EMERGENCY ALERT: Hong Kong Banks Just Shocked The World

Global Finance News
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Last week there were reports that Hong Kong's top bankers were holding informal talks
about developing a so-called bad bank in order to store the city and the system's
increasingly unmanageable pile of soured loans. And then earlier today, just hours ago,
there were further reports that the city's monetary authorities were circulating the
crisis letter, the one that was developed in 1998's Asian meltdown,
whose purpose is to help the banking sector avoid a similar fate.
As one hedge fund executive put it, whenever this document starts making the rounds,
whether cited in regulatory guidance, discussed in boardrooms, or popping up in bankers' inboxes,
it often means that lenders are bracing for, or already confronting, a wave of corporate distress.
There is a bunch more in the Hong Kong banking system, which also explains why
Hong Kong's dollar absolutely plunged in historic fashion during May and June,
having been basically stuck at the lower bound for the past month, as serious concerns over
the situation in the city's globally connected banking system seems to get worse in every
possible way. And one big question which immediately comes to mind is, why now?
And the answer to that one comes from an answer to another question,
why should everyone outside of Hong Kong care about what's going on in the banking sector there?
And the reason is because this isn't really about Hong Kong. It's about all the assumptions
and expectations banks and businesses around the world had been operating on since the lockdowns
ended. How almost everyone viewed inflation as a product of a red hot global economy,
rather than always what it was, the price illusion. Some of the smartest and most accomplished people
in all of global finance fell for it. But rather than deal with the mess, it's been a worldwide
extend and pretend paradigm, the financial equivalent of forgot how to grow economy.
But as the world here in 2025 gets farther and farther away from the soft landing everyone had
hoped would cushion this cleanup, extend and pretend is giving way to urgency and growing
system worries. So what does everyone do now that they realize Goldilocks' arrival isn't just
postponed, she's been cancelled? Well, we're getting some answers to that question from the
wild developments that are coming in from Hong Kong. And it starts with these reports from last
week, the top executives in the city among the best banks and biggest banks there are having
informal discussions about creating a bad bank, which is never a good sign anyway, because it
means the banking sector realizes their pile of bad loans is already too big to really manage.
And it risks getting even bigger and creating even bigger and more destructive tendencies and
problems and potentials further down the road. What Bloomberg reported last week was the pile of
non-performing loans at Hong Kong lenders has grown so large that some in the industry have discussed
the creation of a quote bad bank to soak up the financial hubs sour debt. The talks between some
of the city's biggest banks described by people familiar with the matter have been preliminary in
nature and lenders would face significant hurdles before putting the idea into action. And that's not
really the point. The point here is that they're even discussing it at all, because that means that
there's enough concern among these top lenders and executives that they're even they're even
thinking about it in such a way that they're having informal discussions. It has gotten to be so bad.
And more importantly, the why now part of this is that they realize that the situation isn't getting
any better. It isn't becoming more favorable as everyone hoped it would be here in 2025. And I
don't mean tariffs and trade wars. According to various reports, non-performing loan levels in
Hong Kong are reported to be about 25 billion at least as of the first quarter. And that works out
to a bad debt rate of roughly 2%. Now that's the published number. So you can bet that the real one
that they won't release publicly is much higher and worse is expected to jump even higher. Thus
the preliminary discussions of creating a bad bank. According to a rating agency Fitch,
they say the official NPL rate might rise to around 2.3% this year, which is already off the
worst level the entire Asia-Pacific region. And Fitch also said it isn't going to get any better
next year. And that quote unquote quality will continue to deteriorate into 2026 and maybe even
beyond. And as Fitch already said back at the end of May, it has a deteriorating sector outlook
for Hong Kong banks in 2025 in anticipation of earnings pressure from reduced net interest
margins due to lower interest rates. The sector outlook also incorporates lingering asset quality
risks from local commercial real estate exposures as vacancy rates remain elevated. The mythical
soft landing recovery never showed up. That's what everyone bought into. It's really basically
two major macroeconomic mistakes. The first one being the aftermath of the pandemic that
confusing the rising consumer price rates for a red hot, even overheating economy. And then
afterward, once they realized that that was wrong, that we were in a forgot how to grow situation,
then believing that somehow lower interest rates were going to lead to a soft landing and leave
everyone with a margin of cushion and error that would allow them to absorb all of those previous
mistakes and do so under favorable conditions. I mean, that's what really happened. That's what
this is about, not just Hong Kong, everywhere. Everyone around the world really bought into
the idea. The world was on a red hot recovery trajectory after COVID. They all believe in the
inflation fairy, that rising consumer prices represented an overheating economy that would
last for the long run. But it was all a price illusion. I told you that. The markets all told
you that. Even if central bankers disagree, they wouldn't know. They don't know economics.
