Xi in Big Trouble Again; Reason Behind Xi's Latest Military Overhaul Exposed!

China Truths
61 followers
"Analysis: Xi in Big Trouble Again
Master of Chinese Philosophy, Bachelor of Architecture Tops Trends for Crematorium Job Exam
CCP Ups Surveillance, Frequently Conducts Household Surveys, Especially Targets Overseas Relatives
Hong Kong’s Imported Mainland Labor Now Competing With Local Labor: Analysis
Analysis: The Political Schemes Behind the CCP's Formation of New Troops
#china #chinatruths #chinanews"
Analysis. Xi in big trouble again. Master of Chinese philosophy,
bachelor of architecture tops trends for crematorium job exam.
CCP UPS surveillance, frequently conducts household surveys, especially targets overseas
relatives. Analysis. Hong Kong's imported mainland labor now competing with local labor.
Analysis. The political schemes behind the CCP's formation of new troops.
It's all covered in today's China Truths. Analysis. Xi in big trouble again.
After being passed by the House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate overwhelmingly
approved a $95 billion foreign aid package on April 23, with the bill now only needing
President Biden's signature to become law. Media veteran Yan Chuanguo believes this
aid package will significantly support Ukraine, causing major problems for CCP leader Xi Jinping.
In detail, Yan argues that Putin's invasion of Ukraine, with Xi's covert backing,
was supposed to quickly defeat NATO's European dominance and turn the global strategic
advantage towards China at the expense of the U.S. Discovering China's interference,
the U.S. has launched a dual strategy, massive financial support for Ukraine and blocking
China's covert aid to Russia, threatening severe financial sanctions if China does not withdraw.
The U.S. has a wide array of harsh financial sanctions at its disposal,
each potentially fatal, putting Xi in a tight spot, support Russia and face sanctions and
destruction, or abandon Russia, leading to its fall and, ultimately, the demise of the Chinese
Communist Party. With Blinken's visit to China, Yan notes a shift, the U.S. is out of patience.
The stagnant Russia-Ukraine war has drained NATO and the U.S., while China watches and grows
stronger, harming U.S. interests without any benefit. With the election looming, the U.S.
must break the stalemate by deploying previously reserved powerful strategies to resolve issues
decisively. Blinken's visit is not a friendly one, he must return with tangible results,
or U.S. President Joe Biden will face difficulties with voters. Yan suggests that Xi is in a deep
bind, he's too entrenched with Russia to extricate himself. Russia is the only major ally China can
depend on. Without Chinese support, Putin's regime may collapse, leaving Xi isolated and
vulnerable, particularly if the faltering economy and diplomatic failures lead to Western aggression,
potentially signaling the end for the Chinese Communist Party. According to Yan, Xi will likely
choose the most detrimental path for China. Finally, Yan predicts that a defeated Putin
will be forced from power, pushing Russia towards Western-style democracy. This will leave China
encircled by foes, accelerating its potential downfall.
Master of Chinese Philosophy, Bachelor of Architecture tops trends for crematorium job
exam. On April 22, the Guangzhou Civil Affairs Bureau announced its intent to hire a master's
graduate from the Chinese University of Hong Kong and two bachelor's graduates in architecture and
polymer materials and engineering from South China University of Technology and Guangdong
University of Technology as crematorium operators at the Guangzhou Funeral Service Center.
This hiring drive began in December 2023, aiming to fill 61 positions across five
bureau institutions, including five as crematorium operators. These positions
are permanent staff roles, with a starting salary of 3,500 yuan, about US$483, per month
during probation and an annual salary of about 100,000 yuan, nearly US$14,000, thereafter,
plus comprehensive social insurance. The role of a crematorium operator is technically demanding
and physically intensive. It's open to graduates older than the class of 2023,
with age limits set at under 35 for men and under 30 for women. The Guangzhou Funeral Service Center
also requires job candidates to have a local Guangzhou residency,
a C1 or higher driver's license, and at least two years of work experience.
The job involves direct contact with and handling of bodies and includes night shifts.
The recruitment of highly educated individuals for such roles has sparked a lively debate online.
More comments include, finding a job is incredibly hard for graduates these days,
the exams are much harder than college entrance exams, securing a government job is a big win,
and at least it's a stable job. Those without degrees wouldn't even make it past the initial
screening for this role. Aren't many graduates doing delivery jobs? It's all similar.
Another exclaimed, investing heavily in education only to end up as a crematorium operator leaves
CCP UPS surveillance frequently conducts household surveys, especially targets overseas relatives.
The surveillance efforts of the Chinese Communist Party are escalating,
with community workers increasingly conducting home visits and surveys,
particularly targeting those with international ties or relatives living abroad.
Li, a resident of Jiangsu, shared with Voice of America that since the start of 2023,
she has received numerous visits from community workers because her son is employed in the USA.
