The Dutch 'Military Revolution' During The Eighty Years War | Early-Modern Warfare

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AI GeneratedDutch military reforms in the 16th and 17th centuries transformed European warfare by shifting away from massive, static formations toward maneuverability and firepower. Led by the Counts of Nassau and Prince Maurits, the Dutch replaced melee weapons with a disciplined system of musketry and pikes, creating a tactical evolution that influenced leaders like Gustavus Adolphus.
The Dutch military reforms in the 16th and 17th century influenced the nature of European
warfare strongly and lastingly. Facing the Spanish army, the true military giant of the time,
the Dutch were hard-pressed to improve their own army with quick but decisive innovation.
The backbone of the Spanish military dominance of the time was the so-called tertio,
a deep square formation consisting of pikemen and shot infantry, usually supplemented by cavalry
and artillery. The basic idea was that muskets and arquebuses shoot the enemies to pieces,
while the pikes provide sufficient protection from enemy cavalry attacks. But how then did
the Dutch counter this military goliath? Recent historiography usually explains it as follows.
During the Eighty Years' War it became clear to the Dutch that they had to change their army
significantly if they wanted to defend their newly formed federation. But during this period
most armed conflicts actually weren't open-field battles, but sieges. As long as they were
entrenched in, or themselves, sieging a fortress, the expert on this topic, Olaf van Imwegen,
explains, the Dutch were well capable to go toe-to-toe with the Spanish. But it was crucial
to have an effective force that could credibly challenge opponents in open-field battles to
prevent becoming the enemy's puppet. The English officer John Bingham, who had served in the Dutch
army, summarized this as follows, quote, He, who is master of the field, may spoil the enemy's
country at his pleasure. He may march where he thinketh best, end quote. Thus, the Dutch were
primarily concerned with ameliorating their capabilities in open-field battles. With the
military transformation the Dutch were about to undertake, they set in motion a decisive evolution
of warfare, eventually influencing the famous Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus. And well beyond
his doings, the change in warfare that in due course led to the linear conduct of battle in the
18th century. Three of the strongest proponents of change in military tactics and strategy were
the Counts of Nassau, Maurits, Prince of Orange and his cousins William Lodewijk and Johan VII.
In February of 1599, they issued a revised order for the regulation for the arming of the infantry.
The focus was on replacing melee weapons with ever more muskets and pikes. Historian Olaf van
Imwegen states that, quote, the sword and buckler and broadswords disappeared from the Dutch army
formation around 1595 and halberdiers were replaced by pikemen in 1599, end quote. Previously,
these types of weapons were used to break the deadlock which ensued when two pike formations
got entangled with one another. The shields were used to push the pikes to the side and the
two-handers served to break the pikes themselves and to spread panic among the enemies. This was a
To improve chances in such grapples, Maurits at some point even thought about using bigger
square shields like the ancient Romans did, but he scrapped the idea quickly,
knowing that the way forward was to deploy more guns, not more melee. However, Maurits and his
fellow reformers were indeed heavily inspired by classical Roman, Hellenistic and Byzantine
literature, hoping it would provide them with new ideas to overcome the Spanish pike squares.
Many contemporary writers, such as the Dutch scholar Justus Lipsius, drew parallels between
the massive Spanish infantry formation of the early modern era and the Macedonian phalanx of
the classical past. In classical antiquity, the pike squares of the Macedonians eventually fell
to the more maneuverable Roman maniples. Lipsius, who had read the classical literature extensively,
stressed the opportunities that a more maneuverable formation might offer in the 16th century as well.
Maurits and Lipsius were not the only ones looking back to classical times for advice.
There had been an increased interest in the potential offered by the Roman art of war
throughout the 16th century. Particularly the texts of Vegetius, Dere Militari and Frontius'
Strategmata, Caesar, Livy and Polybius II were read often. The famous Niccolo Machiavelli in
particular had linked ancient Roman and Greek tactics with his own idea on contemporary warfare
in his Libra dell'arte della guerra. However, although this interest in the classics might
have inspired the Dutch, they did not truly adopt the Roman way of warfare as historian
Werner Halweg pointed out rightly. After all, the tactics of the 16th century, such as the
deployment of masses of musketeers and cannons, required a drastically different approach to
battle. Nevertheless, the Dutch did copy some parts of the Romans, such as the deployment of
This change in warfare and its interest in classical antiquity alike led to much scholarly
attention in modern days. This particular scholarly debate is usually referred to as
Military Revolution, a term coined by Michael Roberts in 1955. At its core, the debate is
concerned with the exploration of changes in siege equipment, firearms, tactics, organization,
drill and army composition. But Roberts also stresses the impact of this change in military
affairs for social, economic and political change as a catalyst for bridging the Middle Ages with
the modern era. But that is not the subject of this video. However, for any student of warfare,
it is important to note that much of the literature on this topic bears the stamp of this debate,
and that the concept has seen extensive adaptions, alterations and criticism,
for example by influential historians such as Geoffrey Parker, Jeremy Black and Andrew Aiton.
According to historian Marcus Moiman,
It now makes sense to replace the concept of a military revolution with that of evolution.
This, by the way, is the reason why our series is called Evolution of Warfare.
