德拉克講海軍歷史 歷史學家Robert Lundgren對瓜島海戰(夜戰部分)的最新研究
王者风范
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5 次觀看·2025年10月19日
Hello everybody and welcome to this video which is kindly sponsored by Squarespace
So today we're going to be updating the meeting track section since we've already done the Portsmouth tour
But now I'm going to give everyone a chance to have a voice on where the next tour is going to be
So since there's not an inbuilt polling option on Squarespace, I'm kind of creating one of my own
As you can see here, I'm using the events section which comes in this particular format prepackaged with three events on there
And I'm retitling it as Upcoming Tours Expressions of Interest
And obviously going Portsmouth Historic Dockyard again
And I'm also going to include Chatham and HMS Belfast
And then you'll see in a second I'm just going to edit the button down there
And give it the email and then a default title
So then if you go to the section of the website
If you want to come and have a guided tour around one of these three places
Then all you have to do is go and click on that
It'll generate an email and all you have to do is just hit send
You don't have to add anything else to the body of the message
And then I can count up how many emails I have voting for each place
And that'll dictate to a certain degree where the next tour in early 2024 will take place
It's quite easy to set up actually, I'm very surprised
Anyway
So if after all these little mini tutorials I've been doing you think you could build a website for
Maybe ideally naval history purposes but you never know
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And on with the main show
So today we have a little bit of a different way of doing things on the channel
Now first of all I need to introduce you to a rather special guest
We've had obviously various authors on before
And today is to a certain degree no different
I'm glad to introduce the work of Robert Lundgren to you
Now of course I imagine a few of you will probably already be familiar with his excellent work
He's written a couple of books
The World Wondered What Really Happened Off Samar
And Battleship Victory
Both well worth picking up on
And a lot of other work that he's done
Including an analysis of USS Nevada's performance off of Normandy on D-Day
And perhaps one of the things everyone's hopefully fairly familiar with
A very thorough analysis of the action between Washington and South Dakota
Against Kirishima and friends
Including a precise analysis of what happened to Kirishima
And what happened to South Dakota in terms of damage
Those can all be found on the NavWeb's website
There'll be a specific link in the video description below
Now more recently
Mr. Lundgren has very kindly performed a in-depth
Incredibly detailed analysis of what immediately preceded that action
So the action between Admiral Callaghan's cruiser force
And Hiei, Kirishima and their escorts
The full document is well over 120 pages long
And can be found at the link as I said in the video description below
However, in the interest of not having to go through 120 pages
Of documentation in a video
Although I have read through the report quite extensively
I think about six times already
I thought it would be best to conduct an interview
With Mr. Lundgren
And also with Mr. Sposato
Who kind of prompted Mr. Lundgren to actually do the analysis
And I believe helped him out to a certain degree
So normally of course
You would be seeing either Skype or Zoom conversation
Going on with pictures as we've done with numerous other authors
However, neither of the gentlemen in question
Were able to do a direct interview
And so instead
They were kind enough to submit written responses
To the questions that I asked
But of course this runs into a little bit of a problem
Because my American accent
Could best be described as stereotypical
And get progressively worse from there
And I have no idea how I'd be able to hold
Even a half decent American accent
Let alone two for half an hour plus
And so we agreed that rather uniquely
What we're going to be doing is
I'm going to be doing the questions
As per how I would normally do an interview
But their responses which have been sent via text
Are going to be read out by a text-to-speech AI
With different voices for the two individuals
So Mr. Lundgren's responses will always be first
Followed by Mr. Sposato's
Where he chose to respond to the questions
Because obviously it's primarily
Talking with Mr. Lundgren
As the one who wrote the report
Hopefully it's interesting for everybody
And don't worry this doesn't mean the channel
Is going to become a voice AI channel
This is essentially just using modern technology
To square a particular circle of this particular problem that we have
So with that said
On with the questions
So with relation to
The first major naval night action of Guadalcanal
Historically speaking
What gaps have there been
In the narrative of this battle?
