South Korea has seen a notable fertility rate recovery, driven by a post-World War II baby boom echo and robust government policies, including extended parental leave and substantial cash subsidies. In contrast, China faces declining birth and marriage rates, with minimal fertility incentives, particularly in cities like Shanghai. East Asian nations, shaped by Confucian values, have prioritized economic growth, often at the expense of traditional family-oriented cultures. China’s low fiscal resources and heavy deficits limit its ability to emulate South Korea’s aggressive subsidies. Meanwhile, an oversupply of college graduates fuels unemployment, weakening workers’ bargaining power and discouraging childbirth. This creates a cycle where economic pressures and job insecurity suppress fertility, reducing consumer spending and business profits. While South Korea’s incentives show results, China’s focus on short-term economic gains and employment stability hinders long-term population investment, posing challenges to societal continuity.
0:00 Intro 0:28 A Stark Contrast in Births 0:57 East Asia’s Economic Triumph 1:39 South Korea’s Rejection of Parenthood 2:36 An Unexpected Fertility Surge 3:29 South Korea’s Policy Powerhouse 5:58 China’s Feeble Response 7:40 Fiscal and Motivational Barriers 13:17 A Future of Tough Choices 14:41 The Job Burden of a Billion 15:43 Redefining the Factory 16:27 From Migrant Workers to Automation 17:51 A Low-Growth Trap 19:24 The Vanishing Consumer Base 20:25 Subsidies for Survival 21:28 A Nation at a Crossroads
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Hi, I'm Dong Xiong. Welcome to Digging into China, where we explore China in depth to
review unique perspectives. Over the past year, South Korea has experienced a significant
recovery in its fertility rate. In the first quarter of this year, newborn numbers surged,
marking the largest year-on-year increase since records began in 1981. In contrast,
China continues to face declining birth rates and fewer marriage registrations. In 2024,
China recorded only 6.11 million marriage registrations, a sharp 20 percent decline
from the previous year, reverting to levels last seen in 1980. The number of newborns
has fallen to levels reminiscent of the 1940s during the Second World War, when China's
approximately 400 million, and many young men were engaged in front-line combat.
China, Japan, and South Korea, shaped by East Asian-Confucian traditions,
have cultivated a national ethos that channels immense energy into development.
In less than 70 years since World War II, these nations have built some of the world's
leading economies, unleashing a remarkable burst of progress that has captivated global attention.
However, such intense national competition and economic growth have come at a cost.
It appears that the traditional East Asian value of large families and abundant offspring
is being rapidly eroded. Over a decade ago, South Korea's younger generation
boldly embraced a rebellious five-gives-up philosophy, rejecting romance, marriage,
parenthood, home ownership, and even personal relationships. This was not merely the grumbling
of a small group. A 2021 Seoul survey revealed that 73 percent of South Koreans supported the
signaling a societal shift from reluctance to have children to an active aversion to them.
On the streets, parents with strollers are often met with disapproving looks or discriminating
rather than warm smiles. Cafes, restaurants, and entertainment venues increasingly display
signs prohibiting infants and toddlers, reflecting a clear anti-child sentiment among South Korean
youth. Yet, in this very nation so resistant to parenthood, the fertility rate has begun to
rebound unexpectedly. Two primary factors drive this change—the ethos of the post-World War II
baby boom and a series of robust fertility policies implemented by South Korea.
