Gaza: One of the Most Complicated Places on Earth

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It's perhaps known to you as a byword for conflict, for being the epicentre of some
of the most brutal and consistent fighting episodes which have engulfed the Middle East
in recent years.
The small territory of Gaza has rarely left the news for much of the past three decades,
featuring front and centre in both Palestinian uprisings against Israel, the first and second
in Defarda, becoming the stronghold of the Islamist militant group Hamas in the early
2000s, being the site of the long-term captivity of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit not long after,
and later becoming known for its extensive underground network of militant tunnels and
the start point of the horrendous ongoing Gaza War between Hamas and Israel.
Amidst its long connection to warfare and paramilitary activity, there are several things
which have perhaps escaped the close attention they warranted.
For one, the appalling economic and humanitarian conditions to which the inhabitants of this
narrow strip of land have been exposed to for generations.
And for another, the extremely long and complicated history of this region, which is known to
be continuously inhabited by humans for some 4,000 years.
So today on Places, we thought we'd look into Gaza, its history, its troubles and strife,
and attempt to piece together at least a part of the long history of this place, currently
enduring one of the greatest hardships known to any place on Earth.
The history of what became Gaza is as old as it is contrived, and competing narratives
have resulted in its actual origin stories becoming rather murky.
What is known as the region of what became Gaza was inhabited by the Semitic-speaking
Canaanite people thousands of years ago.
The history of human habitation in the area stretches as far back as 3,000 years BCE,
in other words, around 50 centuries ago.
One of the earliest settlements in the entire Gaza Strip is believed to have been a Canaanite
site known as Tel Asaqan, located on the Wadi Gaza, a river which runs across northern Gaza
from the Mediterranean Sea.
This site was discovered shortly after the First Intifada in 1994.
Unfortunately, excavation has proved difficult due to the periodic fighting which has engulfed
the area before and after its discovery.
The site was partially bulldozed by Hamas in 2017, and later bombed to smithereens by
Israel in 2023.
Regrettably, this lethal combination is a trend which has affected most of Gaza's oldest
and most historic sites, and has made determination of the area's origins particularly difficult.
It is, sadly, likely that many other remnants of ancient habitation from the area will not
have outlived the bombing of the ongoing Israel-Hamas War.
Thus, the facts surrounding the civilizations which once lived in the area, beyond the few
facts already established, may remain obscure and open to competing historical narratives.
But among the many civilizations which controlled the area after the ancient Canaanites were
the ancient Egyptians, the Philistine people, the Greeks under Alexander the Great, Bedouin
tribes, the Ptolemaic Egyptians, the Romans, the Byzantines, various other Arab civilizations,
the Ottomans, the Egyptians, the British, the Egyptians again, the Modern State of Israel
and Palestinian Authority, and, finally, the Palestinian Arabs themselves under its current
governing organization of Hamas.
Deep breath.
By the time Hamas took power in 2007, the Palestinian Arabs had been the majority population
in the region of Gaza for centuries, although their exact origins remain disputed by many,
with some seeing them as the direct descendants of the historical Canaanites, others as ancestors
of the Philistines from where the term Palestine originates, and yet more conjecture beyond
that.
What is known, however, is that the first Arab civilization to dominate the area was
the Nabataeans in the 1st century CE, and the region was Islamized in the 7th century
following its conquest by the army of the Rashidun Caliphate in the year 637.
Following this, many of its existing religious structures became mosques, including the Cathedral
of John the Baptist, itself previously a temple dedicated to the Philistine deity of Dagon,
and which, in turn, became the Great Mosque of Gaza.
Sadly, this mosque was mostly destroyed in the ongoing war, like many others have been.
Now, for much of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, control over Gaza was held by the
Ottoman Empire.
During this time, the area remained culturally influenced by nearby Egypt and was briefly
occupied by Egyptian forces, previously belonging to the Ottoman army, when these went rogue
against their allies in 1832.
By the early 20th century, however, the Ottoman Empire was weak, and crumbled following defeat
at the hands of the Triple Entente in the First World War.
In 1916, as the war raged, Britain and France worked out the so-called Sykes-Picot Agreement,
which would divide Ottoman possessions in the Middle East and Levant into British and
French-controlled spheres of influence.
Although Sykes-Picot was, for the most part, abandoned before the conclusion of the war,
it did nonetheless result in some serious consequences for what was then known as Palestine.
The French and the British had agreed that Palestine would become a British possession
after the conflict, which was one of the only parts of the agreement which actually came
into being.
Confusingly, though, the British had also released the Balfour Declaration in order
to drum up Jewish support for the war effort, which promised Jewish people a homeland in
the Middle East after the war.
