【The Armchair Historian】世界歷史故事合集:普魯士、俄羅斯、拿破崙、二戰、大不列顛、意大利、美國 P12 - 二戰中為甚麼美國不是第一個到柏林的?
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28 次觀看·2025年8月30日
Hi, I'm Griffin Johnson, the Armchair Historian.
Today's video, why the Soviets got to Berlin first.
Today's video is brought to you by The Great Courses Plus. More on that later.
It is spring 1945.
The flowers are in bloom. The sun is shining.
And the deadliest war in human history has entered its sixth and final year.
At Allied Forward Headquarters,
The Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Forces, General Eisenhower,
resists the appeals of his subordinates once again.
After a heated argument, the two storm out of the room,
leaving Eisenhower's mind unchanged.
Many foresee imminent victory, but he's not so sure.
It hadn't even been a year since the ill-fated Operation Market Garden,
which had been stymied by a surprisingly resilient German army.
No, he cannot justify the commitment of more manpower and equipment to the cause these men are championing.
By the end of the Second World War, eagle-eyed spectators of world politics
could sense that a new threat to global security was emerging, the Soviet Union.
Although they had fought on the same side, tensions between the USSR and the US
quickly escalated into a rivalry that would define the rest of the century.
The post-war political landscape may have looked very differently
if the Allies reached Berlin first.
So why didn't they?
The truth is, they didn't want to. They didn't even try.
And with that said, thanks for watching.
Okay, fine. There's slightly more to it than that.
But before we go any further, let's mention a few things
that do not explain why the Soviets got to Berlin first.
Most of these misconceptions stem from the belief
that underhanded political motivations were, in some way, shape or form, the deciding factor.
One theory asserts that Roosevelt had secretly promised Stalin
both Berlin and Prague during the conference at Yalta.
Eisenhower, who was supposedly aware of this,
didn't want to commit the resources to capture a prize
that would ultimately go to America's next geopolitical adversary.
This theory is wrong.
It's true that the Yalta conference did produce the plan
to divide Germany into different occupation zones
and that Berlin would be located in the Soviet zone.
However, the Yalta conference had also determined
that the capital would, in turn, be divided into four occupation zones of its own.
You might recognize that this is exactly what happened following the war,
although the state of affairs didn't last very long.
It has also been suggested that the Westerners held back their troops
in the hope that the Germans would have time to suppress leftists
living in Czechoslovakia before Germany collapsed.
This is also wrong.
As a matter of fact, the main source for this idea
seems to be Soviet propaganda spread after the fact.
So if not for political reasons,
why did the Western Allies fail to get to Berlin first?
In truth, it seems to have been a strategic military decision
and not a universally popular one.
It's worth noting here that the opinions among the top Allied commanders
varied drastically at this stage.
British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery
was convinced that the European theater had been secured
and that Allied hegemony was inevitable.
He and the British command strongly favored
a concentrated attack on Berlin,
a death blow to the Nazi government.
The somewhat less hubristic but equally bold George Patton
believed that another large confrontation,
while possible, could be avoided by striking quickly.
But Eisenhower, the man who was ultimately in charge
of making the decision, was, by far,
the most skeptical of all of them about such a military maneuver.
Like we mentioned before, Operation Market Garden,
while not quite being the complete failure
it's represented as in popular imagination,
had proven that the Wehrmacht could still put up a staunch resistance.
Indeed, if you've seen our video about the Battle of Berlin,
you're probably aware that the troops garrisoning the capital
were still more than capable of badly bloodying an invading force.
And finally, the Battle of the Bulge
had further stymied the western allies
and crushed any dreams of easily rolling through the countryside
while the Wehrmacht still had material support.
Eisenhower reasoned that the fanatical soldiers,
still loyal to the Nazi regime,
would fight on even if the capital fell.
Casualty projections for an assault
approached 100,000 men lost
in the pursuit of a dubiously valuable gold.
Instead of investing in such a decisive
and potentially very costly single thrust,
Eisenhower chose to keep a wide front
and focus on dividing up German forces
still west of Berlin.
Most notably, the Ruhr Valley,
Germany's industrial heartland,
was still heavily defended as the allies pushed east.
Though German forces in this region
were eventually surrounded,
they represented a threat that had to be neutralized
if the thought of taking Berlin
was to be seriously entertained by Eisenhower.
Additionally, there had been persistent rumors
of a mysterious alpine fortress
in southern Germany,
the supposed national redoubt
of German high command.
Allied commanders were so concerned about this
that they dispatched an entire army to investigate.
The Eagle's Nest, orKellsteinhaus,
one of Hitler's many headquarters,
was actually located in the area
of the supposed fortress,
but it hardly fit the bill.
Considering the Fuhrer's distaste
for the small installation,
he rarely visited.
It didn't even begin to approach the scale
or significance that allied intelligence
had ascribed to it.
All of these delays meant that the Soviets
had a massive head start.
When they crossed the Rhine in March,
Montgomery's beachhead was 200 to 250 miles away,
while Georgy Zhukov's Red Army
had crossed the Oder River with a million men,
some less than 40 miles
from where Adolf Hitler was hiding.
The subsequent invasion of Berlin
turned out to be both long and brutal,
but Eisenhower had no reason to think
that he was better positioned.
None of this necessarily means
that Anglo-American forces
couldn't have made it to Berlin.
In fact, there were moments in mid-April
when it seemed to be within reach.
On the 11th, a U.S. Army
was just 60 miles outside the city.
Since the German forces
were so heavily concentrated towards the east,
his approach from the west
might have actually been largely unopposed.
Still, Eisenhower denied requests
to continue to Berlin,
his reasoning being that Hitler
would simply divide his forces
between the two fronts,
allowing the Soviets,
who at this point were hell-bent on revenge,
to capture the city even sooner.
At the end of the day,
asking why the west lost the race to Berlin
against the east
presupposes that there was a race to begin with,
which is extremely debatable.
There was, however,
something of a competition
between Soviet generals
to see who could reach the capital first.
For his part, Eisenhower decided
that a slow, strategic approach
was preferable.
Whether that choice was ultimately correct
is up to the armchair generals out there.
If you want to learn more
about the race for Berlin,
then I highly recommend you watch
Professor Thomas Childers' series
World War II, A Military and Social History,
which has an episode with that exact title.
That lecture is only available
on the website of today's sponsor,
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Another one of my personal favorites
is Professor Gary W. Gallagher's
A History of the United States,
which has an episode dedicated
to the European theater
during the Second World War.
We invite you to start your free trial
at The Great Courses Plus today
by using my link,
thegreatcoursesplus.com
slash the armchair historian,
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By the way, I'd like to remind you
that you guys can check out
our brand new website,
which, as you can see,
has an ever-growing library.
We're very pleased to announce
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