The baby boom echo is a demographic phenomenon. If the original baby boom was a resounding call,
its echoes are smaller waves of increased births that follow. Like an echo, these waves
diminish over time until they fade entirely. Picture a ping-pong ball bouncing. Each rebound
grows weaker. South Korea's recent fertility upswing was sparked by decisive administrative
measures. In early 2024, then-President Yoon Suk-kyo declared a national population emergency
and introduced 15 key policies, including extended parental leave, tax exemptions,
housing support, and financial assistance for childbirth and child rearing. Under these policies,
the South Korean government provides both parents with 12 months of paid parental leave,
which can be flexibly divided into four periods. During this leave, each parent can receive up to
equivalent to approximately $33,500 per child. This means a couple could collectively receive
up to $67,000 in salary support for one child. South Korea has also significantly increased
cash subsidies. From 2024, families with infants under one year receive approximately $770 per
month in fertility subsidies. For children aged 1 to 2, families receive about $300 per month,
along with a one-time childbirth payment. For low-income families, these subsidies can total
roughly $45,800 in the first two years of a child's life. Local governments have also taken
action. For instance, Incheon City introduced the 100 Million Dream policy, providing every child
born and raised in Incheon until age 18 with a cumulative 100 Million Won,
approximately $76,725, in financial support over those 18 years. Beyond one-time payments,
South Korea's ruling party has pledged to waive university tuition for all children and families
with three or more offsprings. The opposition party has gone further, promising that, if elected,
they will offer newlyweds a 100 Million Won, or $76,700, fertility loan. If the couple has
one child, the loan becomes interest-free. With a second child, the principal is halved,
and with a third, the entire loan is forgiven. With such substantial financial incentives,
South Korea's fertility rate has shown a remarkable recovery. This demonstrates that
young people are not unwilling to have children. When sufficient financial support is provided,
they are ready to embrace parenthood. By contrast, China's efforts in universal
fertility encouragement or substantial childbirth subsidies have been limited and lackluster.
To date, only a few first- and second-tier cities have implemented modest measures,
which pale in comparison to South Korea's initiatives. Consider Shanghai, China's
most financially prosperous city. Maternity leave there is limited to 158 days, and paternity leave
is a mere 10 days. Compare this to South Korea's combined 730 days of parental leave for both
a stark disparity. To encourage childbirth, Shanghai provides a modest 5 days of annual
child care leave for parents of children aged 1 to 3, adhering to the minimum national standard.
In terms of financial subsidies, the gap with South Korea is even more pronounced.
Shanghai offers a one-time childbirth subsidy of approximately $4,530.
In a city like Shanghai, this feels less like support and more like an insult to couples who
choose parenthood. For perspective, Shanghai's monthly subsidy for low-income households is
Beyond this, meaningful subsidies or incentives are scarce. The few that exist often require
upfront spending, such as housing purchase discounts, which netizens have markingly
likened to a 5 yuan coupon for a Lamborghini. Why are local governments so reluctant to promote
childbirth? Two reasons stand out—limited resources and insufficient motivation.
First, resources. Supporting fertility demands enormous fiscal expenditure. South Korea,
as a developed nation with a robust economic foundation, can bear this cost with effort.
In 2023, South Korea's per capita fiscal contribution to the government was $12.1 million,
nearly $9,000. In China, this figure is approximately $2,000, less than a quarter
of South Korea's. While China's per capita fiscal revenue is significantly
lower, its fiscal deficit burden is far heavier, 4.4 times that of South Korea,
excluding substantial local government debt. With limited revenue and heavy obligations,
China cannot afford to distribute funds as freely as South Korea.
Additionally, what appears to be ample fiscal resources already committed to addressing deficits
in real estate, infrastructure, and pension systems. In 2024, China's broader fiscal
deficit rate exceeded 9%, with numerous sectors competing for funds.
Second, motivation. Historically, Chinese local governments have acted as both regulators and
participants in economic development. Whether through the fiscal contracting system of the 1980s
or the tax-sharing reform of the 1990s, local and central governments have operated under a system
of separate financial responsibilities, fostering competition akin to businesses in the market.
This is less a hallmark of a market economy and more a form of state and local capitalism,
particularly evident in efforts to attract investment and talent. This competitive
drive has been central to China's rapid economic growth since the reforms began.
Historically, such close alignment of central and local interests is not the norm in China.
With land-based fiscal systems becoming unsustainable, the challenge lies in
maintaining local governments' drive for economic development while reinforcing central authority.
This complex issue is the greatest challenge facing China's economy today.
Take Shanghai as an example. Its population growth strategy has long relied on attracting
external residents rather than subsidizing local births. Shanghai has consistently drawn people
from other regions. So there is little incentive to fund the fertility subsidies, especially since
much of its revenue is transferred to the central government. Thus, Shanghai lacks the motivation
to act. Other regions share this perspective. Spending money locally may not retain people.
For most areas, investing in fertility may not yield long-term economic benefits,
as talent often migrates to economically advanced regions upon adulthood.
