The Forgotten Hero Who Saved D-Day

Historical Identity
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4 Video Views·Aug 17, 2025
A Spanish civilian spying for Germany was actually an intrepid enemy of fascism. Decorated by Germany and Britain alike, he ran an imaginary network of spies and produced fake intelligence that reached the desk of Hitler himself.
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Madrid, spring 1941.
A small Spanish man walked into the German embassy
and changed the course of World War II.
He gave his name as Señor Lopez.
He said he wanted to spy for the fatherland.
Another lie.
But the German secret service believed him.
As a liar, he was world class.
His intricate web of deception would fool Hitler himself
and help bring the Nazis to their knees.
Working as a British agent, his entire spy network was a big lie.
Each sub-agent, a work of his fertile imagination.
Crucially, on D-Day, his lies pinned down over 350,000 German reinforcements,
defending an imaginary Allied attack by an army that didn't even exist.
This is the true story of a consummate liar,
a peerless actor, the ultimate double agent.
The spy who saved D-Day.
Agent Garbo.
Born Juan Pujol Garcia in Barcelona,
in the Catalan region of northern Spain in 1912,
he had a comfortable, politically liberal upbringing.
An unremarkable life as a poultry farmer lay ahead of him,
until in 1936, Spain erupted into civil war.
The 24-year-old Juan Pujol despised political extremism
and avoided military service for two years, using forged ID papers.
Then, in a strange twist, he volunteered for the left-wing republican army,
only to risk his life defecting to General Franco's right-wing nationalists.
In 1939, General Franco emerged victorious and became dictator of Spain.
The young Pujol had served both sides in the civil war,
a telling prophecy of his life to come.
Soon, another European dictator, Adolf Hitler, was on the march.
On the 1st of September 1939, Nazi troops invaded Poland.
Two days later, Britain declared war on Germany.
The Second World War had begun.
Juan Pujol, now married and running a small hotel in neutral Spain,
watched in dismay.
He really felt absolutely passionately that,
based on what had happened to him in the Spanish Civil War,
he had a special insight in what the rest of Europe was about to experience.
And he believed this was the end of civilisation.
In May 1940, the German Blitzkrieg blasted through northern France,
driving the British into the sea.
Pujol saw liberal, democratic England
standing alone against the relentless advance of the fascists and losing.
The only world power that was standing against the Germans was the British.
And so I think at that point, Juan Pujol found himself an anglophile
because the British were the only people
who really stood squarely with his own idea of life at this point.
But what could one man do?
Pujol decided it was his duty to help the British in any way he could.
In January 1941, Pujol's wife visited the British Embassy in Madrid
to offer his services in the war effort.
This offer from a Spanish nobody was rejected out of hand,
but Pujol was not a man to take no for an answer.
Determined to make himself useful to the British,
Juan Pujol executed a bold and dangerous stroke.
Pujol now walked into the German Embassy in Madrid
and, pretending to be an ardent fascist, offered his services to them.
The Germans were hardly more enthusiastic.
What they really needed, they said, was a man in England,
an impossible goal without the right official paperwork.
Pujol, still not taking no for an answer,
was determined he would be that man in England.
Impersonating a Spanish Embassy official,
he coerced printers into making him a document
that looked very like a diplomatic passport.
At a designated cafe,
Pujol showed it to the German intelligence officer,
Sonderführer Karl-Erich Kuhlenthal.
He made the most extraordinary claims that, for instance,
that he had a visa to get to England, when he quite clearly didn't.
All of this is risk-taking,
that, in today's world, a psychiatrist would take a pretty close look at.
Kuhlenthal, codenamed Carlos, was impressed.
Pujol's deceptions had convinced Kuhlenthal that he could get to England.
Pujol, in trying to help the British, had infiltrated German intelligence.
The German secret service, the Abwehr,
now trained Pujol in the classic spying art
of secret writing.
They told him to write an innocuous, chatty letter in Spanish.
Then, using an invisible ink,
he was to write his secret reports between the lines.
On receiving a letter from Pujol,
his handler, Carlos, in Madrid, using the matching developer,
would reveal the British secrets.
In July 1941,
this new German spy, codenamed Alloy,
left Madrid for Portugal with his wife.
His mission was to get accreditation as a journalist
and travel on to England.
He was armed with a secret ink,
an encoding cipher to encrypt the messages,
and $3,000 of Abwehr funds.
Portugal was officially neutral,
but the capital, Lisbon, was a nest of spies.
