The U.S.-China trade war, now in its fourth month, has unfolded in two phases. The first, from April 2’s Liberation Day tariffs to May 14’s Geneva talks, saw China misjudge Trump’s scare-tactic tariffs, retaliating alone and becoming a focal point. The second phase involved diplomatic efforts to rally allies like the EU, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam against U.S. tariffs. China’s lack of preparation and sincerity led to isolation as these nations struck deals with the U.S. A potential third phase looms, where China’s weakened position may yield an unfavorable deal. Despite diplomatic missteps, China’s resilient workforce could absorb tariff costs, though at the expense of its people’s livelihoods. The war’s outcome remains uncertain, with neither side assured victory, highlighting the distinction between fighting well and winning.
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0:00 Intro 0:07 Smoke and Fire – Four Months of Turmoil 0:52 Fighting Well vs. Winning – Lessons from Ukraine 2:46 The First Blunder – China Misreads the Battlefield 3:00 Tariffs 101 – Scare Tactics vs. Substance 5:05 Retaliate and Regret – China Takes the Bait 7:16 The Art of the Bluff – Understanding Trump 8:53 The Missed Opportunity – Phase Two Begins 10:02 Sidelined and Isolated – China Loses Friends 12:13 Europe’s Four Demands – And China’s Arrogance 13:35 Courting Japan and South Korea – A Half-Hearted Effort 14:32 Xi’s Fear of Sacrifice – No Deng Xiaoping Here 17:01 The Road to Isolation – By August, It Was Over 18:12 The Coming Third Phase – When the Bill Comes Due
Hi, I'm Dong Shong. Welcome to digging
into China where we explore China in
depths to review unique perspectives.
The US China trade war now four months
in has been a tpetulent journey. At its
height, opinions swirled. Some claimed
China was prevailing. Others argue the
United States held the upper hand. The
intensity of the conflict fueled
passionate debates with emotions often
clouding judgment. As time has
progressed and with nations like Japan,
South Korea, Vietnam, and the European
Union reaching tariff agreements with
the US, it appears the trade war is
entering a new phase. Today, four months
later, we will revisit the US China
trade war and explore the question of
who is winning and who is losing. First,
allow me to clarify a key point about
the US China trade war. When I speak of
winning or losing, I consider two
distinct aspects. How effectively the
fight is being waged and whether
ultimate victory is achievable. These
are separate considerations. Take
Ukraine for instance. It may not defeat
Russia or reclaim its eastern
territories, but that does not mean it
has fought poorly. Such an outcome
reflects the realities of its
circumstances. Before its war, Ukraine
ranked in the 20th globally in military
strength and was a peripheral nation not
widely recognized as a democratic state.
Its democracy index ranked below
Singapore's often categorized as a semi
athoritarian small and impoverished
country. Yet through the Russia Ukraine
conflict, Ukraine captured global
attention, secured sub substantial aid
and challenged Russia, the world's
second ranked military power while
earning a place among democratic
nations. Given its achievements, what
more could be expected? Ukraine has a
fought with a remarkable resolve. This
is what I mean by fighting well
regardless of the final outcome. For
President Zalinski and the Ukrainian
people, even if Kiev were to fall
tomorrow, they could still claim to have
fought admirably. The US China trade war
shares some parallels beyond the
overarching question of who wins or
loses. There is the matter of how
skillfully the battle is being fought.
Has the Chinese Communist Party
performed well in this regard? In my
assessment, it has not. Indeed, I would
argue it has made frequent missteps.
