一戰之後:暴力論和巴黎和會
建築計畫觀
30粉絲
2025年8月16日
Hi, I'm Jesse.
And I'm Flo.
And welcome to an exciting new episode of Beyond the Great War,
the segment where we answer your questions
about what happened 100 years ago.
Hi, Jesse.
Hi, Flo.
Are you wondering why I'm here?
Just a bit.
OK, I'm here to tell you
and all the viewers out there in YouTube land
about, well, this new format that you just introduced,
which is called Beyond the Great War.
So what is Beyond the Great War?
It's an evolution of what we used to do
in our format called Out of the Trenches.
It's the episode that we released
where we answer the questions from the community.
But instead of just, you know,
having two or three questions from the community
and then answering them very, very briefly,
we're now going to take much more time
to answer them in greater detail.
Why are we doing this?
Well, first of all, I think some of the questions
for the 1919 period need some more detail.
And on the other hand,
it also means that we probably directly
or indirectly answer more questions
from more people about the same topic.
So, and why is it called Beyond the Great War?
Because it's not just for questions about,
you know, the actual events or people or whatever.
It's also the format
where we will take time for historical debates.
So what is an historical debate?
As an example,
I prepared the first question for this format.
And the question is,
what is the Brutalization Theory?
I recently went out with a historian,
we had a few beers,
and he told me about that.
And I was like, OK, so what is this theory?
And why is such a theory a good tool for historians?
Like how can they use that
to answer whatever question?
So I'm just going to go behind the camera
to my production magic,
and I will leave the answer to that question to you.
All right. Thanks, Flo.
Bye, Jesse.
Well, like any historical theory,
the brutalization thesis
is a way of trying to answer a question.
And in this case, the question is,
why was Europe so violent
in the first half of the 20th century?
I mean, the Great War was awful
and resulted in millions of people being killed.
So why then did the fighting continue after the war?
Why would people turn to violent ideologies
like fascism, Nazism or Stalinism?
And how could World War II and the Holocaust happen
even though society had already experienced
the horrors of a total war?
Now, although the armistice had been signed,
Europe was still a violent place
after the war was over,
as we've already seen in the last episode
about the January Uprising in Germany
and the civil wars and revolutions across Europe.
Now, the violence got even worse in World War II
when even more people were killed
and genocides were scientifically planned
and carried out.
So the Brutalization Theory
is a way to try to explain
how violence could continue
and even get worse
in spite of the horrors of the Great War.
George Moss laid out the best-known argument
for the Brutalization Theory.
His work concentrated on Germany,
but he also discussed other countries as well.
He basically wrote that
the societies which had experienced violence
during the Great War
became brutalized as a result.
The soldiers who were traumatized during the war
carried it home with them,
and they effectively transferred
wartime violence to the home front
where it then became part of the post-war culture.
There had been so much death during the war
that people became to some extent indifferent to it.
Central to this brutalized culture
was the creation and glorification
of the so-called myth of the war experience.
This myth turned the horror of war
into an object of almost religious reverence.
The fallen,
which is a poetic way of saying the dead,
were heroes
whose memory was to inspire the nation
to a greatness
that had not been achieved during the war.
This myth incorporated nationalism,
religion,
and ideas about manliness
into a powerful mix.
It also rested on national revenge
and ideas of Christian resurrection and suffering.
The true future of the nation was a man,
and a man was someone
who was ready to kill or be killed.
This process of brutalization
influenced culture and politics.
The language of the front
was used in political speech,
and paramilitary violence
in the name of politics
became quite common.
Just as the military enemy
had to be defeated in the war,
now the political enemy
had to be wiped out.
The idea of a political struggle
had merged with real-life ideas about violence.
This allowed society
to accept violent ideologies,
actual violence,
and eventually mass death
on an unprecedented scale
in World War II and the Holocaust.
A new normal had been created
following the collective trauma
of the Great War.
That's only one of the many reasons
why in German
the Great War is often called
the Ur-Katastrophe of the 20th century,
and roughly translated
that means it was the original catastrophe
from which all others flowed.
