The video examines China's recurring issue of industrial overcapacity, driven by government-led, campaign-style policies that misallocate resources and prioritize political goals over market dynamics. From Zhu Rongji’s 1998 state-owned enterprise reforms to Wen Jiabao’s 2008 stimulus and Li Keqiang’s supply-side reforms, industries like steel, cement, and coal faced purges, followed by new sectors like electric vehicles and solar panels under Xi’s “new quality productive forces.” These cycles lead to price wars, low profits, and closures, as seen in 2024’s solar, lithium battery, and EV sectors. The government’s heavy intervention, weak market mechanisms, and lack of legal frameworks perpetuate inefficiencies, with local governments chasing GDP through subsidies and projects. A proposed unified national market aims to address deflation but overlooks demand shortages, highlighting systemic flaws that trap China in a cycle of wasteful expansion and consolidation.
00:00:00 Intro 00:47:15 Xi’s Deflation Crackdown Begins 01:55:00 A History of Overcapacity 02:59:06 Stimulus and the Boom Years 03:39:10 Supply-Side Reforms Take Hold 04:32:06 The Rise of New Quality Forces 05:10:21 Solar and Lithium Battery Bust 06:13:04 Electric Vehicles in Peril 07:10:22 Industry Faces the Iron Fist 08:15:07 Consolidation Looms for EVs 09:03:12 Why Overcapacity Persists 10:43:15 Systemic Flaws and Policy Missteps 13:38:20 A Misguided Fix and a Bleak Future
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Hi, I'm Dong Shong. Welcome to Digging
into China, where we explore China in
depth to review unique perspectives. Not
long ago, Xi Jinping faced widespread
ridicule both domestically and
internationally for his surprising
comments, questioning the harm of
deflation. However, it appears he has
since recognized the issue and is now
prepared to address it decisively. At
the sixth meeting of the central
financial and economic commission in
early July, she issued a directive to
tackle disorderly low price competition
among businesses in accordance with the
law, encourage companies to enhance
product quality and facilitate the
orderly withdrawal of outdated
production capacity. This is
significant. Any company deemed by she
to have absolute capacity risks
mandatory closure. Historically, the
Communist Party has frequently
undertaken such purges of outdated
capacity, revisiting the practice every
few years. In China's hybrid market
economy, the government's heavy-handed
intervention often manifests as campaign
style governance. When a policy is
announced to promote a specific
industry, the nation surges into action
reminiscent of a modern great leap
forward. Yet this enthusiasm soon leads
to overcapacity and fierce competition
prompting another policy to eliminate
access capacity resulting in widespread
business failures. Such campaign style
governance squanders vast resources and
is highly inefficient. In this video,
we'll explore which companies might face
elimination this time and what
strategies she has devised to address
over capacity. The periodic elimination
of outdated capacity is a longstanding
practice of the Communist Party, though
it has yet to be perfected. To provide a
contest, let's look back to Drew Rong
J's era in 1998. Drew championed a
state-owned enterprise reforms under the
guise of structural adjustment, which
was essentially a largecale capacity
perch. From 1998 to 2002, state-owned
enterprises cut 35 million jobs
nationwide and thousands of small coal
mines, steel plants, and the township
enterprises were labeled as backward and
swiftly dismantled. While Drew aimed to
resolve the lingering issues of the
planned economy, the reforms led to
millions of layoffs causing numerous
family hardships. A few years ago, a TV
series called The Long Season portrayed
the struggles of workers in northeast
China's industrial regions during that
period. It's worth a watch for those
interested. The next cycle occurred
under one jao. Following the 2008
financial crisis, one unleashed a 4
trillion UN stimulus to rescue the
economy. Consequently, China became an
infrastructure powerhouse. Real estate
soared and industries like cement,
steel, and coal enjoyed a golden era. In
2009, China's steel and cement
production surged, making it the global
leader. The demand was so intense that
there weren't enough train cars to
transport coal, leading to fierce
competition for logistics. It was a
frantic period. However, these
industries soon faced over capacity.
When Lee Ka Chong assumed office, he
promptly called for capacity reduction.