These visits typically begin with general inquiries about who lives in her home and
what they do, but the focus soon shifts to her son abroad. On one occasion, when Li mentioned
her upcoming trip to the U.S. to visit her son and daughter-in-law, the workers intensely
questioned her about the details of her visit and cautioned her against scams. They also took
notes upon learning that her daughter-in-law is from Taiwan. Previously called grid workers during
the COVID-19 pandemic, these officials performed functions akin to community committees but are
now termed community workers. Voice of America also spoke with a community worker from Qingdao,
Shandong, who confirmed that international relationships are a central aspect of his duties.
He noted that monitoring residents with family members visiting from abroad is also a priority.
He personally ensures that Chinese nationals with foreign citizenship are reminded to register when
they visit their hometowns. This worker has also heard about colleagues who focus on ethnic
minorities and residents reporting unpaid wages or other issues online, escalating significant
cases to higher authorities. One of the community workers, Han Yu, mentioned that candidates for
this role are generally under 35 with a college degree. Although the job is not permanent,
his salary before taxes, combined with benefits, is considered good compared to his peers.
In his latest book, Sentinel State, Surveillance and the Survival of Dictatorship in China,
Claremont McKenna College professor Minxin Pei discusses how the CCP leverages high-tech tools
like big data and AI to create advanced surveillance systems. However, he points
out that the real power lies in the intricate network of surveillance organizations and the
Analysis
Hong Kong's imported mainland labor now competing with local labor.
Hong Kong is experiencing a significant talent drain affecting various industries due to an
ongoing immigration wave. To counteract this, Hong Kong authorities have increased the importation
of foreign laborers from mainland China, although the effect appears contrary to the plan.
According to data from The Epoch Times, in 2023, Hong Kong brought in over 18,000 laborers,
marking a 4.3-fold increase from the 3,378 imported in 2019.
These workers span various industries and levels of expertise.
Despite this influx, Hong Kong's key industries, particularly the financial sector,
are facing a downturn evidenced by continuous layoffs and overall economic shrinkage.
The arrival of these foreign workers has intensified competition for local jobs and
downward pressure on wages, without necessarily boosting local consumption or investments in
residential and commercial property. Historically, the annual importation of
foreign laborers hovered just above 3,000 from 2019 to 2021. This number began to climb in 2022,
primarily due to increased imports for community service roles.
Following the introduction of the Enhanced Supplementary Labor Scheme in 2023,
the total number of imported laborers jumped significantly from 5,829 in 2022 to 18,628
in 2023. In the construction sector alone, the number of foreign laborers increased to 7,917.
The September 2023 expansion of the Enhanced Supplementary Labor Scheme added 26 new
work types eligible for importation, with direct imports also seen in nursing homes,
aviation, and the minibus industries. 75% of ironworkers don't have enough work.
Despite claims of labor shortages, Hong Kong saw a slight increase in unemployment to 3%
and underemployment rising to 40,000 in the first quarter of 2024.
In the construction sector, which imported nearly 8,000 foreign workers last year,
a survey from the Hong Kong Construction Industry Employees' General Union in April revealed that
75% of ironworkers either had no work or not enough, with almost a third working just one
to three days a week. Workers blame their job losses on these foreign laborers who typically
earn 10 to 20% less than local market salaries, according to a survey by PhotoMedia. The
immigration wave has also reshaped employment across sectors. Employment in finance, trade,
and tourism has fallen by 2.85% since 2019, while fields like medicine, law, and accounting have
seen increases of up to 11.73%. The most significant rise was in registered nurses,
with an increase of 17.32%. In response, the Department of Health proposed allowing
non-locally trained nurses to practice without examination to mitigate shortages.
Meanwhile, employment in traditionally secure sectors like civil services and teaching has
decreased slightly, attributed to the broader immigration trends and a shrinking student
population. The Education Bureau reported a loss of 6,748 teachers for the 2022-23 school year,
particularly in kindergartens, and noted that interest from mainland Chinese students in
teaching roles is low, further complicating efforts to fill these gaps. The ongoing immigration
trend is also leading parents to consider overseas education for their children,
potentially signaling future school closures similar to those seen in kindergartens.
Historically, entering the Hong Kong job market typically involved graduating from
local universities in fields like finance, accounting, and law. According to the Hong
Kong Census and Statistics Department, the proportion of mainland students at these
universities rose from 12.72% in the 2019-20 academic year to 15.83% by 2022-23, indicating
a growing mainland presence in local industries. The Top Talent Pass scheme, TTPS, implemented by
Hong Kong authorities had approved nearly 59,000 applications by the end of February,
with 43,900 individuals relocating to Hong Kong. These talents, earning a median monthly income
significantly higher than the local median, are primarily employed in the financial sector,
which recently faced job cuts by major banks like Morgan Stanley, HSBC, and Deutsche Bank,
highlighting intense competition for high-paying roles. Simultaneously, Hong Kong's finance and
shipping industries have seen declines in global rankings, and the property market has cooled,
evidenced by multiple failed land tenders. This slowdown suggests a decrease in upcoming
development projects. Regarding labor importation, foreign workers, especially those from mainland
China, often do not reside in Hong Kong, opting instead to live across the border.