Of course,
not all historians subscribe
to the brutalization theory.
Some have argued
that while it does have a strong point,
it can't fully explain
the post-1918 violence.
For example,
there was no large-scale violence
in France or Great Britain or Belgium
after the war,
even though millions of men and women
from those countries
had suffered and inflicted suffering
during the war,
in the same way
as those from countries
where violence actually did break out.
In theory,
French and British and Belgians
would be as brutalized
and as likely to turn to fascism
as the societies that actually did,
like Germany
or parts of the former
Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires.
The questions that these historians ask
are a little bit different.
They want to know
why large-scale violence
and a turn to extremism
happened in some places,
but not in others.
It seems the original brutalization thesis
doesn't really have a compelling answer
to this question.
In a way of trying to find an answer,
some researchers have questioned
the level of violence
actually perpetrated by individual soldiers
during the war.
Now, many of them of course
did see fellow soldiers
being killed and wounded,
but how many of them
and how often actually attempted
to deliberately kill an enemy
that they could see?
Some studies suggest
it was a lot fewer than one might suspect,
with no more than 25 percent
of combat veterans
actually having shot at an enemy
on the Western Front at least.
Most of the killing
was not done face to face.
It was the result
of artillery bombardments
which were fired off
from far behind the lines.
And occasions for personalized killing
and the resulting brutalization,
they just weren't that common,
because going over the top
and charging into the enemy position
didn't happen all that frequently
for individual soldiers.
Even when they did attack,
soldiers often tried to avoid killing
or, when they did,
bitterly regretted it afterwards.
In the words of Antoine Prost,
brutalization,
defined as the lifting
of the prohibition on killing
and the liberation
of murderous instincts,
could only have affected
a small minority.
This critique
makes it more difficult
to explain how brutalization
took place,
when relatively few soldiers
had actually behaved brutally.
So that kind of leads us
to the question of
what other answer
could there be
to the question
of post-1918 violence
and extremism?
Robert Gerwart offers
one alternative explanation,
though he limits it
to the immediate post-war years.
And it kind of goes like this.
First off,
the actual violence
and the cult glorifying it
didn't flourish
in the countries
that won the war.
Well,
with the exception of Italy,
but that's a whole other story
that maybe we'll get to someday.
The revolutions and civil wars
took place in the defeated powers.
So the destabilizing
and radicalizing
effect of defeat
must be a part
of the post-war violence equation.
Secondly,
the Russian Revolution
had a dramatic
and polarizing effect
on people
from all across Europe.
Some were inspired
to strive for
violent revolution
based on the Bolshevik example.
But many others
were so afraid
of the revolution spreading
to their country
that they were willing
to use deadly force
to stop it,
whether or not
the threat was as serious
as they feared.
Finally,
violence happened
where states collapsed,
and didn't happen
where the states survived.
You see,
normally the state
has a monopoly on violence.
So only the police
and the army
can legitimately use violence
to keep order
or carry out state policy
like waging a war.
When Austria-Hungary,
Germany and the Ottoman Empire
collapsed,
there was a power vacuum.
The new states
that replaced them
were not only weak,
but they also couldn't agree
on their own borders either.
This led to internal violence
to define the form
of these new states,
but also to small wars
between them
to settle
their border disputes.
Winston Churchill
called these wars
of the Pygmies,
which wasn't particularly
nice of him.
In the end,
I would say
that the combined effect
of defeat,
the Russian Revolution
and state collapse
is also an answer
worth considering,
especially for the
immediate post-war years.
Generally speaking,
in my view,
whatever its strengths
and weaknesses,
the brutalization thesis
is certainly
an interesting way
of trying to account
for the fact
that no simple armistice
or peace treaty
could end
the cycle of violence
unleashed by the Great War.
And as usual in history,
the answer we get
depends on what questions
we ask about the past.
So now it's time for you
to tell us what you think
in the comments.
And here's another question
we got from our community.
Didn't the Paris Peace Conference
also start in January 19?
You didn't talk about that
in your first episode.