In many documentaries
This battle is described as a Pier 6 brawl
Many survivors claim that once the shooting started
Everyone was shooting at anything that moved
Yet surprisingly
There are no real details other than San Francisco
Hitting Atlanta usually mentioned
However with this analysis
Atlanta was not only hit by San Francisco
But Portland as well
And then hit again by Monson
Lafay was sunk by Starrett
Starrett and Helena also hit and cripple Aaron Ward
Helena strafes Portland with her 40mm guns
And fired into Monson
And I believe Fletcher torpedoed Portland
To end it all
Harusami likely crippled Yudachi
So there was a lot of chaos in this battle
I believe this analysis starts to provide the details
Of what the survivors meant by a Pier 6 brawl
Hara captain of a Matsukaze
On the Japanese side
On why Abe hesitated in opening fire paints
A picture similar to Midway
That Hiei's crew was busy
Trying to switch from Type 3 ammunition
To AP ammunition
And this has never made sense to me
That is not how battleships work
So the Midway analogy of the carriers getting caught
Attempting to rearm their aircraft
Never worked for me
I believe the reason Abe hesitated
Was he did not know where the other Japanese ships were
And was afraid of opening fire on his own ships
And this is a far better reason for his delay
As for Callaghan
He lost tactical awareness
He was capping the T in classic naval procedure
Of the two southern columns
But became confused when his own column
Was capped by the most northern Japanese group
This confusion allowed both fleets
To basically collide with each other
There may be some answers to this question
That show up later on
But I kept them in context to those instead
This battle represents
The IJN's last best attempt
To shut down Henderson Airfield
For all the planning they have done
To accomplish this all goes to waste
When the USN has to act immediately
And with very little time to coordinate
A proper response
This is one the few battles
Where the Americans are beaten
But don't let the Japanese get anything out it
You can tell that this was not a well developed plan
Since Admiral Callaghan
Doesn't seem to relay his intentions
To many other ships
Perhaps because he realizes what must be done
And telling others will make that harder to accomplish
He is often seen as a fool
But that's what 80 years
Of not knowing these details has done
Everyone holding an overall command
At this battle will be axed
If they were not killed
With two exceptions being Harrah and Debose
The captain of Portland
Lost in the narrative
Are the effectiveness of USN torpedoes
But also how well or not
They were used
For anyone surprised
About the Fletcher hitting Portland
Just remember the event
Between William Porter and Iowa
As Ludgren will mention
This is the crucible by which the USN
Becomes a well-tuned fighting force
That Japan cannot beat
This was where and when
The IJN come the closest
To deploying their
Kentai Kessen strategy in 1942
And the USN still holds them off
By throwing cruisers at battle cruisers
This was the turning point
In the Pacific war
Admiral Lee will see to the completion of that turn
Given the large number of ships involved
And as you both mentioned
The sheer confusion
Of what was going on in this battle
What was the motivation
Behind taking all of these reports
And then trying to make sense of them
I had no plans to write on this subject
Frank Sposato contacted me
And asked for help
This paper is largely for Frank
And if he is happy with it, so am I
I applied the same methodology
To this battle
That I had applied for the battleship action
And the naval battle of Samar
And plotted each ship's position
In one-minute intervals
Once this was completed
I had a much better understanding
Of where everyone was in relation to each other
My initial motivation
For trying to understand the events of this battle
Was by reading about the USS Portland
In a book called
Sweet Pea at War
The author claimed that this ship
Was responsible for putting the shots
Into the IJN HEAE
That disabled her steering
I have had a personal interest in learning more about the Portland
Due to her extensive war service
That never gets the appropriate attention
She is the only warship to have fought
Directly in all four carrier battles
As well as both battleship actions
Even though she was only present
At Tulagi
But had her guns trained out to sea
In case anyone got close
However, before wanting to learn more about this ship
I had always been surprised
That this battle has never received
A proper track chart
