【The Armchair Historian】世界歷史故事合集:普魯士、俄羅斯、拿破崙、二戰、大不列顛、意大利、美國 P18 - 拿破崙是如何失去滑鐵盧戰役的?
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58 次觀看·2025年8月27日
Hi, I'm Griffin Johnson, the armchair historian.
Today's video, the final defeat of Napoleon's career and how it could have been avoided.
Located in the South Atlantic Ocean, the island of St. Helena was remote, unpleasantly humid, and perpetually damp.
Here, a man who had once conquered a continent and terrified the world was stuck in the deteriorating Longwood House,
a far cry from the palaces he once resided in.
He spent days reading, writing about the great heroes he admired,
and sharing tales of his fascinating life with the throngs of visitors that made the journey to see him.
Many afternoons were spent brooding about the 18th of June, 1815,
the day that he, the first emperor of the French, was beaten one final time.
On a handful of ridges near Brussels, the Hundred Days Period came to a close,
and the Seventh Coalition was victorious.
Napoleon's fleeting restoration ended just four days later, and with it, his dream of ruling France.
But could this disastrous failure have been avoided, or was his fate sealed before the first shots were even fired?
In today's historical analysis, we're looking at whether or not Napoleon could have won at Waterloo.
After doing the impossible, and bloodlessly reassuming power, Napoleon was already back on the offensive.
Having just won a strategic victory at Quatre Bras against the British,
and what would be his final victory at Ligny against the Prussians,
he was on the move toward the site that would reverberate in his mind forever, Waterloo.
The reinvigorated Grande Armée that Napoleon mustered consisted of about 72,000 men, 14,000 of whom were cavalry.
Unsurprisingly, given his fondness of artillery, Napoleon fielded an impressive 250 cannon,
a full 60% more than the British.
The coalition army under Arthur Wellesley, the first Duke of Wellington, consisted of 68,000 men,
about 11,000 of which were cavalry, and 150 cannon.
Finally, the Prussians under Gebert von Blücher arrived later in the battle,
and had a total of 48,000 men, about 7,000 of whom were cavalry, and approximately 134 cannon.
On paper, Napoleon held a clear advantage.
He had more men, who were generally better trained and more experienced than their opponents, and more firepower.
Furthermore, as Wellington himself said while eating breakfast during the morning of the battle,
Napoleon's presence on the battlefield was worth 40,000 men.
But while Napoleon's troops were of higher quality, his officer corps left much to be desired.
A serious brain drain among the higher ranks affected the French forces at Waterloo,
and many officers were assigned command of unfamiliar units upon arrival to the battle.
Even the best soldiers are ineffective when they lack direction.
So, how did things shake out? Well, you guys know.
Before the battle began, the Duke of Wellington went to work fortifying the position where he would meet the French.
Using the reverse slopes just outside the town of Waterloo,
he was able to conceal many of his troops while fortifying three major defensible positions.
These included the Chateau Huguemont to the west, and the Papalat farm to the east,
which he intended to garrison as an anchor on either flank.
In the center lay Le Haye Saint farmhouse, and an adjacent sand pit.
If all went as planned, Napoleon's flanks would be vulnerable no matter which position they attacked.
Despite this geographic disadvantage, the Emperor of the French believed that victory was assured.
However, the most dangerous threat to Napoleon was the proximity of the Prussian troops,
who hoped to bolster Wellington's eastern flank.
In order to delay their arrival,
Napoleon dispatched Marshal Emmanuel de Grouchy,
with approximately 34,000 men, nearly a third of his total strength, to harass them,
thereby buying himself enough time to face one enemy at a time.
The decision was not a bad one, but a torrential rainstorm on the 17th delayed the French response.
Napoleon consequently postponed the attack until midday on the 18th,
as to give the ground the time to dry,
perhaps miscalculating how long it would take the Prussians to arrive.
When the battle properly began around noon,
the French infantry began their feint attack on Huguemont,an important communications hub.
What should have been merely the opening stroke before an assault on the enemy's center
became a brutal slugfest,
as Napoleon sent wave after wave of men against the chateau.
The British garrison held fast without drawing a significant number of reinforcements from the center.
Furthermore, hiding behind the reverse slopes made Wellington's troops all but invulnerable to artillery fire.
Though he had more men and perhaps could have overwhelmed the British eventually,
time was not on Napoleon's side.
Around 1pm, a mass of troops appeared in the distance.
Finally, Grouchy was arriving.
Oh wait, no, that's the Prussians.
Napoleon's worst fear had now materialized.
He would have to move fast or risk being overwhelmed.
A dispatch was quickly sent to Grouchy,
ordering him to return to the main army,
but he never did for disputed reasons.
His initial orders had been to pursue the Prussians and keep them at bay.
Battling the III Corps in the afternoon,
the loyal general was following his emperor's orders to the letter.
Well, not quite to the letter.
He failed miserably to pin the Prussians down.
It was his only job.
He was too busy fighting a small contingent
while the rest of Grouchy's forces bore down on the increasingly beleaguered French army.
Their arrival to the battlefield was slow, however,
and Napoleon, with his unwavering sense of optimism,
still believed he could win the day.
His optimism wasn't entirely ill-founded.
After two brigades of British heavy cavalry,
among them the infamously cavalier Scots Greys,
attacked the French,
they were then caught in a counterattack by the French cuirassiers and lancers.
The Scots Greys were essentially destroyed as a result,
along with many of the other regiments to meet two British brigades.
