John Hawthorne - What is Truth?

Truth exists
11 followers
John, I want to know what's true. I like to have knowledge. Most people do.
These terms can get very fuzzy, though, and sometimes I wonder, is what I think I know,
do I really know, and how do I know it? So I want to ask the question,
and this is a legitimate question, what is true knowledge?
Is there a difference of the question what's true knowledge to the question what's knowledge?
Well, I don't know. That's the question. In other words, if I tell you,
it's going to rain tomorrow, and it's a total guess on my part, total guess, and if it rains,
I was right, and if it doesn't, I was wrong. But does that mean my knowledge now is the same?
Well, I mean, if you're guessing whether it's going to rain in the intuitive sense,
then even if you're right, you didn't know that it was going to rain.
Right.
So that's a paradigm case of a true belief that isn't knowledge. I mean, so
at least one thing's clear, it seems, that there's more to knowing something
than truly believing it. It seems that it needs to be true, but it's not enough that it's true.
Okay, so that's very good. You've already helped me.
So that's the absolute basic thing to get straight, is for a belief to count as knowledge,
it's got to be true, but it's not enough that it's true, and you just illustrated that with
an example. So that's some progress.
I feel I've made a step, and you've helped me with a step. Okay, so what are the next questions
I ask? Now, I have that step, I'm happy, but where do I go next?
I mean, I think one place to go is to sort of get a feel of what sort of situations
you think do count as knowledge. I mean, a situation which someone just guesses and gets
lucky, they definitely don't know, right? But it gets more tricky figuring out in other cases.
I mean, one thing that I've found intriguing is to start with a thought that I think is compelling,
which is you don't know if you've got a lottery ticket, you don't know whether it's going to win
or lose. That seems right. I mean, the motto of the New York State Lottery is you never know.
So everyone seems to think that you don't know whether a lottery ticket's going to,
even though it's very probable that it's going to lose, you don't know that it's going to lose.
But once we start on that track, there seem to be ways to generalize that
to the conclusion that we don't know very much at all. I mean, we wake up in the morning and
we're asked, do we know where our car is? And we'll say yes. But a few cars were stolen in
the night last night, and it seems like we're all part of the great car lottery,
as it were, where a few unlucky people get their car stolen and we don't know.
And the only difference there is what is the probability?
Exactly. The probability is just, I mean, there are differences between the New York State Lottery
and some local lotteries. But across all the lotteries where it's just slightly varying
probabilities, you say that you don't know that you're going to lose, even if it's very, very
probable. And similarly for the great heart attack lottery. I mean, a few unfortunates are going to
die in the next few hours without any real warning of ill health, of a sudden unexpected heart attack.
And if you buy the lottery thought, a natural way to generalize it is to the conclusion, well,
we don't know whether or not we're going to live or die in the next hour. And then if you don't know
whether you're going to live or die in the next hour, doesn't that mean that you don't know
anything about your future? Because it's weird to think that you could know that you were going to
the pub tonight if you didn't know whether or not you're going to die in the next 10 minutes.
So the argument is, on the one hand, you have lotteries in which the odds, as we say, lotteries
are taxed on the mathematically challenged. So the odds will be very long against you,
millions to one, say, to win a major lottery. And on the other hand, to know that you're going to
live for the rest of the day, maybe very 99.99 something, but not 100. So you have this broad
spectrum of percentages and where you fall. And in the lottery case, we have the snap judgment,
we don't know. And then we don't know we're going to lose, even though it's overwhelmingly likely
that we're going to lose. So by analogy, why don't or shouldn't we say we don't know whether we're
going to have dinner tonight? Because while it's overwhelmingly likely we'll have dinner tonight,
there's a small chance of a fatal brain aneurysm or whatever, in which case you won't be having
dinner tonight. So it's very hard to give a cogent reason for saying why you know in the one case,
but you don't know in the other. I found that very puzzling. Is this a descent into what's
called skepticism, where you can't say you know anything? Well, it's heading that way, isn't it?
You can sort of see that it's heading that way. But I mean, just on a common sense,
everything in existence is a matter of probabilistics. Yes, but it appeals to
common sense cut in two directions. I mean, also, it's common sense that we know all sorts of stuff
like, you know, we've got hands, we're talking to each other. I mean, that's common sense too.
But the trouble is that the various aspects of common sense, when you think them through,
start to collide with each other. And then common sense can't just rest content with itself,
as it were. Talk to me about religious knowledge, because many people, myself included,
have had interests in religion and or God and wanting to know if it's true. But then you wonder,
is that thought a rational one? Is it knowledge? I mean, how do you deal with religious knowledge,
or even more generally, claims for knowledge beyond the normal?
I think you can break it down in a few ways. I mean, one thing to ask yourself is this,
is that even if there is a God, take the best case scenario for the theist, as it were. There
is a God. God made the world. God appeared to Moses. Moses wrote some stuff down. Supposing
that's all right, all true, should we conclude in the good case scenario that then people
in the good case scenario know that there's a God by, say, reading the bits of scripture?
Even assuming all that is quite a delicate question. I mean, if we go to a more mundane
setting, I mean, suppose a sports reporter watches a game and then filters through the newspapers.
Interesting thing to ask yourself is, well, do you know there's not a misprint there?
I mean, supposing in fact there isn't. It's the good case scenario. It's still not straightforward
to answer the question, does the recipient of the newspaper know that there isn't a misprint?
Because it looks like that if they can know the sports score, that they can know there isn't a
misprint. But it's really wacky to think that they can know there's not a misprint. So, I mean,
I think that's the sort of end of things where the philosopher might have something to say.
Of course, in the bad case scenario, you don't know. Bad case meaning there is no God.
Of course, if you're in the good case scenario and you do know, suppose you do know, of course
you're not going to convince skeptics that you know. I mean, that's asking for too much always.
So, you shouldn't be thinking, how do I show to the skeptic that I know? You should be thinking,
how do I satisfy myself even in the good case scenario that I'm rational or that I know?
And so, I think sometimes people are hoping too much like appeasing the skeptic. You're going to
lose that battle in the sense that you're not going to bring the skeptic round. I mean, maybe
you can inspire the skeptic or smile sweetly or something, but you're not going to buy some force
of argument, get a really smart skeptic to suddenly be a theist. I think that's hoping for
too much. But you can justify it to yourself that you are rational. Well, that's the lesser
ambition. Can you at least produce defensive moves against arguments that show that you're
irrational? I mean, there are some arguments designed to show that even in the good case
scenario, you're irrational. I mean, if I have a box and there's a beetle in the box and you can't
see in the box, you'd be irrational to believe that there's a beetle in the box, even if it's
in the good case scenario when there is a beetle in the box. If you believe there's a beetle in the
box, when the beetle's hidden in the box, then you're like a bit weird. So, one line of thought
is, well, even in the good case scenario, as a God for all intents and purposes, God's like a
beetle in the box. And so, even if he's there, it's irrational to believe in him. So, I think
the thing that a sort of religious philosopher theist should be doing is try to show how in
the good case scenario, things are very different to the beetle in the box scenario. And it would,
at least in the good case scenario, be a case of knowledgeable belief. I mean, that's at least one
tack. I mean, there's another tack to try and show it's okay to believe things even though you
don't know them, but that's a different tack altogether.
