迦太基vs羅馬:第二次布匿戰爭(漢尼拔) P7 - 7
建築計畫觀
30粉絲
39 次觀看·2025年8月25日
到目前為止,我們一直跟隨著漢諾貝爾的戰路
從伊比利亞,通過高爾,穿越亞洲,一直到中東意大利
他在時間之間擊敗了羅馬聯軍
在意大利的七個月之內,他只站了130公里
羅馬聯軍的戰路已經開啟了,只剩下十天的步驟
但漢諾貝爾的下一個行動正值得討論
在這部影片中,我們想討論他在穿越亞洲的勝利後做出的決定
首先,我們要向我們的朋友在CuriosityStream的朋友們打聲招呼
這是世界第一的直播服務
是關於我們人生中學習、探索和理解的任務
他們的圖書館擁有近兩萬五千個紀錄
你只需要每月三塊錢才能獲得
我個人比較喜歡歷史
今天我看了《城堡防禦》
紀錄了中古時期五百年的城堡建築
集中在城堡防禦、建築技術的發展和其他
你絕對應該去看看
而且你可以免費觀看
CuriosityStream提供了30天的免費無限資訊
給我們所有的觀眾
而且他們不僅做歷史
在CuriosityStream你可以找到註冊
關於物理、宇宙、生物、生物學、醫學、
發展、工程、人工智慧、
電子技術和更多
在他們的服務被訂閱後幾個月
我覺得他們是最佳的直播服務
CuriosityStream是為所有喜歡看紀錄片的人提供的
而且他們可以在許多平臺上獲得
如果你想免費看看他們的整個圖書館
並幫助支持我們的頻道
請在下面的描述欄點擊連結
並使用密碼HistoryMarch
獲得30天免費無限資訊
和千萬個紀錄片
在CuriosityStream
在意大利的首7個月
漢娜波·巴克斯的運動
無懈可擊
儘管幾乎一半的軍隊死亡在亞洲
他領導了他累積的軍隊
並擊敗了羅馬人在提吉尼亞和塞爾維亞
這贏得了他
加勒岡族的支持
許多人加入了卡薩吉尼亞總統
運動繼續往南向著中東意大利
穿過阿波納山和阿努河沙漠地帶
這四天穿過沙漠
非常貴
許多他的士兵死亡
其他人因累積而死亡
漢娜波他自己
因感染而失去視線和一隻眼睛
也失去了大量的
帕克動物和馬
這導致了他的
競選計劃的嚴重問題
他能夠操縱
帕克動物從亞特里斯堪的農民
從帕克動物從亞特里斯堪的農民
在戰爭中訓練馬
這讓漢娜波的士兵
被大量的漢娜波軍隊
對付帕克動物
但儘管這次戰爭
漢娜波軍隊
被漢娜波軍隊
擊殺
但漢娜波軍隊
而幾天後
漢娜波軍隊
農曆1992年
幟安一 comfy
Hannibal was encamped just 130km from the city of Rome.
No army stood in his way, and he could have marched on the capital in less than 10 days.
Yet he decided not to.
Let's try to examine why.
In warfare, tactical objectives and strategic objectives need to be connected in some form.
Tactics refers to methods that an army employs in order to win battles.
Strategy deals with broad objectives that a warring country has, as well as the means necessary to achieve these objectives.
Without strategy, battles are disconnected individual events.
Without tactics, any strategy falls apart.
In the Second Punic War, Rome's strategic objectives were to keep the territories it won in the First Punic War, and perhaps seize parts of Iberia.
Carthage, on the other hand, sought to retain dominance over Iberia and its valuable silver mines,
and win back Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica that were lost in the First War, along with other minor islands in the Mediterranean.
This would enable Carthage to regain its dominance on the sea.
Rome correctly understood Carthage's objectives and moved to prevent them.
Of the 11 legions that were in the field at the time of Hannibal's arrival in Italy,
two were stationed in Sicily, two in Sardinia, and two were sent to Iberia, while one remained in Tarentum.
Four legions were left in Italy to deal with Hannibal.
At the time of the battle at Lake Trasimene, two legions were commanded by Flaminius, which were destroyed.
The other two were commanded by Sivilius, which were rendered useless after the destruction of their cavalry,
forcing Sivilius to return north to fight an ongoing battle with the marauding Gauls.
With the appointment of Fabius Maximus, Rome did authorize the formation of two new legions for the defense of the city,
an annual practice that became regular as of 217 BC.
But these legions likely were not fully trained, and perhaps weren't at full strength either.
Hannibal had a clear advantage in the field.
