Rene Descartes - Machines, Animals, and Rational Beings (Discourse pt. 5) - Philosophy Core Concepts
Hi, this is Dr. Gregory Sadler. I'm a professor of philosophy and the president and founder of an
educational consulting company called Reason.io, where we put philosophy into practice. I've
studied and taught philosophy for over 20 years and I find that many people run into difficulties
reading classic philosophical texts. Sometimes it's the way things are said or how the text is
structured, but the concepts themselves are not always that complicated and that's where I come
in. To help students and lifelong learners, I've been producing longer lecture videos and posting
them to YouTube. Many viewers say they find them useful. What you're currently watching is part of
a new series of shorter videos, each of them focused on one core concept from an important
philosophical text. I hope you find it useful as well. A short but very interesting discussion on
the part of Descartes takes place in part five of his Discourse on Metaphysics and it has to do with
the relationship between human beings, animals, and machines. This comes out of a long
tradition of saying that human beings are fundamentally different than the other
animals in that we possess rationality and because of possessing rationality, we exist at a higher
level than they do and this can be parsed out in many different ways. Descartes introduces another
wrinkle into this, which makes good sense given his metaphysics, in talking about machines and
why does he bring this in? What's the context here? So he's actually discussing in part five
a book that he didn't publish called The World and he's telling us about the different things that he
went over in that. In the course of that discussion, which is quite long and we're not
going to get to most of it, he tells us about how he was setting out for us a theory
of the relationship between body and mind or brain, body, and what at that time they were calling the
animal spirits and the view that they had in the physiology of that time is that there were various
fluids, we can call them, that moved around in our body called the animal spirits and these were
largely responsible for sensation, consciousness, in terms of the body itself, not in terms of
the mind, but in terms of the body's contribution to it, movement, affections, all those sorts of
things. Now we don't actually use that anymore, we talk instead of, you know, biological processes
that are chemical or electrical, but it's really the same idea that we've got a body,
part of that body is the brain and there's all sorts of things going on within various systems
and then these produce the states of consciousness that we have. So he says that, you know, I had
explained all these matters, I'd shown what structure the nerves, the muscles must have in
order to enable the animal spirits to have the power to move its members. He talks about which
changes must occur in the brain to cause states of waking, sleeping, dreaming, how light, sound,
smells, taste, all other qualities can imprint various ideas through the intermediary of the
senses, how hunger, thirst, and other internal passions can transmit ideas to the brain. So he's
very interested in this question and then he brings something up that's quite interesting.
He says, all of this is not going to appear at all strange to a certain kind of people,
people who are well-informed. Well-informed about what? He says, those who know how wide a range of
different automata, that is self-moving mechanisms or moving machines, the skill of a human being
can make only using a very few parts. If we compare that now to this complex machine that is the body,
Descartes says, and we think about the infinite maker of it, in this case, God, right? He says,
then you're going to understand this is an incredibly complex machine. He says, they will
consider this body as a machine which having been made by the hand of God is in comparably better
order and has in itself more amazing movements than any that can be created by man. So he's
bringing up a very interesting point here, is he not? Which is, we human beings create machines. We
are, in effect, the animal that makes machines, right? And then we ourselves, at least in terms
of our body, are machines created by a yet greater maker. So are we maybe just machines then?
There's the key question. That's the context that's setting this. So he says, I dwelt on this
issue to show that if there were such machines having organs and outward shape of different
things, we would interpret them in different ways. What are the different things in this case?
So the question is, could machines created by human beings replicate living beings?
And at the time that Descartes is writing this, of course, mechanics is rather underdeveloped
in comparison to today. And if you think about the amazing advances that we have made
in robotics, in artificial intelligence, in just reducing the size of electrical circuits
down to very, very small entities, and even in what we call machine learning, perhaps it's not
the best term given what Descartes has to say here, because perhaps machines don't actually learn
in a significant sense. But if you think about how we represent these things to ourselves,
is this more plausible today that machines could in fact replicate living beings?