All nationalities converged on this key Atlantic port,
the crossroads of war-torn Europe.
Refugees traded heirlooms for tickets to America.
Intelligence agents traded information.
Pujol hoped that showing the German agents kit
at the British embassy in Lisbon
would finally convince them of his worth.
He couldn't even get an interview,
and that was a big problem.
His forged travel documents may have fooled German intelligence,
but they couldn't really get him from Lisbon to London.
But now, his Abwehr handler, Carlos, in Madrid,
was expecting his new agent, Alaric's, first report
in a letter postmarked from England.
How could he possibly explain why the letter was postmarked Lisbon?
Pujol's solution was a stroke of genius.
He invented an imaginary helper.
Dutch airline KLM still flew between Lisbon and England,
despite the war.
As Alaric, Pujol wrote that he'd recruited a flight attendant
who, for a dollar a letter,
would pick them up in London and post them in Lisbon.
This method, he pointed out,
cleverly avoided possible interception by the British censor.
Pujol waited anxiously.
Would Coulenthal accept his lies?
A letter arrived from the Abwehr in Madrid,
full of praise for their new asset, Alaric.
The deception had worked,
but it only added to Pujol's difficulties
because the Germans now wanted facts from their agent in England.
He'd never been to England.
He didn't really know anything about the English person,
the English character, the English country.
He was having to convince the Germans that he really was in Britain,
when he knew nothing about Britain at all.
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A determined Pujol searched for answers to the questions about Britain
at the Lisbon Public Library.
He bought a map of Great Britain,
a tourist guide to England,
a book on the British Navy
and an English-French dictionary of military terms.
He lifted real addresses of British manufacturers from magazine adverts.
Developing his Nazi persona in writing his reports,
he also began to dream up his first informants for his German masters.
The first, Agent Carvalho,
Pujol decided would be a Portuguese living in Newport, South Wales.
His mission?
To report troop and shipping movements in the south-west.
He also created Agent Goebbels, of German-Swiss descent,
and placed him in Bootle.
His mission?
To monitor Liverpool docks and the north-west.
A third agent would be needed to cover Scotland and the north-east.
So Pujol's fertile imagination gave birth to a Venezuelan,
of independent means, educated at Glasgow University.
His mission?
To report on military activity in Glasgow and on the River Clyde.
With himself based in the south-east,
Pujol had given the Germans a nationwide spy network
at the stroke of his pen.
Writing these supposedly eyewitness reports about Britain from a Lisbon library,
Pujol inevitably made mistakes.
He wrote that Agent Three reported that there are men in Glasgow
ready to do anything for a litre of wine.
Another report stated that in summer,
foreign embassies leave for Brighton to escape the heat of London.
Both un-British, continental habits.
Pujol's nightmare was that an error would expose him as a fraud to the Abwehr,
and the Gestapo would deal with him then.
He needed to secure British protection soon,
or run for his life.
Ironically, the greatest threat to Pujol's safety
came not from the Germans, but from the British.
MI6, the British intelligence espionage service,
had noticed British firms and addresses
appearing among decoded secret German messages.
These on-the-ground reports led MI5, the British counter-espionage service,
to believe a German agent codenamed Alaric had penetrated Britain.
British intelligence then realised that this agent couldn't be in the country,
because his reports were so extremely odd.
He said he saw non-existent regiments,
sailings of non-existent convoys,
naval manoeuvres on Lake Windermere.
The surest way for MI5 to stop him was to expose him as a fake.
Pujol was only saved from disaster by a chance remark to MI5 in London
that a Spaniard was offering espionage services to Britain from Lisbon.
The penny finally dropped.
Could this Spaniard be the ill-informed German spy Alaric?
It was very lucky for the Allies that Juan Pujol appeared when he did.
He was the right fantasist at the right time.
At last, over a year after he first approached British intelligence,
Juan Pujol made contact.
At the end of April 1942,
Pujol found himself in a three-bedroom semi-detached house in the London suburbs.
His son and pregnant wife left behind in Lisbon.
Daily, intense interrogations picked over his fantastic story.
Was he the mysterious agent Alaric?
Was he really a German spy wanting to work for Britain?
Or a loyal Nazi?
Desperate to prove that he was Alaric,
Pujol presented copies of 38 letters he'd written to the German secret service
over a nine-month period.
He hoped to prove his loyalty to Britain
by handing over letters and micro-photo questionnaires from his German handlers.
One key letter detailed how agent Goebbels had seen a convoy leaving Liverpool for Malta.