Furthermore, he could rely on the 70 Carthaginian ships that roamed the waters of the Etruscan coast,
only 120 kilometers from Hannibal's position.
Why did Carthage send these ships so far into Roman waters?
70 ships was over 60% of their entire fleet.
Since they were not carrying reinforcements nor supplies for the army in Italy,
their presence near Rome itself, at the same time when Hannibal was also so close to the capital,
suggests that a possible land-sea operation was planned to take the city.
The 70 Carthaginian warships would prevent Roman transport ships from ferrying troops from Sardinia to the capital,
while Hannibal attacks the city.
The fact that supports this is the positioning of the Roman fleet.
Of the 220 ships in the fleet, 10 were at Ariminium on the Adriatic coast,
150 were protecting the waters of Sicily,
and another 30 were stationed in Iberia to support the Scipio brothers.
Therefore, only around 30 warships were protecting the capital.
With 70 ships, Carthage had a clear naval advantage for any immediate operations against the city,
and on land, Hannibal was virtually at the gates, unopposed.
To move on the capital after Trasimene would have made tactical and strategic sense.
An attack, a siege, or even a feint,
would have forced the Romans to withdraw troops from other theaters to protect the city.
This would have exposed Sicily, Sardinia, or Iberia to Carthaginian attacks.
At the same time, Hannibal could lift the siege to deal with any approaching armies.
This failure to create a link between the strategic and tactical objectives
perhaps played a decisive role in the outcome of the war.
Hannibal himself later acknowledged that this was a missed opportunity,
but he never explained his decisions.
Two main reasons for not attacking the Roman capital were suggested by historians.
First, that Hannibal did not have enough troops to besiege the city due to its size and its garrison.
This doesn't sufficiently explain why Hannibal decided not to attack.
Namely, during the times of the Republic,
the population of the city of Rome was between 450,000 and 500,000 people.
The entire population lived in an area of just 13.5 square kilometers.
The city was surrounded by the 11-kilometer-long Servian Wall,
a stone barrier that's 10 meters high in some places.
There were five main gates on major roads leading into the city.
10-meter-deep defensive trenches were dug up in front of the walls.
The city faced open fields.
These defenses should not have posed a formidable obstacle to Carthaginian engineering abilities,
nor was the city too big to be besieged by Hannibal's army of around 50,000 troops.
In addition, even if the city's garrison of two legions were battle-ready,
10,000 troops manning the walls and multiple gates
would not have posed a strong enough threat to deter an attack.
The second suggestion is that a naval blockade was not possible
because the Roman fleet would keep the supply lines open along the river Tiber.
This would have been true had Ostia been big enough to be Rome's main port at the time,
but it didn't become a major port for another 250 years until Emperor Claudius expanded it.
At the time of the Second Punic War,
the majority of seaborne supplies for the capital came through the port of Puteoli,
over 190 kilometers down the coast,
and were then transported to the city over land.
Hannibal could have cut off these supplies by blocking the roads.
At least for some time, a naval blockade of Rome would not be needed,
and the Carthaginian ships could focus on preventing transports
from bringing in reinforcements from Sardinia.
So, why did Hannibal, one of history's greatest risk-takers,
choose not to attempt to take the city,
while he was, arguably, at his strongest, and Rome was at its weakest?
One possibility that is often suggested by historians
is that Hannibal's view of war was influenced by Hellenistic thinking.
He was certainly an admirer of Pyrrhus of Epirus.
Namely, Hannibal's view was that maybe the total destruction of the enemy
was not needed to win the war.
Instead, battles would be fought until the leadership of one side conceded defeat,
once they realized that they could no longer win on the field of battle,
and stood to lose more if they continued fighting.
Therefore, he may have assumed that Rome would seek terms
once the many contests of armies had been decided.
If Hannibal did indeed hold this conventional Hellenistic viewpoint,
he may have thought that an attack on Rome would have been more costly
than fighting battles in the open.
But the Roman view of war was straightforward.
Destroy or be destroyed.
Rome would not accept any form of defeat, no matter the cost.
They would rather fight to the last man
and have an enemy assert their dominance by imposing conditions on its citizens.
Perhaps Hannibal still didn't fully understand this in 217 BC.
Whatever the case, Fabius began defensive preparations in Rome,
while, unbeknownst to him, Hannibal turned east, towards the Adriatic coast.
A game of cat and mouse between the two commanders is about to begin.
In this video, we provided plausible reasons based on our research
as to why Hannibal didn't attack Rome after Lake Trasimene.
We'd certainly like to know what your thoughts are,
so if you have any theories of your own, let us know in the comments.
As always, thank you for watching.
Credit goes to our awesome patrons for supporting our work.