Like all the other naval fights in this war
For at least a decade
I have wanted to know
And only after getting in contact
With a friend of Ludgren's
Was I able to start figuring this out with him
I was inspired by his previous book
About the Battle of Samar
Where using his minute-by-minute retracing
Of the battle
He discovered that Yamato
Fired the shots that hit the Johnston
At no point would I have believed
That the commonly accepted narrative
Of this battle have been so wrong
A lot of this began
When reading James Grace's book on this battle
There I began to see
And understand it much better
Another concern for me
Was the name given to this action
The first naval battle of Guadalcanal
Is sorely insufficient
And becomes far more confusing
When first is used
And this is technically the third engagement
By naming it the naval battle
For Henderson Airfield Night 1
We clarify that this is the part
Of the Guadalcanal campaign
Where the IJN is looking
To finish off the airfield
That has caused them so much pain
This time by sea
Just like how you broke up the Narvik battle
Into three separate fights
I see this one the same way
Although it needs to be understood
That the battleship duel
Then becomes the third night
Since there was also an attempt
By IJN cruisers
To hit the airfield
In between both actions
So having decided
That you're going to do this analysis
How long did it actually take
And did you discover
Any new sources along the way
At least two years
The newest source material
Is a film of the actual wrecks
I did not initially have
All the film of Hiei
I worked with Park Stevenson
And Victor Vescovo
On finding the wrecks of USS Johnston
And USS Samuel B. Roberts
Along with author Anthony Tully
Parks did a documentary with Lone Wolf Media
Which now owns the film of the wrecks
And eventually
I was able to see all the film of Hiei's wreck
I then applied the same analysis
I did of her wreck
That Anthony and I did for Kirishima
For me the wrecks tell a story
If you are willing to listen
And allow them to speak
Many of their signs are very subtle
A bent propeller blade, a deformed side
Sheared off bolts to a propeller shaft
A bent rudder forward of the rudder post
And a crushed in keel together
Are all signs of an under keel detonation
The other aspect
Is attempting to match up damage
That is visible with the reports
To confirm what is in the reports
For more than a decade
I have been particularly bothered
By the lack of certain details in this battle
And was always confused
With how that had happened
Since every battle is so well covered by comparison
The sources I used over the time
I have been trying to piece this battle together
Began with Enterprise360
And Hornfisher's Neptune's Inferno
Mark Stiller's Osprey
Publishing book on the battle
Thomas Generous's Sweet Pea at War
And most importantly
James Grace's book
The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal
Tamichi Hara's reference was also helpful
But the problem was always
Trying to put together someone else
Retelling from what they had learned
All of the contradictions
Between these sources concerned me
That there was this 50-minute gap
Of critical naval history
That has been completely overlooked
This action's confusing
Close-handed nature at night
With the potential of cover-ups
Taking place all the while
Everyone just wants to get to the part
Where the battleships duke it out
May have contributed to this historical oversight
Speaking of oversights
How many gaps were left
In particular ship records
And how did you fill those in
Based on the records that were available
From other vessels
The biggest gaps remain on the Japanese side
As I could not locate very much primary data
And had to use secondary sources
There are certain observations
Such as Juno reported
The first torpedo hit on her port side
Yet the ship that currently
Claims to have hit her
Was a Matsukaze on her starboard side
I lack primary data on Ikezuchi
And Inazuma
But if they had fired more torpedoes
Juno may have been hit by one of these ships
And not Matsukaze
As most records now tell
However without that data
I also felt obliged to stay with the current narrative
And give credit to Matsukaze
Picking up on that
What are the main contradictions
Between records and sources
That you've had to deal with
The biggest contradiction was
Portland actually hit at 0158 by a torpedo
Or was she hit around
028 0222
Which I believe to be the case
I don't think Yudachi who makes the claim
She hit Portland at 0158
Could reload and fire more 8 torpedoes