It matched entirely a German secret message intercepted by the British.
This established beyond doubt that Pujol was who he claimed to be,
German agent Alaric.
And now, finally, MI5 believed he was on their side.
In the early 40s, one movie star outshone all others in Hollywood.
But MI5 thought Pujol the greatest actor in the world.
His British codename had to be Garbo.
How to best run Garbo as a British double agent was far from clear.
Garbo's case officer would need to be able to exploit Pujol's extraordinary imagination.
MI5, in a moment of inspiration, appointed Thomas Harris.
Tommy Harris was probably unique in MI5 at the time
in that he was willing to give his double agent a lot of leeway.
He could see that this was a man after his own heart,
this was a man with an imagination, and he let him fly.
The semi-detached house in the London suburbs provided perfect cover for Juan Pujol.
Once his wife and son had joined him, it became a family home.
Although Garbo was now working for the British, commuting to anonymous offices in Jermyn Street,
the top priority was to continue the secret letters so that the Germans would detect no change.
MI5 made this very difficult by insisting Pujol change to using a typewriter for the cover letter.
He'd never used one before.
The method of secret writing was also changed, swapping cotton wool for a nib.
Continuity was only maintained as Pujol continued to pose as a verbose, fanatical Nazi,
ready to risk his life for the Führer's New World Order.
England must be taken by arms, he ranted.
She must be fallen upon, destroyed and dominated.
She must be sabotaged, destroying all her potentialities.
With a raised arm, I end this letter with a pious remembrance for all our dead.
Pujol's huge ability was to completely adopt this wholly bogus persona of the absolute ardent Nazi.
Letters from Garbo's German handler in Madrid showed he suspected nothing.
Now the United States had joined the Allies, he was more concerned about a major assault.
The Germans feared an invasion of France must come somewhere at some time.
They wrote to Garbo saying information on British invasion plans was of vital importance.
Not knowing where the Allies might choose to invade, Germany had to defend the entire coast of northern France.
They had begun to construct mile after mile of minefields, barbed wire fences, concrete walls and fortified artillery emplacements.
In 1942 this Atlantic Wall was still woefully inadequate and the Germans were right to be worried.
To establish Garbo's credibility as a source of information on the invasion,
Harris invented a job for Pujol.
Freelance propaganda work for the BBC and the Ministry of Information.
The Garbo network was working and expanding.
Pujol added new entirely imaginary sub-agents to the German payroll.
An RAF NCO he called simply Number 3 he placed in Glasgow, Scotland.
And a Gibraltarian waiter, Agent 4, he centred on Soho, central London.
In truth, all information flowed from the German street office.
Harris, Pujol and an assistant were now sending two or three long letters a week.
They contained as much confusing bulk as possible for the enemy to assimilate and a sprinkle of low-level facts.
The next stage was crucial, establishing the quality of Garbo's information.
In November 1942 the Allies launched Operation Torch, a vast seaborne assault on the coast of Axis-occupied North Africa.
Such a large force took months to assemble and train.
The Germans could reasonably expect their Garbo sub-agents around Britain to pick up enough information to provide an early warning.
The dilemma for Harris and Pujol was that an early warning would jeopardise the whole invasion,
but a lack of credible reports would endanger the whole Garbo operation.
So they had to blow a hole in their carefully constructed network.
Garbo wrote to Madrid that Agent Gerbers on Merseyside was ill in bed and no reports were forthcoming from that region.
Later he broke the sad news that his imaginary Northwest agent had sickened and died, extending the information blackout.
MI5 even placed a fake obituary notice in the Liverpool Daily Post, and Pujol sent it to the Germans as corroboration.
To maintain his credibility, as the day of Operation Torch grew nearer, Garbo released a snippet of accurate information.
One of his invented Venezuelans in Glasgow reported a convoy of ships leaving port.
They were painted, he said, in distinctive Mediterranean camouflage.
As the warships approached North Africa, to place Garbo's loyalty beyond doubt,
Pujol warned the Germans where and when the attack was to take place in an airmail letter.
But falsely postmarked a week earlier, the letter arrived just after the invasion.
The Allies met with little resistance, and Operation Torch was a success.
Garbo's mission to establish his network's credibility was also a triumph.
The Germans thought the warning was excellent intelligence, but had merely been delayed in the disrupted wartime post.
They were so delighted with the accuracy, if not the timing of the report,
that they agreed a bonus and a 50% pay rise for every agent.
The Abwehr were increasingly hungry for Garbo's first-class British secrets, overwhelming the small MI5 team in German Street.