To hinder the Prussian advance,
Napoleon set up a cavalry screen
supported by a corps of infantry.
He then shifted his attention from Huguemont
to the Allied center at La Haye Saint.
Two brigades of infantry under the audacious Marshal Michel Ney
attacked the farmhouse,
but were repeatedly repulsed.
When he mistakenly believed that he saw a break in the British line,
Ney ordered a massive cavalry charge.
Three divisions of French cavalry smashed into the enemy front
as a result of Ney's carelessness,
straight into anti-cavalry screen formations.
By 6 p.m.,
these mounted units had been completely depleted.
But a 6,000-man infantry advance managed to secure the position
after heavy fighting.
From their hard-fought position,
French artillery chewed through the Allied center,
devastating Wellington's command posts.
For a moment,
it seemed that victory was within Napoleon's grasp,
so long as Ney could get some reinforcements
from the Imperial Guard held in reserve.
But Napoleon refused to give up the forces
he was using to secure his flank against the Prussians,
who had been advancing
while Ney launched one more wasteful cavalry attack
after the next.
With more Prussians arriving
and the French flank finally collapsing,
utterly demoralized
after the young guard had been beaten back,
the Emperor was forced to deploy his old guard,
a card that should have been played much earlier.
By then,
even the old guard,
consisting of France's finest troops,
seasoned veterans of numerous campaigns,
could not turn the tide.
They would rather die than surrender.
By 9 p.m.,
it was all over.
Four days later,
Napoleon abdicated the Imperial throne.
The hundred days were at an end.
在1815年,
I relinquished the anticipation
of ultimate success.
I lost my first confidence.
Perhaps I found
that I was wearing beyond the time of life,
at which fortune usually proves favorable.
Or perhaps
the spell that I'd hung
over my miraculous career
was broken.
Now that we've summarized
the course of this historic battle,
it's time to return to our original question.
Was its outcome avoidable?
First,
let me step out of my armchair historian role
and get ready for some armchair generalship.
Much better.
There's a handful of moments in the battle
that are easy to point to
as potentially fatal mistakes.
Ney and Grouchy
are often targets for blame
and have gotten their share of it
over the years.
Grouchy was undeniably outplayed
by the Prussians,
and if he had more effectively delayed them
or had been able to respond more rapidly
to the order recalling him
to the battlefield of Waterloo,
events may have transpired differently.
As for Ney,
his numerous attacks on the British line
were unnecessarily costly.
He threw repeated cavalry charges
against the British infantry
while they were in square formation.
Although the French displayed true heroism
during these charges,
they may as well have been
falling on their own swords.
An earlier combined arms attack
that employed artillery and cavalry
more effectively
may have gone a long way.
The possible permutations here,
especially if we take earlier battles
in the campaign into account,
are nearly endless,
and there's plenty of blame to go around.
Historian Adam Zamoyski,
in his biography Napoleon, A Life,
suggests that Le Petit Caporal
might have just lost his touch.
He says,
the younger Napoleon
would have tied Wellington down head-on
and outflanked him,
pinning him in a trap of his own making.
The Napoleon of old
probably also would have been willing
to dispatch the old guard
to help secure Ney's position
on La Haye Saint,
and he might have not devoted
so much manpower to attacking Huguemont,
which, although an important position,
was not worth the price paid.
Napoleon has also been criticized
for needlessly waiting
for the ground to dry
before attacking the British,
but the trade-off would of course
be delayed movement
of mounted and artillery units.
These strategic blunders
were compounded on a tactical level
by the decision to organize
many of the men into closed columns,
which, despite demoralizing the enemy,
did not constitute the most effective option
for maximizing firepower.
All told, Bonaparte gave two reasons
for his failure.
Grouchy failing in checking the Prussians,
and his great charge of cavalry
being made half an hour too soon.
To us at The Armchair Historian,
Napoleon could very well have won at Waterloo
if he had prioritized
breaking the British center line,
rather than wasting lives
on taking Huguemont.
The Imperial Guard
should have been deployed
as early as possible
to reinforce an attack
on the British center.
In addition, Ney should have never
been given free reign
to deplete the French cavalry divisions.
And Grouchy,
we've talked enough about Grouchy.
Joining me now is Cody
from Alternate History Hub
to talk a bit about
how Napoleon could have achieved victory
on a strategic level.
It seems to me that the best way
Napoleon could have fended off
the Seventh Coalition
was to avoid embarking
on the Waterloo campaign entirely.
Upon Napoleon's return,
it was immediately clear
that a new coalition would form
and resist him
with the same tenaciousness as before.
He could have fought defensively,
giving himself time
to recreate the army
he had fielded in his first reign
at the cost of public support.
Although a defensive strategy
more in line with the Six Days Campaign,
which took place just one year prior,
may have been better suited
to repelling the Seventh Coalition,
winning this war
would likely be the greatest challenge
of Napoleon's life.
Regardless of whether
he stood a chance or not,
defensively or otherwise,
the Emperor opted for
a much more aggressive course of action,
now known to history
as the Waterloo Campaign.
It is ironic that
given how much of his success
on and off the battlefield
was the result of bold maneuvering,
Napoleon's final display
of audaciousness
in pursuing this strategy
may have been the one to doom him.
Yet on the day of the battle itself,
that bold decisiveness
seemed to have been absent.
Napoleon could have won
the Battle of Waterloo,
but probably not the Napoleon
who was present.
The man who lost to Wellington that day
bore more resemblance
to the one who would die
on St. Helena in 1821
than the one coronated in 1804.
