another shared that the private school where her cousin works
has delayed wages for three months in a row.
Even a neighbor who has worked in the same factory for 20 years is now facing delayed paychecks.
This is not an isolated case.
A quick search on social media shows many posts from employees
asking for advice on what to do when their company can't pay salaries.
Once stable jobs, including those in government sectors, are now seeing salary delays.
Companies that were once thought to be secure
are now struggling through an unprecedented financial crisis.
These macroeconomic shifts are translating into concrete numbers,
delayed wages that haven't shown up in employee bank accounts.
For many, this situation causes immediate anxiety.
They still have to pay their mortgages, tuition fees, and medical bills.
These fixed costs don't disappear just because wages are delayed,
and with no clear timeline for when wages will arrive,
workers are left waiting, draining their patience and savings.
What's even more surprising is that jobs once considered the most stable,
like those in the public sector, are now facing wage delays.
A vlogger from Shen Yun recently posted about multiple departments in the public sector
being unable to pay salaries, which sparked widespread discussion.
Comments revealed that all departments in Shen Yun's Yuheng district
hadn't paid wages for six months, with even public kindergartens halting payments.
Workers in other districts, such as Tiexi, Tongzheng, and Heping, reported similar issues.
Employees at Xingxing Social Workstation hadn't been paid in two years.
A volunteer teacher from Puyang Henan Province posted that despite not having formal positions,
they've always struggled financially.
Now even their annual rural subsidies haven't been paid.
A comment on the post read,
it took seven and a half months to receive 1,500 yuan. We can't hold on any longer.
In Liangyungang, Jiangsu Province, workers at a photovoltaic project
under China National Nuclear Corporation blocked their construction due to unpaid wages.
Local businessman Zhu Ziqiang told reporters,
Jiangsu's economy is still considered good compared to other parts of the country,
but even many state-owned enterprises can't pay wages.
The factory where my daughter works has been sold off.
Orders are down, and now they only work three days a week.
The situation could be worse next year.
The U.S. has extended its tariff suspensions on Chinese products for another 90 days,
renewing concerns about a new round of trade tensions between the two countries.
A recent report from Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council points out that as U.S. tariffs increase,
Chinese manufacturing and export businesses are seeing a decline in orders.
This trend is expected to lead to widespread layoffs,
further straining China's already fragile job market.
The report, based on data from the General Administration of Customs,
found that the top 10 categories of products China exports to the U.S.
are all key manufacturing goods.
If the U.S. raises tariffs further, China's exports will take a major hit,
putting pressure on businesses and, in turn, leading to layoffs.
The report advises those planning to work or start
businesses in China reassess the risks involved.
Experts suggest that these new tariffs are not only increasing U.S. government revenue,
but also forcing China to offset export costs through the devaluation of the yuan.
However, this continued devaluation of the yuan will accelerate the outflow of foreign capital,
damage consumer confidence, and put even more strain on the job market.
With the 2025 graduation season approaching,
youth unemployment in China could rise to new levels.
In addition to these three warning signs, China's real estate sector,
which is closely tied to the country's economy, is facing an unprecedented crisis.
According to data from China's National Bureau of Statistics,
new home prices in first-, second-, and third-tier cities fell by an average of 0.2%
to 0.4% in July compared to June.
Compared to the same period last year, new home prices in first-tier cities dropped by 1.1%,
marking 20 consecutive months of decline since December 2023.
The Financial Times reports that these figures have diminished expectations
for a rapid rebound in China's housing market.
Amid four years of slowing real estate growth,
these disappointing figures, coupled with ongoing U.S.-China trade tensions,
are further weighing down China's economy.
Analyst Mr. Xi states that China's economy began stagnating in 2020 due to the pandemic,
with the real decline setting in at the end of 2023.
He claims to have a unique formula for assessing this,
which takes into account not only economic data, but also the real estate sentiment index,
social stability, and international conditions.
According to his formula, China's economy is now slowing at a rate
equivalent to its average economic growth every five years since 2000.
At this rate, he predicts it could return to 1999 levels by 2028.
Over the next three or four years, significant political events,
such as a potential leadership change or the resignation of President Xi Jinping,
could take place.
The analyst suggests that the CCP may not survive until 2029,
and could face collapse before then.
