27 Persistent objector

Global Affairs Academy
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1 Video View·May 30, 2025
In this video, I would like to add a few points in relation to the creation of customary international
law. All those points relate to the generality of practice, and hence to the personal scope
of custom. We have seen that the practice of states must be general. It must both be
settled and shared by the states that are specially affected by the emerging rule. In
that sense, because it is based on what states actually do and on their opinio iuris about
it, customary international law is somehow based on a form of tacit consent by the practicing
states, and also on acquiescence by the other states. Well, this raises difficult theoretical
debates in which I do not want to enter into here, but let us admit for a moment the idea
of custom being ultimately explained by a form of consent. If that is the case, then
three problems may arise. And the first problem is as follows. Is it possible for a customary
rule to emerge if one state objects to the practice of the other states? In order to
answer that question, two situations must be distinguished. In the first situation,
the objecting state is powerful and influential enough to induce the other states to stop
behaving as they once or twice did. The practice will quickly stop, the opinio iuris will not
be expressed, and as a result, no customary rule will emerge. In the second situation,
the objecting state is not in a position to stop the practice of the other states, but
it constantly objects to such practice. Each time the other states act, it reacts and objects
to that practice. The practice will lack a certain generality because the persistent
objector does not share it, but it will nevertheless be general enough when sustained by corresponding
general opinio iuris to result in the creation of a new rule of customary international law.
However, because that state has all along expressed its disagreement with the settled
practice of the other states, it is admitted that it will not be bound by the new custom.
And this is called the persistent objector principle in the formation of customary rules.
And as a possibility, it has been accepted by the ICJ back in 1951 in the Anglo-Norwegian
fisheries case. It reflects a voluntary and consent-based conception of the formation
of international law, even of customary international law. And in contrast to that consent-based
approach, the second problem I would like to quickly address is the one relating to
new states. When a new state comes to existence, it is usually admitted and assumed that it
is immediately bound by all existing rules of customary international law. The new state
does not need to express any consent in that regard, but neither can it start to object
to those existing rules. The persistent objector principle only applies if the objection is
made from the inception of custom, not after the custom has been established. So the new
state is not born in a legal vacuum. It is at least bound by existing customary rules,
that is to say, rules that did not emerge through its practice and its opinio iuris,
not even by its acquiescence. And the new state cannot escape or opt out from existing
customary rules. That situation proves that the consent-based approach cannot explain
everything and is not absolute. Therefore, one must admit that the binding character
of customary law rests also on some sociological necessities rather than on pure voluntarism.
And the third problem I would like to mention is perfectly compatible, both with the consent-based
approach of customary law and a more sociological approach to it. It is the phenomenon of regional
or local customs. In derogation to the idea that international customs are binding on
all states, it is accepted that some customs may be binding only for a certain group of
states in a specific region of the world or even locally on two or three states. In 1950,
in a case between Colombia and Peru about diplomatic asylum, the court did not rule
out the idea of a regional custom, but it considered that Colombia had not sufficiently
proved that there existed a Latin American custom on granting diplomatic asylum. Ten
years later, in 1960, in the case of the right of passage over Indian territory, the court
ruled that there was a local custom allowing for the existence of such a right of passage
in favor of Portugal's enclaves in India. There is no need to delve into those cases,
but I cannot fail to bring to your attention a certain paradox. And the paradox is as follows.
The more local or regional an alleged customary rule is, the higher the standard of proof
will be required, in the sense that the practice and opinio juris of the concerned states will
be closely scrutinized so as to be sure that the practice has been duly accepted as law
by them. And in contrast to this, the standard of proof required when an alleged general
custom is at stake will be paradoxically not as high and demanding. Most of the time, it
will be sufficient to refer to the practice and opinio juris of some states, the practice
of which will be more apparent, while some acquiescence on the part of the other states
will be deduced, absent any objection from them.