In 3 minutes
Hara reported it typically required 10 minutes
To reload the torpedoes
And I feel that is more reasonable
Secondly Portland could still maneuver
And Helena falls in behind her at 0214
And both ships are steering east
This is inconsistent with her damage
So if she was hit at 0158
She should have been immediately disabled at that point
Then Fletcher fires 10 torpedoes
And I believe accidentally hits Portland
Around 0222
But because Portland's report claims
She was hit at 0158
This has been the narrative
I think she placed this in her report
To cover up friendly fire by Fletcher
And it worked
For 70 years it has been covered up
Why was this covered up
The number of friendly fire incidents is significant
Then the five Sullivan brothers
Are killed in this battle
The Navy did not want it getting out to the home front
They were shooting at each other
And family's children were getting killed
By their own comrades
I understand the confusion of a night battle
And don't look at the issue attempting to lay blame
On anyone
But simply report what I believe actually occurred
The errors made in 1942
For the most part helped the Navy
Win the battles of 1943-1945
Now keep in mind
Nimitz placed three surface warfare officers
In charge of developing the Pac-10 directives
Due to the mistakes made in the 1942 battles
More and more men were coming into the fleet
And many had never even seen the ocean before
The need for training
Versus the need to conduct the war
Meant that officers could not be relied on
To make their own battle plans
As none of the various officers
Had ever worked together
And this issue was only going to be compounded
By the expansion of the fleet
The Pac-10 directives
Gave commanders clear instructions
So that a commander could give orders
And everyone understood what was expected
A carrier-centric fleet could transform
Into a surface-centric fleet
With minimal instructions
So the errors in the 1942 battles
Off Guadalcanal
Helped win the battles of 1943-1945
The Japanese on the other hand
Really don't learn and continue to make similar errors
Later in the war
They really liked their Type 3 ammunition
And I feel this ammunition
Was a greater threat to the ships
That carried that to US forces
The marines on Guadalcanal
Felt the Type 3 ammunition was a sideshow
What really affected them
Was the conventional Type 0 HC shells
That cratered the runway
And put the marines themselves in shock
Had the Japanese loaded
Conventional HC projectiles
They would have domed more damage to the US fleet
But Kirishima
Makes the identical mistake
Two nights later
During the battleship action
And is initially loaded
With the wrong ammunition
For a surface engagement
The biggest contradictions
That I was concerned with
Were the positions of the IJN Nagara
And Yudachi
Before talking to Lundgren
My understandings about this battle
Had these ships in multi-places at once
And shooting at different targets
That don't make sense in range bearing
And time of their locations
One other very important detail
That needs to be understood
The only way that people have talked about
This battle for 80 years
Was by referring to ships individually
The inherent problem with this
Laid itself bare when trying to match up
Their records and movements
Not all ships had their times synchronized
Lundgren noticed that ships
Were sometimes as much as 20 minutes off
Too many have taken for granted
Certain details without putting them together
Coherently
So in this work
What are the biggest surprises
That you came across
When it came to sorting out this battle
The number of friendly fire incidents
I believe there are 11 on the US side
And one on the Japanese side
I probably answered this in other places
But defiantly
The amount of friendly fire
Captain Hoover will call out a cease fire
Immediately after Portland is hit by torpedoes
At around 0225
Now of course we do encourage
Everybody who can to read
The full document that's been written
About this battle now
Which as I said can be found in the link below
But
For those of you who are just looking
For an immediate summary right now
How do your findings
Change some of the commonly
Accepted elements of the battle
US destroyer torpedoes
And all US torpedoes at this time period
Were unreliable
Most accounts have US destroyer torpedoes
Bouncing off He's hull
And they did in the case of Cushing's torpedoes
Because they were fired at to close a range
O'Bannon, Monson and Sturet however
Did hit Hiei
With at least 6 torpedoes that exploded
And at least 3 of these detonations