So how did it actually start,
and could you tell us more
about the set-up
of the conference?
Well,the November 11th armistice
may have put an end to the war,
though certainly not to the fighting,
as we've seen.
But the settling of an actual peace
was another challenge entirely.
On January 18th,
delegates from more than 30 states
gathered in Paris
to be in the peace conference.
It was the most significant
undertaking of this kind
since the Congress of Vienna
after the end of the Napoleonic Wars
over 100 years earlier.
And by the way,
the starting date was no accident.
On that same day,
January 18th, in 1871,
the German Empire
had been founded in Versailles
following the defeat of France
in the Franco-Prussian War.
But the conference
was also different
than any which came before it.
The war that was to be
officially ended
had been bloodier,
more expensive,
and more destructive
than any in history.
Not only would the delegates
need to find a way
to bring the war to a close
with peace treaties,
but they also wanted
to establish a new order
for Europe and for the world
to prevent such a war
from breaking out again.
It was a massive affair,
the top news story of the day.
500 journalists
came to Paris
to report on the proceedings,
though they were soon
to be disappointed
by how little information
was actually made public.
Apart from the heads of state,
the diplomats and their staffs,
hundreds of experts
in various fields
participated in the conference as well.
They worked in 52 commissions
and dozens more sub-commissions
which would eventually
meet more than 1600 times
to attempt to resolve
a host of questions.
Their job was to provide advice
to those making the decisions.
There were lawyers
for questions of war guilt,
economists and statisticians
for war reparations,
and there were also historians
and geographers
for questions of national borders
and ethnic minorities.
One expert who participated
was the famous British economist
John Maynard Keynes,
who would go on
to become a sharp critic
of the resulting peace treaties.
Despite the presence
of so many delegates,
the main decisions
would be made
by the Council of Ten,
that is to say,
two representatives each
for the allied powers
of Britain, France, Italy,
the United States and Japan.
Soon, though,
the so-called Big Four
– that's just Britain, the US,
France and Italy –
took control of the conference,
and it was really their leaders
who determined the outcomes.
It wasn't going to be easy
for the Conference of 1919
to achieve its goals
of ending the war
and creating a new world order.
For a start,
the conference opened
without any prior agreement
as to how to proceed,
leading one French observer
to predict that the result
would be an improvisation."
Many members
of the various commissions
assumed that the Germans
would be consulted eventually,
and prepared harsh terms
as a starting point
for the negotiations.
In fact,
one British delegate later wrote,
Had it been known from the outset
that no negotiations
would ever take place
with the enemy,
it is certain
that many of the less reasonable
clauses of the treaty
would never have been inserted.
The victorious countries
also had diverging views.
Their aims were
a contradictory mix
of traditional notions
of territory and power,
but were also economic,
ideological,
and to some extent,
utopian as well.
France wanted above all
to eliminate any future threat
of German aggression,
and they also wanted
the return of the provinces
of Alsace and Lorraine,
plus reparations
to help pay for the destruction
of the war zone.
The British hoped
to keep a balance of power in Europe,
and they also wanted
to extend their colonial empire
in the Middle East
and ensure that Germany
would never again become
a commercial or colonial rival
as it had before 1914.
Italy, for its part,
coveted more territory
to its north and east,
including Istria, Trieste,
the Dalmatian coast,
and the city of Fiume.
Now, the United States,
which had suffered much less
than its allies during the war,
focused more on the establishment
of the League of Nations,
which was meant to be
an international organization
which would work to prevent
future wars from breaking out
and guarantee world peace.
Now, all the participants
had to, so to speak,
dress up
their desires
in the clothing
of the 14 points
proposed by Wilson,
the President of the US,
the year before.
But they didn't see eye to eye
on these points either.
The points relating
to secret diplomacy,
free trade,
disarmament,
self-determination,
new borders,
Russia,
and European colonies
had the potential
to cause disagreement,
and they would
as the conference went on.