You know, we make science fiction stories and movies about this sort of thing. We even have
a word replicant coming of course, from Philip K. Dick's Blade Runner, where we're talking about
an artificial human being made by human beings. So this is a very live issue.
Descartes says, well, when it comes to animals, just plain old animals, take us out of the
equation. The answer is yes. Now there wasn't a possibility at his own time, and it may not in
fact be a possibility yet for us. But if we adopt the Cartesian perspective on animals,
which is essentially that they already are just meat and bone and nerve machines,
they don't have anything besides that, then the answer is yes, we could create new machines like
those. As a matter of fact, the entire bodily process of reproduction, you know, of cells
reproducing by using their genetic material to create new cells and all that, merely mechanical
processes as far as Descartes is concerned. What about human beings? Can we create something
that would mimic a human being so successfully that eventually we would have to say, well,
it really is a human being. What if we took the human body and we mapped it out perfectly,
and then we constructed a machine on that basis? He says, if there were machines having the organs
and outward shape of a monkey or any other irrational animal, we would have no means
of knowing they were not of exactly the same nature as those animals. Whereas if any machines
resembled us in body and imitated our actions insofar as this was practically possible,
that's a key line, insofar as this was practically possible, which nowadays covers an awful lot,
we would still have two, he says, very certain means of recognizing that they were not
human beings. Now, these are also ways of recognizing that animals, other animals,
the brute animals, as they would have called them back then, are not the same as human beings
either. You know, we might say, in addition to something like a Turing test, maybe there could
be an animal version where a very, very smart chimpanzee, you know, either can or can't fool us
into thinking that it's a human being or, you know, cetacean of some sort or an octopus or
pick whatever you like. So what are the key differences? It's not enough just to say, oh,
well, we're rational animals and the other animals are not rational. What is that rationality
actually consistent? What does that mean? You can't just invoke it. That's not solving the issue.
So Descartes here is thinking about something that's really at the core of our rational nature.
The first sign that he talks about is using language or other modes of signs, as he says,
and it's not enough just to be able to, you know, say Polly wants a cracker or something like that,
or for, I don't know, you're, you're, there's these funny YouTube videos where a dog is,
you know, going, rawr, rawr, rawr, and people are saying, oh, it sounds like I love you, right?
For Descartes, all those sorts of things are just signals rather than signs, as we might say,
they don't signify thoughts. They don't signify something new. So he says,
the first criterion is that these machines would never be able to use words or other signs. Now,
it doesn't stop there because I know some people are going to object and say, wait a second,
Siri uses words and signs all the time, or Alexa or whoever, whatever personal assistant you have
on your phone or your, your laptop or, you know, whatever other mechanism you have, right?
Siri, or whatever other thing we can think of in this way, going all the way back to Eliza,
one of the first artificial intelligence programs, which wasn't really artificial intelligence,
but was set to mimic human beings, says things, but are they really saying things in the same way?
So he goes on and he says, composing these signs as we do to declare our thoughts to others
is an artificial construct actually declaring its thoughts. It's doing what its programming
tells it to do, but it doesn't actually have thoughts on its own that it wants to convey to us.