This arrangement has not bolstered the local retail or catering sectors as these workers
spend their earnings elsewhere. Overall, Hong Kong's workforce is being reshaped,
lower-paying jobs are increasingly filled by lower-wage workers, while competition intensifies
for diminishing higher-level positions. This dynamic does not address the housing surplus
caused by emigration or revive local consumer industries, as many workers commuting from
mainland China contribute little to the local economy beyond filling job vacancies and competing
for salaries with local residents. Analysis the political schemes behind the CCP's formation of
new troops. Xi Jinping has disbanded its Strategic Support Force, which was set up less than 10 years
ago and noted as the most short-lived significant unit in CCP military history. This force was on
par with the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force. What strategic calculations are at play?
Katsuji Nakazawa, former chief of Nikkei News China Division, explores Xi Jinping's political
strategies in his latest analysis of the military overhaul. On April 19, the Information Support
Force, a new branch of the CCP military, was officially launched. At its inauguration,
Xi Jinping awarded the unit its military flag and gave a keynote speech, stressing the unit's need
to ensure absolute loyalty and reliability. Official CCP media reports that the Central
Military Commission has directly taken command of the freshly minted Information Support Force,
while simultaneously abolishing the Strategic Support Force and adjusting the oversight of
the Space and Cyberspace Forces accordingly. Meanwhile, Zhu Qianzhen, who led the Strategic
Support Force until recently, has been out of the spotlight for almost half a year.
He has not been appointed commander of the new Information Support Force,
and his current whereabouts remain unclear. Reflecting on the issue, Yao Cheng, a former
staff officer and lieutenant colonel at CCP Navy headquarters, critiqued the 2015 military reforms.
According to Yao, Xi Jinping's decision to integrate cyber, information, electronic,
intelligence, and space warfare into the Strategic Support Force, along with merging the
General Staff's 2nd and 3rd Departments, led to disarray in its management and command structure.
Xi Jinping's Military Restructuring, Timing and Intentions
Why was the Strategic Support Force disbanded less than a decade after it was formed?
According to Katsuji Nakazawa, the Strategic Support Force was disbanded less than 10 years
after its formation due to a series of strategic and political maneuvers by Xi Jinping.
Created in 2014, shortly after Xi became president, the force's initial structure
and objectives were not clearly defined. This period coincided with Xi's aggressive
anti-corruption campaign, which targeted senior military officials and was part of
a broader effort to consolidate his power and secure the military's loyalty.
These moves were publicly recognized by Xi as achievements at the 2017 CCP Congress,
paving the way for the 2018 constitutional amendment that eliminated presidential term
limits. By 2022, Xi had won a third term as general secretary, and he was re-elected as
president in 2023. Nakazawa indicates that Xi is preparing to use the recent military
restructuring as a highlight for future political campaigns, potentially seeking a fourth term.
This ongoing pattern of restructuring, similar to the one initiated with the Strategic Support
Force, suggests a calculated strategy by Xi, repeating a successful formula from his earlier
leadership tenure. The timing of these actions, strategically aligned with CCP congresses,
implies a deliberate orchestration rather than mere coincidence.
Xi Jinping's oversight missed Li Shangfu's downfall. Li Shangfu, previously a CCP Central
Military Commission member, minister of national defense, and state councillor,
also served as deputy minister for the General Equipment Department.
Following the 2015 military reforms, he was key in leading the newly established
Strategic Support Force as its deputy commander and chief of staff. He was later named minister
of the Central Military Commission's Equipment Development Department in September 2017.
Li was formally ousted on October 24 of last year without a disclosed reason.
Nakazawa's analysis links the CCP's recent military reorganization to the removal of
Li Shangfu, who was once a Xi confidant. His ousting stemmed from corruption allegations
related to his tenure at the Equipment Development Department. Additionally,
similar corruption problems plagued the rocket force. The Strategic Support Force,
sharing staff with both troubled departments, did not function as effectively as Xi had initially
hoped. Spy Balloon Incident
In a separate but related matter, tensions between the U.S. and China escalated when a large balloon,
identified by the U.S. as a Chinese surveillance device, was shot down over U.S. airspace in
February of the previous year. The CCP maintained the balloon was a civilian airship for weather
monitoring and vocally criticized its destruction by the U.S. This incident significantly heightened
U.S.-China tensions, with the Pentagon describing the intrusion as a severe breach of U.S. sovereignty.
According to Nakazawa, the Central Military Commission, under Xi's leadership in handling
military meteorological matters, likely tasked the Strategic Support Force with the balloon operation.