Sykes-Picot completely screwed the Arab unifying interests of the Sheriff of Mecca, Hussein
bin Ali, whose descendants are the Hashemite dynasty ruling the state of Jordan.
Bin Ali had been promised by Britain an empire stretching from the southern tip of the Arabian
Peninsula all the way up to Syria, including Palestine, in return for his support against
the Ottoman forces.
Bin Ali's forces had held to the agreement, and begun a successful uprising which became
known as the Arab Revolt, which helped hasten the defeat of the weakened Ottomans in the
Middle East.
But Sykes-Picot would cut the territorial spoils of the revolt by a third, and what
Bin Ali ultimately ended up with was an even smaller territory still, known as the Heyaz,
which was then conquered by the Saud dynasty in 1925, and this led to the establishment
of modern-day Saudi Arabia.
Relations between the Saudi and Jordanian ruling families have often remained understandably
tense ever since.
Both Sykes-Picot and the Balfour Declaration dismayed many Arab populations whose aspirations
towards self-determination were derailed by both agreements, as well as the Kurds, who
were left without a homeland of their own despite their vast population further north.
The litany of conflicting agreements eventually led to a 1920 League of Nations proposal known
as the British Mandate for Palestine, which ensured British oversight over all of Palestine
until 1948.
Meanwhile, the Balfour Declaration and rising anti-Semitism in Europe, combined with the
advance of so-called Zionism, saw Jewish immigration to Palestine increase in the years around
and after the First World War.
The recent arrivals did not get on well with their Arab neighbours at all.
The new living arrangements quickly led to a series of atrocities and massacres, beginning
with the Battle of Tal Hai in 1921, where eight Jews and five Arabs died, and spiralling
further with the Jaffar Riots that same year, the Hebron Massacre in 1929, and many more
instances thereafter.
In response to the perceived threat posed to them, the Jewish arrivals set up paramilitaries
known as the Ergun and Haganah, which in turn committed atrocities against the Arab-Palestinians.
The massacres gained pace in the 1930s and 40s, with hundreds of Jewish and Arab deaths.
This situation was ripe to explode, and would only get worse as the years of the mandate
wound to a close.
In 1948, the British Mandate ended and the Arab-Israeli War began.
The war ignited on May 15, 1948, when five Arab nations invaded territory in the form
of the Palestinian Mandate immediately following the announcement of the independence of the
State of Israel the previous day.
The five countries – Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and Transjordan – began offensives
from each side of the territory.
Gaza became the focal point of much of the southern theater of fighting, where Egyptian
forces battled Jewish communities and settlers.
Gaza had remained largely free from the rising intercommunal violence, although Jewish populations
in the area there were small and the area remained therefore mostly uniformly Arab.
Gaza emerged for the first time as a map-recognized region in 1948, when the UN proposed a clumsy
partition plan for Palestine designating an area, including the modern Gaza Strip and
some parts of the Negev Desert, for the Palestinian State.
But violence would come to the area soon enough as the Egyptian army sought to gain a foothold
by seeking to overturn strategic Jewish settlements in Gaza and the Negev.
Egypt's assault targeted both Kibbutz Kfar Doron, close to Gaza City, and Kibbutz Nerim,
which lay seven kilometers from the modern Gaza Strip and which would later be the site
of a fresh assault by Hamas fighters during the October 7th attacks.
But the Egyptians were held off by resolute Jewish defense and the offensive failed.
Kfar Doron was eventually claimed by the Egyptians, who then moved northward through Gaza toward
the city of Ashkelon.
But the combined Arab armies were unsuccessful in overcoming the Jewish paramilitaries, with
support from the West and armaments from the Eastern Bloc, and the Arab-Israeli War concluded
in March 1949 with the establishment of an independent Israeli state.
The territory of the state exceeded that which had been proposed by the UN Partition Plan,
but did not include either the modern West Bank, which came under Jordanian administration,
or the Gaza Strip, which emerged for the first time in its current territorial guise and
which for now was under Egyptian control.
The consequences of the war for the entire region were absolutely massive.
Economically, politically, territorially, everything was affected.
Around 750,000 Palestinians became refugees, and many of their former villages in what
was now Israel were erased or resettled by Jewish communities.
Hundreds of thousands fled to refugee camps in neighboring countries, and many also fled
to the West Bank and to Gaza.
The Gaza Strip, now a patch of land similar in size to the Caribbean island of Granada
and with a pre-war population of around 200,000 people, grew incrementally in population size
as it entered Egyptian control.
This control continued for almost the next 20 years.
At this point in the video, it is important to focus on the dire economic consequences
that all this upheaval had wrought on the people of Gaza.