As a matter of fact, this is something really worth dwelling upon. Thoughts for Descartes
covers a wide range. It's not just propositions like, you know, the cat is on the table or it's
time now to feed the dog or things along those lines. Dog has a real interest in telling you
it's time to feed the dog, doesn't it? It also includes, you know,
conveying desires, trying to act on, on other things, right? Thoughts covers a wide range. So
he says, we can well conceive of a machine made in such a way that it emits words and even utters
them about bodily actions, which bring about some corresponding change in his organs. So you touch
it on a certain spot. He says, it'll ask what we want. If you touch it somewhere else, it'll cry
that we're hurting it. You know, again, think about, you know, these, these personal assistants
that we have that are AIs, you can, you can ask them kind of funny questions and they give funny
answers, but they're not really conscious. They're just following programming. It's not like they
come up with, you know, original meanings or, or, or, you know, locutions of their own. So he says,
it's not conceivable that the machine would put these words into different orders to correspond
to the meaning of things set in its presence. And this is something that we notice even,
Descartes says, the most dull-witted person can do. So there's a sense in which language
isn't just about having a code where things mean things. It's also about a productive capacity
to use language, to say something new. That's very important. Now, can animals do something
like that? Descartes would say, no, perhaps this is something where we would want to look more
carefully at animal behavior and our contemporary theories about it. But at least for where Descartes
is, he's saying, no, they can't do that. The other key criterion here, what it means to be rational
and how we can tell machines that are imitating human beings apart from human beings or animals
that would in some way be portrayed as being human has to do, he says, with a capacity to do many
things. You might talk about this in terms of what we call transfer from one domain to another. This
is why we can actually learn, why we have the flexibility to move from one context to the next,
to the next, to the next. So he says, although such machines, machines designed to imitate human
beings might do many things as well, or even better than any of us, they would inevitably
fail to do some others by which we would discover they did not act consciously, but only because
their organs were disposed in a certain way. Their organs being essentially their programming,
right? He says, we can take a machine and it could be really, really good at one thing,
or maybe 10 things, but it's not going to be equally good at everything else.
This is an interesting criterion to bring up, isn't it? In our own time,
when we have these incredibly powerful computers that now are doing many things quite well,
Descartes is saying that you're never going to have a computer that does everything that a human
being can do well. Now, he doesn't go into any great detail about this, but we might think about
difficult things that are, in some respect, difficult to explain, and at least for some
people difficult, but which don't seem to be too hard for most of us, but would be hard for
a machine to do, even with the best mimicking programming, showing empathy to another person.
Is that something that a robot who's great at putting together cars is going to be able to do?
Well, I mean, these are open questions that we can ask about. Descartes thinks from his own time
that this is not going to be possible for a machine. It's also not possible for an animal.
Animals do some things very well. There's other things that they don't do well,
or that they can't even do at all. He goes on and he says something that really
helps to inform all of this. Reason, he says, is a universal instrument. Reason is able to extend to,
in theory, just about anything that we human beings can come across. He says
reason is a universal instrument which can operate in all sorts of situations.
Machines, however, whether we think about in terms of organs or programming,
are designed for certain things. So he says it's practically possible for there to be enough
different organs in a machine to cause it to act in all life's occurrences in the same way that our
reason causes us to act. This is assuming, of course, that we're being reasonable, that we're
not just following our own programming coming to us from our society or our genetics or whatever,
and largely oriented by the imagination, as Descartes would say, and habit.
So he says we can determine the difference between men and animals in this way. He says
there's a very remarkable fact there are no human beings so dull-witted and stupid,
not even madmen, that they're incapable of stringing together different words and composing
them into utterances, even if they're crazy talk. And he says this is not just a matter of organs.
Magpies, parrots can talk like we do, but it's not really talking as such. It's not communication.
And he says this shows us animals don't just have less reason, less rationality than human
beings. They don't have any at all. They're just essentially machines. And he goes on to say that
animals show more skill in some of their actions than we do. Dogs are great at, say, sniffing out
drugs or something, right? Pigs sniff out truffles. Our noses are actually rather
underdeveloped by relation. But we can do so many other things that they can't do,
including domesticating the dogs and farming and eating the pigs, right? And using them to find
truffles and using them to find drugs. It wouldn't have occurred to them on their own, most likely.
So this is really an interesting issue. And I think in our own time, just to bring this to a
close, we might want to call Descartes into question on this and say, couldn't machines at
some point pass a threshold where they would be able to do this and would be rational? Might
animals not participate, at least certain higher animals, to a certain degree in this?
If that's the case, then Descartes would actually be wrong, at least in part. Perhaps Descartes is
right, though. And perhaps we are the only creatures that we encounter so far that are
capable of this, in which case we would be able to tell human beings apart from machines designed
to imitate and act like human beings.