At the 2016 Central Economic Work
Conference, the state council formally
introduced a supply side structural
reforms, elevating capacity reduction to
a national priority. Over the next few
years, industries like coal, steel, and
cement faced stringent measures. From
2016 to 2020, approximately 5,000 coal
mines were closed. The steel industry
achieved its 150 million ton capacity
reduction target within two years and
numerous zombie companies were shuttered
or merged. The cement industry underwent
capacity consolidation with the top 10
firms capacity concentration doubling to
70%. Subsequently, Lee Ker Chong was a
sidelined and Xi Jinping's concept of
new quality productive forces emerged,
sparking another policydriven boom.
Industries like electric vehicles, solar
panels, energy storage, and lithium
batteries were heralded as advanced
productive forces of the new era.
However, she's limited economic
understanding overlooked the potential
for overcapacity. As a result, these
industries fueled by she's
technologydriven policies soon followed
the familiar path to access capacity.
Consider solar panels. China's solar
capacity has exceeded 1,200 gawatt, more
than double the global new
installations. This has driven component
prices down, causing losses for major
firms and bankruptcies for smaller ones.
In 2024, Jeno Solar reported a net loss
exceeding $1.2 billion dollar and the
industry formed a production control
alliance with a state-owned enterprises
holding emergency meetings to stabilize
the sector. The competition is
relentless. Lithium batteries face a
similar fate. In 2024, China's lithium
battery capacity reached approximately
2,600
gawatt hours, while global demand was
less than half that amount. Low capacity
utilization, a 90% drop in lithium or
prices and industry profits hitting rock
bottom have led to layoffs, delayed
projects, and the restructuring efforts.
Electric vehicles are no exception. In
2024, China's EV production approached
13 million units, but industry capacity
exceeded 25 million. This means that for
every vehicle sold, an equivalent amount
of capacity sits idle. With over 300
models competing, the top 10 brands
dominate, and industry leader BYD's
aggressive pricing has forced even Tesla
to cut prices repeatedly. Most new EV
startups are still losing money to sell
cars with average profit margins dipping
below 4% pushing many to the brink of
bankruptcy. She has taken notice and is
now intervening targeting the very new
quality productive forces he once
championed particularly in the EV
sector. We've covered the BYYD
extensively and their role in igniting
price wars underscores the severity of
over capacity. Recently, an open letter
from auto dealers associations in
Shanghai, Jangsu, Joang, an Huay
highlighted the industry's struggles,
overwhelming inventory, strained cash
flows, declining sales, and the pressure
from manufacturers. It's no surprise
that even BYYD is facing she's scrutiny.
Following regulatory discussions,
reports in late June indicates that BYD
has a quietly reduced nighttime
production at some factories and slowed
the new plans construction. Employees
have also noted a reduced overtime and a
halt in expansion.
So, what might the EV industry's
capacity purge look like and how will
she reshape it? I predict that compliant
technologically advanced companies with
a strong export potential will be
designated as advanced capacity
preserved and further supported.
Meanwhile, firms with persistent losses
and no export prospects will be labeled
as a backward and a targeted for
elimination. Large politically aligned
companies like a BYD are likely to be
spared. However, smaller firms surviving
on financing with a strained cash flows
and ongoing losses like NEO may face
acquisition or bankruptcy. The industry
will likely consolidate into a few
state-owned giants and leading private
firms. state-owned enterprise such as
SAC, FAW, Dongfong, Chong Anan, BIC, and
the GAC, which transitioned from
traditional automakers to EVs are
certain to remain. Among private firms,
BYD, Xiaomi and Ji are likely to endure,
but I'm less optimistic about the new EV
players like Neo, Xiaoong, and Lee Auto.
They may be merged with perhaps one
surviving at the best. Now why does
China repeatedly fall into this cycle of
over capacity followed by purchase of
outdated capacity every few years? It's
not only inefficient but also wastes
immense resources strains public
finances harms environment and
undermines entrepreneurs, investors and
workers. In essence, China's over
capacity is not accidental but a
systemic inevitability. First, the state
frequently engages in misguided campaign
style development in western markets.
Over capacity typically arise from
natural expansion and competition
followed by selfcorrection in China.
This it's driven by the communist
party's policies akin to ma's great leap
forward. When the central government
issues a directive or she champions a
new direction like new quality
productive forces, resources flood in
subsidies, loans, land allocations and
the tax exemptions align with the trend
and you are guaranteed benefits. This
distorts resource allocation. Resources
should flow to companies with advanced
technology, efficient management and
market vision. In China, they often go
to those skilled at self-promotion, bold
promises, or political connections.