That's where the forgot how to grow global economy came from in the first place. And it's where this
banking and bubble bust cycle originated, the latest one. But instead of dealing with that
fundamental reality, extend and pretend has been all over the place in Hong Kong, just like in U.S.
commercial real estate or corporate credit. And so the new rationalizations have been that lower
interest rates from central banks, as if central banks control this stuff, would help reduce some
of the pressure on bubble borrowers. We see this specifically in U.S. commercial real estate,
and it hasn't really worked out all that great either. If you want to stay on top of everything,
including Hong Kong banks, extend and pretend, the global economy that forgot how to grow,
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There's links in the description. Also at our website, eurodollar.university. In China specifically,
there was the idea that the bazooka from Beijing and just general fiscal and other forms of
stimulus would help stabilize the situation in Hong Kong, especially because Hong Kong is a
derivative of the Chinese economy and the global economy therefore, and Hong Kong banks are exposed
to onshore China too. The idea was that the global economy would pick up after experiencing only a
modest slowdown in late 2023 and 2024, especially with the help of the Beijing bazooka.
There are any number of rationalizations behind extend and pretend to hold off on all price
discovery until more favorable terms can show up, until Goldilocks makes her appearance, and
then everyone can offload the really bad debts with minimal further consequences. And it all
sounds great, but in reality what it means is compounding one error with another error with
another error, and eventually it leads to a situation which would have been more easily
handled back in the past before it got to be truly out of control. And once you get in that situation,
what happens? There is no price discovery. In fact, price discovery becomes the enemy
of extend and pretend. And going back to the Bloomberg report, it said also that Hong Kong's
banks are coming under increasing pressure to offload loans backed by real estate assets
after rolling them over, amending the original terms in the past to avoid write-downs. The delay
by some banks in recognizing impairments has helped mask even weaker underlying asset quality,
which is the entire point here. Quote, we should be seeing more distressed sales. It's a little
alarming that we're not, said Jason Bedford, a former UBS group analyst who made a name for
predicting the troubles that hit Chinese regional banks in 2019. Again, that's the point. Extend and
pretend. No price discovery because price discovery could spook everyone and unleash the very thing
that authorities don't want to unleash. They don't want to see distressed selling, forced selling,
bankruptcies. They want to keep everything in place and the idea that Goldilocks is just sitting
over the horizon so that everything will just work out just perfectly fine. And so now we've
got reports this morning that Hong Kong's monetary authorities are recirculating what's called
the crisis letter. According to those reports from Bloomberg, a 26-year-old document is once again
doing the rounds among bankers in Hong Kong as local borrowers face growing challenges in
refinancing their debt. Quote, whenever this document starts making the rounds, whether cited
in regulatory guidance, discussed in boardrooms, or popping up in bankers' inboxes, it often means
that lenders are bracing for or already confronting a wave of corporate distress. That was according to
Forky Wong, who's a founding partner at advisory firm Fortune Arc Restructuring. Now the document
itself is called Hong Kong Approach to Corporate Difficulties and it was written in April 1998 by
the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. It's really just a set of guidelines to help banks avoid
repeating the mistakes of the Asian Knot financial crisis, the big meltdown that hit the area.
The document basically says, do everything you can to not indiscriminately foreclose on
properties, to force bankruptcies leading to distress and forced sales that can create a
cascading effect on the system. It isn't meant strictly to be extended pretend or to eliminate
price discovery. The document and the government urge patience and consideration, meaning that any
transactions that do take place should reflect the underlying fundamental economics of any deal
rather than the level of distress surrounding it. That's what they're really talking about is
make sure that you're calm and collected and cool and that whatever you do isn't done out of
overwrought urgency or fear or anything too emotional. Just to give you a couple of examples
what's in it, quote, when it becomes generally known that the borrower may be experiencing
financial problems, which we see all over Hong Kong, and banks' initial attitude should be one
of support. They should not withdraw facilities or hastily put the borrower into receivership
or issue writs demanding repayment. Instead, they should endeavor to ensure that the borrower has
sufficient liquidity to continue trading until a considered view of its prospects can be reached.