Garbo himself had a crushing workload.
He wrote hundreds of the 2,000-word secret reports.
Unbelievably, he wrote the cover text for every letter, and was becoming exhausted.
MI5 wanted to switch the Garbo network to radio transmissions,
eliminating both secret writing and the draining cover letters for Pujol.
Radio transmissions would provide instant communication, and Kuhlenthal enthusiastically embraced the change.
But Garbo's workload didn't shrink for long.
He continued to add to his fantasy spiring.
Poor departed agent Gerbers was replaced by three more agents.
A well-placed British official in the Spanish Department of the Ministry of Information, an unwitting informant called J3.
Agent 5, a Venezuelan, the brother of Agent 3, joined him in Scotland.
Agent 6, Pujol decided, was violently anti-Russian, and was to report from North Africa.
These were all manifestations of the imagination of one single extraordinary individual.
They all had their own particular problems, wife trouble, girlfriend trouble, financial issues.
They were living in different parts of the country where Garbo had never visited himself.
All of this is absolutely remarkable.
More agents meant more MI5 staff in German Street.
There was clearly too much information for one man to process,
so Garbo pretended to hire Gerber's widow to help him.
The story he told the Germans was she moved from Butel to live with the Pujol family in Hendon.
Garbo rather melodramatically codenamed his latest character, The Widow.
Pujol had a good time. I think he really enjoyed what he was doing.
They lived, they breathed, they convinced the Germans,
and I think on some level they probably convinced Pujol as well.
German intelligence believed they had a reliable spy network in Britain.
But Pujol had ensured they actually had no spy network at all.
The Abwehr, in good faith, sent 17 micro-dot photos of a secret radio transmission plan
and a new top-secret cipher table to encode his transmissions.
We trust that you will be able to guard all of this material, they wrote,
and prevent it at any time from ever falling into the hands of the enemy.
MI5 sent it straight to the codebreakers at Bletchley Park.
The codebreakers, unknown to the Germans, could already read their most secret internal communications.
British intelligence joined Garbo's transmissions, in black,
with any matching intercepted German radio traffic, in red.
It soon became a very thick file.
All Garbo material appeared to be given priority,
and every military report he sent to Madrid was retransmitted straight to Berlin.
Tommy Harris now knew he'd constructed a channel of deception so strong,
it could become a weapon in the invasion of France.
With a year of extensive training and meticulous planning left until the D-Day invasion,
and with German confidence in Garbo unshakeable,
the network so all-seeing and reliable,
Pujol was finally ready to play his part in the greatest deception in the history of warfare.
The plan to invade France on D-Day, June 1944, was called Operation Overboard.
Overall commander General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Montgomery
knew this would be the riskiest moment of the war.
Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels also understood that any invasion was a big gamble.
They will be staking everything on one card, he said.
They will lose the war very quickly if that card does not win.
The odds were stacked against the Allies.
Waiting for them was perhaps Germany's greatest soldier,
Field Marshal Rommel.
He had taken command of the Atlantic wall,
and reinforced hundreds of miles of coastline with gruesome obstacles and trenches.
He built a death zone of densely packed mines behind every beach,
and reinforced that with infantry and artillery.
Rommel believed any Allied attack had to be smashed early on the beaches,
and knew the first 24 hours of any invasion would be decisive.
But what Rommel and the German high command didn't know was when the attack might come,
and they didn't know where.
If Garbo could fool them about the time and the place of the main D-Day assault,
the invasion might just work.
Garbo's ever-growing band of imaginary sub-agents were dispatched to England's south coast.
Their Gibraltarian waiter went to Southampton.
A retired Welsh seaman covered Dover.
Rags, an Indian poet, was in Brighton.
A fascist Welshman from Brothers in the Aryan World Order monitored Harwich.
Pujol even claimed he'd started an affair with a secretary in the Ministry of Information,
and added a fake US Army NCO to explain his access to detailed troop movements.
The network had never been so large and so powerful,
and German trust in it never so high.
Military orthodoxy would indicate that an invasion from Britain should target the Pas-de-Calais.
It was the closest point to England.
Along the Atlantic wall, the Germans kept watch.
They knew that any invasion fleet would have to cross the channel,
and they knew, too, that afterwards the supply ships would have to cross.
Every day, many times a day.
But because it was the closest, most obvious choice,
the Germans had the ports of the Pas-de-Calais very heavily fortified.