During the EV boom, we saw numerous PPT
car companies. Ever Grand Auto, for
instance, secured the financing and
subsidies without even producing a car
frame. When the state controls resource
allocation, inferior players often
outmaneuver the competent. Second, the
Communist Party's excessive intervention
is evident in its uniform policies. One
day, EVs are encouraged, the next
subsidies are scrutinized. Yesterday,
new quality productive forces were
celebrated. Today, excess capacity is
targeted. One moment you are a model of
progress, the next you are obsolete. The
government's heavy hand seeks to replace
the market in directing resources and
investments. Yet markets are complex
systems and no government, however
powerful, can regulate them precisely
with a meeting or directive. The result
is inevitable chaos. Third, local
governments prioritize political
achievements over market realities.
Chinese officials are evaluated and
promoted based on performance metrics.
So they focus on boosting GDP at all
costs. When a central policy signals a
new trend, regions rush to launch
projects. A single county might
establish two EV industrial zones.
Policy trends bring subsidies and loans.
Prime opportunities to inflate the GDP.
Local government's performancedriven
investment frenzy accelerates over
capacity. Fourth, China's weak rule of
law and market mechanism exacerbate the
issue. In a typical market economy, over
capacity is resolved through price
signals. Resource reallocation and the
survival of the fittest. Failing firms
go bankrupt or merge and the market
clears itself. In China, this process is
undermined because the market's role is
minimal. A company's survival isn't
determined by market forces, but by
those in power. Many stateowned
enterprises incur losses year after
year, but are sustained by government
funds. China's business exit mechanisms
are ineffective with a few firms exiting
due to marketdriven bankruptcy. Some
viable companies are forcibly acquired
if their technology attracts state-owned
firms while others are driven out by
excessive fines when public coffers run
low. Meanwhile, subpar companies with
political backing thrive as seen with
the new clack asset test firms in a few
years ago. This explains why China
constantly emphasizes high quality
development but remains trapped in a
cycle of inefficient expansion,
disorderly competition and capacity
purges. At the present Financial and
Economic Commission meeting, she
proposed a unified national market to
address deflation, a familiar approach.
The market is the problem, yet she's
solution is to impose more direction on
it. To his credit, she has shown some
progress. Initially unaware of
deflation's implications, he now
acknowledges the need to address it,
marking a slight advancement in
understanding. Though his approach
remains rudimentary, she likely believes
that deflation stems from stagnant
prices. So reducing access capacity will
decrease supply and raise prices. He
attributes price wars to inconsistent
standards and local protectionism,
assuming a unified national market will
resolve everything. This idea may seems
reasonable, but those with the basic and
economic knowledge recognize its
simplicity. Deflation's root cause is
insufficient demand, not excess supply.
Reducing capacity won't raise prices if
demand continues to decline. Price wars
aren't solely due to inconsistent
standards, but a lack of profit margins.
Companies are fighting for survival in a
cutthroat environment. Local
protectionism persists because the
performance evaluation system compels
local governments to chase GDP
relentlessly. Thus, a unified national
market is unlikely to help. From steel
to solar, cement to EVs, we have
witnessed the repeated cycles of booms
turning to busts. With advanced capacity
becoming obsolete, China's economy seems
ins snared in the cycle. A policy
triggers a rush. Markets spiral and the
government intervenes to clean up. One
bubble follows another. One crackdown
after another. Superficially, it's about
the shifting industries, but in reality,
it's the same players in new guises. Are
companies to blame for lacking ambition?
No. The system leaves them little room
to thrive. China's capacity cycles are
less about economic patterns and more
about the political momentum. High
quality development remains a slogan and
the true progress requires market rules,
legal frameworks and entrepreneurial
confidence, none of which China
possesses. She's inclination to dictate
the directions is growing stronger.
However, resources are finite with the
Communist Party's persistent campaign
style governance and the recurring
overcapacity. These resources will
eventually be depleted. When that
happens, the nation's prosperity may be
exhausted, potentially signaling the end
of an era. Thank you so much for
watching. If you find this video
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