Consequently, China's economic system, with its long-standing separation of central and local
responsibilities, prioritizes short-term economic gains over long-term population investment.
Business subsidies are favored because population issues are seen as a national concern,
while local governments guard their own budgets. Moreover, a more urgent issue consumes much of the
fiscal focus and limits the policy space for fertility—the rapidly growing number of college
graduates. To some extent, maintaining employment stability has necessitated
sacrificing fertility rates. It's a balancing act. Prioritizing one side inevitably affects
the other. Graduates keep arriving year after year. Last year's cohort remains unabsorbed,
and a new one emerges. The economy's growth cannot match the influx of job seekers,
leading to a rapid accumulation of unemployment. Thus, the government must prioritize stabilizing
the job market. Investments outside the narrow fiscal deficit, such as special bonds or housing
preservation efforts, consume trillions annually. Without these, the youth unemployment rate,
currently at 15%, would be uncontainable. This figure excludes rural residents and college
students who have never held jobs. Official reports may obscure the truth,
but the reality does not. The challenge of finding work after college is now widely
acknowledged. In 2025, the number of college graduates reached 12.22 million. Seven years ago,
it was 8.2 million, a nearly 50% increase. While 12 million graduates already seems substantial,
this is likely the lowest figure for the next decade. The final major birth peak is still in
primary and secondary school. Projections indicate 12.4 million graduates in 2026
and 16.17 million in 2027, with numbers continue to rise. China's last birth peak occurred in 2016.
When this cohort graduates from college around 2038, it will mark the historical peak in
graduate numbers and a trend reversal. For the next decade and beyond, over 10 million graduates
will enter the job market annually, equivalent to adding an entire South Korea's population
every five years. This figure includes only college graduates, excluding those from high
schools, vocational schools, and technical institutes. A large population of jobless,
ruthless youth is a nightmare for any economy, and this issue is particularly acute in China.
The labor support ratio measures how many people a worker's income can sustain. In the US, one
worker's average income supports approximately 4.8 people, a ratio of 1 to 4.8. In the UK, France,
and Germany, it's 1 to 6.8. In Japan and South Korea, it's around 1 to 3.8. In China, it's
approximately 1 to 1.1, or possibly 1 to 1.3. A lower ratio indicates greater pressure on workers,
less financial freedom, and reduced capacity and willingness to raise children. This low ratio
means that for the same population size, other countries require far fewer jobs than China.
In theory, in Europe or the US, a working-age population of 100 million needs only 20 to 30
million jobs. In China, the same population requires over 80 million jobs to maintain basic
social stability. This is why countries like Europe, Japan, and South Korea can sustain GDP
growth rates around 2%, while China must pursue higher growth. Every 0.1% drop in GDP translates
to roughly 1 million unemployed individuals. In essence, Chinese society cannot afford idle
workers. Regardless of GDP quality, as long as it generates jobs, it suffers.
Thus, we should not overly question China's GDP figures. The issue is not falsified numbers,
but an economic model that prioritizes appearance. This explains why China cannot
abandon its role as a manufacturing powerhouse. It cannot lose the capacity to absorb jobs.
Many argue that Chinese factories have moved beyond the labor-intensive models with high
levels of automation. But in the 21st century, factories are not just physical plants.
White-collar workers, office clerks, and similar roles are the true workers of today. Office
cubicles are the new factories, and companies are the new labor-intensive workplaces. While
factory automation has advanced, white-collar workers are increasingly treated like migrant
workers. This is why as a white-collar employee, your salary feels stagnant. You are essentially
a modern-day migrant worker cloaked in a white-collar title to mask the reality.
Two decades ago, during rapid urbanization, countless migrant workers flooded cities.
Factories had little incentive to automate. There was always someone willing to take the job,
keeping migrant worker conditions low. Today, few young people are willing to take such jobs,
forcing factories to automate to maintain productivity. This is not a choice, but a
necessity. College graduates, however, face the opposite dynamic. The issue is not a shortage of
migrant workers, but an oversupply of graduates who have become the new migrant workers.