Many of the war aims
were incompatible
with the 14 points,
and this was especially true
with respect to the case
of national determination,
like the plan to give Poland
access to the sea
by assigning it majority
German-speaking territories
around the city of Danzig,
or the inherent contradiction
of maintaining colonial empires.
The differences were so acute
that French Prime Minister
Georges Clemenceau said
with regards to Wilson's program,
If I accepted such a thing
after so many millions
have been killed or suffered,
I expect and hope
that my successor
would take me
by the scruff of the neck
and have me shot.
There were many other constraints
on the Big Four as well.
Each had to balance
domestic politics
while the conference was going on.
For example,
Wilson's position at the conference
was made a lot more complicated
by the fact that he, a Democrat,
had just lost majority support
in both houses of Congress,
and many Republicans
felt the US should not be involved
in cleaning up Europe's mess.
There were the millions of dead
to bear in mind,
and the emotional trauma
of relatives and survivors.
There were prior political commitments
such as the Treaty of London,
which had promised
large chunks of territory
to Italy in 1915.
There were also
the emotional hangovers of the war.
The public was still in a war mindset
after four years of propaganda
which caused Keynes to bemoan
the blind anti-German passion
which still motivated many
on the Allied side.
The French Foreign Minister
Stéphane Pichon
wasn't hiding his feelings
when he said,
On our territory, at Versailles,
at the gates of our capital,
Germany has given up its claim
for world domination,
a claim which was built upon
the destruction of the freedom of nations.
Also, events in some parts of Europe
and the Middle East
were happening at a blinding pace,
and changing the facts on the ground
as the peace conference
was still going on.
Austria-Hungary
and the Ottoman Empire
had broken up,
and Germany was rocked
by revolution more than once.
And no one knew
what to do about Russia,
where a civil war was raging
in which many of the powers
at the peace conference
were actually fighting,
and no one was sure
how it would end.
The peace conference
also faced a further difficulty
which was not fully appreciated
at the time,
for the statesmen
and experts gathered there
represented only the victorious powers.
Neither the defeated central powers
nor Bolshevik Russia
were granted a seat
at the negotiating table.
So whatever could be achieved,
the losers would pay the price,
which could only be justified
if they were forced to accept
responsibility for starting the war.
This was a complete break
from normal peace negotiations
of the past,
and this would have grave consequences
in the future.
Despite all these limitations,
enormous expectations
were placed on the outcome
of the conference,
and the leaders were conscious
of the weight of history
on their shoulders.
Woodrow Wilson,
even before he reached Paris,
wrote that he feared
that no matter what happened,
it might end in a tragedy
of disappointment.
As the conference opened,
it remained to be seen
whether idealism
or good old-fashioned realpolitik
would determine
the outcome of the peace,
and the stakes
had never been higher.
We will of course cover
the peace conference
in the upcoming months,
and see how it continues to develop.
This was our first exciting episode
of Beyond the Great War.
If you have any questions
about events,
historical figures,
tactics,
or historical debates,
just post them
in the comments below.
And if you really,
really want your question
to get through to us,
you can consider
supporting us on Patreon.
We're also going to answer
community questions
in the Great War Patreon podcast,
for example.
And as always,
you can find the sources
that we use for this episode
in the video description.
You can also get in touch
with us on Facebook,
Instagram,
or Twitter.
I'm Jesse Alexander.
This is The Great War,
a production of Real-Time History
and the only YouTube history channel
that has proper catering
for its peace conferences.
And now,
a message from the future.
Hey, hey, hey.
We just want to say
thank you for 1 million subscribers.
It has been almost 5 years now
since we started the project.
It has been an incredible ride.
Thank you for everybody
who subscribed.
Thank you for everybody
who told their friends
and their relatives
about this show.
Thank you for all the support
for the people
who came to the fan meetings.
And thank you for making
the best job of our life so far,
I guess.
Yeah, that.
And also making it
a very pleasant experience
to transition the show
to a new concept
for the warm welcome
that Jesse got.
And, yeah, stay tuned
for more exciting episodes.
And...
Woo-hoo!
Hey!
Woo-hoo!
Ah...