So Eisenhower and Montgomery rejected it, and chose the furthest workable choice,
the less heavily defended beaches of Normandy.
Montgomery's planned initial Allied assault of eight divisions
could potentially face all 59 German divisions in France.
If the Germans focused on Normandy, the invasion was doomed.
Garbo was to be the linchpin of a complex deception
to keep German forces away from Normandy in the Pas-de-Calais.
D-Day minus 70.
In Dover, opposite Calais, the Welsh seamen reported 20 minesweepers and 50 gunboats.
D-Day minus 56.
At Felixstowe on England's east coast,
Pujol's Welsh fascist reported barges on the beach and new embarkation slipways.
D-Day minus 45.
At Taunton in Devon, the commercial traveller reported many troops belonging to the First American Army.
Like the other sightings, this First US Army group, FUSAG, didn't actually exist.
It was a ghost army of 11 non-existent divisions.
150,000 fictitious men in south-east England, close to the Pas-de-Calais.
The British and US military build-up in Britain for D-Day was huge.
Three million men.
Montgomery's British 21st Army group, training in the west of England, was destined for Normandy.
And Garbo's agents faithfully reported their real movements.
But to this they added vast numbers of invented FUSAG troop movements.
D-Day minus 22.
Vehicles of the 3rd Canadian Division in Brocklehurst.
D-Day minus 16.
Vehicles with the insignia of a red diamond on a blue circle.
D-Day minus 11.
Lion on a yellow square belongs to the 15th Division.
Brighton is full of troops.
Garbo's agents' descriptions of bizarre badges for these fake divisions moving around south-east England
helped the Germans jump to the desired conclusion.
The guarantee of success was German analysts who were piecing together all the individual components themselves.
They were predisposed.
They had an idea of what the picture on the top of the jigsaw puzzle box looked like.
All of this neatly fitted together.
It all fitted the Germans' belief that the target was the Pas-de-Calais.
But the clincher was when Garbo told them that FUSAG, the first US Army group,
was to be commanded by General George S. Patton.
They had enormous respect for him. He was passionate. He was known to be violent.
This was what the Germans believed a general should be.
And so to put him in charge of this army group that was going to make the important thrust into the Pas-de-Calais
made perfect sense.
To reinforce the deception, most Allied bombing was focused on the Pas-de-Calais instead of Normandy
in the weeks before the 6th of June 1944.
D-Day minus 5.
1st of June 1944.
An intercept of German radio traffic showed the deception about where the invasion would come seemed to be working.
The Japanese ambassador to Berlin, General Ashima, met Hitler at his country retreat in Berchtesgaden.
I think that after several diversionary actions, Hitler assured him,
they will then come forward with an all-out front across the streets of Dover.
But the deception also had to mislead the Germans as to the timing of the attack.
The Carbo network reported supply shortages and that newly arrived US troops still needed training.
The Germans concluded that the Allies couldn't be ready to invade until late summer, over two months away.
Any action before then could only be one of the diversions Hitler was predicting.
In reality, the invasion was already upon them.
D-Day, June 6th 1944.
Across a 60-mile front, Allied seaborne and airborne forces assaulted the German defences.
This was the largest amphibious assault in history.
Allied troops assaulted five Normandy beaches between Cherbourg and Le Havre.
In the crucial first 24 hours, the objective was to capture the beachheads,
press on to high ground and establish a front line up to 10 miles inland.
But this vital goal was not achieved.
The Allied invaders, desperately clinging to the French coast by their fingertips,
needed the deception to save D-Day from disaster.
The first intelligence victory was that the assault took the German high command completely by surprise.
Rommel wasn't even in France. He'd gone home to Germany for his wife's birthday.
The other generals were very slow to realise a major attack was even underway.
It was only when Rommel returned late in the afternoon that he did the one thing the Allies feared most.
He ordered two crack panzer divisions, 40,000 men and tanks, to redeploy from the Pas-de-Calais to reinforce Normandy.
The tender Allied bridgehead would be crushed by the overwhelming firepower of these battle-proven armoured divisions.
Somehow, they must be stopped.
On D-Day plus three, the 9th of June, Garbeau sent the most important report of his extraordinary career.
In this emergency, the policy of guiding the Germans with small details and leaving them to draw their own conclusions was jettisoned.
Instead, Garbeau would tell one big lie and hope the Germans would swallow it.
Would their faith in Garbeau hold when it counted most?
The present operation, though a large-scale assault, he said, is diversionary in character.