The trade war can be divided into two
phases. The first phase spanned from the
April 2nd when the liberation day tariff
were announced to May 14 during the US
China Geneva negotiations. On April 2nd,
Trump stunned the world by announcing
tariffs on numerous countries. In
retrospect, it is evident that Trump's
tariff fall into two categories. Scare
tactic tariffs and the substantive
tariffs. Scare tactic tariffs are those
initially proposed such as the 46%
tariff on Vietnam, the 36% tariff on
China or the 100% tariffs threatened
against Canada and Mexico before
liberation day. Later Trump mentioned
the 30% tariffs on the EU and as of
today he has proposed 50% tariffs on
Brazil, 35% on Canada, 50% on India and
20% on Taiwan. These are scare tactic
tariffs unlikely to be implemented or if
enacted sustained for long. They are not
the final tariff levels. The purpose of
these tariffs is to exert pressure
compelling other nations to negotiate
with Trump. Substantive tariffs by
contrast are those in recent agreements
such as the 15% tariffs with the EU,
Japan, and South Korea or the 20% tariff
with with Vietnam. These are the
tangible results of negotiations, not
unilateral threats and are the tariffs
that take effect.
Recognizing this distinction highlights
the CCP's first significant error. At
the outset, it failed to differentiate
between scare tactic and a substantive
tariffs. Reflecting on Trump's April 2nd
liberation day announcement, it was a
broad savo of a scare tactic tariffs
designed to create a panic and drive
nations to the negotiation table. No
country that has since reached a deal
with the US faces tariffs higher than
those announced on April 2nd. In fact,
shortly after Trump scaled back the
tariffs to a uniform 10% and delayed
their implementation until now. Clearly
on April 2nd, the CCP misread the US
intentions. China was not even the
country facing the highest tariffs. Many
others were targeted with the steeper
rates. One might say Trump's tariff
figures were arbitrary. Yet the CCP was
the only one to retaliate, or rather the
only one to take the tariffs seriously.
The result, a mutual escalation with
tariffs reaching 145% on one side and
125% on the other, creating an awkward
standoff.
In my view, the true consequences was
that China became a focal point. the US
immediately shift its attention to
China. I'm not suggesting it was wrong
to counter Trump's trade war or that
China should passively accept US
tariffs. China has every right to
respond. However, we must consider what
that response accomplished. By
retaliating alone on April 2nd, did
China not simply make itself a target?
Unlike Biden, Trump does not adhere
strongly to democratic ideals, and the
US and China are not inevitably
adversaries. Consider Trump's relatively
amicable ties with Russia recently.
China's April 2nd retaliation positioned
it as Trump's primary foe. The CCP's
response suggests two possibilities.
Either it was d disorganized and the
retaliation was an impulsive
miscalculation that drew attention to
China or it was part of a grander
strategy to seize the moment of Trump's
tariff outburst to rally global support
for free trade against the US. If the
former, it was a grave error, a severe
misjudgment of Trump's intentions or his
governing style. The CCP should have the
teams analyzing Trump's behavior and any
thorough study would review his use of
scare tactics. This is not new. It has
been Trump's approach since his business
days. He makes an outrageous demand to
lower expectations and force
compromises. This is Trump's art of the
deal. For instance, when sued by New
York City for illegal development, Trump
counters sued for $100 million, knowing
the figure was unrealistic, perhaps even
fabricated. His aim was to pressure the
other side, lower their expectations,
and push for negotiations. The labor the
liberation day tariff followed this
pattern precisely. Moreover, Trump had
already threatened Mexico and Canada
before April 2nd. Ordinary people
uninvolved in politics might miss this.
But the CCP should not. They should have
recognized that the Liberation Day
tariffs were a scare tactic to draw
countries into negotiations with the US.
To secure a favorable outcome, the CCP
should have understood based on Trump's
history that quiet negotiations were
wiser than public confrontation. That
would have been the optimal approach.
After all, Trump's tariffs targeted
multiple countries, not just China.
China could have let the EU take the
lead and absorb the initial scrutiny.
Some might argue there is another
possibility that the CCP was playing a
larger game. Did they not leverage their
rare earth resources in the first round,
striking back and pressuring the US?
Could this not be seen as securing a
stronger position for future talks,
demonstrating strength, enhancing
China's global image, and rallying
others against the US. This leads us to
the second phase of the trade war. From
the May 14 Geneva negotiations to the
present. During this period, the trade
war appeared to cool with no new tariffs
imposed, resulting in less media
coverage and public attention. However,
this phase is a strategic maneuvering is
arguably more critical than the first.