Perhaps contrary to the perceptions of some, it is not that Gaza was never economically
flourishing.
British traveler Edward Robinson, writing in the 1830s, described Gaza City as both
greater in size than Jerusalem and much more prosperous.
But as with any conflict zone, the Arab-Israeli War hit the economic interests of Gaza hard,
not least because it now found itself hosting thousands of refugees.
To add to this, the Gaza Strip shared a frontier mostly with the State of Israel, with which
it had no economic relations.
With the Palestinian Authority not yet in existence, the Strip was dependent on the
stewardship of Egypt, itself a poor, emergent country with its own great challenges in looking
after its vast domestic population.
Gaza languished in relative impoverishment for most of the 1950s and 60s.
During which time, peace in the area remained brittle and a new war remained permanently
on the horizon.
And that's exactly what came on the 5th of June, 1967.
That year, as Arab coalition forces amassed for what seemed like a major attack, a pre-emptive
counter by Israel resulted in the Six Day War and a decisive military victory for Israel.
Israeli forces managed to sweep into territory held by neighboring countries, going on to
seize the Sinai Desert from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, as well as the symbolically
important West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan.
It also claimed the Gaza Strip, which unlike the Sinai to the east, was not returned to
Egypt after the end of hostilities.
Gaza was now in Israel's hands.
For many Israelis, especially the devout ultra-Orthodox community and religious Zionists, Gaza was
a prize.
It was part of the biblical land of Eretz Israel, and also part of the envisioned Jewish
state put forward by Theodor Herzl's Zionist organization to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.
Even for moderate and secular Israelis, control of Gaza was highly symbolic.
It was, after all, the site of stiff Jewish resistance against Egyptian forces in 1948,
such as the famous battles at Kfar Daron.
Israel soon began building settlements in Gaza, including the re-establishment of the
abandoned Kfar Daron, which became a military outpost and later a kibbutz once more.
The settlements became buttresses against Palestinian freedoms and impacted on the
liberty of movement of the people of Gaza, as well as their economic interests.
However, the Israeli occupation did at least allow Palestinians to take some jobs in Israel
under strict conditions.
This led to around 44,000 Gazan workers doing so by 1992, according to figures by the Middle
East Research and Information Project, with many working illegally or low-paid jobs and
having to receive special permits to cross the border every day.
This new reality continued for around a quarter of a century, when new hope appeared in 1994
with the signing of the Oslo Accords, which meant that Gaza would now enjoy relative autonomy
under the newly established Palestinian Authority.
But that new hope failed to result in economic prosperity of any kind.
The conditions in Gaza under the Palestinian Authority did not improve, and perhaps as
much as 50% of the Gazan workforce was unemployed by the late 2000s.
Gaza became highly dependent on humanitarian aid, which began flowing in from the UN, the
US, the European Union, and Palestinian communities abroad.
The UN has been involved in the conflict to some degree for much of the last century,
and unfortunately, its intervention could be seen as broadly unhelpful.
It was the League of Nations, precursor to the UN, which ratified the parameters of the
set a time limit on satisfactory resolution, which ultimately also wasn't achieved.
The UN, in one of its first actions as a fully established entity, proposed this mess of
a map for a two-state partition of Palestine, a plan which was not accepted by the Palestinians
and which may not have worked, even if it had been, due to its patchwork nature.
The partition plan was roundly abandoned in the wake of the 1948 war.
And since 1948, the UN has continuously classified displaced Palestinians as refugees,
something that remains the case for their descendants.
In other words, even the third generation of displaced Palestinians remain refugees
in the eyes of the UN, the only ethnic group in the world for whom this is the case,
despite the myriad other conflicts resulting in large amounts of displaced people.
The UN's other governing body for refugees, the UNHCR, makes no mention of the transferability
of refugee status to descendants in either its 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol and allows
for the extension of refugee status only to the immediate members of the claimant's family.
What this has meant is that persons of Palestinian origin, born and raised in nearby countries whose
parents were born and raised in those countries, can still be officially classified as refugees
by UNRWA.
This is something which has resulted in the number of official Palestinian refugees ballooning
to almost 6 million in 2019 from the initial 750,000 who were expelled from their homes in 1948.
The status has meant that the UN continues to support these refugees from its budget,
and the measure arguably even relieves hosting countries from having to properly integrate the
Palestinian communities into their own societies, where they continue to live in refugee camps in
Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. Inheritance of refugee status is also patrilineal, meaning that it is
through the father's descendants alone that the UN recognizes individuals as Palestinian refugees.