With so many graduates, why would companies increase benefits? Migrant workers may be
hard to find for 300 yuan a day, but college graduates are plentiful at 50 yuan a day,
and their numbers are growing. During the high-growth economic phase, talent supply
lagged behind business growth. Before 2008, if you couldn't find a job, it was considered your
fault, not society's. As long as growth outpaced talent accumulation, fertility concerns were
minimum. In a low-growth maintenance phase, however, the situation shifts. When growth lags
behind talent accumulation, pursuing graduate studies to delay unemployment is futile.
Time only worsens the problem. As talent accumulates, companies gain greater leverage
over workers, leaving no incentive to reduce internal competition or improve benefits.
Businesses are also struggling to stay profitable. If they refrain from further
cutting salaries, workers should consider themselves fortunate. Local governments
to maintain business operations and ensure graduate absorption often overlook reductions
in labor benefits. This is not a disregard for the public, but a reluctant choice made
for their benefit. At this stage, graduate numbers, fertility rates, and consumer spending
are deeply interconnected, constraining one another in the deadlock. The more graduates,
the greater the talent surplus, the stronger the incentive for companies to exploit workers,
and the weaker workers' bargaining power becomes. Weak bargaining power means constant
replaceability. Older workers fear displacement by younger ones, and this job insecurity translates
into reduced willingness to have children. If you can barely support yourself, how can you
support a child? Parents raising children are the most significant spenders. A child often
necessitates a larger home, moving from a small apartment to a bigger one, perhaps in a school
district. Cars need upgrading too, from hatchbacks to sedans or larger vehicles. Child-related
spending creates extended consumption cycles, often spanning over a decade. Parents and
grandparents are drawn into these cycles, purchasing family passes for amusement parks
or movie theaters year after year. The decline in marriage and childbirth is rapidly diminishing
this stable, long-term consumer base. For businesses, this erodes a significant portion
of profits. Lower profits drive companies to cut costs and intensify workloads, further discouraging
childbirth. This creates an intractable problem. This is the reality of our era.
The only option is to persevere. We must wait until graduate numbers fall back to the millions,
when job market pressures ease. Only then will there be genuine motivation to enforce labor laws
and improve employment conditions. Discussing this now is mere rhetoric. Forcing measures that
disrupt the few remaining jobs is not feasible. Businesses cannot create 12 million new jobs
annually for the next decade. Recent subsidies for cars and appliances have sparked debate,
with some questioning whether large national subsidies are funneled to inefficient companies
and merchants. Is the government unaware of these maneuvers? Of course it is. But there is no
alternative. These are not subsidies for consumption, but for production. Using
consumption as a pretext to preserve jobs. This addresses societal concerns while securing
employment. This explains why, despite China's industries leading globally, they cannot raise
prices or profit effortlessly like Western firms. China must keep prices low to capture markets,
not out of ambition but due to the billions of unemployed workers waiting to be absorbed.
The focus is not on profits but on finding outlets for jobs and access capacity. For the foreseeable
future, China will face an excess of 10 million college graduates and a shortage of 10 million
newborns. National fertility encouragement is driven by macroeconomic considerations,
not individual ones. A phenomenon known as the fallacy of composition. What benefits the
collective may not benefit the individual. No one wants to spend millions raising a child who
may earn only 4,000 yuan monthly. The difficulty in promoting fertility stems from misaligned
interests. When fewer people bear the burden, those hoping for stability grow anxious. Thus,
we cannot simply criticize young people for not having children as irresponsible. On the
contrary, their restraint reflects a deep sense of responsibility. They recognize that modern
society is not as simple as the older generation's notion of a child being just an extra pair of
chopsticks. Rapid economic growth masks many issues. But when growth slows, the public directly
experiences the downside of that rapid progress. In 30 years, China's economy achieved a century's
worth of development, while its people accrued 50 years' worth of debt in just 15 years.
In an era of strong fertility desires, real estate drained the consumer's future. Japan's 50 years
of rapid growth produced the Heisei shut-ins. South Koreans' 40-year gape rise to the 5
gives up youth. China in 30 years has seen the rise of a lying-flat culture. Everything
is accelerating, and this is the price we must pay. Fertility represents a society's ultimate
vote of confidence in its continuity. Overcoming the current surge of job seekers is merely the
first step. The true test for a nation's enduring stability lies in restoring this land as a fertile
ground for hope and life. Thank you so much for watching. If you find this video helpful,
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