However, looking at the Roman way of fighting, the Dutch deployed their troops in smaller,
more maneuverable units and increased the number of gunmen. The main change of the time was the
reliance on firearms to win battles. According to Van Nimwegen,
After 1609, the Dutch army consisted exclusively of pikes and musketeers.
The Dutch reformers hoped to counter the Spanish superiority in two ways,
by drilling and exercising the troops and, during battle, by dissipating the thrust of
an enemy assault across various relatively small units. The impact of the enemy's assault was
This is to say that the battalions were positioned behind one another in a checkered order.
The troops in the front line could easily be relieved or reinforced by the battalions
disposed further to the rear. Maurits and Willem no longer divided their army in the
usual three parts of vanguard, battle and rearguard, as it was common for the Swiss
or Landsknechts mercenaries. They subdivided their battle arrays into smaller units of 800-900 men,
later on 500-600 men. With this formation, the overall risk could be effectively spread.
If one battalion fled, not the whole army became dysfunctional. Drilling and exercising the army
ensured that the tactics would be implemented as well as possible. An instinctive, working
knowledge of this was vital to success in battle, because the hearing distance in combat when wearing
helmets was limited, and the loud muskets, horses and cannons further complicated communication
during battle. In addition, the sheer inaccuracy of gunfire and the required time to reload meant
that a successful deployment of firearms was possible only when several shots were discharged
at once, and each subsequent volley followed after a short interval. Otherwise, the enemy
had the chance to regroup and charge the musketeers. Under the stressful and chaotic
battle conditions, it was possible to discharge one, maybe two shots per minute. Prior to 1594,
the records reveal nothing about the way in which the Dutch were expected to discharge their
weapons as a hail of fire. The first evidence surfaces in 1594 at the hands of Willem Lodewijk,
who wrote in a letter to Maurits, quote, namely, that as soon as the first rank has fired
simultaneously, it steps back per evolutionem et versum. This means an about-turn and return to
the rear of the block. But the second rank steps forward, or stands still, and shoots simultaneously,
then marches back. The third and the following do the same. Thus, before the last rank has fired,
the first has reloaded. Willem included a diagram of a formation which spans nine men across and
five ranks deep. This maneuver was called counter-march, because the soldiers retreated
to the opposite, the counter-direction. Its problem was that a musketeer needed,
according to Van Nimwegen, quote, at least three feet of space to maneuver on either side,
while simultaneously making sure that his smouldering match did not ignite another
soldier's gunpowder, end quote. Likewise, this formation required a street, measuring six feet
across to be kept free between each fire, so that soldiers who had fired could return to the back.
Thus, the formation was fairly wide and loose, and therefore not well protected from enemy cavalry.
In the summer of 1595, Willem came up with a solution to this problem. The major change was
that the gunmen no longer performed individual about-turns. Instead, they made a turn as a rank
and marched in file to the rear of the unit to get ready again. Later on, the ranks retreated
both along the right and the left of the formation. This made possible that the ranks could
clear the front more quickly. By decreasing the number of musketeers in each block from nine to
five or six men, it was possible to increase the rate of fire even more. Enemies could consequently
be kept at a distance more easily. But even this tactic had a disadvantage, which became
clear during the Battle of Newport. The Dutch deployed their battalions with 250 pikemen and
240 musketeers, divided into five blocks of pikemen, each five men across and nine deep,
and six blocks of musket, each four men across and ten men deep. Such a unit had a front of 57 meters,
183 feet. It became evident that the pikemen were unable to provide adequate cover for the
gunmen when they were subject to a cavalry charge. Because if they were charged, the gunmen could not
retreat behind a group of pikes without confusion. The solution was only found in the Jülich campaign
in 1610. There, the musketeers were deployed behind the pikes, moved forward in unison to fire and
then retreated simultaneously. Henceforth, the front rank often kneeled down while the rear rank
remained standing. This made possible a volley of 144 musketeers at once. Historian Geoffrey
Parker called this a production line of death. With that change, the inaccuracy problem of the
musket was temporarily solved as well. This tactic was adopted by others quickly, for example by
Gustavus Adolphus, who used it at the famous Battle of Breitenfeld in 1631. He developed it even
further. He drilled his troops so that they improved their reload speed considerably,
enabling them to continuously fire with only six ranks deep instead of the ten ranks the Dutch
used. Additionally, he started to deploy masses of field artillery. Maurits did not really like
the heavy cannons because of their limited movability. He deployed a mere eight guns at
Nieuwpoort. Gustavus and his protestant allies, in contrast, boasted 51 heavy guns at Breitenfeld
in 1631. In the cavalry department, Gustavus made significant changes as well. While Maurits
replaced his lancers with cuirassiers in 1594, Gustavus often relied on his melee cavalry to
charge his enemies. Maurits' decision actually made sense. Despite the popular intuition about
flat ground in the Netherlands, heavy cavalry was not always well suited for the difficult terrain,
such as marshes or intentionally flooded regions. Moreover, charging headfirst into
pikes did not end well for cavalry either. In addition, lancers required a lot of training
and had to be very good horsemen too. They charged at full speed and hence,
the risk of such a charge was very high. It was a go big or go home move. It was only the
Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus who again popularized charging enemy infantry and cavalry
that is steel in hand. But that will be a topic for another video.