Another example, further decisions should only be made based on information that is reliable
and shared fully with all banks. It is the responsibility of the borrower to make
information concerning its affairs wholly available to those banks. And this document
and what I just read to you goes for what just happened in the last months for Hong Kong New
World, which I'll get to in just a second, but we haven't seen this document circulate
throughout Hong Kong outside of really crisis periods like 2008, as you would expect, but also
2019 during the period of protests and the political instability in the city of Hong Kong,
as well as for obvious reasons in 2020. So the recirculation of the crisis documents suggests,
along with these rumored discussions of a bad bank, the Hong Kong situation may be finally reaching
a decision point. And all this takes place, as I just said, with a backdrop of what happened
with Hong Kong New World last month. It was facing a huge, huge liquidity wall, and the city's banks
got together to build a syndicated loan rescue in a manner that was consistent with the Hong Kong
approach to corporate difficulties. Even so, it took until the last minute for the 50 or so banks
that were involved to work out all the details and give their full commitments. It was almost
a last minute, just in the nick of time, completion. And had it not gone through,
some of New World's key collateral would have been encumbered or even seized,
making the syndicated rescue basically impossible moving forward. Now, New World had about 63
billion Hong Kong dollars worth of borrowings that were scheduled to come due this year,
and since everyone knew that wasn't going to happen, basically an impossibility, so the only
choices were insolvency or everyone puts in a little to keep the firm afloat a little while
longer. Because default on the scale of New World would have sent the already edgy Hong Kong money
and financial markets into a full-on tailspin. That's why all this is taking place. In fact,
short of a government takeover, which was reportedly being discussed at the time,
but was set aside because of fears it might provoke the same market response as a failure
would, the only route out was basically the same one as LTCM followed way back in the 1990s in the
United States, forcing the city's banks to sit down and figure out how to do this, realizing
they'd all suffer the hit if they didn't. That's why the syndicated loan was unusually complex and
took a drawn-out route to completion. And you have to believe that that experience with New World
is a driving force in talking about a bad bank and circulating the crisis letter, because it
represents substantial escalation, downside escalation in the banking system's conditions
here in the middle of 2025, when everything was supposed to be heading toward Goldilocks.
It's not. I pointed out the Hong Kong dollar a little while ago. It had been soaring with a
whole lot of crisis emergency indications like the Swiss franc up until around early May. In fact,
it hit the upper bound of the Hong Kong monetary authority's range by May 2nd. Now, the range is
put together because the HKMA believes that stability for the Hong Kong economy and its
banking system is best achieved by keeping the Hong Kong dollar in a range between $7.75 to the
US dollar on the high side and $7.85 to the US dollar at the bottom end. But along with Swiss
franc and other currencies, the Hong Kong dollar was rising and it reached $7.75, which triggered
a record response by the Hong Kong monetary authority. When it's at the upper bound,
when the exchange value gets to the upper limit, authorities buy US dollars with newly created
Hong Kong dollar reserves. And that record intervention in the currency markets flooded
Hong Kong's money markets with spare funds, sending short-term money rates like HIBOR
all the way down to zero. But the Hong Kong dollar itself also plunged. It went completely
from the upper bound to the lower bound in a period of about a month, an enormous change.