Garbeau stated clearly that the Normandy invasion was a feint to draw off German reserves,
and even ventured his opinion that a second attack was likely in Pas-de-Calais.
On D-Day, Pujol openly urged them to send the report directly to German high command.
Garbeau was actually telling the enemy not to send reinforcements to Normandy.
But had he gone too far?
German intercepts were anxiously decoded.
Would the Germans smell a rat and pour all their forces into Normandy?
Garbeau's report was passed all the way to the top.
Told by Hitler himself.
And astonishingly, the dictator did as he was told.
Just hours after Garbeau stopped transmitting, the armoured divisions were halted,
and orders intended for divisions of the German 15th Army to move to Normandy were rescinded.
Harris and Pujol were the heroes of the hour.
But scarcely believing the deception was still working,
they continued to flood the Germans with small details in support of the Pas-de-Calais attack.
D-Day plus ten.
59th US Division reported arriving in Harwich area.
D-Day plus sixteen.
Agent seven reported activity of forces under Fussag in the Gravesend area.
D-Day plus twenty-five.
Four new US divisions arrived to reinforce Fussag for its upcoming assault on the Pas-de-Calais.
Garbeau's story of preparation for a second, bigger invasion was corroborated by Luftwaffe aerial reconnaissance.
The Germans sent a message as late as D-Day plus seventeen.
There are recognisable indications of completed preparations for air landing and parachute operations, they observed.
The reported concentration of landing craft in the harbours of the east coast also deserves attention.
But things were not as they seemed.
Paper planes, folding trucks, inflatable tanks and dummy landing craft were placed in ports on the eastern and southeastern coasts of Britain,
where the Luftwaffe could photograph them.
In this scene, which are real aircraft and which dummies?
Who can tell? Certainly not the enemy.
The deceptions were believed by the German high command so completely that all through June and into July,
they kept the two armoured divisions and 300,000 infantry in the Pas-de-Calais,
waiting for an invasion that would never come.
This weakening of the German reinforcements to Normandy proved crucial.
The Allied invasion had become badly bogged down, unable to break through the German defensive line.
A brutal slogging match ensued, until finally, at the end of July, US forces broke out of Normandy and swept deep into France.
Garbo's contribution to D-Day is very hard to exaggerate.
If on the 6th of June 1944 there had been an armoured counterattack that had swept the Allied troops back into the sea,
the war would have gone on for another two years.
So the deception campaign was crucial to that very major gamble.
As Hitler, in desperation, issued more and more unrealistic orders,
the remains of the German divisions retreated rapidly.
By mid-September, Allied forces had liberated France.
The Germans never did find out that Fussag was just an illusion.
On the 29th of July 1944, Carlos informed Pujol that he had been awarded the Iron Cross,
in recognition of his services to Germany.
Now he was thrilled to be given a decoration by the Germans,
and we now know from the internal files that this prompted MI5 to have to
sort out the order of the British Empire for him.
Pujol was also then awarded an MBE, in recognition of his services to Great Britain.
A unique double honour, for a uniquely successful double agent.
After hostilities ceased, Pujol tracked down his German handler Carlos, hiding in Spain.
Karl-Erich Kuhlenthal was overcome with emotion at seeing his friend again.
A star agent.
Kuhlenthal died in 1974, never learning of the deception.
Pujol feared reprisals from embittered Nazis, should his identity be discovered.
He left the UK in June 1945 on a Sunderland flying boat.
The Germans had already given him a reward of 35,000 pesetas.
To that MI5 added a £15,000 thank you, and Pujol simply vanished.
Fifteen years later, in 1959, he was reported to have died from malaria in Angola.
But where Juan Pujol is concerned, reports are not necessarily to be believed.
I suspected that he might still be alive, the master deceiver, deceiving to the very last.
Author and journalist Nigel West decided to investigate,
and after several false trails, discovered Pujol alive and well,
working for Shell Oil in Venezuela.
Nigel West persuaded Pujol to return to London, where Prince Philip, the Duke of Edinburgh,
wanted to thank him personally for services rendered to Britain.
His MBE was pinned proudly to his chest.
Four years later, Juan Pujol died, aged 76.
Pujol and Harris had woven a web of deception that misled the Nazis and shortened the war,
saving thousands of Allied and German lives.
Garbo was very self-effacing,
and it was really only when he emerged from one of the cemeteries in Normandy,
with tears rolling down his cheeks,
that he said, I knew I'd saved tens of thousands of lives,
but I don't think I did enough.
That was true proof of his extraordinary character and qualities.