Moreover, the UN established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East, or UNRWA, in 1949, an organization which has been consistently
dogged by allegations that its members played a role in tacitly supporting instances of Palestinian
militant actions and even in the murders and kidnappings committed on October 7.
UNRWA has also faced accusations that its sites had been used as holding locations for
militant weaponry, Hamas fighters, and some of the hostages taken on October 7.
By 2013, the UN had passed 45 resolutions concerning Israel, and only 21 concerning
North Korea, 21 concerning Syria, and 14 concerning Iran. Perhaps irresultantly,
Israel has largely completely abandoned the UN as a mediator in the conflict,
and a fractured relationship emerged which has continued to this day.
Alright, back to the mid-2000s when a new political force emerged, one which would
soon dominate Gaza and whose actions would have perhaps the greatest ever and most tragic effect
on the beleaguered population of the Gaza Strip. In 2005, control of Gaza changed hands once again
when Israel suddenly pulled out and closed all Jewish settlements in the Strip. This, in theory,
left Gaza solely in the hands of the Palestinian Authority, or PA,
under Mahmoud Abbas, who'd taken over from long-time Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat
that same year. But Israel had not prepared the PA for the move, and the transition was therefore
entirely disjointed. The PA was not particularly popular among Gazans. Some saw them as sellouts
to the occupier, and others were dismayed at their consistent failures to achieve a peace
on equitable terms with Israel, especially and above all one that would allow the Palestinian
expellees to return to their former homes in Israel. The PA also hadn't really done anything
to alleviate the severe economic conditions in Gaza, and had been accused of creating monopolies
favorable to their interests at the cost of everyday Gazans, many of whom had seen their
economic prospects suffocated further when Israel enacted border closures after a series of suicide
bombings in 1996. Moreover, the Israeli withdrawal came at the end of the Second Intifada, when
thousands more Palestinians had been killed for little benefit. For decades, the people of Gaza
had had to contend with extreme economic isolation, power shortages, high unemployment,
lawlessness, cyclical violence, massive poverty, and broken promises. With Gaza teetering,
continued support for the PA was very far from assured. Abbas, perhaps not realizing this,
called for legislative elections in Gaza and the West Bank in 2006. It would prove
a catastrophic decision. Although the Palestinian Legislative Council had been
overdue for elections for many years, Gaza had seen recent unrest in 2005, and Abbas probably
could have gotten away with offsetting the elections further for some amount of time.
But he didn't, and in January 2006, the Palestinian Authority's main political party,
Fatah, failed to win the election, securing 41% of the overall vote. Fatah were pulverized in
Gaza, winning only one seat from a possible 13 between the three districts of Gaza City,
North Gaza, and Deir al-Bala. Practically all of the remainder went to the outright
winner of the election, the Change and Reform Party, a front for the Islamic Resistance Movement,
better known to you and me as Hamas. Hamas had been conducting a savvy campaign to win
Gazans' hearts and minds for many years. While the PA prompted dialogue, Hamas favored direct
action. This may not always have worked for them, but the long years of failed negotiations and the
deterioration of Gaza's economic situation had lent them more support. Hamas had also exploited
Gazan anger at Israel's targeting of its high-level figures, including bomb-maker Yair Ayyash, who was
killed in 1996, and interim Hamas leader Khaled Marshall, who'd narrowly escaped death by poisoning
in 1997 when the responsible Israeli agents were caught and Israel was forced to hand over an
antidote. But an even bigger contributing factor was when Israel assassinated two of Hamas' founders,
Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, in 2004, shortly before their withdrawal from Gaza. Both
men were natives of Gaza, having arrived as ex-Belis of the 1948 war at a very young age,
and both of them were held in high esteem. This was especially true in the case of Yassin,
a paralyzed imam whose charitable exploits had seen him ranked as the second most popular Palestinian
after Yasser Arafat. Yassin had founded an Islamic charity in 1973, Majama al-Islamiyah,
which offered clinics, blood banks, daycare facilities, food, and youth clubs to the people
of Gaza and which had at one time received charitable recognition from Israel itself.
He also contributed to the founding of the Islamic University of Gaza in 1978 and,
in spite of his disability, attracted huge crowds to his sermons and the Shati refugee camp where
he'd grown up. Although Yassin's ideology, like that of Hamas, contained nakedly vicious
statements regarding Israel, and he was the ideologue behind many of Hamas' suicide bombing
campaigns which targeted Israeli soldiers and civilians alike, his image among Gazans was that
of a humanitarian, a spiritual leader. He'd been imprisoned by Israel in 1989 for ordering the
deaths of collaborators, but was released in 1997 following the failed assassination of Khaled
and had returned to Gaza with a rapturous welcome. His assassination in 2004 spawned huge public
anger, especially given Yassin's failed physical state and ailing health, and the destruction
occasioned by the drone strike which killed not only him, but members of his entourage
and nine civilian bystanders. Predictably, the accumulated anger played into Hamas' hands.