The key issue, who can secure more
allies? The US China confrontation is
not merely a bilateral contest. For
China to prevail, restricting US access
to rare earth is insufficient, just as
US tariffs or chip restrictions alone
cannot ensure victory. Even Zalinsky
understood that after defending Kief, he
needed to build global momentum,
positioning himself as a champion of
democracy to rally allies against
Russia. If the CCP's first phase
retaliation was not impulsive, then in
this second phase to defeat the US, the
focus during the truth should have been
uniting other nations against US
tariffs. Yet the CCP was woefully
unprepared and the results have been
disastrous. After the April 2nd tariffs,
China held the moral high ground,
appearing resolute against an
unpredictable Trump. His global tariffs,
whether beneficial to the US or not,
were morally questionable to Western and
global south nations. Trump was
alienating allies. It given China a rare
occurrence for an authoritarian state a
chance to claim moral superiority. This
was a unique opportunity to champion
free trade. Did the CCP seize it in the
second phase? They made an attempt, but
it was clearly inadequate, more a
reactive patch up than a deliberate
effort. Who did the CCP need to align
with? Traditional Western powers like
Japan, South Korea, and the EU. China's
largest markets outside the US and ASEAN
nations like Vietnam critical for trans
shipment shipment trade. Ideally, these
countries would align with China reject
US deals and join a trade war against
America. At a minimum, China needed
allies like Vietnam to stand with it,
providing a fall back for trans
shshipment exports to the US under high
tariffs. The reality, a complete
failure. Efforts to unite Japan, the EU
or Vietnam against the US fell flat.
During the truce, the US secured
agreements with Japan, the EU, South
Korean, UK, and others, including
Vietnam, China's key transment partner.
The US now imposes a 20% tariff on
Vietnam, which in turn monitors the
trans shshipment to goods and levels a
40% tariff. Who are these measures
targeting? Clearly, China. Some might
blame these countries for lacking
resolve, but I disagree. The CCP failed
to offer sufficient sincerity. Early in
the tariff war, EU officials were open
to discussions with China, preferring to
explore options with China before
aligning with the US against Trump's
aggression. The EU presented four
demands. Chinese investment in Europe,
reduced the product dumping, human
rights and the Russia Ukraine conflict.
Apart from human rights which is
somewhat routine, the others were
practical and negotiable. Yet the CCP
agreed only to invest in Europe and
offered the vague commitments on
dumping. The third and the fourth
demands were outright rejected. Media
reports suggest that during Foreign
Minister Wong Europe visit, his demeanor
was uncooperative. EU officials
described the negotiations with Wong as
akin to being lectured with him fixated
on justifying China's support for
Russia. For Chinese audiences, this
patronizing style is familiar. Such
talks could not yield positive outcomes,
let alone a China EU alliance against
the US. The EU's initial hesitation to
align with the US stemmed from a desire
to explore China's offer. They were open
to setting aside ideological differences
to counter the US trade war if China
showed enough commitment.
But after talks, they chose the lesser
evil, aligning with the US and
abandoning hopes for China. The same
applies to neighbors like Japan. The CCP
made efforts such as softening criticism
of Japan's nuclear waste water and
lifting bans on Japanese seafood and
fruit. Yet, these gestures did not
prevent Japan from leaning towards the
US. The CCP's sincerity was plainly
insufficient. Some may argue the EU's
demands were excessive, that China's
support for Russia is strategically
necessary, or that Japan was ungrateful.