Now, why did that take place? The mainstream explanation is carry trade. It's always carry
trade for the mainstream media. In other words, people borrow Hong Kong dollars at those cheap
money rates, then reinvest the funds overseas, mediating through the US dollar. So they're
selling their borrowed Hong Kong dollars and buying the US dollar, therefore weakening the
Hong Kong dollar's exchange value. But when that normally happens, when the carry trade is triggered
because Hong Kong money rates go down farther than they are around the rest of the world,
whenever you see the carry trade, though, money rates tend to normalize. But we haven't seen that
here. In fact, at last check earlier this morning, the overnight HIBOR rate in Hong Kong was still
relatively close to zero, 0.195 percent. Yet Hong Kong's dollar remains at 785 anyway, indicating
it's been more of a one-way trade, as in money fleeing Hong Kong rather than trying to take
advantage of a large positive carry. This all started to come about around the same time as
the rescue of New World came out. And while it sounds positive on the surface, to most people,
they naturally ask how bad it must be in Hong Kong if the banking system had to resort to a
massive, almost forced rescue, just to keep it from getting to be a lot worse. And now with the talk of
a bad bank, the circulation of the crisis memo, staying away from Hong Kong's financials makes
perfect sense. Hong Kong dollar is weak because of the growing risk to the entire financial system
from what's taking place, as this final forced cleanup from all of the last year's mistakes upon
mistakes finally might be starting to emerge. Given all that, it's fair to ask why now? And it's a
reasonable conclusion to say the situation in Hong Kong isn't improving. More importantly, it isn't
expected to get better anytime soon. There's every reason to think it will get materially worse, given
just what I've told you here in this video. First of all, the global economic situation hasn't worked
out like everyone wanted. First of all, there was no recovery after the pandemic, only the bubbles and
further distortions, both of which are proving to have been highly damaging. And here in the short
run for 2025, the outlook isn't just negative, it's increasingly negative, and it isn't just, it isn't
about tariffs. The situation in China is still highly deflationary. We're getting negative signals
all around the rest of the global economy. We're getting negative signals in financial markets. I
keep talking about swap spreads. Why are swap spreads so negative? Well, an end to extend and
pretend globally would certainly get interest rates around the world down a long ways and keep
them there for a long period of time. With regard to specifically China, which is a heavy influence
on Hong Kong for obvious reasons, especially the banking sector, lost in the last data release
about a week ago. Not only did the Chinese report a slowdown in GDP, even if it wasn't as much of a
slowdown as expected, it came with another negative deflator, one that accelerated to the downside.
And that marked the ninth consecutive quarterly decline in overall Chinese GDP prices, driven
mainly by the business sector, what we see in the producer price index. You can call it oversupply,
you can call it overcapacity. It's basically recession levels, lack of demand, either
internally or externally. It's both places at the same time. And remember, none of the Chinese
stimulus has changed anything. Remember the bazooka? No one else does either. And that was almost an
entire year ago and basically nothing to show for it. Mainland banks still aren't lending. The
Chinese economy still isn't recovering. The only times when we see activity pick up is when Beijing
is picking up the tab, like in retail sales back in May. But once the subsidies are ended, retail
sales that we saw in June were actually negative. In other words, all of the risks are on the
downside. So as bad as all of these soured loans are piling up in specifically Hong Kong, there is
no Goldilocks. Goldilocks is not delayed, not postponed. She has been cancelled. So Hong Kong
is another cautionary tale for China, sure, but also the rest of the world. We still have to pay
for all of the mistakes of the pandemic, the initial lockdowns, but also the incorrect belief
that the global economy was on the road to recovery in 2021, if not hotter than recovery.
Very smart and very accomplished people fell for the price illusion, thinking that high rates on
CPIs were the same as an overheating economy. It was nothing more than a supply and demand imbalance
and in a much lower state. And as usual, rather than owning up to those mistakes, the world has
been extending and pretending that they weren't mistakes. Or for those who did realize the truth,
they were hoping that they would be covered up by a soft landing in 2024 or maybe 2025 at
the latest, that interest rates would go down at the same time and a real recovery would take shape.
But that hasn't happened either. So can kicking, extend and pretend is getting harder and harder
to do. That's a lesson that applies far outside the Hong Kong city limits. The global forgot how
to grow economy that is remembering how to do worse in part because of the cleanup that needs
to be involved. Why else do you think interest rate swap spreads have been so low and so negative
and getting lower and getting more negative? There is still so much cleanup left to do,
not just in Hong Kong or even China, but basically everywhere. Everyone bought into the idea of the
price illusion and the recovery, and we still have to pay for it. We still have to pay for
the pandemic. Well, I've mentioned swap spreads being more and more negative a bunch here in this
video. I went over the details behind them and the contrast between swaps and stocks.
That's all linked below. As always, thank you very much for joining me. Huge thank you,
your university members and subscribers. Check out our sub stack subscription
link in the description. And until next time, take care.