When combined with a cunning electoral campaign and the PA's seeming short-sightedness,
Hamas found itself at a sufficient level of popularity among Palestinians to win the
legislative elections in 2006 and quickly went on to dominate the Gaza Strip shortly after.
Hamas consolidated its power, forcing out Fatah and the PA and establishing tight control over
Gaza. From 2007, the Strip was fully under Hamas' control.
Now, some of the Palestinians voting for Hamas' Change and Reform Party, especially in Gaza,
may have hoped that what they would receive was exactly that, changes and reforms which
would alleviate at least their poor economic prospect, if not exactly a vote for peace and
security. This was, perhaps, not absurd, given the charitable exploits of Majama al-Asmir and
the posturing of Hamas as an entity willing to improve the living arrangements for everyday
Palestinians on the ground. It was hoped that, somehow, Gaza's fortunes could begin to improve.
But they didn't. Gaza's fortunes only got worse. The period of occupation by Israel had, at least,
allowed Palestinians the relative freedom to find jobs and work in Israel. But with Gaza now
under Hamas' control, that possibility was firmly curtailed, leading to dire consequences for many
in Gaza. Moreover, Egypt, the other country with which the territory of Gaza shared a border,
also closed off access in 2007, and Israel enforced a controversial maritime cordon of
six nautical miles from the coast for Gazan fishermen soon after.
Gaza was now completely shut off from the world. It was not even safely reachable by air.
The Strip, at once. Briefly, had an airport built in 1998, but it was destroyed only three years
later, during the Second Intifada, and today lies in ruins. In effect, Gaza now had economic
relations with nobody, and would become reliant on remittances sent from abroad, as well as aid
work and support by friendly nations, much of which would be appropriated by its new governors.
Hamas, shortly after its ascent to power, set to work creating a vast network of tunnels under
Gaza, both to evade Israeli intelligence and to prepare for an ultimate attack on their sworn
foe. The so-called Gaza Metro was already in operation by the time of the 2014 Gaza War,
and encompassed around 500 kilometers of tunnels by 2021, according to later Hamas leader Yasser
Sinwar. In the meantime, Gaza's economy just about remained afloat. Unemployment remained sky high,
typically around 50%, but Hamas' tunnel network allowed for black market trade with Egypt,
and remittances from abroad, aid from around 160 humanitarian organizations,
around 450 million per year in monetary and material support from UNRWA,
and further support from the PA, left some semblance of normality despite the widespread
unemployment. With that said, the undoubted major benefactors of the inward flow of cash was Hamas
and those close to it, and the general figures concerning Gaza's economic situation became
robustly obscured by the Gaza Strip's new overseers. Hamas also received donations from
benefactors such as Iran, and installed a tax system on everyday costs for its own benefit,
from packets of cigarettes to vehicle registration. Hamas also received a $400 million grant from
Qatar for construction projects in 2012, and over time, some limited economic interaction
with Israel took place too. Aid trucks began to cross from Israel via the Kerem Shalom border
crossing, and some Palestinians were able to return to work day jobs in Israel under a planned
permit quote, which rose to about 17,000 workers by 2022, according to the Times of Israel.
Hamas also threw money into both expanding its tunnel network further,
and buying munitions to use in attacks against Israel. Between 2006 and 2023, it engaged in no
less than five conflicts with Israel, each of which resulted in bombing attacks on Gaza
and significant loss of life. While preparing for the 2023 attack,
Suleiman regularly incited Palestinians to commit random acts of violence against Israel,
and in 2018, he encouraged Gazans to assemble on the Gaza border fence with Israel in what
became known as the Great March of Return, something which resulted in hundreds of deaths
as Israel responded with tear gas and live ammunition. And Gaza's relative economic
survival would not last. By the early 2020s, especially following the COVID-19 downturn,
Gaza's economy began to tank once again. The summer of 2023 saw rare economic protests
occur in Gaza City and Khan Yunis, both of which were cracked down upon by Hamas' security apparatus.
But all this was immaterial, as something far more significant was by now brewing,
something which would devastate Gaza immeasurably, unlike anything which had done so before.
Finally, after years of planning, the Hamas operation was ready to begin. On October 7,
2023, Hamas fighters flooded into Israel and carried out the bloody attack which would plunge
Gaza into conflict once more. Only this time, the conflict would lay waste to the ancient land.
Practically in its entirety.