But the world does not accommodate every
desire. Trump seeks US economic revival
and a debt reduction, even reliquishing
global leadership in the democratic
ideals. Did the CCP not anticipate that
the rallying allies against US tariffs
would require sacrifices when it
retaliated? This is why I believe the
initial response was more impulsive than
strategic. If it was planned, diplomatic
preparations and concessions should have
been ready. After engaging the US, the
CCP should have been prepared to meet
Europe's demands, even if it meant the
distancing from Russia or adjusting
production, particularly for electric
vehicles. to men ties with Japan. They
should have curbed anti-Japanese
sentiment online, banned inflammatory
content like a Nanjing photo studios or
film like a Dongji Island. The CCP could
do this. Anti-Japanese sentiment is
within their control. Lifting the Korea
ban could have prevented South Korea
from aligning with the US. After the
trade war began, Europe, Japan, and
South Korea offered openings. Japan's
Prime Minister Ishiba and South Korea's
President Lee are relatively pro-China
figures. The CCP could have secured
better outcomes but failed to
capitalize. Alternative, if unprepared
to meet the EU, Japan or South Korea's
conditions, China should not have
retaliated by holding back and letting
the EU lead. China could have gained
leverage in EU negotiations even with
the later attempts to unite others
against the US. The efforts seem
improvised, lacking preparation and
sincerity. Even if the first phase's
retaliation was rash, the second phase
offered a chance to recover by
increasing offers. After all, is it not
a matter of Xi Jinping's decision? As
with the COVID reopening, she spoke and
it happened. Yet she lacks such resolve.
He has ambition but not courage. Trump's
global tariff presented an opportunity.
If she had done Xiaoping's boldness,
unafraid of domestic criticism or
foreign capital, he would have opened
the markets, suppressed nationalism and
courted nations like Japan, South Korea,
Europe, Taiwan or India. Shortterm, this
might threaten the CCP's rule by
removing external enemies and the
nationalist outlets. But a successful
anti-US tariff alliance could have
bolstered the CCP's legitimacy for
decades. Like a Dang Xiaoing, who opened
the discourse and grew the economy,
risking short-term instability for
long-term stability. She lacks such
courage.
Reviewing the timeline on April 2nd,
Trump's liberation data sparked the
conflict. The CCP retaliated and the
trade war began. By May 14, the Geneva
negotiations paused the hostilities. The
first phase, this appears impulsive,
unprepared for other either severing US
ties or leading an anti-US coalition.
From May 14, during the truth, both
sides maneuvered diplomatically to win
allies. the second phase. This was an
opportunity to correct the first phase's
impulsiveness by offering better terms
to the EU, Japan, and South Korea. The
CCP failed by August the 1st. As Japan,
South Korea, and EU reached the US
agreements, China was isolated. I do not
argue that China should not counter US
tariffs. Retaliation or restrain each
has its strategy. The April 2nd response
was not inherently wrong. The issue is
how well China fought afterwards. So
far, it has been an uneven effort, but
the consequences will not be immediate
as the trade war continues. A third
phase likely awaits where the US after
securing deals with others renegotiates
with China. China's current tariffs,
including liberation day and fentinel
tariffs, total roughly 55%.
These are not final, but the scare
tactic tariffs turned substantive due to
China's retaliation. The final terms are
unclear. The CCP may retaliate again,
but its leverage will be weaker than on
April 2nd, a result of earlier missteps.
The failures of the first and the second
phase will manifest in the third in the
terms of the final agreements. As the US
secures deals with Western nations and
Vietnam, China's negotiation position
weakens. Even the tariff war pauses like
the Geneva or recent Stockholm talks
were strategic errors for the CCP. These
pauses gave the US time to secure deals
with others, reducing China's chances
for a favorable outcome. Fighting well
and winning are distinct. Ukraine fought
admirably, but given the power disparity
struggles to secure a victory. The US
China trade war may follow suit. The
final tariff agreements between Trump
and she is uncertain. Likely lower
tariffs and increased Chinese purchases
of US goods. But will this be effective?
I have doubts. China's greatest asset is
its diligent, resilient workforce
unmatched by the US. Claims of returning
manufacturing to America overlook who
will undertake the labor. Tariffs alone
cannot address this. Even if the CCP's
diplomatic failures yield an unfavorable
deal, they can absorb tariffs by
squeezing Chinese workers, maintaining
low profit exports to undercut US
manufacturing. If the US seeks to curb
Chinese dumping rather than 50% tariffs
or demanding $500 billion dollars in
soybean purchases, enforcing China's
labor law would be more effective.
Trump, however, seems to lack this
perspective. If the trade war continues
this way, China may not lose, but the US
may not win either. the cost of China's
resilience, a harder life, and the lower
wages for its people.
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