Are preserved in her hull
I also believe this is why the wreck broke apart
In order for the wreck to break up
Her sides had to be severely compromised
However
When the article was first put up
The discussion that resulted provided a possibility
That US torpedoes may have been
Detonating slightly prematurely
Due to their magnetic fuse
This may explain why Hiei was able
To absorb so many US torpedoes
Yet later in the war
Congo was sunk by 2
So keeping that in mind
Which ships turn out to have had
The most different battle
Compared to previous accounts
Of this action
I focused on Hiei
So I hope her story is better understood
Other than what Lundgren has said
About the Hiei
For me the Portland has been the most critical to learn about
She plays an important role in this fight
Even when she unfortunately
Hits the Atlanta with multiple salvos
She still puts rounds
Into the Hiei
Although not the critical hits to steering
As delivered by the San Fran
Taking what may have been up to 3 USN torpedoes
To her stern
When you study the damage charts
Made public online
That show a more narrow area of destruction
From a single IJN torpedo
Northampton is a good example
Versus multiple USN torps
That hit Portland
This makes her quite lucky
To have survived such damage
The irony to this situation is that
This allows her the next morning to sink
Yudachi while the Japanese are still trying
To extract the Hiei
But most importantly
The Portland becomes the HQ of first responders
By picking up the surviving crews
Of the sunken ships
And even the Atlanta crew
The other ships I would like to highlight
Are many of the American destroyers
While the green crews
Aboard the Fletcher made an unfortunate mistake
With their torpedoes
The O'Bannon, the Starrett and Monson
All made important contributions
To this battle by getting hits
On an enemy battleship
The time and location of these hits
Are spread out enough
That Hiei's crew contained the damage below
While at the same time
Dealing with the fires above
Delivered by Laffey and Cushing
There are still some gaps that need closing
Such as what Juno and Yukikaze did
During the battle
But these may be lost to time and later events
I do find it interesting
That this is the first fight
That Fletchers get into
And again, the Yukikaze's curse
Befalls the IJN here as well
So with two books
The Kirishima analysis
And this one under your belt
What other narratives have you done
Or are you planning to do?
This article and the latest article
On the Nevada at Normandy
Are likely my last attempts at writing
US naval history
This would be my first
I would someday like to tell the story
Of the Java ghost fleet that tries to escape
After the Langley was sunk
I also would like to tell the story
Of two competing auxiliaries
That were sunk in the Solomons
While delivering troops and equipment
Directly to the battlefield
The USS Macaulay
And IJN Nishan
And finally, what are the best places
For people to catch up on
And read your full body of work, Mr. Lundgren?
At Tony DeJulian's website
navweeps.com
Under Robert Lundgren historical resources
I have several articles including
The naval battle for Henderson airfield
First night
The naval battle of Guadalcanal
Which is on the battleship action
Analysis of the wreck of Kirishima
Analysis of damage to USS South Dakota
At the naval battle of Guadalcanal
USS Nevada
From June 6 to June 15, 1944
Off Normandy, France
Utah Beach
Part 1 and Part 2
Are completed, Part 3 will soon be completed
I have written two books
The world wondered on the naval battle of Samar
Battleship victory
That covers the Pacific campaign in WW2
Well, thank you very much
To both of you for submitting
The written answers to the questions
And agreeing to do so
So that we can put this video together
Obviously, those of you who have just listened through
Will realize that
Whilst voice AI has come a fair way
In the last five years
There are a few pronunciation errors and so forth
That it still needs to overcome
Which is comforting for those of us
Who rely on our voices
To transmit information
As part of our day-to-day living
But with that
It's time to wrap up this video
Other than to reiterate
If you want to read the full analysis
Of this particular fight
The link is once again in the description below
And of course you can pick up
Battleship victory
And the world wondered
What happened off Samar
From all good bookshops
Again links below
And thanks very much for everyone
For bearing with us in this little experiment
Of how to bring voices alive
When they are just in text
